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VABSTRACT
Any examination of the origins of the National Front for 
the Liberation of South Viet-Nam must give prominence to the 
role of the Viet-Nam Workers' Party. During the period 1954-60 
the VWP was enveloped in a continuing debate over how to 
achieve national unification. In 1954, despite disagreement 
within the VWP's Central Committee, it was decided to accept a 
negotiated settlement to the war. Accordingly the Party set 
out a two-year policy of political struggle synchronized with 
the various provisions of the Geneva Agreements. The VWP saw 
its tasks in each zone as being fundamentally different: 
priority was given to socialist construction in the north, 
while cadres in the south were expected to carry out a people's 
national democratic revolution.
Implementation of this new policy in the south was 
hampered by the growing strength of the Diem government, and 
by the failure of VWP diplomacy to secure either French or 
Russian commitment to general elections. The failure to hold 
consultations in July 1955 led to growing southern 
disenchantment. In September 1955 the Fatherland Front was 
created. Its program in effect recognized the need for a 
policy of political struggle based on something other than the 
Geneva Agreements.
This policy proved difficult to implement. Although 
alliances of convenience were forged with the armed forces of 
the dissident sects, the Diem regime proved successful in 
meeting and overcoming this challenge. By late 1956 southern 
pressures for increased use of revolutionary violence coincided 
with failures in conducting land reform in the north. These
vi
circumstances led to leadership changes in which the southern 
lobby was given an increased voice. The immediate result was 
the drafting of another long-range policy. Political struggle 
was given renewed emphasis but a limited policy of 
"extermination of traitors" was permitted. The prime task was 
to rebuild the Party organization. This policy was carried out 
during 1957-58 at which time great efforts were made to 
consolidate the north and to win international sympathy and 
support.
In 1959 the southern lobby argued convincingly for a new 
policy sanctioning reunification "by all appropriate means".
This meant the use of armed forces. This new policy of 
combining political and armed struggle was ratified at the 
VWP' s 3rd National Congress in September 1960. The growing 
influence of the southerners was evident in leadership 
appointments to the Politburo, Secretariat and Central 
Committee. Le Duan, the outspoken advocate for armed struggle, 
became the Party's First Secretary. The 3rd National Congress 
committed the entire VWP to carrying out the people's national 
democratic revolution in the south. Southern cadres set about 
creating a national united front and regroupees in the north 
began returning south. In December 1960 an organizing 
committee met and proclaimed the formation of the NFLSVN. Over 
a year later, after much organizational work, the First Congress 
of the NFLSVN was held. The origins of this Front lie both in 
the interaction between contending factions within the VWP 
leadership and the interaction between the VWP and various 
southern social forces and personalities on the one hand, and 
the Diem regime and its American backers on the other.
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"It is much too soon to think of writing a definitive account 
of the origins of the movement which has come to be known as 
the 'Viet Cong'. The principal sources for such an account are 
the large quantities of documentary material captured by the 
South Vietnamese authorities and by the Americans during this 
past decade, and it will be some time before all of this 
material is available to scholars with no official 
responsibilities, and even longer before it has been 
thoroughly sifted and analysed".
Ralph B. Smith, writing in 
April 1968.
PART I
POLITICAL STRUGGLE
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
I. CONTENDING INTERPRETATIONS
On December 20, 1960 an organizing committee of
Vietnamese revolutionaries met somewhere in eastern Nam Bo
(southern Viet-Nam) and declared the foundation of the
National Front for the Liberation of South Viet-Nam (NFL).^
The significance of this event is that it formalized a
process which had been underway to shift the tactics of the
revolutionary movement from political to military struggle.
The birth of the NFL, therefore marked a new stage in the
2history of Viet-Nam Workers' Party (VWP). After nearly 
six years of trying to unify the country by peaceful means 
(under the provisions of the 1954 Geneva Conference), by 
political means (designed to exploit the "contradictions" in
In Vietnamese: Mat Tran Dan Toe Giai Phong Mien Nam Viet
Nam. The expression for "south", mien nam could be more 
correctly rendered by "southern" but because of common 
useage the former will be retained.
2 The Viet-Nam Workers' Party, Dang Lao Dong Viet Nam, is 
the present designation for the Communist Party for Viet- 
Nam, Viet-Nam Cong San Dang, founded by Ho Chi Minh in 
Hong Kong on February 3, 1930. The Party changed its name 
in October 1930 to the Indochinese Communist Party, Dong 
Duong Cong San Dang, at the request of the Comintern. On 
November 11, 1945, ostensibly for tactical reasons, the 
Indochinese Communist Party dissolved itself. Comrades 
with a theoretical interest in Marxism were invited to 
join the Marxist Studies Group (or Association). The 
Party reappeared on February 11, 1951 as the Viet-Nam 
Workers' Party (VWP). In order to avoid confusion the 
term Party will be used to refer to all of the above 
groups. Lao Dong Party and Viet-Nam Workers' Party 
will be used interchangeably for stylistic reasons.
2South Viet-Nam) and through political violence (support 
to armed sect dissidents; and armed propaganda, including 
political assasinations) the VWP leadership reached the 
conclusion that a major reorientation of the revolutionary
movement was necessary. The new aim was the liberation
3 4of South Viet-Nam from the yoke of the "My-Diem regime"
by a combination of political and military forces grouped
under the umbrella of a new united front, the NFL.
The formation of the NFL soon acquired international
significance. A month later in January 1961, John F.
Kennedy was inaugurated President of the United States.
Upon assuming office he was confronted with the text of
a speech made by the Soviet Premier N.S. Khrushchev, in
support of wars of national liberation. The new American
President linked the situation in Viet-Nam (and Laos) to
this statement and concluded that such wars were a new
instrument of Soviet policy designed to upset the status
5quo and thus alter the global balance of power. Accordingly
The term here, as will become apparent from the following 
discussion, refers to a geographical area created as a 
result of the partition of Viet-Nam in 1954. It is not 
synonymous with either the State of Viet-Nam or the Republic 
of Viet-Nam which are expressions referring to two 
governments claiming to exercise authority over the 
territory of South Viet-Nam.
4 "My-Diem" is a derogatory short-hand expression coined by 
opponents of the Republic of Viet-Nam. It means "American- 
Ngo Dinh Diem" on the face of it but according to Dennis 
Duncanson it also carries the innuendo "strumpet"; see: 
Government and Revolution in Vietnam (London: Oxford
University Press, 1968), p.401.
5 Khrushchev's speech was delivered on January 6, 1961. 
According to Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "[Khrushchev's] 
elaborate speech... made a conspicuous impression on the 
new President, who took it as an authoritative exposition 
of Soviet intentions, discussed it with his staff, and
cont'd
3counter-insurgency planning become the order of the day 
as American crisis-managers studied ways of coping with 
this new threat to international order and security.
One of the first American responses was to increase 
military and economic aid to the Republic of Viet-Namg(RVN) in order to bolster the beleaguered government of 
Ngo Dinh Diem.
In late 1961 the United States government issued a
White Paper entitled "A Threat to Peace - North Viet-Nam's
7Effort to Conquer South Viet-Nam" to justify its actions.
According to this document:
The content and methods of Viet Cong political 
activity leave no doubt as to its Communist 
orientation. In a transparent effort to give 
their movement a cloak of respectability and 
of popular support, the so-called "Front for 
Liberation of the South" was formed late last 
year. Within the front are separate "liberation" 
organizations - for youth, for the peasants, for 
workers, for intellectuals, for women, indeed 
for every significant segment of society in South Vietnam.
5 cont'd
read excerpts from it aloud to the National Security Council 
...."; see: A Thousand Days (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Co., 1965), pp.302-303. See also the reference to 
"Khrushchev's 'wars of liberation'" in a letter of trans­
mittal which accompanied the report written by Maxwell D. 
Taylor to the President after a study trip to Viet-Nam 
quoted in Senator Mike Gravel, editor, The Pentagon Papers: 
The Defense Department History of United States Decision­
making on Vietnam (Boston: Beason Press, 1971), Vol.2, p.98.g As a result of a referendum conducted on October 23, 1955 
the State of Viet-Nam was declared a Republic. The State 
of Viet-Nam, (SVN), headed by Bao Dai, was created on January 1, 1950.
7 United States Department of State, A Threat to Peace 
- North Viet-Nam's Effort To Conquer South Viet-Nam 
(Washington, D .C.: U .S. Government Printing Office,December 1961), in two parts.
4However, seized documents, propaganda pamphlets, 
and indoctrination leaflets picked up throughout 
South Viet-Nam make clear that the Lao Dong 
(Workers) Party, that is, the Communist Party, 
is the vanguard of the 'liberation' movement.
As those familiar with the Communist movement 
know, this means that the 'liberation' 
movement is directed by the Communist Party.
The Lao Dong Party of the South is part of 
and controlled by Ho Chi Minh's Lao Dong 
Party in the North.
The Viet Cong organization in the South follows 
the familiar Communist pattern. The basic 
unit is the cell of a few persons in a village 
or neighborhood. Village units are subordinate 
to the district headquarters and these in turn 
are controlled by the provincial party head­
quarters. Above the latter are the regional 
or zonal headquarters which take their directions 
from Hanoi.
The pattern of political indoctrination is what 
one would expect - concentration on studies of 
'socialism' meaning communism; praise for and 
identification with the program and progress of 
the Ho regime in the North; promises of support 
for the 'liberation' movement by the 'socialist 
camp'; of the 'imperialists', 'warmongers', and 
'colonialists' and their 'puppets'.
Through their propaganda the Viet Cong seek to 
appeal to every group in the South with promises 
of special attention - 'autonomy' for minority 
tribal groups, land and freedom from usury for the 
peasants, education for the youth, 'freedom' for 
the intellectuals, and so forth.
In addition to the party organization itself, close 
ties are maintained with the military units through 
a system of political officers assigned to all 
units down to the platoon. They provide additional 
eyes and ears for the military units, supplying 
reports on GVN [i.e. Republic of Viet—Nam] 
military establishments and troop movements. They 
may be assigned to collect money or to gather 
food for the Viet Cong.
Elsewhere the White Paper provided details concerning 
the infiltration of political and military cadres as well 
as supplies from the North to the Communist underground 
in the South. In later years this view about the control
8 Ibid., Part i, pp.10-11.
5and direction of the Communist movement in southern Viet-Nam 
would lead the United States to undertake a campaign of 
covert operations against the Democratic Republic of 
Viet-Nam (DRVN). Infiltration routes through Laos would 
be bombed, cross border hit-and-run raids would be 
conducted and retaliatory acts of sabotage would be carried 
out.
Needless to say the decision of the United States 
government to intensify its military commitment to the 
RVN was a controversial one. As the facts became public 
a global debate errupted over the justifications advanced 
by the Americans for their actions. Echoes of this 
debate resounded across Australia as the government of the 
day decided to follow the American lead.
One of the most contentious issues concerned the
origins of the NFL. According to a second American White
Paper published in 1965:
The National Front for the Liberation of South 
Viet-Nam is the screen behind which the Communists 
carry out their program of conquest. It is the 
creature of the Communist government in Hanoi.
As noted above the Communist Party in the North 
demanded establishment of such a 'front' three 
months before its formation was actually 
announced in December 1960. It was designed 
to create the illusion that the Viet Cong 
campaign of subversion was truly indigenous 
to South Viet-Nam rather than an externally 
directed Communist plan.^
Critics of the official American interpretation stressed 
the indigenous nature of the Front's leadership and the 
importance of Diemist repression in the formation of the
United States Department of State, Aggression From the 
North: The Record of North Viet-Nam's Campaign To Conquer
South Viet-Nam (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, February 1965), p.22. For an Australian equivalent 
see: Commonwealth of Australia, Department of External
cont'd
6NFL. George Kahin and John Lewis argued for example:
In sum, the insurrection is Southern rooted; it 
arose at Southern initiative in response to 
Southern demands. The Liberation Front gave 
political articulation and leadership to the 
widespread reaction against the harshness and 
heavy handedness of Diem's government. It gained 
drive under the stimulus of Southern Vietminh 
veterans who felt betrayed by the Geneva Conference 
and abandoned bv Hanoi. After the withdrawal of 
their troops to the North these Southern Vietminh 
were left with no effective means for enforcing 
the political terms of the armistice - either the 
conducting of the elections or protection against 
reprisal. They were denied the promised opportunity 
to reassert their political ascendancy through 
elections and then savagely persecuted for their 
past political affiliations. Not surprisingly, 
they lost patience with the communist North and 
finally took matters into their own hands. Hanoi, 
despite its reluctance, was then obliged to sanction 
the Southerners' actions or risk forfeiting all 
chance of influence over the course of events in 
South Vietnam.10
Communist historians have chosen to explain the origins 
of the NFL in this way:
Against this background of constant revolt and 
multiform struggle on a national scale [by various 
social forces in South Viet-Nam between 1954-60], 
the necessity urgently arises of a mustering of all 
forces of opposition operating together according to 
a common plan. The setting up of a national front 
of struggle for the liberation of the country from 
powerful foreign grip and an ever tougher arbitrariness, 
stems from a common will. The great enthusiasm with 
which millions of people have greeted the founding 
of the South Viet Nam Liberation National Front has 
no other origin, the more so as the latter is not 
even obliged to act clandestinely.H .
9 cont'd
Affairs, Studies on Viet Nam (Canberra: Commonwealth
Government Printer, August 1965), Information Handbook No.l 
of 1965. These reports were preceeded by: Republic of
Viet-Nam, Violations of the Geneva Agreements by the Viet- 
Minh Communists (Saigon, July 1959) and Violations of the 
Geneva Agreements by the Viet-Minh Communists: From July
1959 to June 1960 (Saigon, July 1960).
^  George McT. Kahin and John W. Lewis, The United States in 
Vietnam (New York: Dell Publishing Company, Revised Edition
1969), p.119.
Tran Van Giau and Le Van Chat, The South Viet Nam Liberation
National Front (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishinq House1962), pp.23-24.
7II. LEGALITIES AND SEMANTICS
It is not the purpose of this thesis to determine which 
of these views is correct; but to provide an alternate 
framework of analysis which takes into account the following 
three factors: (1) the role of the Viet-Nam Workers' Party,
(2) socio-political conditions in South Viet-Nam and
(3) the influence in the international environment. A new
framework of analysis is necessary because the early debate
on the origins of the NFL was greatly influenced by legal
arguments arising out of conflicting interpretations of the
1954 Geneva Agreements. At issue was whether or not South
Viet-Nam was a sovereign state bound by the political
12provisions of the Geneva Agreements. The view of the SVN 
and American governments was that South Viet-Nam was a 
sovereign state and therefore not bound by any of the terms 
of the Geneva Agreements. The counter-view held by DRVN 
officials, was that the SVN, as a successor state to one 
of the signatories (i.e. France), was bound by the terms 
of the 1954 Agreements.
A major objection to this legal framework is that the 
acceptance of one argument over the other implies approval 
of the actions of one party and condemnation of the actions 
of the other. Specifically, if one accepts the argument 
that South Viet-Nam was a sovereign state not bound by the 
provisions of the 1954 Geneva Agreements then the actions 
by other parties (VWP cadres, DRVN officials, etc.) to bring
A variety of the arguments, pro and con, have been conven­
iently gathered in Richard A. Falk, editor, The Vietnam War 
and International Law (Princeton: Princeton Univeristy Press,
1968) , Veil. I. These issues are dealt with particular force 
by Wesley R. Fishel, "One Vietnam or Two? A New Look at an 
Old Question", Virginia Quarterly Review (Summer 1974),
Vol.50, No.3, pp.348-367.
8about their (the Agreement's) implementation or as 
retaliation for breach of their implementation appear 
either as acts of aggression or rebellion against a legally 
constituted government. On the other hand, if one accepts 
the view that the State of Viet-Nam was bound by the terms 
of the 1954 Geneva Agreements but refused to implement them, 
then the actions by the aggrieved parties appear justified. 
This thesis is not concerned with assessing the justice or 
legal merits of either case as an explanation of the 
origins of the NFL. Rather this thesis focuses on the 
perceptions^  of the contending parties and the implications 
that these differing perceptions had on subsequent political 
developments.
This approach directly confronts a basic semantic 
problem which bedevils all discussion of contemporary 
Vietnamese politics.13 What is really meant by the terms 
North Vietnamese", "South Vietnamese" and "Viet Cong"?
During nearly eighty years of French colonial rule 
the country of Viet-Nam was divided into three administrative 
regions: Tonkin (roughly the Red River Delta area in the
north) , Annam (roughly the territory between the 11th and 
20th parallels in the centre) and Cochinchina (roughly 
corresponding to the Mekong Delta area in the south (see 
Map 1-1). These divisions resulted from the sequence of 
French occupation.14 They did not reflect the separation
These arguments have appeared elsewhere, see: 
Thayer, "The PRG and the Unification of Viet-Nam" 
House Papers (June 1975), Vol.I, No.5, pp.1-5.
Carlyle
Dyason
A.
Joseph Buttinger, Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled (New York- Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1967), Vol.I, pp.3-42 and
Virginia Thompson, French Indo-China (New York: OctaaonBooks, 1968), pp.58-108. y
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15of distinct nationalities as is often assumed.
This is not to say however that there were no pre­
existing regional differences among the Vietnamese people. 
Indeed the diverse pattern of settlement created during 
the prolonged migration southward (Nam Tien) resulted in 
differences of dialect and village social organization 
among Vietnamese (see Map 1-2). Occasionally the unity 
of the central court was threatened by regional secession.
The French colonial experience exacerbated some of these
17regional variations, especially in the south. There new 
patterns of landholding were created as a result of French
Virginia Thompson, op.cit., refers to the Vietnamese as 
"Annamites" throughout her study. The United States Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service in its Daily Reports used to 
label its transcriptions from Viet-Nam as being broadcast 
in Tonkinese, Annamese or Cochinchinese. The unity of the 
Vietnamese as a people and as a nation is attested to by 
publications produced in both Hanoi and Saigon; see:
Viet Nam: A Historical Sketch (Hanoi: Afro-Asian Peoples
Solidarity Organization, n.d.); Viet Nam - A Sketch (Hanoi: 
Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1971); Nguyen Phut Tan,
A Modern History of Vietnam (Saigon: Khai Tri, 1964); and
An Introduction to Vietnam (Saigon: The Vietnam Council on
Foreign Relations, 1969).
16 Michael G. Cotter, "Towards a Social History of the 
Vietnamese Southward Movement", Journal of Southeast Asian 
History (March 1968), Vol.9, No.l, pp.12-24; and John T. 
McAlister, Jr. and Paul Mus, The Vietnamese and Their 
Revolution (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), pp.78-92.
17 Milton E. Osborne, The French Presence in Cochinchina and 
Cambodia Rule and Response (1859-1905) (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1969), pp.59-174; R.B. Smith, "Bui Quang 
Chieu and the Constitutionalist Party in French Cochinchina, 
1917-30", Modern Asian Studies (1969), Vol.3, No.2, pp.131-150; 
Milton E. Osborne, "The Faithful Few: The Politics of
Collaboration in Cochinchina in the 1920s", in Walter F.
Vella, editor, Aspects of Vietnamese History, Asian Studies 
at Hawaii No. 8, (1973), pp.160-190; R.B. Smith, "The
Development of Opposition to French Rule in Southern 
Vietnam, 1880-1940", Past and. Present (February 1972), No.54, 
pp.94-129; and R.B. Smith, "The Vietnamese Elite of French 
Cochinchina, 1943", Modern Asian Studies (1972), Vol.6,
No.4, pp.459-482.
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efforts to open up the delta. As the south (Cochinchina)
was the first territory to come under French administration
it experienced the impact of French civilization over a
more prolonged period than the other two regions. Politically,
the south was governed as a direct colony. Nevertheless
the political divisions which arose in Viet-Nam after
the Second World War were not North-South differences but
differences between Vietnamese throughout the entire
. 18 country.
In 1954 the decision to partition Viet-Nam at the 17th 
parallel was made in preference to the so-called "leopard 
spot" solution which would have seen opposing forces
19concentrated into the areas they controlled on the ground.
The partitioning of Viet-Nam,which was protested by
20representatives of the State of Vietnam at the time,
was supposed to have been temporary and solely to enable the
regroupment of opposing military forces. According to the
Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference:
The Conference recognizes that the essential purpose 
of the agreement relating to Vietnam is to settle 
military questions with a view to ending 
hostilities and that the military demarcation 
line is provisional and should not in any way 
be interpreted as constituting a political or 
territorial boundary. 1
The "Republic of Cochinchina" notwithstanding; see:
Ellen J. Hammer, The Struggle for Indochina, 1940-1955 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966), pp.168-169.
19 The "leopard spot" solution had been broached by the 
French as a possible solution; see: Philippe Devillers and
Jean Lacouture, End of a War: Indochina, 1954 (London:
Pall Mall Press, 1969), pp.206-207.
20 Fishel, "One Vietnam or Two?", op.cit., pp.357-360.
21 Point 6 of the Final Declaration in Great Britain, Further 
Documents Relating to the Discussion of Indochina at the 
Geneva Conference, Miscellaneous No.20 (1954), Command Papers
cont'd
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As history has recorded the "military demarcation
line" became in fact a political boundary. This boundary,
it should be noted, cut across regional and political
loyalties. Henceforth the information and propaganda arms
of the United States and Republic of Viet-Nam governments
employed the terms "North Vietnamese" and "South Vietnamese"
to differentiate Vietnamese people living in either
regroupment zone. It should be noted that this inter-
22pretation conforms to only one view of these events. In
English the terms "North Vietnamese" and "South Vietnamese"
are misleading for they combine two meanings: (1) region
of birth and (2) political affiliation.
With regard to the first meaning it should be noted
that under the terms of the 1954 Geneva Agreements a
regroupment of civilians took place which saw the
migration to the south of nearly 900,000 persons. Some
129,000 others regrouped to the north. What is the correct
terminology for these people? The terms "North Vietnamese"
23and "South Vietnamese" ignore the centrists (central Viet-
21 cont'd
Cmd. 9239 (London: Great Britain Parliamentary Sessional
Papers, XXXI, 1953-1954), pp.9-11.
22 William S. Turley has put the matter succinctly in a 
brief discussion on the People's Army of Viet-Nam (PAVN): 
"'VPA', for Vietnam People's Army, also is an acceptable 
translation of the Vietnamese, Quan doi Nhan dan Viet-nam. 
'North Vietnamese Army (NVA)' is not a translation of any 
term used in the DRV but rather an attempt, in which 
journalists and common useage have acquiesced, to label 
organizations in a way consistent with official American 
and Saigon interpretations of the war". See: "The Political
role and Development of the People's Army of Vietnam", in 
Joseph J. Zasloff and Macalister Brown, editors, Communism 
in Indochina: New Perspectives (Lexington: D.C. Heath and
Co. , 1975) . p.,158.
2 3 The terms "centrist" and "central Vietnamese" while not 
often employed in English-language writing on Viet-Nam are
cont'd
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namese) whose region was split by the military demarcation
line. In other words centrists who remained north of the
17th parallel were called, after 1954-55, "North Vietnamese"
whereas centrists who remained in the south were called
"South Vietnamese". There can be no doubt, whatever the
intentions of RVN and US officials who used the term "South
Vietnamese", that southerners in the Mekong Delta viewed the
northern and centrist refugees as outsiders. Thus the
expressions "North Vietnamese" and "South Vietnamese" to
describe a person's region of birth are misleading in that
they did not accord with contemporary useage in the period 
241954-60.
The terms "North Vietnamese" and "South Vietnamese" 
are equally misleading when used to describe a person's 
political affiliation. As both expressions have been used 
in Western writing on Viet-Nam, a "North Vietnamese" is 
supposed to be a person who is loyal to either or both the 
VWP or DRVN government. Similarly, a "South Vietnamese" 
is supposed to be a person who is loyal to the Republic of 
Viet-Nam. Unfortunately the latter term ignores the fact 
that as many as three million persons resided in so-called
cont'd
common terms in Vietnamese reflecting no doubt a cultural 
perception shared by native speakers. This perception is 
tacitly acknowledged in the vocabulary and language drills 
contained in the United States Department of State, Foreign 
Service Institute's Vietnamese Basic Course, (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), Vol.II, pp.44-45 and 
311.
24 For example, both Ngo Dinh Diem and Vo Nguyen Giap were 
born in the central Vietnamese province of Quang Binh. After 
partition Quang Binh was located north of the seventeenth 
parallel. See: Bernard B. Fall, The Two Viet-Nams: A
Political and Military Analysis (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, 1967 Revised Edition), p.325 and United States 
Central Intelligence Agency, Who's Who in North Vietnam 
(November 1972), p.106.
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liberated areas, that is areas under the control of the
DRVN's war-time administrative structure, south of the
2 517th parallel at the time of partition. These centrists 
and southerners expected reunification elections to take 
place in 1956. However, because their military forces had 
regrouped to the north they were in a very poor position 
to resist the imposition of RVN authority which was often 
accompanied by the use of force. In order to distinguish 
them from loyal "South Vietnamese" the term "Viet Cong" 
was invented.^
Pham Van Dong provided the estimage of three million 
persons in the liberated areas south of the 17th parallel 
to Wilfred Burchett in an interview published in The Daily 
Worker (July 26, 1954), p.4.; this accords with figures 
extrapolated from French and American intelligence estimates 
discussed at greater length elsewhere in this thesis.
An estimate of two million was provided by Joseph Alsop,
"A Reporter at Large", The New Yorker (June 25, 1955), 
Vol.XXXI, No.19, p.3 5.
2 6 According to Hoang Van Chi, "(t)o distinguish between 
Vietminh as a national movement and the Vietnamese communists, 
the press in Saigon since 1956 has referred to the latter 
as 'Vietcong', Cong (an abbreviation of Cong-san) standing 
for 'communists'. The new term is precise and accurate 
and, contrary to what many foreign correspondents believe, 
does not have any disparaging meaning". Chi, From Colonialism 
to Communism: A Case History of North Vietnam (New York:
Popular Library, 1964), p.74; Bernard Fall, The Two Viet- 
Nams, op.cit., p.180 give a different impression: "(t)he
disparaging term Viet-Cong (Vietnamese Communist) is used 
only by South Vietnamese [i.e. Republic of Viet-Nam 
officials] and American officials". D. Gareth Porter has 
written: "(i)n the same manual [a publication of the U.S.
Civil Operations Revolutionary Development Support for use 
in training personnel for service in Vietnam] Chi even 
claimed credit for having 'created the term "Viet Cong" 
for Diem'". See: "Testimony of D. Gareth Porter" in
Hearing before the Subcommittee to Investigate the 
Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other 
Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary 
United States Senate, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, July 27, 
1973. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1973) , p.6.
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The use of the term "South Vietnamese" as opposed
to "Viet Cong" is inappropriate as the meaning of the
former explicitly combines region of birth and political
affiliation whereas the latter only describes political
affiliation. In other words this dichotomy implicitly
suggests the notion of the legitimacy of the Republic of
Viet-Nam as the terms "South Vietnamese" and "South Viet-Nam"
fail to distinguish clearly between the concepts, country,
27nation and state. A country is the whole territory of
a nation. A nation is a stable, historically developed
community of people with a territory, economic life,
distinctive culture and language in common. A state is the
governmental structure of an inhabited country which (1)
has domestic legitimacy, (2) international recognition and
2 8(3) sovereignty. "South Viet-Nam" in its geographical 
sense is part of the territory of the Vietnamese nation.
In useage it is sometimes held to be synonymous with the 
Republic of Viet-Nam. This is incorrect for, as chapters
Country and nation are used here in their ordinary sense, 
whereas state is given a more specialist definition; see: 
Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language (New 
York: The World Publishing Company, 1964), p.338 and 997.
International relations theory commonly distinguishes 
nation from state and it is this distinction which is at 
the heart of the matter; see: J. David Singer, "The Level-
of-Analysis Problem in International Relations", in Klaus 
Knorr and Sidney Verba, editors, The International System: 
Theoretical Essays (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1961), pp.77-92.
2 8 Ivo D. Duchacek, Nations and Men: An Introduction to
International Politics (Hinsdale, Illinois: The Dryden
Press, Third Edition 1965), pp.14-30; for a discussion of 
sovereignty see: E. Raymond Platig, "International Relations
as a Field of Inquiry", in Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, editor, 
Politics and the International System (New York: J.B.
Lippincott Company, 1972), pp.16-17 and Joseph Frankel, 
International Politics: Conflict and Harmony (Harmondsworth:
Penguin Books, 1973), pp.37-38.
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2, 3 and 4 will demonstrate, the RVN was a government which 
did not exercise control over the entire territory of 
South Viet-Nam. The RVN in fact lacked complete domestic 
legitimacy and had only limited international recognition.
Its sovereignty was likewise a matter of dispute. In the 
period 1954-60 the concept of a "South Vietnamese 
nationality" was premature to say the least.
"Viet Cong" a contraction from the Vietnamese "Viet Nam 
Cong San" means "Vietnamese Communist". It was coined in 
the mid-1950's to replace the expression "Viet Minh". "Viet 
Minh" in turn is a contraction of the Vietnamese Viet Nam Doc 
Lap Dong Minh Hoi - League for the Independence of Viet Nam. 
The Viet Minh League (or Front) was founded in 1941 as a 
broad national united front led by the Indochinese Communist 
Party (ICP) with the twin objectives of opposing Japanese 
fascism and French colonialism. Although the "Viet Minh" 
was officially merged with Hoi Lien Hiep Quoc Dan Viet Nam - 
or Lien Viet Front - in March 1951, it remained a popular 
common term denoting anti-French Vietnamese nationalists.
Such expressions as the "Viet Minh" army or the "Viet Minh" 
government blurred over the existence of three distinct 
organizations: a party (the ICP), an army (People's Army
of Viet-Nam) and a government (the Democratic Republic of 
Viet-Nam and its various levels of administration.
After the Resistance War (1945-54) ended the Diem 
government sought to undermine the nationalist appeal of the 
"Viet Minh" by referring instead to members of the war time 
resistance who did not rally to the RVN as "Viet Cong".
In the mid to late 1950's in fact, the term "Viet Cong" 
referred to DRVN government officials, VWP cadres and
18
supporters of either organization resident throughout 
2 9Viet-Nam. Later, when the insurgency in the South picked 
up, the term "Viet Cong" was applied only to individuals in 
South Viet-Nam. DRVN officials, VWP cadres, and members of 
the People's Army of Viet-Nam in the north were now dubbed 
"North Vietnamese". Both terms gained popular acceptance 
in the West thus reinforcing the view that the war in Viet- 
Nam was basically a case of Communist aggression directed 
against the independent state of "South Viet-Nam". In fact 
during the years under consideration in this thesis the 
majority of the domestic opponents of the Diem regime were 
non-Communists to whom the appellation "Viet Cong" was 
totally inappropriate.^ Jean Lacouture has written for 
example:
But the various national and religious forces that 
had been only wartime allies for the Vietnamese 
Communists did not consider themselves bound by
For example a Vietnam Press (Saigon) dispatch in October 
1956 referred to a DRVN delegation headed by Ton Due Thang 
as a "Viet Cong Parliamentary group"; Vietnam Press, "Viet 
Cong Parliamentary Group to Leave for Moscow", The Times of 
Viet Nam Weekly (October 13, 1956), Vol.I, No.39, p.2.
30 For example, Douglas Pike wrote the following in a 
memorandum to his publisher, "I suggest we name my book 
Viet Cong - not because the term is fully accurate (it is 
not) but because' it will do what a title is supposed to do: 
tell the reader what the book is about". Pike, Viet Cong:
The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation 
Front of South Vietnam (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1966),
p.xxii. Denis Warner, The Last Confucian: Vietnam,
Southeast Asia and the West (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1964),
p.109, has written: "The introduction of repressive laws
and ordinances did not strike Diem as likely to cause 
disaffection among the peasants. The laws were for evil­
doers: and he was unaware that they were used to hound
the innocent and also turn many of them more and more 
towards the Viet Cong, as the Viet Minh in South Vietnam 
was now called by his administration: the name simply
means Vietnamese Communists".
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these agreements and refused to bow before the 
commitments taken in the name of the guerillas 
by the Marxist leaders, or to yield to the 
authority of the new chief of government in 
Saigon, Ngo Dinh Diem. Soon the Ngo's family's 
'witch hunting' policy no longer left open to 
the growing number of its opponents any 
alternatives other than prison, exile, or 
the guerilla forces. Soon future President 
[Phan Khac] Suu was in jail, all the former 
government chiefs were in exile, and many people 
who wanted primarily to escape the pursuit of 
Diem's police or Nhu's "Republican Youth" were in 
the guerilla forces. From then on the Saigon 
authorities called every dissatisfied person a 
communist or a Viet Cong. 1
In order to avoid confusion and implicit bias the
following conventions have been adopted (except by way of
direct quotation). "North Viet-Nam" and "South Viet-Nam"
will be used solely as geographical expressions; for the
territories created by the partitioning of Viet-Nam in 
321954. When it is necessary to refer to a person's place 
of birth the expressions northerner, centrist and southerner 
will be employed. The terms "North Vietnamese" and "South 
Vietnamese" will not be used to describe a person's 
nationality or political loyalties. Instead it will be 
assumed that whatever the political divisions there is 
but one Vietnamese nationality. These allegiances will be 
identified as precisely as possible as the following 
examples will illustrate. "DRVN official" and "VWP cadre" 
will be used instead of "North Vietnamese official" and 
"North Vietnamese cadre". The term "RVN official" will be
Jean Lacouture, Vietnam: Between Two Truces (New York:
Vintage Books, 1966), p.52.
32 One writer, for example, employs the terms "Northern 
Regroupment Zone" and "Southern Regroupment Zone" in place 
of "North Viet-Nam" and "South Viet-Nam" respectively; H.G. 
Slingsby, Vietnam Fights Back (Christchurch, New Zealand: 
Caxton Press, 1972), passim.
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used in place of "South Vietnamese official", similarly
the expression "RVN government" will replace "South
33Vietnamese government".
III. MODERNIZATION AND THE SEARCH FOR POLITICAL COMMUNITY
The conflict between various Vietnamese political
groups which followed the division of Viet-Nam in 1954-55
must be placed in a broader context than the Cold War period.
Otherwise there is a danger that the search for political 
34community in Viet-Nam, a concomitant of the modernization
process, will be viewed simply as a clash between
Communists and anti-Communists.
Traditional Viet-Nam was a society composed of autarkic
villages loosely administered by the Imperial Court in
Hue. According to Paul Mus,
The typical village of Viet Nam is enclosed within 
a thick wall of bamboo and thorny plants; the 
villagers used to live behind a kind of screen 
of bamboo, or perhaps it was more like living within 
the magic ring of a fairy tale. Supplying their 
needs from the surrounding fields, they kept to 
themselves behind their common protection, 
away from strangers, away even, from the State.
For instance, when it came to taxes (there, as 
elsewhere, the State's chief concern) they still 
presented a united front. They paid their taxes 
as a group, and the community was recognizable.
The villages dominated the landscape; they were 
the backbone of the nation. Yet each preserved 
an internal autonomy and autarky, with an economy 
based on local consumption. Before the Europeans 
arrived, the Chinese carried on what commerce 
there was.
The expression "Government of Viet-Nam", abbreviated 
GVN, is often used in place of Republic of Viet-Nam. This 
term of course displays even greater bias.
3 4 Political community is used here (and by McAlister) in 
the sense developed by Samuel P. Huntington, Political 
Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1968), pp.8-24.
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The traditional Vietnamese state was conventionalized 
in accordance with Confucian political thought; it 
was withdrawn behind a wall of Chinese characters.
It was authoritarian, but it preserved a 
ritualistic distance between itself and its subjects.
At the same time it intervened directly in village 
life by regulating the agricultural calendar and 
by imposing, through its rituals, attitudes and 
standards a deportment upon the group and the 
individual. By its right of inspection of 
village affairs the State guaranteed conformity 
to the models provided by Chinese tradition; the 
codifications of the Le dynasty, in the fifteenth 
century, are an outstanding example.
The traditional Vietnamese state kept its budgetary 
requirements to a minimum by governing through 
powers of verification and eventual repression, but 
not of execution. The responsibility for detailed 
implementation remained with the villages. The 
state was a coordinator, not an executive. Its 
object was to prevent the smaller communities from 
going astray, and its chief 'ministers' (the word 
does not have its European meaning) were a kind of 
high tribunal sitting in judgement upon lapses 
from the Confucian model. Therefore, the State 
recruited its personnel for all but the humblest 
positions from the literati; whose learning 
consisted entirely of Confucius, the classics, 
and their commentators.^
As a result of the corrosive features of French
colonialism the traditional dynastic state was emasculated
while the autarky of local villages was undermined.
Vietnamese society in Mus' memorable expression, was "thrown
off-balance". Attempts by the literati (scholars) to
rally around the Emperor failed as did their resort to
3 6armed resistance against the French. Villages lost their 
autonomy as local society was atomized under the impact of 
French colonial administration. In brief the transformation
15 The traditional dynastic state also took charge of 
raising an army and coordinating public works; McAlister 
and Mus, The Vietnamese and Their Revolution, op.cit., 
pp.31-35.
David G. Marr, Vietnamese Anticolonialism 1885-1925 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971),
pp.44-76.
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37of the "great tradition" was set in motion. Vietnamese
scholars, like their Chinese counterparts, faced with
the humiliation of colonial conquest, began searching for
3 8non-traditional solutions to their dilemma.
Why had the Court proved so easy a prey? What features
of French society accounted for their success? How
could Viet-Nam recover its independence? There were more
questions than answers as Vietnamese scholars looked to
China, Japan and the Soviet Union for solutions. Eventually
reformism within the context of French political
39institutions yielded to revolutionary activism. The pace
of developments quickened in the early decades of the 20th 
4 0Century. In 1905 a revitalized Japan fought and won a 
modern naval engagement against Tzarist Russia. In 1911 
Imperial China collapsed, in the wake of the Republican 
revolution. In 1917 the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia. 
Each of these events had repercussions in Viet-Nam as a 
variety of political groups became increasingly active.
I am referring to a process described in great detail 
for China, Japan and Korea by John K. Fairbank, Edwin 0. 
Reischauer and Albert M. Craig in A History of East Asian 
Civilization (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965),
Vol.II, East Asia: The Modern Transformation, pp.4-10.
3 8 Marr, Vietnamese Anticolonialism, op.cit., pp.77-184;
David Marr, "Concepts of Harmony and Struggle in Prerevolution 
ary Vietnam", Paper delivered to the First Conference of 
the Asian Studies Association of Australia, The University 
of Melbourne (May 14-16, 1976).
39 Marr, Vietnamese Anticolonialism, op.cit., pp.201-211.
4 0 See: William J. Duiker, The Rise of Nationalism in
Vietnam, 1900-1941 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976);
and Nguyen Dien, "Nationalism and Revolution in Vietnam in 
the 1920's and 1930's", Paper delivered to the First 
Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia,
The University of Melbourne (May 14-16, 1976).
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1930 marked a decisive turning point. Early in the
year the Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang (Vietnamese Nationalist
Party), a party modelled on the Chinese Kuo Min Tang, rose
in unsuccessful revolt. The defeat of the VNQDD marked
the end of purely anti-colonialist nationalism as a force
capable of overthrowing the French. That same year Ho
Chi Minh unified the various communist organizations into
41a single Indochinese Communist Party. Although ICP
cadres were unsuccessful in their attempts to establish
4 2revolutionary soviets in central Viet-Nam during the
second half of 1930, nevertheless the ICP managed to survive
the political suppression which followed. With the advent
of the Popular Front government in France, which permitted
renewed political activity in Indochina, the ICP grew in
strength. Thereafter the strands of anti-colonialism,
Vietnamese nationalism, revolutionary modernization and
Marxism-Leninism were combined in the hands of the ICP.
The ICP's rise to dominance was greatly facilitated
4 3by the events of World War II. French Indochina was in no 
position to resist the might of Japan as France itself was 
under the heel of the Nazis. The colonial regime, like its
As was noted above the Indochinese Communist Party 
received its name in October 1930. In the period February- 
October the name of the party was the Communist Party of 
Viet-Nam.
42 William J. Duiker, "The Red Soviets of Nghe-Tinh: An
Early Communist Rebellion in Vietnam", Journal of Southeast 
Asian Studies (September 1973), Vol.IV, No.2, pp.186-198; 
and Milton E. Osborne, "Continuity and Motivation in the 
Vietnamese Revolution: New Light from the 1930s", Pacific
Affairs (Spring 1974), Vol.47, No.l, pp.37-55.
4 3 For an overview of this period see: William J. Duiker,
"Building the United Front: The Rise of Communism in
Vietnam, 1925-1954", in Zasloff and Brown, editors, Communism 
in Indochina, op.cit., pp.3-26.
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Vichy counterpart, collaborated with the occupying forces.
This action insured that both Japanese fascism and French
colonialism would become the objects of the war-time
resistance. In 1941 Ho Chi Minh's ICP organized a broad
national front known as the League for the Independence
of Viet Nam with precisely these objectives. A miniscule
44military force was established which later served as the 
seed from which other units would sprout.
Inevitably, as the tides of war turned against Tokyo, 
Japanese leaders in Indochina became suspicious of the French 
administration. After evidence began to accumulate that
certain elements among the French community might belatedly
-jorc,e.take to arms, the Japanese launched a pre-emptive coup d-'ma-ln. 
On March 5, 1945 the Japanese disarmed French forces and 
imprisoned them thus accomplishing what decades of 
revolutionary activism had been unable to achieve: the
overthrow of the colonial regime. This dramatic event 
coupled with the obvious decline of Japanese military power 
elsewhere led Ho Chi Minh and his colleagues to the 
inescapable conclusion that it was necessary to plan to 
seize power. The aim, of course, would be to secure 
recognition from the Allied Powers while presenting France 
with a fait accompli.
Indeed while the Vietnamese revolutionaries were
drafting their plans, the startling news of Japan's
45unconditional surrender reached them. They immediately 
4 4 In fact the Viet Nam Liberation Army Propaganda Unit, 
under the command of Vo Nguyen Giap, was not establi.shed 
until December 22, 1944; An Outline History of the Viet Nam 
Workers' Party (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishinq House,
1970) , p .3 6.
45 Ibid., p .39.
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declared the formation of a provisional government and
ordered the commencement of a country-wide general
insurrection. The events which followed, since named the
4 6August Revolution, witnessed the seizure of power by
Vietnamese nationalists, including Communists, in all the
major urban centres, including Hanoi, Hue and Saigon.
Emperor Bao Dai, belatedly installed by the Japanese at the
head of an "independent" Viet-Nam abdicated. On Septembei
2, 1945 Ho Chi Minh declared Viet-Nam independent under the
title of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. The DRVN
government in fact included an amalgam of nationalist
groups among whom the ICP and its Viet Minh Front were
47undoubtedly the strongest and most cohesive.
It is a moot question as to what form this government 
would have taken, for external forces once again decisively 
intervened in Vietnamese affairs. As a result of the 
Potsdam Conference the Allies decided to effect the surrender 
of Japanese forces in Indochina by dividing the country 
at the 16th parallel and by assigning the tasks to the 
Chinese Nationalists and British respectively. The Chinese 
army's occupation of the north brought in its wake the 
return to Viet-Nam of a variety of political groups who had
History of the August Revolution (Hanoi: Foreign Languages
Publishing House, 1972); John T. McAlister, Jr., Viet Nam:
The Origins of Revolution (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969),
pp.185-222; and Huynh Kim Khanh, "The Vietnamese August 
Revolution Reinterpreted", Journal of Asian Studies (August 
1971), Vol.XXX, No.7, pp.761-782.
47 I. Milton Sacks, Political Alignments of Vietnamese 
Nationalists, (Washington, D.C.: Department of State,
Division of Research for Far East, Office of Intelligence 
Research; October 1, 1949), OIR Report No.3708, pp.75-100.
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4 8spent the war in exile. In the south British General
4 9Gracey refused to deal with the Vietnamese authorities.
He released the imprisoned French and permitted them to 
re-establish their rule. Thus the ultimate aims of the 
August Revolution were thwarted. The Allied powers neither 
prevented the French from returning to Viet-Nam nor did they 
grant recognition to the DRVN.
50As a result of various negotiations between the French, 
Vietnamese and Chinese, the latter withdrew from northern 
Viet-Nam. French troups were permitted to return. It 
was also agreed that they would be progressively withdrawn 
over a five-year period and that a referendum would be held 
in the South to determine whether it would opt to join an 
independent Viet-Nam. However the nationalist camp began 
to break up. Extremists condemned Ho Chi Minh for not taking 
to arms. Anti-Communists split with Communists. Politicians 
out of the centre of power intrigued to undermine those in 
power. Politico-religious sects in the south consolidated 
their power on a territorial basis, creating "states within 
a state". Members of the bureaucracy, and pro-French groups 
sought to side with the colonial authorities. Monarchists 
hankered for a return of the Emperor. Nationalist political
4 8 King C. Chen, Vietnam and China 1938-1954 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1969), pp.99-154; Interview 
with Ambassador Yuan Tze-chien, Taipei, May 11, 1972. 
Ambassador Yuan was with the Chinese Consulate in Hanoi during 
this period; he later served as the ambassador of the 
Republic of China to the Republic of Viet-Nam (1956-64).
49 George Rosie, The British in Vietnam: How the Twenty-Five
Year War Began (London: Panther Books Ltd., 1970); and Dennis 
J. Duncanson, "General Gracey and the Vietminh", Journal of 
the Royal Central Asian Society (October 1968), Vol.LV,
Part III, pp.288-297.
50 Hammer, The Struggle for Indochina, op.cit., pp.148-174.
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parties attempted to entrench themselves in local areas.
The disunity of the nationalist camp and the shift in the 
balance of forces as France reestablished her pre-war 
presence made the grant of complete Vietnamese independence 
remote. Tensions on either side, which built up in a 
series of incidents in late 1946, finally exploded into 
open warfare. Ho Chi Minh and his government and party 
colleagues took to the mountains and began an eight year 
long protracted resistance against the French.
The return of the French to Viet-Nam and the start of 
the Resistance War postponed the resolution of the conflict 
among Vietnamese groups as to which form the modernization 
of Vietnamese political institutions should take. Neverthe­
less this process of modernization was an important under­
current of the larger conflict between Communist-led anti­
colonial nationalism on the one hand and the forces of French 
colonialism and anti-Communist nationalism on the other. 
During the Resistance War a radical transformation occurred 
in areas of the countryside under the domination of the 
Communist Party.5'*'
Through the Viet Minh and Lien Viet fronts as well as 
the People's Army of Viet Nam (PAVN) and the administrative
McAlister, The Origins of Revolution, op.cit., pp.256-272 
and 319-364; for descriptions of the governmental structure 
of the DRVN during wartime see: George Ginsburgs^ "Local
Government and Administration Under the Viet-Minh, 1945-54", 
in P.J. Honey, editor, North Vietnam Today (New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), pp.135-165; George Modelski, 
"The Viet Minh Complex", in Cyril E. Black and Thomas P. 
Thornton, editors, Communism and Revolution: The Strategic
Uses of Political Violence (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1964), pp.185-214; and Bernard B. Fall, The Viet-Minh 
Regime: Government and Administration in the Democratic
Republic of Viet-Nam (New York: Institute of Pacific
Relations, 1956).
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structure of the DRVN government, Viet-Nam's political 
institutions were modernized and the "imbalance" in village 
society restored. Not only was village self-sufficiency 
re-created within the framework of larger "free" (liberated) 
zones, but the superstructure of central control was once 
again re-imposed. These developments occurred throughout 
all the regions of Viet-Nam (see Map 1-3).
In short the Communist Party mobilized millions of
rural folk into modern organizations with specific social,
)
political and economic goals. A new leadership hierarchy
was created in the villages. These intervening organizations
coupled with the introduction of revolutionary values proved
to be self-sustaining in the face of external stress. A new
"Vietnamese political community" was created which replaced
52the decimated vestiges of the traditional dynastic state.
The end of the Resistance War did not mark the
resolution of the conflict of which model of political 
53development the Vietnamese would choose. The 1954 Geneva 
Agreements, despite their references to a political 
settlement, merely brought about a ceasefire and the 
withdrawal of the French Expeditionary Corps. With its 
departure the colonial political model ceased to exist as 
a viable option. The French exit set the stage for a
52This process had already been observed by Paul Mus in the 
1950's; see: McAlister and Mus, The Vietnamese and Their
Revolution, op.cit., pp.111-127.
5 3 For a discussion of the salient features of the 
Vietnamese model see: Bob Catley and Bruce McFarlane,
"The Vietnamese Social Model", The Australian Quarterly 
(December 1974), Vol.46, No.4, pp.22-37; for a current view,
Mark Seiden, "People's War and the Transformation of Peasant 
Society: China and Vietnam", in Edward Friedman and Mark
Seiden, editors, America's Asia: Dissenting Essays on Asian-
American Relations (New York: Vintage Books, 1971), pp.357-392.
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MAP 1-3
INTER-REGIONS DURING THE RESISTANCE WAR (1948-1954)
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"Viet-Cong Political Geography of South V.iet-Nam" , 
Viet-Nam Documents and Research Notes (March 1971), 
No.93, p .6.
SOURCE:
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resumption of the domestic conflict. In the south vast
areas of the countryside were not under the control of the
State of Viet-Nam. These included warlord fiefs of the
54various sect generals as well as the liberated areas 
still administered by the Communists. In the urban areas, 
the main base of the State of Viet-Nam, political division 
reigned similarly. On the one hand were the forces of 
republicanism led by Ngo Dinh Diem; on the other hand were 
a variety of forces, some pro-French, others pro-monarchist 
opposed to Diem. By May 1955 the urban conflict had been 
resolved in favour of Diem, who then turned his energies 
to expanding administrative control throughout the country­
side of South Viet-Nam.
The overall situation has been succinctly summarized 
by John McAlister:
By 1954, after seven years of revolutionary 
conflict, two competitor governments emerged:
The Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam in Hanoi 
and the Republic of Viet-Nam [sic] in Saigon.
Each claimed to be the sole legitimate 
government for all the Vietnamese people, yet each 
controlled about half the territory of the 
country. When these two governments withdrew 
into separate territories divided at the 17th 
parallel by the Geneva Conference of 1954 the 
Western powers expected them to act like separate 
nation-states, instead of adversaries in a 
revolutionary war. But neither government did.
Nor has either of them denied that 'reunification' 
is its ultimate goal....
The war now raging in Viet-Nam is a continuation 
of the pattern of conflict launched during the 
First Indochina War; it is not a war being 
fought between two separate nations, but a 
revolutionary struggle within one nation. More 
conspicuously than in wars between nations,
Bernard B. Fail, "The Political-Religious Sects of 
Vietnam", Pacific Affairs (September 1955), Vol.28, No.3, 
pp.235-253.
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revolutionary war is, in the words of 
Clausewitz, a 'continuation of politics by 
other means'. It is a competition between 
two or more governments, each of which wants 
to become the sole legitimate government of a 
people. In wars between nations, political 
objectives are usually sought by destroying the 
military power of an adversary, but in 
revolutionary wars, political goals are sought 
more directly. The focus of conflict is to 
eliminate the political structure of an 
opponent and replace it with a political 
structure of one's own.^
IV. AIM, SCOPE AND METHODS
This thesis is not a history of the Viet-Nam Workers' 
Party and neither is it an account of the process of 
revolution underway since 1945. Rather it is a detailed 
examination of one very important period in the history 
of the Vietnamese revolution, the six year period from the 
1954 Geneva Conference to the formation of the NFL. At 
the start of this period the leadership of the VWP redefined 
the objectives of the revolution from defeating French 
colonialism, to socialist construction in the north and 
the carrying out of a national democratic revolution in the 
south. These twin objectives reflected the territorial 
division of Viet-Nam. Although both aims were interrelated 
the VWP nevertheless accorded priority to the former. At 
the end of this period the VWP found it necessary to 
devote increased resources to the tasks of the national 
democratic revolution. The Party also found it necessary 
to shift its tactics, giving increased weight to military 
force. This change in emphasis occurred simultaneously 
with renewed emphasis on political struggle. In brief the 
Resistance model was modified and reapplied to suit the new
55 McAlister, The Origins of Revolution, op.cit., p.4.
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circumstances. Military force would provide a shield 
behind which base areas and liberated zones could be built. 
The embryonic revolutionary society which had survived 
over the previous six difficult years would be built up 
and expanded at the expense of the authority and legitimacy 
of the RVN. From the point of view of the Party, which was 
not a mass organization, the creation of a new national 
united front was necessary in order to mobilize the people 
for the new stage ahead.
The purpose of this thesis is to trace and explain
shifts in the VWP's policy on unification and national
liberation during the 1954-60 period. Four sets of factors
are analyzed: (1) the effects of the international
environment on decision-making within the VWP's Central
Committee; (2) the interaction between the Central
Committee and its subordinate Nam Bo Regional Committee;
(3) the effects of policies initiated by the Diem regime on
the Party's southern organization and (4) the impact of
the pace of northern social, economic and political
development. In other words the VWP political system is
seen as functioning and interacting simultaneously with both
56domestic and international systems.
The VWP's policies and reactions to these influences 
were authoritatively dealt with by regular plenary sessions 
of the VWP's Central Committee. During the period .July, 1954 
to September, 1960, (when the VWP convened its 3rd National
56 Cf. David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis 
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1965),
pp.35-135 for a discussion of political systemsand the 
interaction between a political system and its environment.
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Congress) there were thirteen plenums, numbering from
six to eighteen, (see Table 1-1). Each of these meetings
assessed the success and shortcomings in the implementation
57of policy since the previous session. This thesis traces
domestic and international developments surrounding each
plenum in an effort to determine what factors played a
significant role in shaping policy outcomes. This framework
enables us to place domestic Vietnamese developments into
a larger and more comprehensive setting than other studies 
5 8to date.' What emerges is a picture of the VWP as a 
complex organization with many parts simultaneously trying 
to accomplish a list of priorities while at the same time 
reacting to both domestic and external pressures. Success 
was never complete and policy had to be modified
continually. Errors, mistakes and failures occurred; sometimes 
these were due to poor implementation, bad organization or 
low morale. At other times external force intervened to
Carlyle A. Thayer, "Origin of the National Liberation 
Front: Debate on Unification Within the Vietnam Workers'
Party", Vietnam Report, Part I, (July 15, 1974), Vol.III,
No.14, pp.12-15, and Part II (August 1, 1974), Vol.III,
No.15, pp.12-15; and Thayer, "Origins of the National Front 
for the Liberation of South Viet-Nam, 1954-1960: Debate on
Unification Within the Viet-Nam Workers' Party", Paper 
delivered to the Sixteenth Conference of the Australasian 
Political Studies Association, The University of Queensland 
(July 20-21, 1974).
5 8 Pike, Viet Cong, op.cit.; and Jeffrey Race, War Comes to 
Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972). There
are no full length studies which explicitly analyze the 
decision-making process within the Viet-Nam Workers' Party 
for the time period under consideration. Despite its title, 
Race's study casts a far wider net than Long An province.
Its interpretations on the origins of the insurgency are 
both pioneering and brilliant; however the bulk of his 
work is concerned with the Vietnamese conflict in a later 
period.
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TABLE 1-1
CHRONOLOGY OF PARTY MEETINGS
C h r o n o lo g y  o f  IParfry M e e t in g s
1954
M ill-Ju ly  
S e p te m b e r
6th P le n u m  
M eeting  of P o l i tb u ro
M arch
A ugust 13-20 
August /S e p te m b e r
1955
7th P le n u m  
8th  P len u m
1st Xu-lTy N am -B o  C onference
M a rc h /A p r i l
April 10-24 
J line
S e p te m b e r  
1 lecem ber
1956
C onference  of P ro v in c ia l  R e p re ­
sen ta t ives ,  P la in  of Reeds 
9th  P le n u m
M eeting  of N a m -B o  Regional 
C o m m it tee  
10th P len u m  
11th P len u m
E ar ly  1957 
M arch
M id -D ecem ber
1957
2nd X u -U y  N am -B o  C onfe rence  
12th P le n u m  
13th P le n u m
A ugust
N ov em b e r
1958
3rd X u -U y  N a m -B o  C onference  
14th P le n u m
J a n u a r y
A pril
May
M id-O ctober  
O ctober
1959
15th P le n u m  
16th P le n u m  
M eeting  of P o l i tb u ro  
17th P le n u m
4th X u - l J y  N am -B o  C onference
L a te  Ju ly  
S e p te m b e r  5- 10
1960
18 th P lenum
T h ird  N ational C ongress  of th e
V ie tnam  W o rk e rs ’ P a r ty
SOURCE: Carlyle A. Thayer, "Origin of the National
Liberation Front", Vietnam Report (August 1, 
1974), Vol.III, No.15, p.15.
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frustrate the VWP in the pursuit of its objectives. For 
example peaceful struggle under the terms of the 1954 
Geneva Agreements gave way in late 1955 to attempts to 
reunify Viet-Nam by political means based on the platform 
of the Fatherland Front.
In 1956 the shock waves of Khrushchev's denunciation 
of Stalin threatened the unity of the socialist bloc while 
North Viet-Nam groped with errors committed during the 
course of land reform, a revolt of the intellectuals and 
an armed uprising in one of its provinces. Plans for a 
quick unification of the country were shelved while longer- 
range strategies were devised. In the south the RVN went 
from strength to strength seriously challenging the 
authority of the VWP underground in its base areas. 1957 
witnessed the completion of an economic recovery program 
in the north, the ignition of a low-level rural insurgency 
in the south, and the beginnings of the Sino-Soviet 
dispute following the November 1957 Moscow Conference. In 
1958 the DRVN embarked on its first three year plan with 
increased aid from the Soviet Union, Diem continued to 
receive American assistance while internationally, Chinese 
foreign policy veered to the left. Finally, by 1959 both 
the international climate and the situation in the north 
were considered favourable enough for VWP leaders to 
consider shifting more attention to the south. There the 
Party's underground was struggling to survive and was 
desperate for the go-ahead to resume armed struggle. 
Permission was granted and after a year of beating back the 
RVN, conditions were considered right for the establishment 
of an NFL and an increased effort to topple the Diem
36
government. It is the complex interplay of these events 
which will be traced in the following chapters in an effort 
to reanalyze the origins of the National Front for the 
Liberation of South Viet-Nam.
CHAPTER 2
THE AFTERMATH OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE : REGROUPMENT
(July 1954 - March 1955)
I. THE GENEVA CONFERENCE
The First Indochinese War, fought for nearly eight 
years between, on the one hand, France and her indigenous 
allies and, on the other, the resistance movements of 
Viet-Nam, Laos and Cambodia, was brought to an end as a 
result of the Geneva Conference in July of 1954. Although 
much has been written about these agreements, especially 
their political provisions, one writer has correctly 
observed:
apart from the decision to implement a 
cease-fire throughout Indochina, no 
significant general agreement was reached 
at Geneva at all. Not only were the 
published agreements themselves riddled with 
ambiguity, but they were further undermined 
by a tissue of secret agreements, private 
understandings and mental reservations 
which deprived them of whatever residual 
clarity they did possess.
In retrospect it appears that at least four of the 
Great Powers (Britain, China, France and the Soviet Union) 
reached the conclusion that a ceasefire in Indochina 
would serve their own interests. Britain wished to see 
a resolution of the conflict lest its continuation spill
Geoffrey Warner, "The 1954 Geneva Agreements: An Ambiguous 
Legacy", paper delivered to the Seminar Series of the 
Contemporary China Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, 
The Australian National University on September 26, 1974; 
forthcoming in The Australian Journal of Politics and History. 
Professor Warner's research is particularly valuable in that 
it incorporates material from "The Pentagon Papers" and 
interview material with many of the leading French officials.
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over and affect her position in Malaya where she was
2facing a local Communist-led insurgency. The government
of France, facing a population increasingly disenchanted
with the "dirty war", was at the end of its electoral 
3tether. The Soviet Union and China both shared a common 
fear that the war in Indochina would escalate, particularly 
as the United States appeared to be tottering on the 
brink of intervention. Russia also may have hoped to 
link a settlement in Indochina with negotiations over
4Europe, an area of greater strategic concern. China too 
had other reasons for wishing to see peace restored. At 
this time she was turning inward concerned with a new five-
5year plan of economic construction. Although the United 
States was initially opposed to the idea of an international 
conference to bring about an end to the war in Indochina, 
indeed her senior officials were talking openly of "united 
action", nevertheless French and British diplomatic 
pressures secured American attendance. In brief, a 
constellation of powers on the international scene, each 
for their own particular reasons, were simultaneously 
moving in a direction favourable for peace in Indochina.
2 Anthony Eden, Full Circle (London: Cassell, 1960), p.87.
3 A poll taken on November 21, 1953 indicated that nearly 
67% of those who expressed an opinion were in favour of either 
negotiations or a French withdrawal; Vincent Auriol, Journal 
de Septennat 1947-1954 (Paris: Armand Colin, 1971), Vol.7,
pp.474 and 819 cited in Warner, "The 1954 Geneva Agreements", 
op.cit., pp.2 and 26.
4 New Times [Moscow] (July 31, 1958), p.l and supplement, p.8.
5 Warner, "The 1954 Geneva Agreements" , op.cit., pp.11-13 cites 
a well-publicized speech by Chen Yun on March 5, 1954.
 ^ Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Mandate for 
Change, 1953-1956 (New York: Signet Books, 1965), pp.403-452.
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There is sufficient evidence to conclude that Russia
and China both brought pressure to bear on the leaders
of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam (DRVN) to agree to
7negotiations with the French. Undoubtedly the two allies
wished to encourage the momentum gained as a result of the
armistice in Korea (July 1953). In November 1953, Ho Chi
Minh signalled a change in his government's view on the
matter. Interviewed in the pages of the Swedish newspaper
Expressen he stated:
if the French Government have drawn a 
lesson from the war they have been waging 
these last few years and want to negotiate 
an armistice in Viet Nam and solve the Viet 
Nam problem by peaceful means, the people 
and government of the Democratic Republic g 
of Viet Nam are ready to meet this desire.
In January 1954 a conference of the Big Four foreign
ministers (Britain, France, the Soviet Union and the United
States) was convened in Berlin. As a result of approaches
made by the French Foreign Minister, Georges Bidault, it
was agreed to convene a meeting of the "Five Great Powers"
(the People's Republic of China being included) and "other
states concerned" in Geneva in April (1954) to discuss the
problem of restoring peace in Korea and Indochina. The
7 Dispatch from Tillman Durdin in Geneva to The New York 
Times (July 25, 1954), pp.l and 3 states, for example,
"A number of members of the Vietminh delegation have 
declared openly that pressure from Chinese Communist 
Premier Chou En-lai and Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav 
M. Molotov forced their regime to accept less than it 
rightfully should have obtained here".g "Replies to a Swedish Correspondent (November 1953)", 
in Ho Chi Minh, Selected Writings (1920-1969), (Hanoi: 
Foreign Languages Publishing House, 197 3) , pp.153-154 .
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Indochina phase of the talks opened on May 8th, with 
representatives from France, Britain, the Soviet Union, 
China, the United States, the State of Viet-Nam, the 
Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the kingdoms of Laos 
and Cambodia.
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss
in detail the progress of the conference, as the results
9are widely known. Nevertheless it is necessary to 
highlight certain developments in order to understand 
why a workable military agreement was reached and a 
political settlement was not. Firstly, after the initial 
political broadsides had been exchanged, it was agreed 
to separate political from military matters and to leave 
the resolution of the latter to confidential talks 
between representatives of the French and People's Army 
of Viet-Nam (PAVN) High Commands.^ Secondly, the French 
government of Joseph Laniel fell during the course of 
the conference. The new Premier, Pierre Mendes-France, 
set a self-imposed deadline of thirty days for an agreement 
otherwise at which time he would resign. In such a case
Victor Bator, Vietnam: A Diplomatic Tragedy (Dobbs Ferry,
New York: Oceana Publications, 1965), pp.51-148; Chen,
Vietnam and China, op.cit., pp.279-330; Devillers and 
Lacouture, End of a War, op.cit.; Melvin Gurtov, The First 
Vietnam Crisis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967),
ppillG-130; and Robert F. Randle, Geneva 1954: The
Settlement of the Indochinese War (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1969)i Unfortunately all of these accounts 
were published before the Pentagon Papers became public.
See: "The Geneva Accords 1954", in United States - Vietnam
Relations 1945-1967 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1*971), Book 1, Part III, Sections A-D.
Randle, Geneva 1954 , op.cit., pp.274-280 .10
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he hinted that he would recommend conscription to the
National Assembly.^  Thirdly, representatives of the
State of Viet-Nam were effectively frozen out of the
12secret talks held by the various parties. By the time 
they learned that partition had been seriously discussed 
it was too late. When they raised objections and an 
alternate proposal, they were ignored. Finally, both the 
Soviet Foreign Minister, Molotov, and his Chinese counter­
part, Chou En-lai, intervened decisively at various stages 
of the conference to keep up the progress. Chou effectively 
pressured Pham Van Dong, the DRVN Foreign Minister, into 
dropping his demand that the Khmer and Lao resistance 
forces be given separate recognition. Molotov selected
the two year timetable for holding reunification elections.
w o o  fedThere were basically two solutions muted for a
settlement of the conflict. The idea of a coalition
government, with Communist representation, was quickly 
13discarded. Thereafter attention turned to the idea of 
military regroupment. Here also two major proposals received 
attention: (1) regroupment into enclaves, the so-called
Devillers and Lacouture, End of a War, op.cit., p.246.
The Soviet Union undoubtedly wished to see the Mendes-France 
government remain in office because of its opposition to 
the proposals for a European Defence Community.
12
13
Fishel, "One Vietnam or Two?", op.cit., pp.355-357.
The DRVN suggested a non-Communist coalition government 
to the French as early as April 1954; I am indebted to 
Professor Warner for providing the details from Georges 
Chaffard's Carnets Secrets de la Decolonisation (Paris: 
n.p., n.d.) in a personal letter dated November 14, 1974. 
See also: Randle, Geneva 1954, op.cit., pp.199-200.
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"leopard spot" solution and (2) regroupment into zones,
14in other words partition. Both sides eventually favoured
partition. As a result of staff-talks held by Western
military officials, it was decided that a demarcation
line across central Viet-Nam at roughly 17°30' north
15would be militarily defensible. The DRVN representatives,
on the other hand, were anxious to secure a unified
territory, adjacent to China with its own port and
capital. It was clear from gestures made by Ta Quang Buu,
representative of the PAVN High Command, at a secret military
session held on June 10th with M. de Brebisson, his French
counter-part, that the DRVN was considering a line drawn
17at about the sixteenth parallel. The French considered 
the eighteenth parallel more appropriate. During the 
course of late June and early July, Pham Van Dong pressed 
for the thirteenth, fourteenth and sixteenth parallels. 
Apparently the former claims were attempts to pressure the 
new Mendes-France government. It was only on July 20th, 
the deadline set by Mendes-France, that Molotov intervened 
and picked the 17th parallel - a compromise between the 
two. At the same time he also dashed DRVN hopes for early 
elections by suggesting a delay of two years (until July
Randle, Geneva 1954, op.cit., p.203; and Devillers and 
Lacouture, End of a War, op.cit., pp.207, 224, 250 and 259.
15 See telegram from the U.S. Department of State, TEDUL 
222 (June 18, 1954), to the American Consulate in Geneva 
in United States-Vietnam Relations, op.cit., Book 9, p.577; 
and T.B. Millar, editor, Australian Foreign Minister:
The Diaries of R.G. Casey 1951-60 (London: Collins, 1972),
p . 14 7 .
16 Devillers and Lacouture, End of a War, op.cit., pp.233-234. 
17 Ibid., pp.249-253.
1956). These crucial decisions, made during the final
hours, have been dramatically described by two French
writers who undoubtedly relied on Mendes-France, who was
present, as their source. According to this account:
A visitor entering the great drawing room 
of the villa a little before five o'clock 
would have discovered a surprising sight: 
sitting in chairs casually scattered around 
the large table, amid a decor better suited 
to a village wedding, Eden, Mendes-France,
Molotov, and Chou [En-lai] surrounded Pham 
Van Dong. Perspiring, anguished, looking 
almost hunted, Dong was bending over a map 
of Indochina - mile by mile, Communist 
Vietnam was shrinking northward.
Impassively, Molotov waited for the 
appropriate moment to launch his compromise 
solution. It was obvious that he had long 
expected to arbitrate a compromise 
demarcation line at the 16th Parallel between 
the Vietminh, who demanded the 13th or 14th, 
and the French, who held out for the 18th 
Parallel. He had pointed out repeatedly, as 
we have seen, that this line was selected, after 
the Japanese defeat, to divide the British and 
Chinese spheres in Southeast Asia. (Everything 
that brought that epoch back to him - the days 
when the war ended, his country triumphed, Japan 
was defeated, the days when the fate of the 
world was settled with a slide rule, and the 
fair days of San Francisco - all this was to 
Molotov's taste.) At the beginning of July, 
however, during a conversation he and Chauvel 
[the French Ambassador to Switzerland] had 
arranged between two senior Soviet officers 
and de Brebisson, the latter had succeeded in 
convincing the Russians that, among other 
disadvantages, a demarcation line at the 16th 
Parallel would deny Laos the use of its vital 
link with the sea, Colonial Route 9. Molotov 
had tried to counter this argument by suggesting 
that special arrangements could be made for the 
use of the road, but we have already noted how 
little enthusiasm the French expressed when Pham 
Van Dong made this suggestion. On July 13, Chou 
had persuaded Dong to give up the 14th Parallel 
and settle for the 16th. Molotov felt obliged 
to support his allies' demand to begin with, 
but he still wanted to play the part of arbitrator. 
Chou had made Dong surrender two parallels;
Molotov would only ask him for one. Now, on 
July 20, Molotov let it drop: "Let us agree on
the 17th Parallel."
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Eden and Mendes-France exchanged a quick look.
The 17th Parallel was within 50 miles of the 
line proposed in the Anglo-American "seven 
points", which had been accepted as the Western 
terms for a settlement at the Paris meeting on 
July 14. The end was in sight. Mendes-France 
had virtually run out of arguments to counter 
Molotov's proposal. Dong, now looking as though 
nothing further could be wrung from him, except 
his last breath, nevertheless found the strength 
to demand that, in return for this concession, 
a date be fixed for the elections. Mendes-France 
tried to maintain that it would be better not 
to be specific; but here, as on the demarcation 
line, he failed to secure all he was bidding for.
Dong demanded elections within six months, the 
latest Soviet memorandum provided for elections 
with sixteen months, while six weeks earlier,
Bidault's experts had wanted to hold them after 
eighteen months. "Two years?" said Molotov. 
Mendes-France agreed, and Eden no longer even 
tried to hide his satisfaction.
It was 5.15 in the afternoon of July 20. The 
news spread fast - agreement had been reached!
Everyone began to prepare for the solemn session 
in the Palais des Nations at which the armistice 
texts would be signed and the final declaration 
on the nine powers adopted. 0
The DRVN acceptance of partition along the 17th
parallel, as indeed their decision to negotiate a
ceasefire, cannot be entirely explained by pressures from
the Soviet Union and China. It will be recalled that on
May 7, 1954, on the very eve of the Indochina phase of the
Geneva Conference, the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu
19surrendered after a 55-day seige. It has often been 
asserted that the 13th parallel represented a more realistic 
division of Viet-Nam, based on a balance of forces on the
18 Ibid., pp.292-293.
19 For accounts of this battle see: Bernard B. Fall,
Hell in a Very Small Place (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott,
1966) ; VcT Nguyen Giap, ÖTen Bien Phu (Hanoi: Foreign
Languages Publishing House, 1959); and Jules Roy,
The Battle of Dien Bien Phu (New York: Harper and Row,
1965) .
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ground, than the 17th parallel. The question why the 
Communists would make such a generous settlement with 
the defeated French can be partly answered with reference 
to external pressures. The complete answer must look at 
the internal situation.
Most arguments which stress the importance of Sino-
Soviet pressure neglect the little publicized view that
the PAVN forces may have been exhausted from what must
20have been a Pyrrhic victory at Dien Bien Phu. War­
weariness coupled with the possibility of American military 
21intervention might have influenced DRVN and VWP (Viet- 
Nam Workers' Party) officials that continued military 
struggle was unnecessary to obtain what could easily 
be gotten at the negotiating table. Although France had
According to French estimates (no Vietnamese figures 
have been released by the DRVN) PAVN losses may have 
exceeded French casualties (15,000) by 30% - 100%; Pierre 
Rocolle, Pourguoi Dien Bien Phu? (Paris: Flammarion, 1968),
pp.553-557 cited in Warner, "The 1954 Geneva Agreements", 
op.cit., p.7.
21 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 
0646 GMT, July 19, 1954. Transcripts of monitered radio 
broadcasts used in this thesis have been obtained from two 
sources: (1) United States Central Intelligence Agency's
Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report and 
(2) the British Broadcasting Corporation's Summary of World 
Broadcasts, Parts 3 and 5. Both sources are available 
at the National Library of Australia in Canberra for the 
period 1954-1962. In order to avoid excessive footnoting 
I have omitted reference to all details except those 
relating to the primary source. Normally a broadcast is 
printed within two days of transcription. In the case of 
important broadcasts (or those whose appearance in print 
follows the original date of broadcast by a considerable 
amount of time) full details are provided. Generally the U.S. FBIS Daily Reports are more complete and were consulted 
first. There are differences between the two services with 
respect to the editing of the daily transcripts for 
publication. Material selected for inclusion in the Daily 
Report, for example, may not appear in the Summary of 
World Broadcasts and vice versa.
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suffered a crushing psychological blow and military defeat 
at Dien Bien Phu she still retained a powerful Expeditionary 
Corps supplemented by a growing National Army of the State 
of Viet-Nam.
In 1957 Huynh Van Tieng, a deputy in the DRVN's
National Assembly from Saigon-Cholon, admitted in a radio
address to compatriots in the south:
Three years have passed since the day we 
met in Ca Mau [a province in the extreme south 
of Viet-Nam] to celebrate the reestablishment 
of peace. You certainly remember that, in the 
various meetings held before our repatriation, 
we spiritedly discussed for many days and 
nights running the prospects for our struggle 
for national unification. We came to the 
conclusion that our forces, compared to those 
of the enemy, were only able for the moment, 
to wholly liberate a half of our country, that 
we should continue to struggle, through 
political means - by utilizing the possibilities 
of the Geneva Accords - to liberate the other 
half. . ,22
According to Janos Radvanyi, a Hungarian diplomat 
who visited Hanoi in April 1959, Vo Nguyen Giap told him 
that:
[t]he battle of Dien Bien Phu was essentially 
the last, desperate exertion of the Vietminh 
guerrilla army. [Had it not been victorious 
there] French colonial power in Vietnam would 
still be having its seat in Hanoi and Saigon.
Our armed forces were on the verge of complete 
exhaustion. Our supply of rice was running 
out; lack of ammunition was reaching 
catastrophic proportions. The population had 
become apathetic during the long partisan war 
and it was becoming difficult to draft new fighters 
for our guerrilla army. Because of years of jungle 
warfare, morale in the fighting units had reached 
the low point.22
Voice of Vietnam in Vietnamese to South Vietnam, 1200 
GMT, July 21, 1957.
23 From an unpublished manuscript cited and quoted in Warner, 
"The 1954 Geneva Agreements", op.cit., pp.6-7 and 27. No 
reference appears in Janos Radvanyi's Hungary and the 
Superpowers: The 1956 Revolution and Realpolitik (Stanford:
Hoover Institution Press, 1972) . Another book may be 
forthcoming.
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A similar view is provided by N.S. Khrushchev in 
his memoirs:
Before the Geneva Conference there was a 
preparatory meeting in Moscow. China was 
represented by Chou En-lai and Vietnam by 
President Ho Chi Minh and Prime Minister 
Pham Van Dong. We worked out the position 
we would take in Geneva, basing it on the 
situation in Vietnam. The situation was 
very grave. The resistance movement in 
Vietnam was on the brink of collapse. The 
partisans were counting on the Geneva 
Conference to produce a cease-fire agreement 
which would enable them to hold on to the 
conquests which they had won in the struggle 
of the Vietnamese people against the French 
occupation. Hanoi was securely in the hands 
of the French. If you looked at a map on 
which our own demands for a settlement were 
marked out, you'd see that North Vietnam 
was pockmarked with enclaves which had been 
captured and occupied by the French. 4
While the testimony of a Hungarian defector and
the veracity of unofficial memoirs might be suspect,
authoritative DRVN sources have confirmed that there was
a problem with morale at Dien Bien Phu. A commentary
on that famous battle published in Hanoi revealed, for
example:
This second phase was thus characterized by 
long and extremely bitter fighting. We had 
to solve arduous tactical and technical 
problems, to overcome fatigue and weariness, 
to meet extremely hard fighting conditionsr 
living week after week in trenches and under­
ground shelters. Sometimes, our positions 
would be flooded with rain, supplies would be 
insufficient, and as fighting was carried on 
uninterruptedly, losses had to be compensated 
for by reinforcements, and units had to be 
reorganized.
Under those conditions, political work played 
an important role in maintaining the morale 
of the troops, for among certain cadres and
Strobe Talbot, editor and translator, Khrushchev Remembers 
(London: Sphere Books Ltd., 1971), pp.442-443. The
authenticity of the memoirs is discussed by Edward Crankshaw 
in the introduction.
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men, negative tendencies had appeared: 
fear of losses, privations and fatigue; 
or complacency, underestimation of the 
enemy and impatience to gain a quick 
victory.
Before starting the offensive which was to 
end this second phase, the Central Military 
Committee, on order from the Political 
Bureau, launched a campaign for 'moral [sic] 
mobilization' and 'ideological rectification' 
among the cadres and Party members. ^
Later, an official Party history commented:
However, in 1954, the revolutionary forces 
were not strong enough to liberate the whole 
country; the enemy was defeated, but he was 
not completely subdued. Therefore our country 
was temporarily divided into two zones. 6^
It seems reasonable to conclude that war-weariness,
exhaustion after Dien Bien Phu, the risks of prolonged
fighting, perhaps most importantly the possibility of
27American military intervention and external pressures 
from Russia and China all played a part in the VWP-DRVN 
decision to seek a negotiated end to the war. A more 
difficult question, however, is whether or not the 17th 
parallel represented an accurate dividing line between 
the two contending forces. There can be no question that
"How the Dien Bien Phu Battle Was Won", Vietnamese Studies 
[Hanoi] (March 1965), No.8, Contribution to the History of 
Dien Bien Phu, pp.68-69.
2 6 An Outline History of the Viet Nam Workers' Party, op.cit . 
p . 7 9 .
27 The United States had downgraded its representation at 
the Geneva Conference and it was only at the end of the second 
week in July that the American Secretary of State agreed to 
let Bedell Smith, an Under Secretary, return to Geneva. The 
DRVN delegation and indeed its leaders in Viet-Nam could 
not permit themselves to underestimate American intentions, 
especially if the talks broke down.
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PAVN military and DRVN political strength were greater 
in the north (Bac Bo) and centre (Trung Bo) than in the 
south (Nam Bo).
As maps 2-1 and 2-2 indicate any demarcation line
drawn north of the 13th parallel across Viet-Nam would
cut across areas under the control of the VWP and its
subordinate organizations. According to American sources:
During June and July [1954], according to 
CIA maps, Viet Minh forces held down the 
larger portion of Annam (excepting the major 
port cities) and significant pockets in the 
Cochinchina delta. There consequent claims 
to all the territory north of a line running 
northwest from the 13th to the 14th parallel 
(from Tuy Hoa on the coast through Pleiku 
to the Cambodian border) was far more in 
keeping with the actual military situation 
than the French demand for location of the 
partition line at the 18th parallel. 8
29However, as an account published later in Hanoi indicates, 
the 18th parallel marked the divide between the "two 
parts of Viet Nam":
North of the 18th parallel which cut the 4th 
Interzone into two parts, the French troops 
only maintained their control over the Red 
River delta which was considered to correspond 
roughly to the 3rd Interzone, and in the Tay 
Bac Interzone (or Northwest), over the system 
of strong points at Na San and Lai Chau town 
which they had to evacuate in August and December 
1953 respectively. The greater part of Bac Bo
"The Outcome for the Communists", in United States - 
Vietnam Relations, op.cit., Book 2, III.D.l., pp.D8-D9; 
see also: U.S. Department of State telegram from Geneva,
SECTO 557 (July 3, 1954) to the Secretary of State in 
Washington, D.C. which contains an appraisal by Chauvel of 
French strength, in ibid., Book 9, pp.600-602.
29 Ta Xuan Linh, "South Viet Nam at the Time of Dien Bien 
Phu", Vietnamese Studies, (1976), No.43, Dien Bien Phu: 
Before, During, After, pp.56-57.
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MAP 2-1
THE SITUATION IN MAY 1953
THE SITUATION IN MAY 1953
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MAP 2-2
THE SITUATION 0^ THE BELLIGERENT FORCES 
FOLLOWING THE DIEN BIEN PHT.J BATTLE
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remained under the people's power. It formed, 
with the three northern provinces of the 4th 
Interzone, an immense free territory encircling 
the occupied zone.
Contrary to the North, the South, making up about 
three-fifths of the country's area, presented 
a carved-up aspect, with occupied and free zones 
interlacing one another. It was controlled by 
the colonialists, from north to south, in the 
following areas:
-- the coastal provinces of Central Viet Nam 
crossed lengthwise by Highway 1, from the 18th 
parallel to the Thu Bon river, south of Da Nang 
(16th parallel), Quang Binh, Quang Tri, Thua Thien 
(with Hue city) and the northern part of Quang Nam; 
-- Tay Nguyen Highlands with Kontum, Pleiku,
Darlac and Lam Dong provinces;
—  the southern part of Central Viet Nam from 
the Deo Ca pass (Cape Varella) to the boundary 
of Nam Bo (roughly from the 13th to the 11th 
parallels);
-- and the major part of the Mekong plain.
The free zones were composed of:
—  the 5th Interzone, Lien khu V in Vietnamese
(LK 5 for short): the major part of Quang Nam
province; Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh and Phu Yen 
provinces (Roughly from the 16th to the 13th 
parallels);
-- the 9th Interzone in the Mien Tay Interzone 
or western Nam Bo, which almost corresponded 
to what the French called Transbassac: the major 
part of Bac Lieu and Rach Gia provinces and part 
of Can Tho province.
The situation in the occupied zones was complicated. 
It should be noted that right from the beginning 
of the war many guerilla bases had been set up in 
the mountain regions of the coastal provinces 
of Trung Bo and eastern Nam Bo. They formed with 
the free zones of the 4th and 5th Interzones 
a single stretch of land. There were also 
enclaves which served as springboards for the 
people's armed forces to attack the enemy's 
rear. Most often they only consisted of five to 
ten communes such as Phong Dien, north of Hue,
Dien Ban, south and southeast of Da Nang, the 
southwestern part of Phan Thiet ... But they also 
covered large areas such as the famous D and C 
war zones and that of the Plain of Reeds in Nam 
Bo. There were also disputed regions which fell 
under the control of either side according to the 
fluctuations of the balance of forces.
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As a result of the provisions of the Geneva Accords
PAVN military forces located below the 17th parallel
were to withdraw into one of four regroupment zones and,
over a three-hundred day period, transfer to the north.
Regardless of whether or not the 17th parallel was an
accurate guide to the balance of forces on the ground,
it did serve its purpose as a military demarcation line.
The political provisions of the Geneva Agreements
were much more ambiguous. The vital clauses setting
forth details on elections, for example, were included
in the unsigned Final Declaration. The key provisions
were contained in point seven which read:
The Conference declares that, so far as Vietnam 
is concerned, the settlement of political 
problems, effected on the basis of respect for 
the principles of independence, unity, and 
territorial integrity, shall permit the 
Vietnamese people to enjoy the fundamental 
freedoms, guaranteed by democratic institutions 
established as a result of free general elections 
by secret ballot. In order to ensure that 
sufficient progress in the restoration of peace 
has been made, and that all the necessary 
conditions obtain for free expression of the 
national will, general elections shall be held 
in July 1956 under the supervision of an inter­
national commission composed of representatives 
of the Member States of the International 
Supervisory Commission, referred to in the agree­
ment on the cessation of hostilities. Consultations 
will be held on this subject between the competent 
representative authorities of the two zones from 
July 20, 1955 onward.30
Both the United States and State of Viet-Nam issued 
separate statements at that time clearly disassociating
31themselves from the responsibilities of implementation.
30 Point Seven of the Final Declaration in Great Britain, 
Further Documents Relating to the Discussions of Indochina 
at the Geneva Conference, Cmd. 9239, op.cit., p.9-11.
31 Randle, Geneva 1954, op.cit., pp.342-346.
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Although France signed the ceasefire agreements with the
PAVN High Command and agreed to the Final Declaration,
she nevertheless issued two public statements which
clearly indicated her recognition of the State of Viet- 
32Nam. Wesley Fishel has even argued, on the basis of a
secret grant of independence to the State of Viet-Nam,
prior to the adoption of the Final Declaration, that
France had recognized the sovereignty of the State of
33Viet-Nam over the entire territory of Viet-Nam.
There is some evidence that Pham Van Dong and his 
colleagues did not expect elections to take place.
P.J. Honey asserts, for example, that "Pham Van Dong, 
immediately after signing the Geneva Agreements on Indo­
china under Russian pressure, remarked to some non- 
Communist Vietnamese friends staying at his villa that
the national elections envisaged by the agreements would
34never take place'!. In a subsequent account Honey states:
The worthlessness of this concession [i.e. a 
definite date for elections] can be seen in a 
remark made by the Communist North Vietnam 
(DRV) Prime Minister, Pham Van Dong, to one of 
my Vietnamese friends immediately after the
Great Britain, Further Documents Relating to the 
Discussions of Indochina at the Geneva Conference, Cmd. 9239, 
op.cit., p.42.
3 3 Fishel, "One Vietnam or Two?", op.cit., p.363, writes:
"What is the letter's [from Mendes-France to Tran Van Do] 
significance? There can be no question but that it is 
proof of Vietnam's juridical sovereignty. The carefully 
phrased equation of 'Vietnam' with the 'State of Vietnam' 
carried the clear implication that Vietnam was one - and 
it was not the Vietnam of Ho Chi Minh, but the Vietnam of 
Ngo Dinh Diem!" (emphasis in the original). A copy of tHe 
letter in English translation may be found in ibid., pp.361-362.
34 P.J. Honey, "North Vietnam's Party Congress", The China 
Quarterly (October-December 1960), No.4, p.70.
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signing of the agreements. When asked which 
side he thought would win the elections, Dong 
replied, "You know as well as I do that there 
won't be any elections".35
Jeffrey Race cites an interview he conducted with
Vo Van An, a high-ranking Party cadre who later defected,
to confirm this view: "[ajccording to An, higher level
cadres (province and above) were certain that general
elections would never take place, although this was not
discussed at lower levels to maintain morale and so as
not to conflict with the Party's public stance that the
3 6Geneva Accords were a great victory for the Party".
Robert Turner, a former U.S. government official in Viet-
Nam, has written that Race's observation "is supported
by the author's [Turner's] interviews with senior 
37defectors..."
P.J. Honey, Communism in North Vietnam: Its Role in
the Sino-Soviet Dispute (Cambridge: The M .I.T . Press,
1966) , p .6 . ’
3 6 Race, War Comes to Long An, op.cit., p.34.
3 7 Robert F. Turner, Vietnamese Communism: Its Origins
and Development (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press,
1975), p .107; Turner's interviews were conducted between 
1968-1971. My own experience with defectors from the ranks 
of the Communist underground in South Viet-Nam is less 
categorical. Most expressed the opinion that even in the 
face of indications that elections were unlikely they 
nevertheless worked in the political struggle movement to 
bring them about. A most important consideration is the 
time period in question. After July 1955 when the deadline 
for consultations passed and nothing happened most cadres 
concluded that elections would not be held. I have been 
unable to confirm on the basis of'. interviews with "stay- 
behinds" (those who did not regroup) and "regroupees"
(those who went north) that the Party officially acknowledged 
prior to July 1956 that elections would not be held. 
Interviews with Phan The Ngoc, a stay-behind cadre who was 
active in Cambodian press circles in 1954-55 and who later 
became a member of the My Tho province committee specializing 
in "arts and letters" (uy vien van nghe), Saigon, Ministry 
of Open Arms, June 8, 1972; and Bui Cong Tuong, a member
cont'd
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According to Seymour Topping, a correspondent
working for Associated Press in Geneva at that time:
The Vietminh [DRVN] no doubt had every 
reason to believe, as did Chou En-lai 
and Molotov, that all of Vietnam would fall 
to them within two years. In this sense, the 
Vietminh leadership was satisfied, although 
members of their delegation complained 
privately to me that they had been cheated 
and expressed doubt that the national 
elections would be held in 1956. y
In light of Topping's remarks, and the vociferous
campaign subsequently waged by the DRVN authorities
39to hold elections, it seems reasonable to conclude that 
the DRVN, despite whatever misgivings it might have 
expressed in private and to its own cadres, favoured 
elections as the means of unifying Viet-Nam. Pham Van 
Dong and other members of his delegation were undoubtedly 
gravely upset that elections had been scheduled for two
37 cont'd
of the Long-Chau-Ha (a combination of the first names of 
three delta provinces: Long Xuyen, Chau Doc, Ha Tien)
province during 1946-54. Tuong became a member of the Ben 
Tre province committee in 1954 specializing in propaganda 
and training, Saigon, Ministry of Open Arms, June 9, 1972. 
Tuong was also one of Turner's informants; Xuan Vu, 
member of the Ben Tre province committee until 1954 when 
he regouped to the north, Saigon, Ministry of Open Arms, 
July 12, 1972.
3 8 Seymour Topping, Journey Between Two Chinas (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1972), p.151.
39 Cf. Franklin B. Weinstein, Vietnam's Unheld Elections: 
The Failure to Carry Out the 1956 Reunification Elections 
and the Effect on Hanoi's Present Outlook (Ithaca: 
Southeast Asia Program, Department of Asian Studies, 
Cornell University: July 1966), Data Paper No.60.
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years instead of within six months, a time scale they 
4 0had favoured. At that time DRVN officials still held
out hope that France would honour its commitments.
The overall view of the situation was summarized
by a directive allegedly issued by the Central Committee
of the VWP which the French acquired in November 1954:
peace is concluded to procure advantages 
for us, not for the purpose of ceasing the 
struggle. Peace as such is not unconditional.
We love peace and do not want war which 
causes bloodshed, but we are resolved to 
maintain our fundamental point of view 
which is independence, unity, democracy and 
peace. If the political struggle does not 
permit us to accomplish this essential aim, 
we are resolved to continue the war in order
our just cause and to achieve totalto support- 
victory.
On June 10, 1954 Pham Van Dong answered accusations 
from representatives of the State of Viet-Nam that his 
proposals of May 25th would leave Viet-Nam divided by 
underlining that national unity would be restored by 
elections which would be held within 6 months; Warner,
"The 1954 Geneva Agreements", op.cit., p.16; Devillers 
and Lacouture, End of a War, op.cit., p.250.
4.1 "Viet Minh policy document on Post-Geneva strategy, 
probably issued by the Central Committee of the Lao Dong 
Party to the Eastern Interzone of Nambo, obtained in 
November, 1954", in United States Department of State,
Working Paper on the North Vietnamese Role in the War in 
South Viet-Nam (Was hingt on, D.C., 19 6 8j , Appendices, Item 
200, p.7. The text of the Working Paper has been reproduced 
in Congressional Record, 90th Congress, 2nd Session (May 9, 
1968), Vol.114, No.79, pp.3604-3610 and in Viet-Nam Documents 
and Research Notes [Saigon] (June 1968), Document Nos.36-37. 
According to-Jeffrey Race, "The Origins of the Second 
Indochina War", Asian Survey (May 1970), Vol.X, N o .5, p.361, 
footnote 3, only 250 copies of the appendices were produced. 
The author consulted a collection on deposit at the Widner 
Library, Harvard University.
The use of captured materials inevitably raises the 
question of forged or faked documents. Because the appendices 
are used as a major source of documentation for this thesis 
it is necessary to explain why I believe the collection is 
genuine. Firstly, the 1968 Working Paper originated as 
an inter-agency study within the U.S. government. In its 
initial stages it was not intended for publication;
cont'd
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41 cont'd
indeed much of its materials were highly classified 
consisting of radio intercepts, agent reports and such 
like. When the decision was taken to make the report 
public via the State Department various officials who 
were assigned to the project were requested to go over the 
massive amount of documentation and select out for 
publication items of undoubted authenticity. In the process 
some materials had to be extracted, summarized or shortened 
to protect the original sources. Secondly, much of the 
documentation was also used in the preparation of "The 
Pentagon Papers". The unauthorized leak of the latter in 
1971 permits cross-checking. None of the material which 
overlaps appears to have been tailored for the 1968 
Working Paper whose publication was authorized. Finally, 
other scholars have used this source without complaint 
that the materials are faked. Although this does not 
demonstrate the authenticity of each and every item it 
does establish their general acceptance among scholars 
who are closely involved with scrutinizing such materials. 
See: Gareth Porter, A Peace Denied: The United States,
Vietnam, and the Paris Agreement (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1975), pp.1-16 and 279, footnote 15 
(which is the document cited above); Brian C. Shaw,
"Some Comments on North Vietnam's Involvement in South 
Vietnam", paper delivered to a Work-in-Progress Seminar, 
Department of International Relations, Research School of 
Pacific Studies, The Australian National University (May 7, 
1969); and Race, War Comes to Long, op.cit., pp.1-140, 
passim.
Obviously each and every document must be taken on 
its own merits. Wherever possible additional sources have 
been cited when the point in questions seems controversial 
or in need of documentation. The item in question is 
probably authentic for the following reasons. Firstly, 
Professor Geoffrey Warner, quite coincidently, managed 
to read a copy of the French language original (itself a 
translation from the Vietnamese) in the possession of General 
Michel de Brebisson in Paris on March 5, 1973. This seems 
to indicate that the dating of the document and source (via 
French intelligence) are correct; rather, the document 
was not fabricated by the United States in 1968. Secondly, 
internal references in the document to the 6th plenum of 
the Viet-Nam Workers' Party, in particular a quotation from 
Ho Chi Minh's speech, preceeded the publication of the 
speech by Hanoi in 1962. Interestingly Jean Lacouture 
quotes extensively from this speech in his biography of 
Ho Chi Minh, giving as his source: "The Selected Works of
Ho Chi Minh (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House,
1962), pp.458-62." No such speech appears in the English- 
language edition and I can only assume that the translator 
of Lacouture's book (written in French) rendered the title 
of the French edition of Ho's Selected Works into English.
The French edition of Ho's writings are not available to 
the author. See: Jean Lacouture, Ho Chi Minh: A Political
Biography, translated from the French by Peter Wiles and 
edited by Jane Clark Seitz (New York: Vintage Books, 1968),
cont'd
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II. THE SIXTH PLENUM (JULY 1954)
The decision by VWP leaders in 1953 to seek a negotiated 
end to the war was not without controversy. General Vo 
Nguyen Giap, PAVN Commander-in-chief, apparently 
argued heatedly for pushing the seige at Dien Bien Phu 
to a successful conclusion as a prerequisite for any 
political bargaining.^ Pham Ngoc Thao, at that time a 
Colonel in the People's Army, reported that a majority 
of his colleagues, mainly staff officers,
41 cont'd
p.195; Geoffrey Warner, "Interview with General Michel de 
Brebisson, Paris, 5 March 1973", typescript of interview 
notes, pp.1-2. Interview with William S. Stearman, 
Washington, D.C., Executive Office Building, August 25,
1972. Mr Stearman, then a member of the National Security 
Council, was involved in preparing the 1968 Working Paper 
for publication.
According to Pentagon analyst General Paul F. Gorman, 
"In early 1967, at the request of the Secretary of Defense, 
an interagency study group was convened from CIA, DIA 
[Defense Intelligence Agency], and the Department of State 
for a comprehensive review of U.S. intelligence concerning: 
'The North Vietnamese Role in the Origin, Direction, and 
Support of the War in South Vietnam'". According to a 
footnote "(t)his study was designed to answer queries 
from Congressman Evans ... and was considered for 
publication, modified as a 'White Paper'". Congressman 
Evans was responsible for inserting the document in the 
above-cited Congressional Record. The unclassified 
version was tabled by W. Averell Harriman, Chief U.S. 
Delegate, at a session of the Paris Peace Talks on May 
27, 1968. The original study was labelled as follows:
United States Interagency Intelligence Committee, "The 
North Vietnamese Role in the Origin, Direction and 
Support of the War in South Vietnam", (DIA AP-4) (May 1967 - 
SECRET), 2 Vols. See: "Hanoi and the Insurgency in
South Vietnam", in United States - Vietnam Relations, 
op.cit., Book 2, IV.A.5. Tab. 3, p.34; and "Failure of 
the Geneva Settlement", in ibid., Book 2, IV.A.5. Tab. 1, 
unpublished footnotes, note 8.
Cited hereafter as: Working Paper.
42 Chen, Vietnam and China, op.cit., op.294-295.
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refused to accept the rumours of an impending settlement 
at Geneva until addressed by Ho Chi Minh himself at a 
specially convened meeting held in June 1954.^
Nevertheless the VWP met in mid-July at the sixth
44plenary session of the Central Committee to review 
progress at Geneva and to approve the outline of the 
settlement whose basic provisions (partition and elections) 
had already emerged. There is every likelihood that the 
self-imposed deadline set for July 20th by Premier Mendes- 
France weighed heavily on the deliberations. A failure 
to secure an agreement at this time may very well have 
meant a resumption of the fighting with the possibility 
of American military intervention.
The tenor of Ho Chi Minh's speech to this Party 
gathering suggests that disagreement was rife. Some, 
no doubt recalling the unsatisfactory agreements negotiated 
with the French in 1946, wanted to continue the fight. 
Others, reflecting on the destruction and war-weariness 
of the population, appeared eager to make concessions in 
order to secure peace. Ho's remarks touched on both points 
of view, but his extended comments on "leftist deviation" 
appeared a signal that the hawks were the more powerful 
group.
Charles B. McLane, "The Russians and Vietnam: Strategies
of Indirection", International Journal (Winter 1968/69), 
Vol.XXIV, No. 1, p.4'97 footnote 3‘.
4 4 Only brief accounts of this meeting have appeared before:
An Outline History of the Viet Nam Workers' Party, op.cit., 
p . 7 6; Lacouture, Ho Chi Minh, op.cit., pp. 193-195; Bernard 
B. Fall, "A 'Straight Zigzag': The Road to Socialism in 
North Viet-Nam", in A. Doak Barnett, editor, Communist 
Strategies in Asia: A Comparative Analysis of Governments
and Parties (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), p.207;
and "Thirty-five Years of Revolutionary Struggle by Our Party", 
Working Paper, Appendices, Item 209, p.16.
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45Ho divided his address into three sections.
In part one he argued: given the aggressive nature of
American imperialism the very convening of the Berlin 
and Geneva conferences "is in itself a victory for our 
side and a defeat for the imperialists"He attributed 
this success to the divided nature of the capitalist camp 
caused by contradictions between the U.S. on the one hand, 
and France and Britain on the other. In brief, the 
United States was opposed to peace in Viet-Nam and was 
doing everything in its power to sabotage the Geneva 
Conference even to the extent of proposing "joint action" 
in Indochina. It had become, in Ho's words, "the main 
enemy of world peace" .
Turning to the domestic front Ho made a cautious
analysis of the progress achieved to date. Among the
positive aspects were the unity of the Khmer, Lao and
Vietnamese resistance movements, major military victories
including Dien Bien Phu and initial success in combating
feudalism through mobilization for land reform. Despite
these accomplishments, however, Ho warned:
Thus, since the start of the resistance, our 
posture has grown stronger and the enemy's 
weaker. But we should bear in mind that this 
should be understood in a relative, not 
absolute sense. We must guard against
I have used two versions of this speech, one in 
Vietnamese and the other in English; see: Ho Chi Minh, 
Nhung Chang Duong Lieh Su Ve Vang [Episodes from a 
Glorious History] (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Quan Doi Nhan Dan,
1973), pp.77-90; and "Report to the 6th Plenum of the 
Viet Nam Workers' Party Central Committee (July 15, 1954)", 
in Ho Chi Minh, Selected Writings, op.cit., pp.172-183.
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subjectiveness and not underrate our enemy.
Our successes have awakened the American 
imperialists. After the Dien Bien Phu 
campaign, the latter's intentions and plan 
for intervention have also undergone changes 
aimed at protracting and internationalizing 
the Indochina war, sabotaging the Geneva 
Conference, and ousting the French by every 
means, in order to occupy Viet Nam, Cambodia 
and Laos ....
Therefore, the US imperialists not only are 
the enemy oF the world's people, but are 
becoming the main and direct enemy of the 
Vietnamese, Cambodian and Laos peoples"]
(emphasis in original")
IIn part two, entitled "New Tasks", Ho argued that 
the new situation required a change in objectives. The 
old slogan, "Resistance to the end" must be replaced by 
a new one: "Peace, Unity, Independence, Democracy".
American imperialism had replaced French colonialism as 
the main enemy of the revolution. Therefore, according 
to Ho :
Our policy must change in consequence: 
formerly we confiscated the French 
imperialists' properties; now, as 
negotiations are going on, we may, in 
accordance with the principle of equality 
and mutual benefit, allow French economic 
and cultural interests to be preserved in 
Indochina. Negotiations entail reasonable 
mutual concessions. Formerly we said we 
would drive out and wipe out all French 
aggressive forces; now, in the talks 
held, we have demanded and the French 
have accepted, that a date be set for the 
withdrawal of their troops. In the past, 
our aim was to wipe out the puppet 
administration and army with a view to 
national reunification; now we practise 
a policy of leniency and seek reunification 
of the country through nation-wide elections.
Ho' s mention of elections was made five days before
Molotov settled the issue by choosing a two-year time
frame. Neither, or so it seems, was Ho aware that the
17th parallel would be picked as the military demarcation
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line. Nevertheless, as the following quotation reveals,
Ho and the VWP were already committed to partition. In 
Ho's words:
If you want peace you must end the war; 
if you want to end the war then you must 
obtain a cease-fire. If you want a 
cease-fire then you must readjust [dieu 
chinh] zones, which is to say, the enemy's 
army must concentrate in one area, so as 
to be able to withdraw gradually [from 
the country], while our army concentrates 
in another area. We must obtain a very 
large territory where we would have 
sufficient means for building, consolidating, 
and developing our forces for the purpose 
of influencing other regions, and thereby 
bring about reunification [of the country]. 
Readjustment of zones is not partition; 
it is a temporary affair leading to 
reunification.4 6
Ho then went on to talk about the various problems
that would arise (especially among people in the south
where the French would take responsibility) as a result
of partition. He also expounded on the need to create
new policies, especially in the north, where the Party
would be given control of cities. Ho concluded this part
by warning those present against the following ideological 
47errors:
Leftist deviation. Some people, intoxicated 
with o-ft repeated victories, want to fight 
on at all costs, to a finish; they see only 
the trees, not the whole forest; with their 
attention focused on the withdrawal 
of the French they fail to detect their 
schemes, they see the French but not the
This is my translation from the Vietnamese.
47 Lacouture, Ho Chi Minh, op.cit., p.195, observes: "The
amount of attention which he devotes to 'leftism' and 
'rightism', respectively, testifies to the nature of his 
own position and of the opponents whom he had to convince".
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Americans; they are partial to military 
action and make light of diplomacy. They 
are unaware that we are struggling in 
international conferences as well as on the 
battlefields in order to attain our goal.
They will oppose the new slogans, which they 
deem to be rightist manifestations and to 
imply too many concessions. They set forth 
excessive conditions unacceptable to the 
enemy. They want quick results, unaware that 
the struggle for peace is a hard and complex 
one. Leftist deviation will cause one to be 
isolated, alienated from one's own people 
and those of the world, and suffer setbacks.
Rightist deviation will lead to pessimism, 
inaction and unprincipled concessions. It 
causes one to lack confidence in the people's 
strength and to blunt their combative spirit, 
to lose the power to endure hardships and to 
aspire only to a quiet and easy life.
Leftist and rightist tendencies are both wrong.
They will be exploited by the enemy; they will 
benefit them and harm us.
Part three of Ho's speech was brief and to the point. 
He listed three responsibilities and ten tasks which were 
to be carried out in the immediate future "under the 
leadership of the Central Committee". The three 
"responsibilities" were:
1. To secure and consolidate peace; to 
achieve unity, independence, and 
democracy for the whole country .
2. To strengthen the people's armed forces 
and build up a mighty people's army capable 
of meeting the requirements of the new 
situation.
3. To keep implementing the slogan: land
to the tiller. To strive to restore 
production and to prepare for national 
reconstruction.
Ho listed the following ten tasks ("Each locality 
and each branch will not necessarily have to carry out 
all ten but each will be assigned a certain number of
tasks".):
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1. To create unity of mind in the whole
Party and among the entire people as regards 
the new situation and the new tasks.
2. To strengthen leadership in diplomatic 
struggle.
3. To strengthen the people's army.
4. To take over the newly-liberated zones; 
especial attention to be paid to the taking 
over and management of the cities.
5. To give a new orientation to work in the 
zone temporarily reserved for regrouped 
enemy forces.
6. To keep consolidating the former free 
zones.
7. To mobilize the masses vigorously for 
land reform.
8. To improve economic and financial work
and prepare conditions for the reconstruction 
of the country.
9. To assist the Pathet Lao and Khmer forces.
10. To continue the work of reorganization and 
ideological rectification of the Party in the 
newly-liberated areas.
It is possible that the Central Committee also heard 
a report by Ho on his talks with Chou En-lai held 
during July 3-5, 1954. Chou undoubtedly appraised Ho 
of the talks he had held in Berne with Mendes-France on 
June 23rd as well as his conversations with Nehru in 
India and U Nu in Burma held enroute to the Sino-Vietnamese 
border. Chou and Mendes-France reached agreement on 
certain issues relating to Laos and Cambodia; on Viet- 
Nam they both agreed that military issues should have priority 
over political ones. Both men raised the issue of 
regroupment zones. Mendes-France suggested the possibility
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of a "horizontal" cut while Chou recommended bilateral
48talks between the DRVN delegation and France on the issue.
Chou's trip to India was his first to a non-Communist
Asian country. While in Delhi he promised Nehru that he
would persuade the DRVN to withdraw its forces from
Cambodia and Laos and grant recognition to both kingdoms.
In their final communique both leaders agreed to conduct
their future relations on the basis of the five principles
of peaceful coexistence and expressed the hope that these
principles would be applied "to the solution of the
4 9problems in Indochina". According to one writer, "(t)he 
importance of this historic meeting cannot be exaggerated.
It helped Chou later to persuade Ho Chi Minh to withdraw 
from Laos and Cambodia by pointing out that Indian and 
Asian opinion would be adverse toward the Vietminh's
50[DRVN's] aggressive moves and continuation of the conflict".
Later Chou would nominate India as chairman of the tripartite
International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC),
a body set up to oversee the implementation of the Geneva
Agreements in Indochina. Chou's visit to Burma had more
to do with bilateral relations between the two countries
than with the settlement at Geneva. Nevertheless the
principles expressed in the Sino-Burmese joint communique
51had relevance to Viet-Nam.
Devillers and Lacouture, End of a War, op.cit., p.255.
4 9 D.R. SarDesai, Indian Foreign Policy in Cambodia, Laos, 
and Vietnam, 1947-1964 (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1968), p .48.
50 Ibid.
Russell H. Fifield, The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia: 
1945-1958 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958), pp.198-199.
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A marked change in the DRVN1s views on where to draw 
the demarcation line was evident after the Chou-Ho talks. 
According to an American account these changes resulted 
from Chinese pressure:
This Viet Minh [DRVN] position [on demarcation] 
underwent a drastic change by the middle of 
July; and the change can be traced to a 
meeting between Chou En-lai and Ho Chi Minh 
at Nanning near the China-Vietnam border.
According to CIA reports, Chou applied 
pressure on Ho to accept a partition line 
much farther to the North, probably the 17th 
or 18th parallel. Pham Van Dong's subsequent 
compromise position indicating a willingness 
of the Viet Minh to discuss partition at the 
16th parallel seems to have originated in the 
talks between Chou and Ho.^2
Ten days separated the end of the Chou-Ho talks and
Ho's speech before the 6th plenum of the Central Committee.
53The VWP Politburo met immediately after the talks. It 
probably discussed the various implications of the cross­
cutting pressures being brought to bear and reviewed the 
situation on the ground before agreeing to accept partition 
at or near the 17th parallel. Ho's speech to the 6th 
plenum clearly indicates that "some comrades" had misgivings.
These were obviously overcome. According to a later Party
54account of this meeting:
"Sino-Soviet Objectives and Strategy", in United States - 
Vietnam Relations, Book I, III.C.2., p.C-23. The CIA source 
is cited as follows: CIA Memorandum, "Asian Communist
Employment of Negotiations as a Political Tactic", RSS No. 
0017/66 (SECRET/No Foreign Distribution/Controlled 
Distribution), no date; Devillers and Lacouture, End of 
a War, op.cit., pp.257-258.
53 Ban Nghien Cuu Lieh Su Dang Trung Uong [Department of 
Historical Research Party Central (Committee)], Bon Muoi 
Lam Nam Hoat Dong Cua Dang Lao Dong Viet-Nam [45 Years of 
Activities of the Viet-Nam Workers' Party] (Hanoi: Nha
Xuat Ban Su That, 1976), p.74.
54 Ibid.
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The [sixth] session unanimously agreed with 
the Politburo on the decision to negotiate 
in order to reestablish peace in Indochina on 
the basis of French recognition of the 
independence, sovereignty, unity and 
territorial integrity of Viet-Nam. The 
Conference decided 'to direct the struggle 
against the U.S. imperialists and the 
French warmongers and, relying on the success 
already achieved, to struggle to realize peace 
in Indochina, to smash the schemes of the 
U.S. imperialists to prolong and expand the 
Indochinese War, to consolidate peace, realize 
unity and independence, and to achieve democracy 
throughout the country'.
Additional details on the resolution of the sixth
55plenum are provided by an East German who was told by 
the VWP Secretary-General Truong Chinh, that the Central 
Committee resolved the following:
1. To observe strictly the cease-fire agreement 
and to strengthen peace;
2. To enlarge the national and democratic 
Front and to prepare for general elections 
with the aim of achieving the unity of the 
country and to bring about complete 
independence and democracy;
3. To strengthen the national defence and the 
forces for the protection of peace;
4. To materialize further the slogan "Land to 
the Tiller", to liberate the productive forces 
of the village, to build up the national 
economy, to realise the plans for national 
construction and to improve gradually the 
economic and cultural living conditions
of the people.
III. THE AFTERMATH OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE
In the post-Geneva period most Western observers 
believed that the Lao Dong party was so strong politically
Franz Faber, Rot Leuchtet der Song Cai 
Kongress Verlag, 195 5) , p .135 .
(Berlin:
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5 6that it would dominate the scheduled electoral contest. 
Party officials were certainly aware of their assets in 
the south. French and American intelligence sources 
estimated their control to range between sixty and ninety 
percent of the population in areas outside of sect control. 
This would mean a rural strength of approximately 2.1 to 
3.6 million persons out of a total population of some
ten million living below the seventeenth parallel at that
. . 57time.
United States Central Intelligence Agency, Post-Geneva 
Outlook in Indo-China, National Intelligence Estimate 
(August 3 , 19 54) , NIE 63-5054 in United States - Vietnam 
Relations, op.cit., Book 10, p.692^ "if the scheduled 
elections are held in July, 1956, and if the Viet Minh does 
not prejudice its political prospects, the Viet Minh 
will almost certainly win".
57 United States Department of State, The Communist Subversive 
Threat in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos (Washington, D .C.:
Office of Intelligence ResearcK, December 29, 1955), pp.8-10 
cited in "Rebellion Against My-Diem", in United States - 
Vietnam Relations, op.cit., Book 2, IV.A.5.Tab 2, p.10;
Joseph Alsop, writing in The New York Herald Tribune (March 1,
1955) is quoted as saying"^  "Estimates of the dimensions of 
the problem vary rather widely, to be sure. If you ask 
the Americans here [in Saigon] they will tell you that outside the feudal domains of the military religious sects, 
anywhere from 50 to 70 per cent of the southern Indochinese 
are subject to Viet Minh influence or control. French 
experts give still higher percentages, between 60 and 90". 
Cited in Hammer, The Struggle for Indochina, op.cit., p.360. 
According to census figures the population south of the 
seventeenth parallel was about 10 million; this would have 
placed the population in the liberated areas at between 2.1 
and 3.6 million; Viet Nam Cong Hoa [Republic of Viet-Nam],
Bo Kinh Te Quoc Gia [Ministry of National Economy], Viet Nam 
Nien Giam Tong Ke [Annual Statistical Yearbook] (Saigon:
1956) , Vol.4 (1952-53) and 6 (1956). The total population 
figures had to be extrapolated from missing data (population 
of some provinces was available for 1943 only). Joseph 
Alsop, "A Reporter At Large", op.cit., p.35, provided an 
estimate of 2 million; Pham Van Dong, in an interview with 
Wilfred Burchett, stated that the figure was 3 million of 
whom 2 million had been under the DRVN government since
the August Revolution of 1945, Wilfred Burchett dispatch 
from Geneva in The Daily Worker (July 26, 1954), p.4. This 
figure reappears in Wilfred Burchett, North of the 17th
cont'd
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The political situation in areas outside Party
control were favourable. Here the Party's analysis
emphasized the feudal nature of the sects, the monarchical
nature of the State of Viet-Nam and the contradictions
5 8between French and American interests. In short, 
the Party perceived advantages in a divided opposition 
which they felt they could take advantage of in the period 
ahead.
It took the VWP nearly two months to work out the
details of its program for the south. This delay may
have been due to three factors: (1) dissension in the
Party over both the principles of the peace settlement
and the fine details eventually agreed to (2) a deep
suspicion over American intentions immediately after
the Geneva Conference and (3) problems in communicating
and coordinating action with the leaders in Nam Bo. It
was not until the third week of September that the Politburo
assembled and approved the basic resolutions which would
59guide policy in the year ahead.
57 cont'd
Parallel (Delhi: People's Publishing House, 1956), p.213;
it is quoted approvingly in B.S.N. Murti, Vietnam Divided: 
The Unfinished Struggle (Bombay, Calcutta and New Delhi: 
Asia Publishing House”, 1956), p.26.
5 8 Working Paper, Appendices, Item 200, pp.1-6.
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Xu Uy Nam Bo [Nam Bo Regional Committee], Tinh Hinh 
Nam Bo Tu Sau Hoa Binh Lap Lai Den Hien Nay [The Situation 
in Nam Bo from the Restoration of Peace to the Present] 
(typescript, circa 1959/60). This is a high-level policy 
review-cum-history written by the Nam Bo Regional Committee 
on the eve of a shift from political to military struggle.
A copy of the Vietnamese original was obtained by the 
author while on field work in Viet-Nam in the summer of 
1972. I would like to thank Mr William E. Gausmann, then
cont'd
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In the meantime on July 25th, the Central Committee
held another meeting. Despite whatever reservations
certain individuals might have felt, the public
announcements presented a united front. An editorial in
the Party's newspaper, Nhan Dan, declared that the Geneva
Conference constituted a "brilliant success".^ A Joint
Enlarged Session of the Lien Viet Front and the Viet-Nam
Peace Committee was convened to give its full support and
61approval for the agreements. A Plenary Session of the
6 2National Assembly's Standing Committee did likewise.
The immediate policy tasks in the new period were 
listed in both the Nhan Dan editorial and in an Appeal by 
the Party on the same date. The editorial stated that the 
main task of the revolutionary movement was
59 cont'd
editor of Viet-Nam Documents and Research Notes, for 
bringing this document to my attention. I would also like 
to thank Mr Douglas Pike for extracting a copy of the 
Vietnamese original from the Republic of Viet-Nam authorities. 
The document was initially obtained by the 5th U.S. Special 
Forces on April 28, 1969 in unexplained circumstances. An 
English translation was published in United States 
Department of Defense Intelligence Information Report 
(March 11, 1970), Report No. 6-028-0130-70, CDEC [Combined 
Documentation Exploitation Center] Document Log Number 
01053370. Copies of this translation are available from 
two sources: Jeffrey Race, compiler, Vietnamese Materials
(Chicago: Center for Research Libraries) , microfilm reel
III, document number 1083; and "Turner Document No.3",
Hoover Institution, Stanford, California, Robert Turner, 
a former assistant to William Gausmann, deposited this and 
several other items with the Hoover Institution archives. 
Cited hereafter as Tinh Hinh Nam Bo.
6 0 "We Enthusiastically Welcome the Restoration of Peace 
in Indochina", Nhan Dan (July 25, 1954) as broadcast by 
Vietnam News Agency Tn English morse to Southeast Asia,
0619 and 1200 GMT, July 25, 1954.
61 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia,
1200 GMT, July 30, 1954.
6 2 Voice of Vietnam in Vietnamese to Indochina and Southeast 
Asia, 0430 GMT, July 29, 1954.
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struggle to consolidate the peace we have won, faithfully and rapidly implement the provisions 
of the armistice agreement, and go forward 
to the settlement of the Indochinese political 
issues, so as to fully regain our national 
rights, that is - complete unity, independence, 
and democracy.^
The Appeal declared:
The patriotic struggle of our people has 
entered a new phase. The phase of armed 
struggle is now being replaced by the 
phase of political struggle. However, 
like the armed fighting, the political 
struggle will certainly be long and hard before reaching complete victory.64
Neither the Appeal nor the editorial was specific
about policy in the south other than its emphasis on
implementing provisions of the ceasefire agreements.
For example, the same Nhan Dan editorial spelled out
the tasks for the new phase of political struggle in this
way:
we must continue to fulfill the present 
pressing tasks in order to consolidate and 
develop our people's democratic regime.
These tasks are: consolidate the forces of
peace of our people, carry out the peasant 
mass mobilization, carry through reduction 
of land rent and the agrarian reform, 
increase production to restore and develop 
the economy in the countryside as well as in the urban areas.6 5
During the course of the First Indochina War 
coordination of Lao Dong Party policy throughout the 
length of Viet-Nam was usually difficult. In part this
6 1 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 
0619 and 1200 GMT, July 25, 1954.
6 4 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 
1200 GMT, August 5, 1954; 0515 GMT, August 6, 1954.
f\ R Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 
0619 and 1200 GMT, July 25, 1954.
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reflected regional differences in the country as well
as the geographical configuration of Viet-Nam. In 1951
an attempt was made to remedy this situation by creating
a special Central Committee Directorate for Southern
6 6Viet-Nam (Trung Uong Cue Mien Nam). This Directorate 
was staffed by members of the Lao Dong Party's Central 
Committee and served as its forward echelon. Its 
precise location, if there was one, was guessed to be
6 7somewhere in the U-Minh forest area of the Ca-Mau peninsula.
It was this Directorate which implemented Party
policy in the south after the Geneva Agreements were signed.
It was charged with implementing a ceasefire in central
Viet-Nam on August 1st and in southern Viet-Nam on 
6 8August 11th. In each region regroupment of military 
forces was to take place within fifteen days of the ceasefire 
into certain specified provisional assembly areas. These 
were: (1) Binh-Dinh and Quang-Ngai provinces, (2) Ham-Tan -
Xuyen-Moc, (3) the Plain of Reeds and (4) in Ca Mau 
province (see map 2-3).
After this initial regroupment a final regroupment of 
PAVN forces north of the seventeenth parallel was to occur
Albert E. Palmerlee, "The Central Office for South Viet- 
Nam", Viet-Nam Documents and Research Notes (August 1968), 
Document No.40, Appendix A, pp.19-20, which contains an 
English translation of a French translation of the Vietnamese 
original document issued by the Lao Dong Party establishing 
the Directorate for the South (Trung Uong Cue Mien Nam); 
see also Robert J. O'Neill, General Giap: Politician and
Strategist (Melbourne: Cassell Australia, 1969), p.103.
Palmerlee, "The Central Office for South Viet-Nam", op.cit., 
p.4; Race, War Comes to Long An, op.cit., pp.28-29.
6 8 Article 10 of the "Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities 
in Viet-Nam", in Great Britain, Further Documents Relating 
to the Discussion of Indochina at the Geneva Conference,
Cmd. 92 39 , op.ci t., pp.27-38 .
within three hundred days following the schedule listed 
in Table 2-1.
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Table 2-1 . Final Military Re'groupment Timetable
1) Within 80 days (10 October 1954)
Ham-Tan - Xuyen Moc
Binh-Dinh - Quang-Ngai (first instalment)
2) Within 100 days (30 October 1954)
Plain of Reeds
Binh-Dinh - Quang-Ngai (second instalment)
3) Within 200 days (7 February 1955)
Ca-Mau
4) Within 300 days (19 May 1955)
Binh-Dinh - Quang-Ngai (third and final instalment)
A similar procedure was to be followed by the French 
Union Forces which would result in their regroupment 
south of the seventeenth parallel. A special demilitarized 
zone would then separate the two sides.
It seems probable that in the period from July 20th 
until a meeting of the Political Bureau in late September 
the Central Committee Directorate for Southern Viet-Nam 
was told to exercise extreme vigilance until the ceasefires 
went into effect, and then to regroup into the provisional 
assembly areas and await further instructions. No doubt 
French actions were being studied with care, especially in 
the north, and American intentions were being closely 
scrutinized during this critical period.
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MAP 2-3
VIETNAM: PROVISIONAL ASSEMBLY AREAS
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Demonstrations organized to welcome the restoration
6 9of peace, although reported as early as July, did not
really take shape until August 1st when they occurred
simultaneously in Hue, Da-Nang and Saigon-Cholon.^
The demonstrations were suppressed in both Da-Nang,
where one person was reportedly killed and two wounded,
and Saigon-Cholon, where police fired into a crowd
wounding several people. It is unclear what role the
Lao Dong Party had in all this. The demonstration in
Saigon-Cholon occurred ten days before the ceasefire
came into effect and thus its suppression was predictable.
Reports at that time said the August 1st demonstration
welcoming the Geneva Agreements was called as a riposte
to an earlier gathering on July 18th protesting partition.^
Perhaps as many as 5,000 were mobilized for the August 1st
event, and later claims that 50,000 were involved must be
72dismissed as excessive exaggeration. The significance
Vu Can, "The People's Struggles Against the US-Diem 
Regime from 1954 to 1960", Vietnamese Studies (1968),
Nos.18/19, p .103.
Radio France-Asie in English to the Far East, 2330 GMT, 
August 9, 1954; and "Vietnam Sets Up 2 Sedition Courts",
The New York Times (August 4, 1954), p.2.
71 Radio France-Asie in English to Southeast Asia, 2330 
GMT, November 5, 1954.
7 2 Vu Can, "The People's Struggles Against the US-Diem 
Regime", op.cit., p.95; and Xu Uy Nam Bo* Tinh Hinh Phong 
Trap Dau Tranh Chinh Tri o Nam Bo Tu Hoa Binh Lap Lai Den 
Hien Nay [The Situation of the Political Struggle Movement 
in Nam Bo From the Restoration of Peace to the Present] 
(typescript, circa 1960/61). This is a companion piece to 
Tinh Hinh Nam Bo; it was acquired by the author while on 
field work in Saigon in 1972. An English translation was 
published in United States Department of Defense Intelligence 
Informaticn Report (February 20, 1970), Report N o . 6-028-008 8-7 0 , 
CDEC Document Log Number 01-0535-70. Cited hereafter as 
Tinh Hinh Phong Trap.
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of the event is that in the aftermath of the police 
shootings a Movement for the Defense of the Peace and 
the Geneva Agreements was organized in Saigon-Cholon, 
and branches were soon established in Hue and Da-Lat.
In brief the Party's underground was now beginning to 
flex its political muscles.
IV. THE SEPTEMBER, 1954, POLITBURO CONFERENCE
Sometime around the third week of September, the
7 3dates have not been been stated officially, the Political 
Bureau of the Lao Dong Party held a conference of 
enormous consequence. The timing is worth noting: it
occurred after the initial regroupment into provisional 
assembly areas and before the start of the final regroupment 
into the northern regroupment zone and it occurred after 
an eight-nation conference in Manila had formed the 
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. Finally, if the 
dating of the conference is correct, it occurred at the 
height of a political crisis in Saigon between the newly 
appointed Premier, Ngo Dinh Diem, and the chief of staff 
of the Army, General Nguyen Van Hinh. Each of these 
events were to shape the final conference resolution. At 
this meeting the Political Bureau adopted a long-range 
policy which would allow the Lao Dong Party to synchonize 
its policies internationally, in the north and in the south 
so as to bring about the complete implementation of the 
Geneva Agreements, as the Party interpreted its provisions.
Ban Nghien Cuu Lieh Su Dang Trung Uong, Bon Muoi Lam 
Nam Hoat Dong Cua Dang Lao Dong Viet Nam, op.cit., p.80.
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In 1954 the Lao Dong Party still based its analysis 
of world affairs on Zhdanov's "two camp theory 
According to the VWP interpretation the world was seen 
as divided into two blocs, one composed of the forces of 
peace led by the Soviet Union and the other composed 
of-the--forces—of peace--led by the Soviet-Union and the— 
ether composed, of the forces of war, led by the American 
imperialists. The newly established DRVN was declared 
to be part of the democratic and peace front led by the 
USSR. This bloc in the Party's view was "becoming more 
and more prosperous" while the bloc led by the American 
imperialists was "becoming more and more isolated". The 
American imperialists were thus trying to provoke war 
because of their increasing decline. For example this 
is why the United States was pushing for military alliances 
in Europe (EDC) and Asia (SEATO). These pacts would allow 
the United States to encircle both the Soviet Union and 
the People's Republic of China and attack the socialist 
camp.
The American-led bloc favouring war was enmeshed in 
difficulties because of competition among the capitalist 
powers. In particular, the American imperialists were 
striving to replace France in Indochina. The French 
capitalists were divided into two groups, those who were 
deemed American puppets and those who were "pacifists" 
and rejected the policies of the U.S.
Working Paper, Appendices, Item 200, passim. Unattributed 
quotations in the following paragraphs are taken from this 
source.
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In the view of the VWP the strategy of the bloc
favouring peace, on the other hand, was seen as achieving
success, as an increasing number of people were being
united in a broad anti-imperialist front. The policy of
7 5the peace bloc was based on five principles which were
endorsed by the world's peoples: (1) reciprocal respect
for sovereignty and territorial integrity, (2) mutual
non-aggression, (3) non-intervention in the internal
affairs of other countries, (4) equality and mutual
interest and (5) peaceful coexistence.
With regard to Indochina, the Geneva Conference was
seen as evidence for the view that "[a]ny international
7 6conflict could be resolved by negotiations ..." However 
peace could only be maintained if it were defended properly. 
Thus leaders of the VWP viewed North Viet-Nam as an 
integral part of a "Front for Peace" whose object in 
unifying the country was to deny its human and material 
resources to the American imperialists. Success in this 
endeavour was seen as contributing to the isolation of 
the U.S. imperialists internationally thus helping to 
thwart its "war-like schemes".
Lao Dong Party policy in the north, designed to carry 
out the building of socialism, aimed at political 
consolidation and economic reconstruction. An editorial
These are of course the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence, agreed to by Chou En-lai and Nehru and U Nu 
in 1954. Their history from their Indonesian origins 
to their adoption by India is traced in a letter from 
Nehru to Russell Fifield in his The Diplomacy of Southeast 
Asia, op.cit., Appendix B, pp.510-511.
76 Working Paper, Appendices, Item 200, p.4.
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in Nhan Dan described these tasks as they were listed 
in the Political Bureau's resolution: "to achieve
agrarian reform, restor[e] and increas[e] production 
and strengthen... the people's army so as to consolidate 
northern Vietnam..."77
In other words, the North was to constitute the 
foundation for the building of socialism. This in itself 
would protect the peace and influence the political 
struggle in the south. This was explained by a Central 
Committee directive:
The results which we have acquired, and the 
progress which we will make in the task of 
reconstruction will constitute [the] firm 
initial base ... on which the reconstruction 
of the entire country will be based after 
the general elections. The results will 
be effective enough to incite [sic] the 
population of the South to struggle in favor g^ 
of the application of the Geneva Agreements...
Lao Dong Party policy in the south was aimed at
carrying out the Geneva Agreements, and reorganizing
and reorientating the Party and its united front in the
"new period" so that the political provisions of the
Geneva Agreements would be strictly implemented and that
the general elections scheduled for 1956 would be held.
Thus Party policy carried out on three fronts (internationally,
in the north, and in the south) was to be integrated in
such a way that each would reinforce the other, and that
the combined force of all three would lead the Lao Dong
"Let Us Unite Ourselves in Thought, Realize Inner 
Solidarity, and Resolutely Struggle to Accomplish the New 
Tasks", Nhan Dan (March 3, 1955) as broadcast by Vietnam 
News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 0600 GMT, 
March 3, 1955.
78 Working Paper, Appendices, Item 200, p.10.
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Party towards victory. This was spelled out by the 
Politburo in a resolution issued after its September 
meeting:
the general task of our Party is: to
unite and lead the people in the struggle 
for the implementation of the armistice 
agreement, forestalling and overthrowing 
all schemes to undermine this agreement 
so as to consolidate peace; to strive 
to complete the land reform, restore and 
increase production, step up the build-up 
of the people's army to strengthen the 
North; to maintain and step up the 
political, struggle of the Southern people, 
with a view to consolidating peace, 
achieving reunification, completing 
independence and democracy in the whole 
country.79
The Central Committee Directorate in the south 
was accordingly charged with two broad areas of 
responsibility: (1) implementing the Geneva Agreements and
(2) reorganizing the Party and its mass organization, 
the Lien Viet Front, to win the forthcoming elections.
The implementation of the Geneva Agreement was seen as a 
two step process: carrying out the military provisions
and then carrying out the political provisions. The 
first step was to be initiated during the three hundred 
day regroupment period. The second step was to commence 
immediately with a political struggle movement demanding 
consultations between "the competent authorities of the 
two zones" to begin planning for the 1956 general elections.
Party reorganization had one main purpose; to 
prepare for a period of clandestine activity in which 
formerly "liberated areas" were to be reoccupied by the
7 9 An Outline History of the Viet Nam Workers' Party, 
op.cit., p.81.
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State of Viet-Nam and French authorities. This meant
that different policies would have to be designed for
areas of varying degrees of Party control: base areas,
areas of contested control and "enemy" controlled areas.
The Lien Viet Front, although not formally disbanded
until September, 1955, was also slated for reorganization.
Its functional constituents, the national salvation
associations (hoi cuu quoc), were disbanded. Rural
members were channelled into semi-legal mutual work
exchange, mutual assistance and social welfare organizations,
8 0or into legal associations for farmers and women. The 
village-based administration, the committee of resistance 
and administration (Uy Ban Khang Chien Hanh Chanh), was 
to be modified so it could adjust its functions to a 
new status.
The massive program of reorganization and redirection 
was begun during the regroupment into the provisional 
assembly areas. It was to be completed by the date of 
final regroupment. On the basis of external evidence 
this reorientation probably took place during the months 
from September, 1954 until February, 1955 when many of 
the officials connected with the Central Committee
81Directorate for Southern Viet-Nam regrouped north.
Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, p.21.
81 "A biographic intelligence summary issued in 1961 
based on agent reports compiled during the Indochina 
war with France", Working Paper, Appendices, Item 11, 
pp.1-2; See also: Carlyle A. Thayer, "Southern
Revolutionary Organizations and the Vietnam Workers' 
Party: Continuity and Change, 1954-1974", in Zasloff and
Brown, eds., Communism in Indochina, op.cit., pp.31-35.
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V. REORGANIZATION IN THE SOUTH
At the time of the ceasefire the Lao Dong Party
had a southern membership of some 60,000 comrades.
After reorganization this number was reduced to 15,000 
8 2in 1957. An unknown percentage, certainly very small, 
regrouped to the north. Others had their Party 
membership cancelled. This action was taken on the basis 
of a cadre's morale, past activities and class origin
8 3and was conducted at all levels from province to village.
Initial reorientation was based on a study of such 
topics as "the significance of the victory achieved at 
Geneva", "the new Party line in an era of peace", 
and "on the immediate tasks". These differed, as Ho Chi 
Minh pointed out, according to the position of the Party 
in each area.
The basic organizational structure for the political 
struggle movement was a familiar organizational device 
the united front. As has already been indicated, the 
Lien Viet Front had outlived its usefulness in the new 
phase of political struggle. The Party intended to replace 
it with another united front with a much wider appeal which 
would even embrace former enemies and collaborators. The 
new front, however, was to be organized over a period of 
time, step-by-step. In the interim the Party chose to 
rely on three types of organizations with which to wage the
Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, pp.24-25.
8 3 Ibid., p .25; Race, War Comes to Long An, op.cit., 
pp.32-33; Working Paper, Appendices, Item 200, pp.15-16.
political struggle, legal, semi-legal and secret groups. 
These were to be based in the cities as well as the
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countryside. Some groups were to be ad hoc, while others 
were to be permanent.^
In the countryside the Party and its youth group 
were to go underground and lead a clandestine existence. 
Certain self-defence military units and specialised
8 5assassination committees were to become covert also.
A variety of semi-legal organizations in the rural
areas provided the next concentric ring of Party influence.
These consisted of: war veterans' associations, a student
movement, rubber plantation workers' associations, village
self-defence groups, mutual labour exchange and mutual
assistance groups, war refugee committees, committees to
protect the moral life of the people, committees to
propagate the national language, mass education organizations,
committees to protect the interests of prisoners and
8 6internees, etc. Legal associations in the country 
consisted essentially of two groups: the farmers'
association and the women's association.
Party activities in the cities were promoted and 
intensified in the post-ceasefire period. Obviously both 
the party and its youth association remained secret. In 
terms of semi-legal groups the Party seems to have
Tinh Hinh Phong Trao, pp.1-6; Working Paper, Appendices, 
Item 200, pp . 15-16'.
o c Ibid., pp.15-16; Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, p.22; and Vietnam 
News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 0705 GMT, 
July 3, 1955.
8 6 Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, pp.14-16; and Tinh Hinh Phong Trao,
pp.1-2.
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developed a flexible philosophy: form groups when a
certain issue arises or penetrate groups that have formed
without Party assistance. Examples of the former
include: war refugee committees, the movement to prevent
the decay of the national culture, the movement to aid
the victims of the fighting (formed during the Binh Xuyen
crisis), people's education committees, and labour youth
organizations. Groups penetrated by the Party included
the Movement for the Defense of the Peace and the Geneva
Agreements, student associations, women’s associations
8 7and even the fire prevention sections. Legal groups 
used by the Party in the cities included: athletic clubs,
ancestor worship cults, trade unions and various Chinese 
associations.
Each of these groups and associations pursued certain
objectives related to the political struggle movement.
Their aims were either for "the defense of the peace" or
for "social welfare". The defence of the peace category
included all activities related to the Geneva Agreements.
Their objectives may be summarised by the following slogans:
demand democratic liberties, demand consultations with the
north, pursue the normalisation of relations between the
two zones, protest terrorism, resist reprisals, and
8 8demand general elections. Social welfare slogans 
included: protest the return of landlords, guarantee
the lives and property of the people, improve living
Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, p.21; "Translation of a Lao Dong Party 
document acquired on November 29, 1954, in the Saigon-Cholon 
area", Working Paper, Appendices, Item 29, pp.1 and 4.
8 8 Ibid., pp.1-6; Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, pp.15-16; Tinh Hinh 
Phong Trap, pp.16-17.
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conditions, fight conscription and encourage desertion
from the Army, demand reduction in rents and interest
rates, increase the number of schools, fight unemployment,
oppose piracy and theft, resist corvee labour, protest
refugee camp conditions, resist expulsion from homes,
89boycott elections and support the workers' demands.
The political struggle movement was designed to 
defend the political rights and welfare of the people 
(as achieved curing the First Indochina War and as 
enumerated in the Geneva Agreements) in the face of 
"enemy" (i.e. French and State of Viet-Nam) encroachment 
on formerly liberated areas. In other words, the Party 
operated on the assumption that all organizations not 
under its control or allied with it were both dangerous 
and illegitimate. Any attempt by a group to interfere 
with Party aims would be resisted. Action in this regard 
was to be based on the Geneva Agreements and accordingly 
great effort was made in the reorientation programs to 
instruct cadres how to file petitions and engage in other 
forms of peaceful protest for these ends. The object 
was to bring pressure to bear on the International Control 
Commission, the Mixed Commissions and the commands of the 
French Union Forces and the Army of the State of Viet-Nam 
to intervene and stop activity which the Party felt 
violated the agreements.^
Ibid.; Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, pp.15-16; and Working Paper, 
Appendices, Item 29, pp.1-6.
90 Ibid., p .1.
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Action which threatened the social welfare of the 
people were to be met by similar protests to the village 
council of notables, military post chiefs, provincial 
authorities, etc. The foregoing should highlight the 
fact that the Lao Dong Party saw its initial tasks as 
being essentially defensive and ones which were to be 
carried out on the local level. Therefore, great 
consideration was given as to how to preserve the 
integrity of the revolutionary movement in the face of
attempts to supplant it by the new administration.
91One key document, issued for the guidance of 
provincial level authorities by the Eastern Interzone 
committee dealt with the crucial questions of self-defence 
and village control. The Party recognised that "security 
of the people's lives and possessions" was essential if 
the political struggle objectives of "strengthen the peace", 
"work for the triumph of democracy", and "achieve 
independence and unity" were to be obtained. The ability 
to provide security rested in turn on a knowledge of how 
to organize the police, notables and troops for self-defence.
Self-defence groups would have to be built up from 
small groups into larger ones. The Party suggested that 
youths be organized for this purpose, initially, at least, 
so that their efforts could be directed against bandits.
War veterans and former Party security men would provide 
the backbone of this self-defence movement.
91 Ibid., pp.1-6; this directive appears to be the 
application on the local level of the resolution of the 
Politburo of September, 1954.
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Party policy towards the village councils and 
notables underwent a change. It was recognised that the 
war-time policy of neutralising them was no longer approp­
riate. According to the new policy
the activity of these organisms [sic] is in 
accord with the Geneva Agreement, for we are 
convinced that during the next two years, until 
the general elections, it is necessary to have 
an administrative machine to provisionally 
arrange the affairs of the country which is 
occupied by the enemy. Such a machine is 
indispensable for the South Vietnam zone.92
In areas where the police and council of notables
had already been neutralised the revolutionary movement's
organizational structure was to remain intact. In areas
which the "enemy" planned to install new councils, the
Party was to gain control over them by secretly introducing
its own sympathizers. It was not intended to use the
Party's administrative cadres but to rely on its supporters
from among the farmers, poor peasants, even the rich
peasantry and the landowning classes if necessary, and
as a last resort, even former notables could be used.
This tactic was designed to protect the Party from direct
exposure to security officials of the State of Viet-Nam.
VI. THE PARTY AND THE HINH CRISIS
As was mentioned above, the September Political 
Bureau conference met while a political crisis was brewing 
in Saigon. The crux of the matter was whether Premier 
Ngo Dinh Diem, recently appointed to his post, would be able 
to exercise full control over the Army or not. This issue
92 Ibid., p .6.
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touched on a raw nerve in the relationship between
the Chief of State, Bao Dai, and the man he appointed
as Premier with full powers, Ngo Dinh Diem. Interconnected
with this issue was the question of France's perogatives
in Viet-Nam and the divergence between French and
American policies. Gen. Nguyen Van Hinh, as chief of
staff, claimed he derived his authority from Bao Dai
and that only Bao Dai could dismiss him. Gen. Hinh
accordingly refused to comply with instructions issued
by the Cabinet ordering him to retire from active service.
He later refused to obey the Premier's orders that he
leave for a six-week "study tour" of France. By the time
the Political Bureau met Gen. Hinh had twice refused to
leave Viet-Nam and had sent a cable to Bao Dai asking
him to intervene. Nine members of Diem's first Cabinet,
only appointed in July, resigned. Rumours that Gen. Hinh
was planning a coup d'etat abounded and these prompted
the American Ambassador, Donald Heath, to warn Gen. Hinh
and other leaders that the U.S. government would not
recognize a government established by force. Cuts in
financial and economic aid were threatened. These events
93received wide publicity in the press.
"Vietnam Premier Ousts Army Chief", The New York Times 
(September 12, 1954), pp.1 and 2; United Press dispatch in 
ibid., (September 13, 1954), p.l; "'Ousted' Army Chief 
Replaced in Vietnam", ibid., (September 14, 1954), p.l; 
Dispatch from Paul Kennedy in Saigon in ibid., (September 15, 
1954), p.l; Tillman Durdin dispatch from Saigon in ibid., 
(September 18, 1954), p.3; United Press dispatch from 
Saigon in ibid., (September 19, 1954), p.2; Tillman Durdin 
dispatch from Saigon in ibid., (September 20, 1954), p.6;
"5 Refugees Slain in Saigon Clash", ibid., (September 22, 
1954), p.3; Radio France-Asie in English to Southeast Asia, 
2330 GMT, September 24, 1954; and Edward G. Lansdale, In the 
Midst of Wars; An American's Mission to Southeast Asia,
(New York: Harper and Row, 1972), pp.171-182.
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The general political situation in southern Viet- 
Nam at this time was one of great confusion. An 
American journalist has described the atmosphere in this 
way:
there was scarcely any administrative talent 
left, and disorder, abetted by banditry, 
mounted in the countryside. Communications 
everywhere were in a state of collapse, the 
Vietminh having sabotaged the railroads and 
set up obstacles on the roads and in the 
rivers and canals. Vietnamese soldiers were 
deserting by the thousands, and for a time 
Diem's actual authority scarcely extended 
beyond Saigon itself, where he had only a 
single battalion of loyal troops upon which he could completely depend.94
How did the Political Bureau react to these events?
No formal statement was made nor was the Diem-Hinh crisis 
alluded to in public announcements which reported the 
meeting's decisions. A possible clue might be found 
however, in a Vietnam News Agency (VNA) broadcast at 
this time. The Diem-Hinh split was seen as a reflection 
of the contradictions between the American and French 
imperialists. According to VNA, the Americans were using 
Diem as their tool to supplant the French and to turn 
Viet-Nam into an American colony. In order for the U.S. 
to carry out their plot, VNA said, it was necessary to 
gain control of both the Army and the administration.
Since Hinh was pro-French, his ouster would aid the Americans. 
VNA also expressed the view that the root of the 
contradiction was the hatred of the people for Diem and
Peter Schmid, "Free Indo-China Fights Against Time", 
Commentary (January 1955), Vol.19, No.l, p.28; and 
Robert Shaplen, The Lost Revolution: The U.S. in Vietnam,
1946-1966 (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p.115.
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For this reason Ngo Dinh Diem ought to be 
overthrown. The people in South Vietnam 
strongly urge the overthrowing of Ngo 
Dinh Diem and the formation of a new 
government from which all the lackeys of 
the American imperialists and the French 
warmongers would be eliminated.^ 5
A later broadcast by the Voice of Nam-Bo also called 
for the overthrow of Diem. It explained the matter in 
more detail: Diem was an American lackey who was
supported by the French warmongers. He constituted "a 
great obstacle to the consolidation of peace, national 
independence, and unity" and for this reason "the
96population of the south is resolved to overthrow him".
Since the Political Bureau accepted the distinction
between American and French imperialism and between French
warmongers and "pacifists", this call for Diem's
overthrow must be seen in the context of opposing the
stronger force (American imperialism) and encouraging
the group most favourable to the Party's interests (the
French "pacifists"). The Voice of Nam Bo in explaining
this reminded its listeners that "...the French government
is bound to consolidate peace in Vietnam and respect the
97agreement. It is an obligation..."
A Party history of this period defined the current 
task as
not to overthrow the enemy government as in 
the last Resistance, but to compel the enemy 
to apply freedom, and democracy, gradually 
replace the enemy government [with] our own 
and create favourable conditions for the
95 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 
1200 GMT, September 23, 1954.
96 Voice of Nam Bo in Vietnamese to South Viet-Nam, 1000 
GMT, September 25, 1954.
97 Ibid.
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reunification of the country in accordance 
with the Geneva Agreement.9°
This was spelled out more concisely elsewhere:
"oppose the enemy in a tenacious way, avoiding rightist 
or leftist tendencies as well as assassinations and all 
semi-military measures as were used during the resistance" 
Although this Party retained military forces in the south 
they did not use them to exploit the Hinh crisis.
The question poses itself: why did the Party leave
military forces in the south? Undoubtedly one answer 
lies in the desire to provide some form of self-defence 
for Party cadre and installations. A former- member of 
the Party's provincial committee in Tay Ninh suggested 
another answer:
Why should the Party proclaim political 
activity as the main line but retain 
military forces? From a revolutionary 
point, the South was still a backward 
agricultural country, without any 
democratic conditions in which parliamentary 
struggle could be effective: it was still
in the 'national liberation' stage. In 
that stage, if one wants to carry out what 
we call the 'revolutionary mission', force 
is the decisive element. Without it nothing 
can be accomplished.^ O
Various estimates by U.S., French and Vietnamese 
(State of Viet-Nam) intelligence organizations for the 
1954-1960 period placed PAVN armed strength in the 5,000 
to 10,000 range, of whom no more than 2,000 were ever 
considered a c t i v e . A t  the time of the Geneva Conference
Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, p.27.
100
Working Paper, Appendices, Item 200, p.17. 
Race, War Comes to Long An, op.cit., p.35.
101 "u.S. Perceptions of the Insurgency, 1954-1960", in 
United States - Vietnam Relations, op.cit., Book 2, IV.A.5. 
Tab 4, p.25.
93
PAVN strength in the south was estimated to have
been as high as 100,000 men. Around 90,000 were said
102to have regrouped north. Those remaining in the
south were assigned to one of three tasks: (1) some
were transferred into political and administrative jobs,
(2) others were retained in secret military units 
dispersed in base areas and (3) the remainder were
103assigned to skeletal units at province level and below.
Major concentrations were stationed in the resistance
base areas in Ca Mau, Go Cong, in the That Son (Seven
Mountains) area along the Cambodian border, in the Plain
of Reeds, in the highlands of Central Viet-Nam and near
104the border of the northern regroupment zone.
What were the Party's intentions in this matter?
It seems doubtful to argue on the basis of this decision 
(to leave military units in the south) that the Party 
did not expect general elections to take place and had 
therefore prepared a secret military force to seize power
"Rebellion Against My-Diem", ibid., Book 2, IV.A.5.
Tab 2, p .49; Murti, Vietnam Divided, op.cit., p. 2 24 ;
J.J. Zasloff, Origins of the Insurgency in South Vietnam, 
1954-1960: The Role of the Southern Vietm.inh Cadres,
(Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, May 1968), Memorandum
RM-5163/2-1SA/ARPA, p.l; "Commentary: Bernard B. Fall
on Bui Van Luong", in Richard W. Lindholm, editor,
Viet-Nam The First Five Years : An International Symposium
(East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1959),
p . 57 .
103 Race, War Comes to Long An, op.cit., p.35.
10 4 "Rebellion Against My-Diem", in United States - Vietnam 
Relations, op.cit., Book 2, IV.A.5.Tab 2, p.9; and Anita 
L. Nutt, Troika on Trial: Control or Compromise?
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, September
1967), Vol.I, p.251.
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at the appropriate moment should disorder break out 
as happened, for example, following the Diem-Hinh crisis. 
Two points deserve stressing. Firstly, the PAVN units 
appeared to have been widely dispersed throughout south 
Viet-Nam. Even at moments of greatest instability, as 
with the Binh Xuyen crisis of March-April, 1955 and the 
events of May 1, 1955 when a Revolutionary Committee 
appeared to have seized power momentarily, there appears 
to be no evidence that these PAVN units were concentrated 
on the approaches to Saigon, poised for a
c o u p ____ . Secondly, the relative small size of
the PAVN force, 10,000 men at most, compares unfavourably 
with other military forces organized at that time:
French Union Forces (100,000 to 176,000), Army of Viet-Nam 
(170,000 to 265,000), Cao Dai Forces (10,000 to 25,000), 
Hoa Hao Forces (10,000 to 40,000) and Binh Xuyen Forces 
(5,000 to 7,100),106
The Lao Dong Party probably tried to prepare for 
every contingency imaginable at their September 1954 
Political Bureau conference. The evidence presented here,
Race, War Comes to Long An, op.cit., p.32.
1 0 The estimates for each category varied throughout 
this period. There are certain obvious problems of 
definition with respect to the sect forces. However the 
point being made is a general one: after regroupment
Communist military strength was numerically weaker than 
the array of forces opposing them; for estimates see:
"U.S. Training of the Vietnamese National Army, 1954-1959", 
in United States - Vietnam Relations, Book 2, IV.A.4., 
pp.0, R, V, W, X, FF, GG, HH, and II; dispatch by Dana 
Adams Schmidt from Washington in The New York Times 
(September 29, 1954), pp.1 and 5; United Press dispatch 
from Saigon in ibid. (May 28, 1955), p.3; and Fishel,
"One Vietnam or Two?", p.362.
95
and their actions subsequently, indicate that the Party
still had confidence that the political settlement
envisioned in the Geneva Agreements would be carried
out. Despite reservations and misgivings, this assessment
of the future is what the Lao Dong Party acted upon.
In so doing the Party underestimated the speed by which
America would displace the French as the predominate
foreign influence on the State of Viet-Nam, and the
alacrity with which Ngo Dinh Diem would dodge political
roadblocks set for him by his opponents (the Binh Xuyen,
the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao sects, Bao Dai supporters and
other anti-Diemist elements). These trends, however,
were not so discernable in the immediate post-Geneva
Conference period; what seemed more evident was the
instability of the non-Communist position which carried
107within it the seeds of anarchy.
VII. REGROUPMENT AND THE BEGINNINGS OF POLITICAL STRUGGLE
After the September meeting the Political Bureau's
resolution was transmitted to its Directorate in the
south which in turn issued detailed directives for its 
10 8implementation. Final regroupment to the north
United States Central Intelligence Agency, Post-Geneva 
Outlook in Indo-China,op.cit.; and United States Central 
Intelligence Agency, Current Trends in South Vietnam, Special 
National Intelligence Estimate (September 15, 1954), SNIE 
63-6-54 in United States - Vietnam Relations,Book 10, 
pp.751-752.
108 Working Paper, Appendices, Item 29, p.3, refers to 
instructions nos,16/CT-K (September 24, 1954) and 43, 
45/CT/TWC. The former probably refers to a directive 
flowing from the Politburo conference; the latter is 
probably a directive issued by the Central Committee
cont'd
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proceeded apace. Withdrawal from the Ham-Tan - Xuyen-Moc
area was completed before the deadline. The first
instalment of troop regroupment from Binh-Dinh - Quang-
Ngai were also completed. Despite a series of incidents
press reports stated that the relative smoothness of the
movement was taken as evidence that the Lao Dong Party
109was fulfilling its obligations. At the end of October
regroupment from the Plain of Reeds as well as the second 
instalment from Binh-Dinh - Quang-Ngai was successfully 
carried out. In February, Ca Mau was evacuated thus 
leaving only one provisional assembly area left south of 
the demarcation line. When the third and final instalment 
from Binh-Dinh - Quang-Ngai (scheduled for completion 
by May 19, 1955) was finished the partitioning of Viet-Nam 
would be complete.
During the withdrawal of military forces into the 
provisional assembly areas Party cadres began an immediate, 
and in some cases hurried, study of the Geneva Agreements 
and their significance. Preparations were also feverishly 
undertaken to decide who was to regroup north and who was 
to remain. Similar decisions had to be made concerning
108 cont'd
Directorate for Southern Viet-Nam sometimes abbreviated 
in Vietnamese "TWC" (Trung Uong Cue). See also: Working
Paper, Appendices, Item 200, footnote 16 for what appears 
to be a paraphrase of the September Politburo resolution.
109 Nutt, Troika on Trial, op.cit., Vol.l, pp.175-178; 
and dispatch by Tillman Durdin from Saigon in The New 
York Times (September 29, 1954), p.5.
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equipment. Much of it was stored in c a c h e s . T h e r e  
was undoubtedly much confusion among both cadres and 
civilians as this process took place.
Despite the fact that the Geneva Agreements made provision 
for the regroupment of both military and civilian 
personnel, military regroupees to the north outnumbered 
their civilian counterparts two to one. Table 2-2 below 
sets out the figures by provisional assembly area.
Table 2-2 CIVIL AND MILITARY RFGROUPMENT
Provisional Assembly Area: Soldiers Civilians Total
Ham-Tan - Xuyen-Moc 10,700 5,300 16,000
Plain of Reeds 13,500 6,500 20,000
Ca Mau province 20,000 9,900 29,900
Binh-Dinh - Quang-Ngai 42,700 21,300 64,000
Total 86,900 43,000 129,900
SOURCE: B.S.N. Murti, Vietnam Divided, p.224.
The civilian figures include administrative cadre? 
former prisoners, their families and others. Included 
among the cadreswere those termed "special cases", that 
is well-known Party members, security service personnel 
and administrators who were disliked locally. Included 
among civilians regrouped to the north were children,
Nutt, Troika on Trial, op.cit., Vol.l, pp.250-254; 
Warner, "Interview with General Michel de Brebissen", 
op.cit., p.l, "(t)here were indeed arms caches and they 
were intended for future use in his [de Brebisson's] 
opinion. At this point he showed me an intelligence 
report, dated 4 January 1955 and classified 'Secret'."
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youths, technical specialists, highlanders and non- 
Communist cadres.111 Some in the later category may even 
have been used to "fill-out" the departing military ranks. 
As stated above, the vast majority of the PAVN forces 
were regrouped.
The bulk of the war-time administrators, from
regional level downward, remained. In fact, there was
no provision in the Geneva Agreements which made this
illegal. Indeed, since the Party at that time expected
elections to be held within two years, it is doubtful
they would have dismantled their political machine and
thus given an advantage to their opponents. Both Party
and non-Party cadreswere classified, trained and given
assignments. Party members who were known were dispersed
to other areas where they would act as "single-contact
112members" (don tuyen). Their tasks would be to organize
new cells and participate in the various organizations 
to be used in the political struggle movement. Party 
cadres who were not well known remained in place where
Race, War Comes to Long An, op.cit., p.32; Nutt,
Troika on Trial, op.cit., Vo1.1, pp.175-176; Gerald C.
Hickey, Preliminary Research Report on the PMS (Saigon: 
Michigan State University Vietnam Advisory Group, June 1957), 
p.26, a copy of this document was located in the Wason.. 
Collection, Olin Library, Cornell University, Interview 
with Tran Kim Tuyen, Saigon, July 13, 1972; Tuyen headed 
the Service des Etudes Politiques, Economiques et Sociales 
(SEPES), an intelligence organization which operated during 
the Diem years.
112 Race, War Comes to Long An, op.cit., p.33; Interview 
with Phan The Ngoc, Saigon, June 8, 1972.
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they were reorganized into small three-man cells. Their 
tasks were to carry out Party policy covertly. Most 
cadres at the village level were instructed to obtain 
"legal status", avoid arrest and take up legitimate 
occupations until they were contacted.
Other cadreswere directed to move to the cities and 
obtain "legal status" too. This they did by obtaining 
identity cards, registering for the census, etc. These 
people, as well as well as the covert penetration agents, 
were to form the base of the urban struggle movement 
which was to take shape. The government administration 
was penetrated even further and in central Viet-Nam there 
seems to have been a policy for cadres to turn themselves 
in, obtain clearance, and then work secretly for the
4- 1 1 3Party.
One result of this reorientation was that the 
organization of the revolutionary movement was rendered - 
momentarily at least - less efficient. In addition, 
there seems to have been a drifting away of some of the 
members and cadres of mass organizations who became 
inactive. These were people who responded to the 
ceasefire by returning to their home villages and beginning 
the task of starting a normal, productive life. Others 
voluntarily "rallied" to the State of Viet-Nam when hrmy 
troops moved into their area after withdrawal of PAVN units
113 Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, p.25; Voice of the Dai Viet National 
Liberation Troops in Vietnamese to Vietnam, 2300 GMT, 
December 6, 1955 and 0500 GMT, December 20, 1955.
114 Race, War Comes to Long An, op.cit., pp.34-36; Zasloff 
Origins of the Insurgency, op.cit., pp.5-6.
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Because of the process of phased regroupment
(80, 100, 200 and 300 days) this reorientation process
was undertaken at a different rate in each of the
provisional assembly areas. This allowed the Party,
for example,to study the regroupment from Ham-Tan -
Xuyen-Moc and apply the lessons learned there to subsequent
withdrawals. It was the Party's intention that a
reorientated clandestine organization would be able to
survive the imposition of the opposing administration.
Since, in some areas, Party control stretched back for
8 or 9 years, the Party felt confident of success because
they had the people's support. Any attempt to root out
the Party and destroy its organizations would be resolutely
protested not only in local demonstrations but in appeals
to the various mobile teams assigned to the ICSC and to
115PAVN officers assigned to the Mixed Commissions.
The first major attempt to use the Geneva Agreements 
as the legal basis for political struggle is illustrated 
in the case of the Movement for the Defense of the Peace 
and the Geneva Agreements. This organization was
Nutt, Troika on Trial, op.cit., Vol.l, p.176.
116 Devillers and Lacouture, End of a War, op.cit., 
pp.385-387 ; Wilfred G. Burchett-, Vietnam: Inside Story
of the Guerilla War (New York: International Publishers,
1968), pp.120-121; I.M. Shchedrov, A .B. Stukov,
Z.M. Zelma and V.N. Rogov, compilers, Fighting Vietnam 
(Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, December
1965), no pagination; the section "Story of Three Prisoners" 
provides details on Nguyen Huu Tho, Nguyen Van Duong and 
Pham Huy Thong, all members of the Movement for the Defence 
of Peace. A copy of this book was located in the John D. 
Rockefeller, Jr. Library, Brown University. Tho was 
elected chairman of the presidium of the NFL's Central 
Committee in 1962 at the Front's First Congress. Thong went 
to the north in 1956 where he became active in literary 
circles.
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established in the aftermath of a demonstration held
in Saigon-Cholon on August 1st referred to above. It
must be assumed that covert Party agents were associated
with this Movement for the Defense of the Peace, yet
there is no direct evidence that the Movement itself was
117created by the Party. The Movement was based on a
group of left-wing and progressive intellectuals and
students who lived in the urban areas. It was initially
formed in Saigon-Cholon, and additional branches were
soon established elsewhere in southern Vietnam. By that
time the Movement had caught the Party's attention as an
effective semi-legal organization to which petitions and
reports of violations of the Geneva Agreements could be 
118sent. It appears that on the local level the Party
took the initiative in forming various village-level
119committees of the Movement for the Protection of Peace.
It is unknown what relationship the Executive Committee 
of the Saigon-Cholon Committee had with branches elsewhere, 
but it was probably very unstructured.
117 Devillers and Lacouture, End of a War, op.cit., p.385; 
the following individuals, members of the Movement for the 
Defence of Peace, later held positions on the NFL's 
Central Committee or became members of the Provisional 
Revolutionary Government: Nguyen Huu Tho, Trinh Dinh Thao,
Phung Van Cung, Huynh Tan Phat, Le Van Huan, Ho Thu, Le Van 
Tha, Nguyen Long, Nguyen Thi Binh, Dang Quang Minh, Tran 
Hoai Nam, Nguyen Ngoc Thuong, La Van Phuong, Bui Thi Me, 
Huynh Van Tam and Le Thanh Nam.
118 Working Paper, Appendices, I tern 29, pp.1 and 4.
119 Zasloff, Origins of the Insurgency, op.cit., p.7; and 
Burchett, Inside Story of the Guerilla War, op.cit., p.120.
102
Sometime in late October three members of the
Saigon-Cholon Peace Committee (as the Movement for the
Defence of the Peace was called to distinguish it from
the other branches) were arrested. It is unclear whether
the three had been involved in protests at a resettlement
center on the outskirts of Saigon where certain of the
recent refugees from north Viet-Nam embarrassed the
authorities in Saigon by asking to be repatriated. In
any event these arrests were only the first in a series
undertaken by the Diem regime in its efforts to cripple
120the Peace Movement.
The most damaging arrests were carried out on 
November 11th when the entire eight-member Executive 
Committee as well as 23 ordinary members of the Peace 
Movement were picked up. This followed by three days a 
demonstration called to protest the arrival of President 
Eisenhower's special representative to Viet-Nam, General 
J. Lawton Collins. No doubt the Diem government lost 
patience with this group which had earlier provoked a 
scuffle on the occasion of the visit to Saigon of Prime
Associated Press dispatch from Saigon in The New York 
Times (December 4, 1954), p.3; Radio France-Asie in 
English to Vietnam, 0130 GMT, December 5, 1954; Radio 
VNW in Vietnamese morse to Vietnam, 0205 GMT, November 25, 
1954; and Quang Loi, South of the 17th Parallel (Hanoi: 
Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1959), pp.25-26.
Joseph Weiss, then a member of the Central Intelligence 
Agency, in a letter to the author dated February 13,
1973, wrote: "(s)pecifically, with regard to the VNA5,
VNW, KNL cites, these are legitimate Vietnamese Communist 
service transmitters (not 'radios' per se) which FBIS was 
and is still capable of monitoring". Weiss was writing in 
response to a written request for specific information 
on these and other radios cited in the FBIS Daily Reports.
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Minister Nehru, when they passed out leaflets supporting
121peaceful coexistence. When the Saigon-Cholon Peace
Committee drew attention to the relations between Saigon
and Washington at the Collins demonstration they probably
touched a very sensitive nerve.
Further arrests totalling 29 in all were carried
out in Saigon in December and in March, 1955. The Hue
branch of the Movement for the Defense of the Peace was
struck twice, once in March and again in April.
122Simultaneous raids were carried out in Dalat.
These arrests immediately attracted the attention 
of the DRVN authorities. Pham Hung, chief of the PAVN 
High Command delegation in southern Viet-Nam, sent a 
letter dated November 26th to the command of the French
123Union Forces protesting the October and November arrests.
General Van Tien Dung raised the matter at the November 29th
meeting of the Joint Commission where he blamed the
French for not carrying out their responsibilities under
124the Geneva Agreements.
Protest statements, demonstrations and the like were 
quickly mounted in the north. Their aim was to catch 
international attention and thus bring pressure to bear on
"Nehru Criticized in Saigon", The New York Times 
(October 31, 1954), p.25; and Devillers and Lacouture, 
End of a War, op.cit., p.385.
122 Loi, South of the 17th Parallel, op.cit., p.26.
123 Voice of Nam Bo in Vietnamese to South Vietnam, 1000 
GMT, November 27, 1954.
124 Voice of Vietnam dictation in Vietnamese to Southeast 
Asia, 0130 GMT, November 29, 1954.
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the French to stop the arrests and secure the release
of those jailed. On November 2nd, for example, the Viet-
Nam Committee for the Defense of World Peace sent a
note to the World Committee for the Defense of Peace
protesting the violations of the "democratic rights"
of the members of the Saigon-Cholon Peace Committee and
125demanding their release. On November 27th a variety
of groups (including the Viet-Nam Committee for the Defense 
of World Peace, the Viet-Nam General Confederation of 
Labor, the Peasants' National Liaison Bureau, the Viet- 
Nam Women1s Union and the Committee for the Protection 
of Vietnamese Children) staged a public protest over the 
arrest of members of the Movement for the Defense of the
•d 126Peace.
Four of the eight members arrested on November 11th
were released twelve days later, but this appeared to
be due more to the family connections of one of them,
127Luu Van Luong, than to the public protests. Naturally
each new wave of arrests generated more protests. The 
PAVN delegation dutifully raised each matter with their 
French counterparts at the sessions of the Joint Military 
Commission. In April the Diem government dramatically
12 5 Radio Hanoi in Vietnamese, 0430 GMT, November 27,
1954; and Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast 
Asia, 1250 GMT, November 27, 1954.
126 Vietnam News Agency in Vietnamese morse to Vietnam,
0930 GMT, November 27, 1954.
127 Devillers and Lacouture, End of a War, op.cit., p.386, 
Luu Van Lang was the father-in-law of the then Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, Tran Van Do; Radio Saigon in 
Vietnamese, 1230 GMT, November 27, 1954.
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announced that several of the leaders of the peace 
movement had been transferred to Hai Phong in the north 
where they would soon be given the choice of returning 
to the south or of remaining when the city was turned 
over to DRVN control. However by May (1955) the issue of 
the Movement for the Defense of the Peace had been 
superseded by other events as the focus of attention.
At that time the PAVN delegation to the Joint Military 
Commission requested information on the whereabouts of 
the "peace partisans" who had been arrested, the French 
promised to supply the information after making enquiries.
The matter then faded in importance. However the pattern 
of protest was to be repeated over again as a response to 
reports of alleged violations of the Geneva Agreements 
by the French and State of Viet-Nam authorities.
VIII. POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN THE SOUTH: DIEM AND THE SECTS
Of greater importance to the Lao Dong Party at this 
time was the stability of the political situation in 
southern Viet-Nam and the interaction between the major 
social forces and the fledgling State of Viet-Nam.
There are three aspects to this: the relationship among
the groups comprising the State of Viet-Nam, the relationship 
between the State of Viet-Nam and the other indigenous 
social forces and finally, the relationship among the 
sects themselves. The significance of this for the Lao 
Dong Party, of course, is that a divided opposition which 
was continually quarrelling was better than a united one.
The State of Viet-Nam, at the time of the Geneva
Conference, was a dubious concept in political and legal
terms. The French controlled its army and exercised
other responsibilities of government normally perogatives
of a sovereign state. Even though both France and America
tried hard on a government-to-government level to agree
on a common approach in southern Viet-Nam, it proved
almost impossible on the local level. Political and
military operatives of both governments ignored their
own country's policies and backed Vietnamese groups in
128competition with their ally.
The State of Viet-Nam was split in other ways: 
there was a continuous tension between the Chief of 
State and his Premier, there were differences between 
certain Army leaders and the Premier and there were the 
curious differences between the Binh Xuyen sect, which 
controlled the police and security services, and the 
Premier. In addition to all this, there were two large 
sect groups, the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao which ran, literally, 
"states within a state". Each of the sects, in turn, 
was subdivided into particular war lord factions (see 
Map 2-4) .
When the Lao Dong Party met in September, Premier 
Diem was facing his first grave crisis: a challenge to
his authority by the chief of staff of the Army, General 
Nguyen Van Hinh. This was eventually resolved in the
106
For one side of the story see: Lansdale, In the Midst
of Wars, op.cit., pp.316-317.
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Premier's favour in early December 1954 when Gen. Hinh 
obeyed Bao Dai's instructions summoning him to France. 
Prior to the resolution of this crisis, however, at
12 9least one plot to overthrow Diem had been thwarted.
The Diem-Hinh confrontation was also marked by the
intervention of Bao Dai who attempted to obtain sect
backing for a new government. His gambit was to use the
leader of the Binh Xuyen, Le Van Vien, in his approach
130to other sect leaders. This move failed when Diem
enlarged his Cabinet with precisely these men. It will 
be recalled from earlier discussion that Diem's first 
Cabinet had resigned. The key appointments to the 
second Cabinet formed on September 24th were Nguyen Thanh 
Phuong of the Cao Dai and Tran Van Soai of the Boa Hao 
as Ministers of State without portfolio. Additional 
appointees from the Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao filled other 
vacancies.
In the following months sporadic fighting broke out
in the countryside between elements of Ba Cut's Hoa Hao
forces and Cao Dai units. The scramble to gain control
of recently evacuated DRVN territory in the Plain of Reeds 
131was at issue. The same problem also brought Ba Cut's
units into conflict with the Army. The matter intensified
Ibid., p.175; Lansdale whisked Hinh's staff on a 
tour of the Philippines on the eve of the plotter's coup.
130 Marjorie Weiner, "Government and Politics in South 
Vietnam, 1954-1956", M.A. Thesis, Cornell University, 1960, 
pp.31-42.
131 United Press dispatch from Saigon in The New York 
Times (March 9, 1955), p.5 and United Press dispatch in 
ibid. (March 13, 1955), pp.1 and 4.
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in December when reports revealed that fighting was
taking place between certain Hoa Hao units, between
Ba Cut's forces and certain Cao Dai units and between
the Army and Ba Cut. The fighting continued into
January and during the following month shifted location
as the Army and Ba Cut's forces squared off to determine
who would first "liberate" the Ca Mau area after the
13 2final withdrawal of PAVN units. As it turned out, these
were only the beginning rounds of a fight which was to 
last well int»19 57.
At the same time Ngo Dinh Diem succeeded in playing
on the factionalism of his opponents who, in mid-September,
had managed to provide a facade of unity. American
support for Diem, even over French objections, proved
decisive. On December 31, 1954 , the U. S. government
announced that it would no longer give aid to Viet-Nam
via the French as was customary, but as of the New Year
133would mount direct aid to the State of Viet-Nam. This
move undercut the French position which had used the 
"power of the purse" to encourage policies to its liking. 
This shift in American policy also touched directly upon 
the vital issue of subsidies to the sect armies which the
13 2 United Press dispatch from Saigon in ibid. (April 4,
1955), p .3.
1 33 "Indochina Aid Now Direct", ibid. (January 1, 1955), 
p .4; at the same time France ended the Pau Agreement of 
1950 and transferred its control of finances and economic 
matters to the State of Viet-Nam,* "General Monetary and 
Commercial Convention Between France and State of Viet-Nam" 
Notes et Etudes Documentaires (January 25, 1955), No.1973, 
pp. 41-43 translated and reprinted in Allan B. Cole, editor, 
Conflict in Indo-China and International Repercussions:
A Documentary History, 194 5-191T5 (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1956), pp.199-202.
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French had provided. The Diem government now found its
position considerably strengthened in relation to the
sects. Thus it was a combination of American support
and monetary inducements which helped Diem to split the 
134sect ranks. In January Nguyen Van Hue, Tran Van Soai ' s
chief of staff, rallied to the State of Viet-Nam and
promised to integrate a force of 3,500 men loyal to him
into the Army. He was followed by another Hoa Hao officer,
135Major Nguyen Day,who brought with him 1,500 soldiers.
On February 13, two days after the French subsidies 
officially ended, a Cao Dai leader, Trinh Minh The, 
entered Saigon and proclaimed his support for the Diem 
government. He was followed ten days later by Nguyen Giac 
Ngo, a Hoa Hao leader.
Meanwhile Diem had been slowly preparing his next
move in his quest to gain control over the entire governmental
apparatus which he nominally headed. His target this
time was the Binh Xuyen sect which controlled the police,
13 6security, gambling and vice operations in Saigon-Cholon. 
Although the showdown came in late March it had been 
preceeded by other events which made an armed clash highly 
likely. The head of the Binh Xuyen, Le Quang Vinh (Bay Vien)
Fall, The Two Viet-Nams, op.cit., pp.245-246; Buttinger, 
A Dragon Embattled^ op".cit. , Vol.2, pp.1101-1107 and 1115; 
and William Henderson, "South Viet Nam Finds Itself",
Foreign Affairs (January 1957), Vol.XXXV, NO.1, pp.287-288.
135 Buttinger, A Dragon Embattled, ö d .cit., Vol.2, p . 867.
Ibid., p.816; "The Exotic Mob", Time [Pacific Edition] 
(January 3, 1955), p.20; and Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics 
of Heroin in Southeast Asia (New York: Harper and Row,
1972), pp.107-126. McCoy's work is especially valuable 
for its interview material with Binh Xuyen leaders and 
French officials.
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had been conspiring openly since at least August to
either bring down the Diem government or to "kick Diem
upstairs" into a figurehead position. In late November
a brief Army-Binh Xuyen clash foreshadowed the events
of March as Diem deliberately attempted to undermine
137the Binh Xuyen's financial position.
In early 1955 Diem moved to close down the Binh
Xuyen-operated brothels and to cancel their gambling 
138concessions. Then, in order to strengthen his
military position in Saigon, Diem began to transfer units
which were loyal to him from central Viet-Nam to Saigon,
13 9including Nung soldiers. During the third week of
February (1955) the Binh Xuyen attempted to counter this
gambit by bringing together the various sect factions for
discussions on united action. In attendance were Nguyen
Thanh Phuong, Pham Cong Tac and Trinh Minh The of the Cao
Dai and Tran Van Soai, Lam Thanh Nguyen and Ba Cut of
the Hoa Hao. On March 3rd these men announced the formation
of a united front, a mutual non-aggression pact and
opposition to the Diem government (of which several of
them were nominal Cabinet members). Pham Cong Tac, the
14 0spiritual head of the Cao Dai was named leader.
137 Radio France-Asie in English to Southeast Asia, 0945 
GMT, December 1, 1954 carries a commentary by Richard Neville 
entitled, "Gen. Hinh's Dismissal"; and "Vietnam Soldiers 
Fight with Police", The New York Times (December 2, 1954), 
pp.1 and 4 .
138
139
"Voluntary Disinfection", Time (January 24, 1955), p.26.
Donald Lancaster, The Emancipation of French Indochina 
(New York: Octagon Books, 1974) , p . 38 4 ; Buttinger,
A Dragon Embattled, op.cit., Vol.2, p.870.
140 Ibid., p.868; and Lancaster, The Emancipation of 
French Indochina, op.cit., p.383.
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On March 21st the tri-sect united front issued an 
ultimatum to Diem calling on him to form a new government 
of rational union and to carry out certain reforms.'*'^
An intense five day period of negotiation followed 
in which both France and America became involved. Diem 
succeeded in getting Trinh Minh The to switch his loyalty 
and then prepared to attack. On March 28th he ordered 
Army units to dislodge the Binh Xuyen from the police 
and security headquarters buildings in Saigon. Fighting 
broke out on the evening of March 29th/30th. South Viet- 
Nam was about to be plunged into a period of domestic 
crisis and political instability.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
The Lao Dong Party, which led the eight-year war 
of resistance against the French and her indigenous allies, 
decided in July, 1954 to cease armed struggle as the 
method of achieving its objectives and to shift to political 
struggle. This decision was made in response to both 
external pressures and as a result of weighing domestic 
strengths and weaknesses. Externally, the DRVN found that 
her allies, Russia and China, were both moving towards 
a limited detente with the West and for reasons of their 
own wished to see an end to the First Indochinese war. 
Secondly, domestic opposition to the war operating inside
"Statement of the Presidium of the Front for the 
Unification of All National Forces", broadcast by Radio 
France-Asie in Vietnamese to Indochina, 1230 GMT, March 
21, 1955.
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France had created a favourable climate for striking an 
advantageous bargain. The PAVN victory at Dien Bien Phu 
was calculated to strike the French solar plexus and 
knock out her will to fight. Finally, the ever present 
threat of American military intervention hung over the 
Lao Dong Party leaders.
On the domestic scene the Party itself realised 
that it was not strong enough to win the complete 
independence they had been fighting for. Their forces 
and strength lay in the north, not the south. But having 
observed this, the Party also realised that it had certain 
assets: a well-organized political administration in the
villages, a disciplined party and a popular program.
The Party weighed the balances of forces and concluded 
that it was better to opt for a political settlement, 
secure half of the country and get the French out than to 
continue fighting. Therefore they signed agreements 
with the French at Geneva bringing to an end the First 
Indochina War.
In September, 1954 the Party held a major Political 
Bureau Conference where they took stock of the situation 
and decided on a long range Policy synchronised with the 
various deadlines and provisions in the Geneva Agreements. 
Since Viet-Nam was to be partitioned, Party policy would 
have to be adjusted to the peculiarities of each region.
In the north the Party would fulfil its obligations during 
the period of French regroupment and withdrawal. A 
similar policy was to be pursued in the south; but new 
provisions had to be made for those personnel not slated
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for final regroupment. The Party directed that those 
who remained must prepare for a situation in which the 
"enemy" would shortly become the administration. Party 
cadres were directed to reorganize and prepare to function 
covertly. Most mass organizations associated with the 
Lien Viet Front were either dissolved or reorganized.
By early 1955 leaders of the Viet-Nam Workers'
Party could be reasonably satisfied with the implementation 
of the Geneva Agreements. A ceasefire had been 
effectively implemented, thus bringing peace to Viet-Nam. 
The anticipated American military intervention did not 
eventuate. Reorganization of the Party's apparatus in 
Nam Bo as well as the regroupment of military forces had 
been executed effectively. Within the space of two months 
the final military withdrawals from central Viet-Nam 
would be completed simultaneously with the withdrawal 
of French troops from the north.
The completion of the major military provisions of 
the Geneva Agreements (ICSC control and supervision of 
military personnel and equipment would continue) signalled 
a shift in attention to political matters. High on the 
Party's list of priorities was the North-South consultative 
talks to determine the modalities of the elections. The 
current political instability in the south was no doubt 
foreseen by Party leaders. They probably felt that Diem 
would fall leaving in his wake a succession of weak 
governments. Perhaps a group of pro-DRVN politicians
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14 2would take office and smooth the process of unification.
If not, then perhaps France would have to play a stronger
role. Either way the Party stood to benefit.
However there were some dark clouds on the horizon.
American influence in the south was growing rapidly. Aid
was now channelled to the State of Viet-Nam by-passing
the French. On November 17, 1954 J. Lawton Collins, a
special representative of U.S. President Eisenhower with
the rank of ambassador announced at a Saigon press
conference that "an American mission will soon take
charge of instructing the Vietnam Army in accordance
with special American methods which have proved effective
143in Korea, Greece, Turkey and other parts of the world".
Although the State of Viet-Nam was not a signatory to the
Manila Pact (SEATO Treaty), it had been placed under SEATO's
144protective umbrella in a separate protocol. The growth
There were a variety of Vietnamese politicians in exile 
in Paris, most notably Buu Hoi, who might have replaced Diem 
in 1954-55. Hoi was on record as favouring a rapprochement 
with the DRVN; see: United Press dispatch from Saigon m
Le Monde (August 18, 1954), p.12; Devillers and Lacouture, 
End of a War, op.cit., p.364, footnote 5; and "The U.S. 
and France's Withdrawal From Vietnam, 1954-1956", in United 
States - Vietnam Relations, op.cit., Book 1, IV.A.3., p.15.
143 Dispatch from Saigon in The New York Times (November 18, 
1954), p.3; for a general overview of this period see: 
Geoffrey Warner, "The United States, France and Vietnam in 
the Year After Geneva", paper presented to a seminar of the 
Department of International Relations, Research School of 
Pacific Studies, The Australian National University 
(September 20 , 1972) .
The Protocol states: "The Parties to the Southeast
Asia Collective Defense Treaty unanimously designate for 
the purposes of Article IV of the Treaty the States of 
Cambodia and Laos and the free territory under the jurisdiction 
of the State of Vietnam". The Protocol and the Treaty, 
including article IV, may be found in Eisenhower, Mandate 
for Change, op.cit., pp.708-711.
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in American influence was at the expense of France whom 
the DRVN leaders held responsible for implementing the 
Geneva Agreements.
CHAPTER 3
POLITICAL STRUGGLE UNDER THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS 
(March - August 1955)
I. INTRODUCTION
Sometime during the month of March the Central 
Committee of the Lao Dong Party held its Seventh Plenum.
Very little is known of this meeting, including the 
precise dates it was held. It is known, however, that 
the Fourth Session of the DRVN National Assembly was 
convened during March 20-26. It seems probable that the 
Central Committee met just before the National Assembly 
convened. Summaries of the speeches given to the 
National Assembly by Pham Van Dong and Vo Nguyen Giap 
were publicly broadcast and from this information and 
other sources it is possible to discern Lao Dong Party 
policy at this stage. Before doing so two significant 
events should be highlighted.
First, by March 1955 final military regroupment north 
of the seventeenth parallel had been carried out in all 
provisional assembly areas except for Binh Dinh and Quang 
Ngai. In December, 1954 a press report indicated that four 
top southern revolutionary leaders had also regrouped and 
were given important posts in the DRVN government.'*" In 
late February, the PAVN High Command gave a tea party for 
the Nam Bo units which had regrouped. The published list of
Pham Van Bach, the former chairman of the Nam Bo Committee 
of Administration and Resistance, became Assistant Secretary 
of the Interior; Ung Van Khiem became Assistant Minister for 
Foreign Affairs; Pham Ngoc Thach became Assistant Secretary 
of Health; and Nguyen Duy Trinh became Assistant Secretary 
in the Premier’s Office; see: "Reds Widen Cabinet Base", The
New York Times (December 31, 1954), p.4.
guests present indicated that even more southern leaders 
were in the north. Of the eight original members of the 
Central Committee Directorate for Southern Viet-Nam six 
were now in the north: Le Due Tho, Pham Hung, Ung Van
2Khiem, Duong Quoc Chinh, Pham Ngoc Thuan and Thuong Vu.
The fact that their presence was reported in the north soon
after the final PAVN regroupment from Ca Mau might be seen
as confirmation that the Directorate had been located in that
region. From the above information it seems safe to
conclude that the Directorate was deactivated at this time.
The second significant event to occur between the
September Political Bureau Conference and the 7th Party
Plenum was the convening in January (7th-llth) of a National
Congress of the Lien Viet Front. This was the largest
Congress since 1951 when the Viet Minh Front merged with
the Lien Viet Front. There can be no doubt as to the purpose
of this Congress, for one theme runs through the major reports
and speeches delivered there. Typical was an editorial in
the Party paper, Nhan Dan, which appeared on the first day:
Today, confronted by the new situation, the 
Lien Viet National Committee decided to meet 
in order to review what has been done, the 
policy written, the program of the Front, 
acknowledge the new situation, the new 
missions, and deals with the very important 
problem of widening and strengthening the 
National United Front, so as to unite and 
consolidate the forces of the people in order 
to struggle for peace, independence, and the 
democratization of the country.^
Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia,
0525 GMT, February 20, 1955; Le Duan remained in the south 
to head the Nam Bo Regional Committee. The whereabouts of 
Ha Huy Giap went unreported but he later appeared in the north
3 "Let Us Acclaim the National Congress of the Lien Viet Front 
Nhan Dan (January 7, 1955) broadcast by Voice of Vietnam in 
Vietnamese to Southeast Asia, 0430 GMT, January 7, 1955.
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The final communique reflected the fact that
enlarging the Front had top priority. Point one concluded:
"...the National United Front must still extend and
strengthen itself. Therefore it must issue new regulations
4better fitting the present situation..." The remainder of 
the communique made these points: (1) the Front is to be
based on the worker-peasant alliance; (2) the aims are to 
struggle for peace, unification, independence and democracy 
(that is, for North-South consultations); (3) no 
discrimination will be exercised in membership on the basis 
of sex, nationality, religion or political tendency as long 
as the person or group fully supports "peace, unification, 
independence and democracy" for Viet-Nam ; (4) the solidarity
of the Front is based on these principles: democracy,
unity, respect for the autonomy of member groups and mutual 
help, and (5) that in order to form a new Front on the 
basis of the above points, a national assembly composed of 
all the classes, parties, groups, religions in the north 
and south, should be called. Toward this end an organizing 
committee was set up.
A special "Message... to the compatriots of the South" 
was issued which recognized the possibility that Viet-Nam 
might remain permanently divided unless the people in both 
zones united to strengthen the National United Front to 
"struggle for the coming general e l e c t i o n s ^
"Communique of the Resolutions of the Conference of the 
Lien Viet National Committee", Voice of Vietnam, 1100 GMT, 
January 20, 1955.
5 "Message Sent by the National Conference of the Delegates 
of the Lien Viet to the Compatriots of the South", Voice of 
Vietnam in Vietnamese to South Vietnam, 1000 GMT, January 
17, 1955.
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As usual, an editorial in Nhan Dan spelled out for
Party members the significance of the Congress and its
communique. It is worth quoting the editorial at some
length for a full appreciation of developments:
The conference passed an important resolution 
conforming with the desire of our people to 
widen and consolidate the National United 
Front to safeguard peace, achieve unity, 
perfect the independence and democratize 
the country.
We must recognize that our Front at the 
present time is a national united front 
including all of the country, that it 
struggles for peace, independence, 
unification and democratization of Vietnam 
based on the alliance of workers and farmers 
under the leadership of the Party.
The Front must follow a strong policy not 
only in the free areas but also among 
all the people's classes of the cities and 
newly liberated regions of the plain.
This policy must be applied not only in North 
Vietnam but also in South Vietnam.
During the application of the National United 
Front it is necessary to hold firmly to the 
principles of unification in our essential 
activities. This is very important. If we 
do not act exactly thus we might fall into 
error, either of the right or on the left.
We must know how to change the policy of the 
Party to consolidate the front in order to 
make the greatest expansion.
All the cadres of the Party, the Government 
and the Front must study the decisions made by 
the recent conference of the representatives of 
the Lien Viet Front and endeavour to apply 
them faithfully.
At present there is also - in some regions -
a great number of cadres who are neglecting
the main lines of the Lien Viet National Front,
who do not study the policy of the front, and
who do not favor adhering to this front. Several
errors have been committed regarding the application
of the principles of the front. This causes
serious prejudice to the unification of the
people and relations between the Party and the people.
The conference of the representatives of the Lien 
Viet Front had decided this vear to take steps to
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convene a congress of the entire country to 
include all the representatives who have not 
yet participated in the Lien Viet [Front] in the 
south as well as the north - in order to discuss 
the formation of a national front coherently 
widened to group all the democratic forces of 
the people with a view towards the 
intensification of the struggle against the 
American imperialists, against the French 
colonialist elements - saboteurs of the 
armistice agreements - and against the Ngo 
Dinh Diem band, to consolidate peace, achieve 
unification, independence and democracy in the 
country...6
These two events, the deactivation of the Central Committee 
Directorate for Southern Vieb-Nam and the call for a 
national congress to revitalize the Lien Viet Front, 
provide the necessary backdrop to the 7th Plenum. Political 
developments in the south, sketched in chapter two, should 
also be borne in mind.
II. THE SEVENTH PLENUM (March 1955)
An official chronology of this period stated that the 7th 
plenum of the Central Committee had set forth the 
following tasks:
- continue to implement the Geneva Agreements and 
fight for their strict observance by other 
parties,
- consolidate the North in all respects,
- keep up and step up political movement of the 
South Vietnamese people,
- broaden and strengthen the National United 
Front throughout the country,
"To Achieve Systematically the Resolutions Made by the 
Conference of the Representatives of the Lien Viet National 
Front", Nhan Dan (January 22, 1955) broadcast by Vietnam 
News Agency in Vietnamese morse to Vietnam, 0435 GMT, 
January 22, 1955.
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- intensify diplomatic activities and enlist 
the support and sympathy of the world's 
peoples. '
It was at this time that the full range of problems 
encountered in trying to establish a DRVN administration 
in the north began to mount, thus draining the energy and 
resources which might have been used in dealing with southern 
problems. In other words, the Lao Dong Party was preoccupied 
with two major problems north of the seventeenth parallel: 
security, and economic self-sufficiency. The massive 
movement of refugees to the south brought with it mixed 
blessings: on the one hand it freed the north of potential
dissidents, it decreased the number of mouths to feed and 
it made available more land for the landless. On the other 
hand, the massive flow of people to the south carried with 
it certain security problems, it disrupted agricultural 
production, it depleted the DRVN of certain skilled manpower 
and it caused grave embarrassment internationally.
Security problems were troublesome and suppression of minor 
guerrilla activities required a diversion of resources.gEnemy psychological warfare activities caused concern.
"Socialist Construction and Anti-US Resistance: Chronology
of Events (1954-1970)", Vietnam Courier [Hanoi] (August 10, 
1970), No.281, p.4.
o The American "Saigon Military Mission" under the direction 
of Edward Lansdale was involved in training and infiltrating 
several guerrilla bands for operations in North Viet-Nam; 
they also conducted psychological warfare against the DRVN 
authorities. These exploits are discussed in the report of 
the Saigon Military Mission in "Lansdale Team's Report on 
Covert Saigon Mission in '54 and '55", in Neil Sheehan, 
compiler, The Pentagon Papers as Published by The New York 
Times (New York: Bantam Books, 1971), Document No.15,
pp.53-66. Murti, Vietnam Divided, op.cit., pp.23-24, 
recounts details of a clash between Tai Chin Quy, a pro-
cont'd
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Therefore, on the eve of final withdrawals, the French 
from the north and the PAVN from the south, there was some 
doubt as to the Lao Dong Party's ability to meet all the 
crisis points at once, and successfully.
The Nhan Dan editorial cited above, mentioned the 
problem of cadres who did not apply the main lines of Lien 
Viet Front policy properly. Ho Chi Minh was quite precise 
on this problem. In his opening speech to the 7th plenum 
he listed four major goals which the Party, Army and people 
had to carry out:
1. Continue to rigorously apply the Geneva 
Agreements, to consolidate peace, and to 
continue to struggle in order to realize 
unification of the country by free 
elections,
2. Consolidate the north from all points of view 
and, at the same time, maintain and 
energetically develop our work in the 
south,
3. Consolidate and enlarge the basis of the 
Unified National Front throughout the country,
8 cont'd
French partisan leader, who refused to disarm or regroup 
following the withdrawal of the French Union Forces from his 
area. Voice of Free Vietnam in Vietnamese to Indochina,
1100 GMT, January 17, 1955 describes a clash between PAVN 
units and Nung [an ethnic minority group] troops. According 
to Geoffrey Warner, "General de Brebisson strongly denied 
charges that France maintained and supplied partisans in 
North Vietnam after Geneva. They had maintained and supplied 
Thai and Meo bands on the Chinese border before the armistice, 
but the few French officers and non-coms operating with them 
had all been killed and the bands themselves, which are very 
small, had slipped across the border into China..." in 
"Interview with General Michel de Brebisson", op.cit., p.l. 
Nevertheless contemporary reports suggest both French and 
American involvement in aiding disturbances in the north; see: 
"Vietnam Truce Unit Criticizes French", The New York Times 
(February 11, 1955), p.6; Radio France-Asie in French, 0445 
GMT, April 26, 1955; Voice of Vietnam in French to Southeast 
Asia, 1030 GMT, April 23, 1955; Vietnam News Agency in English 
morse to Southeast Asia, 0615 GMT, June 17, 1955; 0703 GMT, 
July 5, 1955; 0749 GMT, July 20, 1955; 0805 GMT, August 22,
1955; and People's Radio, Revolutionary Committee, Saigon, in 
Vietnamese to Vietnam, 1330 GMT, September 27, 1955.
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4. Perfect the direction, complete the instruction 
of the members of the Central Committee, 
perfect the organization and the methods of 
work, raise the spirit of organization and 
of discipline, and perfect the revolutionary 
education of all officers and members of 
the Party.^
On March 20 Pham Van Dong delivered a report to the 
4th Session of the DRVN National Assembly in which he dealt 
at length with the "present situation and tasks". This 
speech was the most comprehensive policy statement to be 
officially released by the DRVN government to date. DRVN 
news media gave it extensive coverage.
Since Dong was both a Vice Premier and Political Bureau 
member it is reasonable to conclude that not only was the 
speech obviously authoritative but it probably reflected 
the views of the recent Party Plenum.
Pham Van Dong dealt with three policy areas: the
international scene, problems of economic recovery in the 
north and the development of a broader national united 
front for both zones.
Dong's analysis of the world situation repeated the 
major tenets of the September Politbureau resolution: (1)
the front of peace led by the USSR is clearly stronger 
than the front of the imperialists, and (2) the front of 
peace is growing stronger each day.~^ In discussing the
9 "President Ho Chi Minh's Speech at Opening Meeting of the 
Seventh Session of the General Executive Committee of the 
Labor Party of Viet-Nam", Voice of Vietnam in Vietnamese 
to South Vietnam, 1200 GMT, April 29, 1955.
Pham Van Dong's speech was transcribed in four parts:
(1) Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 
0600 GMT, March 23, 1955 in U.S. FBIS Daily Report (March 
24, 1955), No.58, pp.CCC5-CCC10; (2) Voice of Vietnam in
Vietnamese to Southeast Asia, 0001 GMT, March 22, 1955 in 
U.S. FBIS Daily Report (March 25, 1955), No.59, pp.CCC1-CCC15;
cont'd
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role of the DRVN in this "front of peace", Dong related 
his analysis of the world situation to the Southeast Asian 
region. Here he focused on SEATO, and American attempts 
to oust the French so as to convert Viet-Nam into an American 
colony. SEATO was seen as a possible springboard for an 
attack on China. The aim of American policy was: "to
prejudice the re-establishment of normal relations between 
the north and s o u t h . . . I n  other words, despite the trend 
favouring peace in the world, tensions in Southeast Asia 
were emerging which carried the potential to disrupt the 
larger, more favourable peace forces. Therefore, concluded 
Dong, "The present enemies of our people are the American 
imperialists, the French colonialists, saboteurs of the
12agreements, and their lackeys, the Ngo Dinh Diem band".
Dong went on to develop his analysis into a statement
of foreign policy goals which he said formed the external
policy of the DRVN. Firstly, the DRVN would further
strengthen friendly relations with the People's Republic of
China, the USSR and the people's democracies. Secondly, he
stated with respect to Laos and Cambodia, the DRVN "is ready
to establish normal relations... on the basis of the five
principles contained in the Sino-Indian and Sino-Burmese
13joint declarations". Thirdly, Dong acclaimed the forthcoming 
cont' d
(3) Voice of Vietnam in Vietnamese to Southeast Asia, 0001 
GMT, March 22, 1955 in U.S. FBIS Daily Report (March 28, 1955), 
No.60, pp.CCC1-CCC6; and (4) Voice of Vietnam in Vietnamese to 
Southeast Asia, 0001 GMT, March 22, 1955 in U.S. FBIS Daily 
Report (March 29, 1955), No.61, pp.CCC1-CCC7. Cited hereafter 
as Dong Speech Part I, II, III and IV, respectively.
^  Dong Speech, Part II, p.CCC12.
12 Ibid.
13 Dong Speech, Part IV, p.CCC5.
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Afro-Asian Conference to be held at Bandung in Indonesia.
Fourthly, with regard to France, which shared with the DRVN
the responsibility for implementing the Geneva Accords, in
the DRVN view, Dong stated:
The relations between the two countries are 
indispensable to maintain and strengthen peace.
The government of the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam is preoccupied with maintaining economic 
and cultural relations with France on the 
principle of equality and community of 
reciprocal interests.14
Dong concluded this list by indicating the DRVN's support 
for Russia's stand on disarmament and the banning of atomic 
weapons, and the DRVN's opposition to the U.S. occupation of 
Formosa and the rearmament of West Germany.
The most significant portion of Dong's report was his 
analysis of developments in the north. Dong stressed 
several times that the mobilization of the masses for the 
reduction of land rent and the application of the agrarian 
reform was considered the foundation of all reconstruction 
policy. Two brief excerpts from his speech will illustrate 
this point:
The essential mission of the Vietnamese 
revolution is the total abolition of the 
regime of appropriation of lands and rice 
fields, of spoliation and exploitation of the 
peasants by the feudal landowner class.15
and
As regards North Vietnam, the agrarian 
reform constitutes the essential basis of 
national recovery on the political, economi[c] 
cultural and social planes.16
Ibid., p.CCC6. The DRVN government had been dealing 
with a French mission headed by Jean Sainteny; see: Warner,
"The United States, France and Vietnam", op.cit., pp.14-20.
15 Dong Speech, Part III, p.CCC3.
16 Ibid., p.CCC4.
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Elsewhere in his report Dong discussed the enormous
agricultural problems confronting the DRVN leaders as they
tried to rebuild their war damaged economy. Dong mentioned,
in particular, the destroyed irrigation, communication and
transport systems which forced the Party "to make
exceptional efforts to surmount the difficulties from the
viewpoint of the supply of rice and that of financial 
17purification". In light of these problems it seems that 
the Central Committee, as reflected in Pham Van Dong's 
report, made a decision to accord first priority to 
consolidating the north over the carrying out of the 
political struggle in the south. The priorities were 
justified in this way:
In order to win victory in the struggle for peace, 
unity, independence and democracy, we must 
depend on the people's power in the south as in 
the north. The north becomes the basis of the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam. To strengthen 
the north is to strengthen the principal bases 
[sic] which will decide the victory of the 
present struggle for national liberation, the 
foundation of which is the struggle to strengthen 
peace and national unification.
To strengthen the north we must do everything 
necessary on the political, economic, cultural 
and military planes. It is a question of 
developing the application of the agrarian 
reform and realizing the economic and cultural 
recovery, in order to improve the material 
and moral conditions of the people, to 
progressively make the country advance toward 
industrialization; in order to strengthen the 
national defense, to defend peace and the 
Fatherland, to strengthen the Government of 
the Democratic Republic and to give significance 
to all its diplomatic actions.
In so doing we will strengthen the north, but we 
must also pay attention to the south and take 
into consideration the aspirations of the
17 Dong Speech, Part II, p.CCC9.
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compatriots of the south, so that they may 
understand the necessity of positively 
participating with full confidence in the 
common struggle of all our people.
In order to undertake mass mobilization for rent
reduction and to carry out agrarian reform "a single and
central direction" was necessary. The Party, according
to Dong, must enhance its discipline and authority over
19"the cadres charged with internal and external policy".
Dong continued:
Our power must be consolidated and widened in 
order to make it a vast National United Front.
The rural powers must be reorganized, with the agrarian reform as the basis. 0
Party policy in the south, stated Dong, would be based
on the strict implementation of the Geneva Agreements "which
aim at consolidating peace, unifying the country, and
21perfecting independence and democrac[y]". Therefore the
struggle in the south to achieve these aims [peace, unity,
independence, democracy] must be co-ordinated with the
22struggle in the north.
As in the north, the basis of the Party's power in the 
south would be a national united front. Its policies would 
be directed at creating "a large movement in favour of peace 
and unity, free general elections, a political conference 
between the governments of the two zones, the re-establishment 
of normal relations between the north and south and in
Dong Speech, Part III, p.CCC2.
19 Dong Speech, Part IV, p.CCC4.
20 Ibid.
2  ^ Dong Speech, Part III, p.CCCl. 
22 Ibid., p.CCC2.
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favour of the plans of the National Assembly and the
Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam concerning
2 3these problems".
Dong ended his report with a brief reference to the
Party: "To enlarge increasingly the National United Front
we must first consolidate and extend the direction of the
24Vietnam Workers' Party [the Lao Dong Party]...".
General Vo Nguyen Giap also delivered a report to the
National Assembly and it too received wide publicity. Its
scope was much narrower than Pham Van Dong's report but it
nevertheless contained some significant revelations about
Lao Dong Party policy at this juncture. Giap, like Dong,
was also a full member of the Political Bureau and it is
reasonable to assume his words were an accurate reflection
of Central Committee thinking.
Gen. Giap addressed himself to a review of the
implementation of the Geneva Agreements over the past eight
months, and to the likely developments in the future.
According to Giap the Geneva Agreements constituted a "great
victory" for the people of Viet-Nam because the international
community recognized the "sovereignty, independence and
territorial unity" of Viet-Nam. The agreements ended the
war, provided a set timetable for the withdrawal of the
French, and made provision for a political settlement by
2 5means of general elections to be held in 1956.
Dong Speech, Part II, p.CCC14.
24 Dong Speech, Part IV, p.CCC6.
25 General Vo Nguyen Giap's speech to the DRVN National 
Assembly, broadcast by Voice of Vietnam in Vietnamese to 
Southeast Asia, 1300 GMT, March 23, 1955, was transcribed
cont'd
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Giap's second point was that the main military 
provisions had been carried out satisfactorily: [d]uring the
last eight months we have always correctly and strictly 
applied all clauses of the Geneva accords: the adversary,
2 6on his side, has also respected certain of these clauses". 
Among the points of contention, according to Gen. Giap, was
the question of prisoners who were still held by the other
• , 27side.
Far more serious were the efforts of the American
imperialists to violate the Geneva Agreements. Giap
specifically mentioned SEATO and its extension of protection
to Indochina as a "cynical violation" which threatened the
2 8"security and peace in Southeast Asia". The Americans,
Giap argued, were preparing for a war with China.
The French were guilty of collusion with the Americans. 
Here Giap cited as examples the Ely-Collins cooperation in 
Saigon, meetings of officials of both countries, and France’s 
participation in SEATO.
Certain articles of the Geneva Agreements protecting 
individuals against reprisal and guaranteeing their democratic 
liberties were being violated according to Giap. He accused 
the Diem regime of conducting a policy of terrorism against 
former Resistance veterans. According to his figures, "since
cont'd
in two parts: (1) U.S. FBIS Daily Report (March 29, 1955),
No.61, pp.CCC13-CCC16 and (2) U.S. FBIS Daily Report (March 
30, 1955), No.62, pp.CCC1-CCC17. Cited hereafter as Giap 
Speech Part I and II, respectively. The quotation is from 
Giap Speech, Part I, p.CCC14.
2 f) Giap Speech, Part II, p.CCC3.
27 Giap Speech, Part I, p.CCC2.
2 8 Giap Speech, Part II, p.CCC5.
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the cease-fire up to Jan.31, 1955, the adversary committed
292,321 acts of terrorism and massacres".
Gen. Giap then turned his attention to the north and
explained what had happened there. He concentrated his
remarks on discussing the refugee flow to the south and
the problem of security. Regarding refugees, Giap states
that they were both tricked and forced to regroup to the
south, where they would become either soldiers in Diem's
army or "coolies on the rubber plantations".
Giap then exposed the activities of "reactionaries in
the service of the Diem government" who used propaganda to
distort "the spirit of our policy" and who sowed panic
among Catholic compatriots. Giap listed the following slogans
30as examples of false propaganda:
God has gone to the south.
Catholics will be excommunicated if they 
stay in the north.
Those who go to the south will be given 
ricefields, buffaloes, and will lead a 
happy life.
Those who stay in the north will be exterminated 
by American atomic bombs.
Gen. Giap concluded this section by stating what had
become a keystone of DRVN policy: even though the Americans
have replaced the French militarily and politically, it was
"[t]he French authorities who were signatories to these
31accords and [who] are also responsible for it".
Gen. Giap's conclusions reiterated previous policy and 
added some new features. First, developments in Cambodia and
Ibid., p .CCC8.
3 0 Ibid., p.9; Faber, Rot Leuchtet der Song Cai, op.cit., 
pp.177-182.
31 Ibid., p.CCCll.
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Laos were linked to developments in Viet-Nam. That is,
the implementation of the Geneva Agreements there would
create "a solid base" for the opening of favourable relations
among the three nations of Indochina. Secondly, DRVN policy
towards the Agreements remained unchanged: "We are continuing
to respect and apply the signed agreements; we are resolved
to struggle to demand that the adversary respect and apply
32the agreements". Thirdly, "struggle" against the saboteurs
of the Geneva Agreements is the only solution Giap offered
as to what the DRVN reaction would be if America and the
Diem government continued to violate the Agreements.
Lao Dong Party statements were never clear on this
point, and in this instance Gen. Giap proved no exception:
With the struggle in favor of the application of the 
agreements, the struggle for the consolidation 
of peace and the development of unity remains 
intimately bound. The general elections will 
only take place when peace is consolidated. The 
struggle for the carrying out of unity will 
contribute largely to the consolidation of 
peace.3 3
In the final section of his report Gen. Giap stressed 
the use of the "legal" status of the Geneva Agreements as a 
base on which to launch this struggle. He claimed that 
for the political struggle movement to be successful the 
people must first be educated in how to denounce violations. 
Secondly, a broad front consisting of the supporters of 
peace, unity, independence and democracy must be formed. 
Thirdly, PAVN must continue to respect the Agreements by 
regrouping the remaining troops in B'inh Dinh - Quang Ngai 
provinces. Fourthly, the clauses of the agreement relating
32 Ibid., p.CCC15.
33 Ibid.
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freedom of movement should be respected. ("Those who want
34to go should go; those who want to stay, should stay").
Fifthly, the struggle movement should protest coercive measures,
restrictions of movement, acts of terrorism, distinctions in
the treatment of people based on political belief and
violation of democratic freedoms. Finally, Giap stated:
We must prepare to negotiate with the 
adversary with regard to the general elections.
To favor these negotiations our Government and 
the compatriots of the two zones must join 
their efforts in order to re-establish and 
increase economic, cultural and social 
relations.^5
Although official Party histories provide no further 
details as to the decisions taken at the 7th Plenum, the 
speeches by Pham Van Dong and Vo Nguyen Giap can be taken 
as accurate reflections of Party thinking. We have seen 
earlier how the Party hoped to integrate policy on three 
levels (on the international scene, in the north and in the 
south), to achieve maximum impact. The 7th Plenum met just 
before the final regroupment of military forces. Gen. Giap 
reported in his speech that the regroupment would be carried 
out as far as the PAVN was concerned. This event, then, 
marks the divide between the two-step process of implementing 
the Geneva Agreements; step one was focused on military 
details while step two would be concerned with political 
affairs. Partition was to occur in May and be followed in 
July, supposedly, by consultations between the "competent 
authorities" in the two zones.
34 Ibid., p .CCC16.
35 Ibid., p .CCC17.
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Lao Dong Party policy at this point continued to 
reflect the long-range assessment drafted in September.
It also addressed itself to some new tasks, two features of 
which are striking: the DRVN was going to start a "diplomatic
offensive" among its allies and neighbours and secondly, 
agrarian reform was going to be given top priority in the 
north. The south was to rely on its own resources developing 
the clandestine network of Party members and in carrying out 
a political struggle movement emphasizing slogans related 
to the implementation of the Geneva Agreements (namely, a 
call for consultations, a call for normalization of relations 
and protest at reprisals, terrorism and violations of 
democratic freedom). In March of 1955 at the time of the 
7th Plenum there was still no reason to believe that any 
other policy would yield better results. In fact, the south 
was on the verge of anarchy as no real efforts had yet 
been undertaken by the State of Viet-Nam authorities to 
destroy the clandestine organization of the Lao Dong Party. 
Overall, the situation looked favourable.
III. FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to deal 
systematically with the foreign policies of the Lao Dong 
Party in the post-Geneva period. To do so would involve a 
consideration of the relationship of the DRVN with three 
different constellations of countries: (1) the fraternal
socialist allies, (2) the Geneva Conference participants and 
ICC representatives, and (3) with Asian neighbours (Laos, 
Cambodia, Burma, Indonesia). However, at this point in 
the narrative it is imperative to discuss three foreign policy
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events: (1) the DRVN's attendance at Bandung, (2) the
DRVN's attempts to open consultations with the authorities 
in the south and (3) the trip abroad to China and Russia 
by a DRVN government delegation headed by President Ho Chi 
Minh.
In chapter two the desire on the part of the Lao Dong 
Party leaders to secure a national territory, complete with 
port and capital, was mentioned. In the post-Geneva period 
the DRVN came into being at least as a "state" accorded 
de facto recognition. As a member of the "front of peace" 
the DRVN soon exchanged diplomatic representatives with a 
majority of socialist nations. Beginning in October the 
following embassies were established in Hanoi: People's
Republic of China (PRC), USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, North Korea, 
Rumania, and Bulgaria. Coincidentally with this, a series 
of trade and other agreements were signed and various 
cultural-educational-political groups were exchanged.
Both Nehru and U Nu paid courtesy calls to Hanoi en 
route to the PRC. In November 1954 a group of Indonesian 
diplomats spent a week touring the DRVN. This new status 
on the world diplomatic stage soon resulted in invitations 
to visit abroad.
The Bandung Conference provided the DRVN with an 
opportunity to make its foreign policy known and to secure 
support for its interpretations as to how the Geneva 
Agreements should be implemented. The DRVN delegation which 
was led by Pham Van Dong, stopped in India and Burma
en route.
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Dong's stay in India was marked by the release of a 
joint communique which stressed the "importance of free 
elections and the achievement of unity of Viet-Nam as 
provided for by the Geneva Agreements", as "an important 
contribution, not only to unity and peace in Viet-Nam,
3 6but also in Indo-China as a whole and in Southeast Asia".
The DRVN's reception at Bandung was a marked success. 
According to SarDesai:
At the Bandung Conference, Nehru had largely ignored 
the delegation from South Vietnam, whereas 
the DRV delegation, led by Pham Van Dong, had 
received sympathetic attention from the 
conference's sponsors, the Colombo powers, 
particularly India. The conference had passed 
a resolution recommending the admission of 
several countries, among them Laos, Cambodia 
and a 'unified Vietnam', to the United 
Nations.  ^/
The high point of the Conference, from the DRVN's
point of view, came when Nehru and Chou En-lai "sponsored"
a joint declaration by the Royal Lao Government (RLG)
and the DRVN. The State of Viet-Nam officials refused to
take part, thus increasing their diplomatic isolation. Laos
and the DRVN agreed to establish harmonious and good-
neighbourly relations on the basis of the five principles of
peaceful coexistence. The DRVN stated that a political
settlement between the RLG and Pathet Lao was the internal
3 8affair of Laos. This latter point harked back to the
3 6 "The Text of the Joint Communique by the Prime Minister 
of India and Shri Pham Van Dong Deputy Prime Minister and 
Foreign Minister of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam in 
New Delhi on April 10, 1955", in Foreign Policy of India: 
Texts of Documents, 1947-1959 (New Delhi: Lok Sabha
Secretariat, 1959) , pp. 169-170.
37 SarDesai, Indian Foreign Policy, op.cit., p.89.
38 Ibid., pp.70-72 and 88.
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Nehru-Dong joint statement in which the DRVN first accepted
the five principles of peaceful coexistence.
The DRVN made several attempts prior to the 7th Plenum
to open normal relations with the south. For example, on
January 28, 1955 the DRVN Postal and Telegraphic Service
addressed a memorandum to its counterpart in the south
suggesting they reach agreement by March 1st on details
which would allow the exchange of postal cards between the
two zones. After a month's wait with no reply, the DRVN
Postal and Telegraphic Service sent a second memorandum to
its counterpart suggesting the same exchange as before,
and recalling its original memorandum. This time a reply
was received and the two services hammered out an agreement
in April which permitted, as of May 15, 1955, the exchange
39of family postal cards.
As we have seen, Vo Nguyen Giap raised the issue of 
joint north-south negotiations and the issues of general 
elections and normalization of economic-cultural and 
social relations in his report to the 4th Session of the 
DRVN National Assembly. This was not the first time the 
issue of normalization had been raised. Pham Van Bach, the 
DRVN Deputy Minister of the Interior was reported to have 
called for the normalization of relations as early as 
February 6th 1955.^
After the seventh Plenum this theme was given increasing 
emphasis, especially as the July 20, 1955 date for the
39 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 
1400 GMT, March 6, 1955; and 0750 GMT, May 21, 1955.
4 0 Voice of Vietnam in Vietnamese to Southeast Asia, 0430 
GMT, February 8, 1955.
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commencement of consultations approached. During the
month of May, for example, there were at least three
reports in the official DRVN media raising the normalization 
41issue. Thus it came as no surprise when, on June 6,
1955, Pham Van Dong undertook a major initiative on this
matter. After pointing out that the 300-day period for
military regroupment had ended, Dong said the time had
arrived to implement the political provisions. He therefore
issued the following invitation to the State of Viet-Nam:
The Government of the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam declares its readiness to hold the 
consultative conference with the competent 
representative authorities in South Vietnam 
for [sic] July 20, 1955 onwards in order to 
discuss the organization of free general 
elections throughout the country in July 
1956.42
A reply was forthcoming on July 16, 1955. Ngo Dinh Diem
with full U.S. backing answered:
We did not sign the Geneva Agreements. We 
are not bound in any way by these agreements, 
signed against the will of the Vietnamese 
people.* 4 3
Diem went on to state that his government did "not 
reject the principle of free elections" but that they could 
only be meaningful if they were "absolutely free". Diem
The DRVN Council of Ministers on May 15, 1955; Ta Quang
Buu, at a Hanoi press conference on May 16, 1955; and by
Vietnam News Agency on May 21, 1955.
4 2 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 
0600 and 0715 GMT, June 6, 1955 in U.S. FBIS Daily Report 
(June 7, 1955), No.110, pp.CCC1-CCC5.
43 "Premier Diem States Policies Regarding Country-Wide 
Elections (July 16, 1955)", Embassy of Vietnam (Washington, 
D.C.), Press and Information Service, press release (July 
22, 1955), Vol.l, No.18 reprinted in Cole, Conflict in 
Indochina, op.cit., pp.226-227.
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continued:
Faced now with a regime of oppression as practised 
by the Viet Minh, we remain skeptical concerning 
the possibility of fulfilling the conditions of 
free elections in the North. We shall not miss 
any opportunity which would permit the unification 
of our homeland in freedom, but it is out of 
the question for us to consider any proposal from 
the Viet Minh if proof is not given that they put 
the superior interests of the National Community 
above those of communism... * 4
Diem's reply was perfectly timed to catch the attention
of world leaders for it was issued on the eve of another
Big Four Conference in Geneva. Although Indochina was not
on the agenda it must certainly have been in the minds of
some of those present for on July 20th a government (i.e.
State of Viet-Nam)-organized mob ransacked two Saigon
hotels which housed ICC members. Thereafter the Indochina
question was raised in private conversation. Diem's reply
was also issued after Nehru (whose country was chairman of
the ICC), had signed two joint statements which specifically
referred to elections. The first was a joint declaration
reached with Bulganin on June 23rd. It stated:
In particular they [Bulganin-Nehru] would strongly 
urge that where elections are to be held as a 
preliminary to a political settlement the 
efforts of the Governments concerned should be 
directed to the full implementation of the 
provisions of the agreements.4^
The second document was a joint statement agreed to
between the Indian and Polish governments. It stated:
It is essential for the sake of peace not only 
in Indo-China but in the Far East generally 
and the world that the Geneva agreements should
44 Ibid.
4 5 "The Text of the Joint Declaration by Marshall Bulganin 
and Shri Nehru Issued in Moscow on June 23, 1955", in 
Foreign Policy of India, op.cit., pp.185-187.
140
be fully implemented by the parties concerned 
and the ejections held as provided for 
therein.* 4
Faced with this situation on July 19th, the eve of the
deadline set for consultations, the DRVN issued another
call for north-south talks:
The Government of the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam proposes that you appoint your 
representatives and that they and ours hold 
the consultative conference from July 20,
1955 onwards as provided for by the Geneva 
Agreements at a place agreeable to both 
sides on Vietnamese territory in order to 
discuss the problem of unification of our 
country by means of free, general elections 
all over Vietnam.
At this point it is necessary to retrace our steps and 
consider briefly the third foreign policy event of 
this period: Ho Chi Minh's trip to China and Russia. It
was obviously timed to precede the Big Four Conference and 
perhaps influence its deliberations. For this reason one 
may conclude that Ho Chi Minh was after Chinese and Russian 
backing of the DRVN call for consultations.4® Ho's itinerary 
took him to China first (June 27 to July 7), to Mongolia and 
to Russia (July 12-18). The composition of the delegation
49clearly revealed that Ho was also seeking reconstruction aid.
"The Text of the Joint Statement By the Prime Ministers of 
India and Poland Issued in Warsaw on June 27, 1955", ibid., 
pp.191-192.
4 7 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia,
0602 GMT, July 20, 1955 in U.S. FBIS Daily Report (July 21,
1955), No.141, pp.CCC1-CCC3.
4 8 Hong Kong dispatch in The New York Times (June 27, 1955), p.7.
4 9 The DRVN government delegation was composed ,of: Ho Chi
Minh, President and Premier; Truong Chinh, Secretary-General 
of the VWP; Le Van Hien, Minister of Finance; Phan Anh,
Minister of Industry and Commerce; Nguyen Van Huyen, Minister 
of Education; Nghiem Xuan Yem, Minister of Agriculture and
cont'd
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In evaluating Ho's trip one must be careful to place 
it in the context of the times. In later years (particularly 
in the 1960's) Viet-Nam became the focal point of socialist 
bloc unity, but in 1955 the situation was much different
as Cameron reminds us:
If the Soviet Union was displaying less than total 
enthusiasm for the character of the DRV as a 
Socialist state and for the problem of reunification, 
the North Vietnamese [i.e. DRVN] themselves were 
obviously less than enthusiastic about establishing 
the closest of all possible ties with the Soviet 
Union. Relations were, of course, correct, but 
the North Vietnamese chose to show their 
displeasure, or distrust, of the Soviets by 
maintaining relations on a formal government- 
to-government basis while de-emphasizing party ties.
That policy was clearly demonstrated during 
July and August 1955 when a high level DRV 
delegation visited both China and the Soviet 
Union. Although headed by Ho Chi Minh and 
including Truong Chinh, then General 
Secretary of the VWP, the delegation was 
carefully described by the Vietnamese as well 
as by the Chinese and Russians as 'the 
Government delegation of the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam'. The visits were correct 
in form, but the Soviet reception for Ho Chi 
Minh did not compare in the warmth to that accorded 
to Prime Minister Nehru of India during his 
visit in June. The joint communiques issued 
in Peking and Moscow at the conclusion of the 
visits made no mention of party relations.
Neither communique indicated that the Vietnamese 
had won staunch support from these Communist 
brothers on the issue of reunification, but 
differences in wording indicated that there was 
somewhat more success in Peking than in Moscow. u
Ho Chi Minh's trip, almost as if by way of compensation,
was a great success in terms of the amount of aid he
cont'd
Forestry; Ung Van Khiem, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs; 
Nguyen Duy Trinh, director of the Presidential House; Pham 
Ngoc Thach, Deputy Minister of Public Health; Hoang Van 
Hoan, DRVN Ambassador to China; and Nguyen Luong Bang,
DRVN Ambassador to the USSR.
50 Allan W. Cameron, "The Soviet Union and Vietnam: The
Origins of Involvement", in W. Raymond Duncan, editor, Soviet 
Policy in Developing Countries (Waltham, Massachusetts: 
Ginn-Blaisdell, 1970), p.200.
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received - aid vitally necessary for Viet-Nam's recovery and 
later planned industrialization.51 In China the DRVN 
delegation received news of a grant of 800 million Chinese 
yuan (US$200,000,000) to be applied towards the repair of 
damaged roads (Nam Quan to Hanoi and Lai Chau to Haiphong), 
bridges, railway lines (Lao Ky to Hanoi), airfields and the 
reconstruction of some eighteen projects including the 
important Nam Dinh cotton mill. The Chinese also announced 
a manpower exchange whereby Chinese technical personnel 
would serve in Viet-Nam and Vietnamese workers would serve 
as apprentices in Chinese industrial enterprises. The final 
DRVN-PRC joint communique hinted at future expansion in 
trading relations.
In Moscow the Soviet government announced a non-refundable 
(free credit) grant of 400 million rubles (US$100,000,000) to 
assist in the reconstruction of twenty-three industrial and 
public service enterprises (inclduing engineering plants and 
textiles) and the development of Viet-Nam's tin and phosphate 
resources. Separate technical and trade agreements worth 200 
million rubles (US$50,000,000) were also negotiated. Included 
among them was finance for a three-cornered deal by which 
the USSR supplied certain goods to Burma in exchange for
The information on Ho's visits to Peking and Moscow has 
been gathered from a variety of sources: ibid.; Harold C.
Hinton, Communist China in World Politics (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Company, 1966) , p. 256 ; Roy Jumper and Marjorie Weiner 
Normand, "Vietnam", in George McT. Kahin, editor, Governments 
and Politics of Southeast Asia, Second Edition (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1964), p.506; William Kaye, "A Bowl of Rice 
Divided: The Economy of North Vietnam", in Honey, North Vietnam
Today, op.cit., p.112; and McLane, "The Russians and Vietnam", ’
op.cit., p.60. For the texts of the two communiques see: New
China News Agency (Peking) in English morse to Southeast Asia, Europe, and North America, 0905 GMT, July 8, 1955 in U.S.
FBIS Daily Report (July 8, 1955), No.132, pp.AAA1-AAA6; and 
Soviet Home Service (Moscow), 2000 GMT, July 18, 1955 in U.S. 
FBIS Daily Report (July 19, 1955), No.139, pp.CCl-CC4.
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Burmese rice which was then shipped to Viet-Nam. Finally,
the Soviets also agreed to exchange personnel with Viet-Nam.
Ho Chi Minh secured support from both Russia and China
for the DRVN's policy on consultations. However, it is
doubtful if the Soviet endorsement went far enough. For
example, Bulganin was reported as remarking to the press
at a reception for Ho Chi Minh that the DRVN was "partly a
member of our family of democratic nations" and that it
would become a full member only after unification and the
53accomplishment of "other great tasks".
Press reports indicate that the subject of Indochina
54never reached the Big Four agenda. Discussions did take
place between Eden and Molotov at lunch, but these were
prompted more by the anti-ICC riots in Saigon than by Ho *s
special influence with the Russians. At these private talks
Molotov raised the question of convening a conference of
the 1954 Geneva Conference members which Eden politely
55turned down. According to The Economist, the Russian
Foreign Minister was "unexpectedly amiable" in accepting this.
However, during the final hours of the Big Four
Conference, Molotov did mention Indochina - as a problem
for future settlement. He said:
The Soviet delegation regrets that further attention 
was not given to the problems of Asia and the Far 
East at our conference.
"Ho Gets Burmese Rice", The Economist (September 24, 1955), 
Vol.176, No.5848, pp.1022-1023.
53 Welles Hangen dispatch from Moscow in The New York Times 
(July 16, 1955), pp.l and 3.
^  "Taking Indo-China Gently", The Economist (July 30, 1955), 
Vol.176, No.5840, p.373.
55 Ibid.
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Among others, such questions as the restoration of 
the legal rights of the Chinese People's Republic 
in the United Nations organization, the regulation 
of the situation in the Formosa region on the 
bases of the recognition of the indisputable rights 
of the Chinese people, the execution of the 
Geneva agreements on Indochina and other 
problems will not tolerate postponement.
[emphasis added].
These remarks were aimed more at China than the DRVN.
China had been left out of the Big Four meeting and would
shortly pursue a policy of trying to convene an Asian
57"Geneva-type" conference. But the fact that "peaceful
coexistence" was the order of the day, and that PRC-USA
ambassadorial talks were about to open, meant that the DRVN
was left out in the cold. The best hint of this is a
report of Ho Chi Minh's remarks made immediately on his
return to Hanoi. Ho drew attention to the American plot to
partition Viet-Nam. He called on the Vietnamese to
maintain their "fighting spirit" and vigilance against these
moves. He thanked Russia and China for their "generous and
disinterested" aid, and then concluded:
Just like during the resistance, our line at present 
must be, first and foremost, to rely upon 
ourselves whereas the help from friendly countries 
must come second.^ [emphasis added].
Reuters dispatch from Geneva in The New York Times (July 
24, 1955), p.2.
57 Henry R. Lieberman dispatch from Hong Kong in The New York 
Times (July 31, 1955), pp.l and 2; excerpts from the text of 
a speech delivered by Chou En-lai to the closing session of 
the National People's Congress as translated by the New 
China News Agency are provided by Reuters in a dispatch 
from Hong Kong in ibid., p.2.
58 "Bao Cao Cua Ho Chu Tich Ve Viec Doan Dai Bieu Cua Chinh 
Phu Ta Di Tham Lien-Xo va Trung-Quoc", [Report by Chairman 
Ho Concerning the Work of the Delegation of Representatives 
of Our Government on Their Visit to the Soviet Union and 
China] Nhan Dan (July 24, 1955), No.508, p.l.
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IV. REBELLION IN THE SOUTH
Political developments in southern Viet-Nam from March 
to August (1955) were the most confused and tumultuous 
ever recorded in the period since the Geneva Conference, 
during this time all the forces operating against the 
stability of the new Diem regime were given full play.
From out of the frightening chaos and violence Diem 
emerged triumphant v/ith the sect problem reduced to mere 
dissidence, with control over the Army restored, and with 
Bao Dai deposed. This new measure of strength permitted 
Diem to proclaim a Republic, to nominate himself as its 
first President, and to turn his energies towards eradicating 
from the South the influence of the Lao Dong Party organization 
and its supporters.
During the final days of March, Diem attempted to push
the Binh Xuyen out of Saigon. It was only due to French
efforts that a ceasefire was obtained and then gradually
extended. In the interim an intermittent food blockade was
imposed on the capital. This shaky truce finally broke down
at the end of April when fighting erupted and reached full
force in the streets of Saigon. The Army smashed the
Binh Xuyen and drove them out of the city. Thereafter their
units were pursued and scattered. During the months of
July and August the Binh Xuyen went into death throes with
a spate of terror bombings in Saigon. By October, however,
the Binh Xuyen insurgency collapsed when Bay Vien fled to 
59Paris.
59 Shaplen, The Lost Revolution, op.cit., pp.120-126; Lansdale, 
In the Midst of Wars, op.cit., pp.260-281; and Lancaster,
The Emancipation of French Indochina, op.cit., pp.381-397.
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The tri-sect United Front against Diem proved similarly 
ineffective. The majority of the Cao Dai rallied to Diem 
and units loyal to Trinh Minh The were used in the expulsion 
of the Binh Xuyen from Saigon. The Hoa Hao under Ba Cut 
provided minimal support for their ally. Despite rumors of 
Binh Xuyen-Hoa Hao coordination, nothing materialized. As 
has been noted, other Hoa Hao factions had rallied to the 
Diem government. While the Binh Xuyen crisis mounted,
Army operations continued against Ba Cut and Tran Van Soai 
in the southwest region of Viet-Nam. In May the two Hoa Hao 
leaders declared "war" on the Diem regime and began sporadic 
actions against delta cities. In June, in reply to a mortar 
attack, the Army launched a series of major offensives 
which swept the Hoa Hao units from their home territory and 
drove them into strongholds in the hills among the Cambodian 
border in the That Son - Rach Gia sector. By July the Hoa Hao 
were a spent military force and as a delaying tactic they 
floated peace feelers. In October, the units under Ba Cut's 
command were sufficiently recuperated to conduct a counter­
offensive in the Tri Ton area but this failed. Like the Binh 
Xuyen the Hoa Hao insurgency also collapsed. Both Soai and 
Ba Cut were able to keep up sporadic guerrilla raids until 
March and April of 1956 but by that time they represented no 
serious military threat to the Republic of Viet-Nam (RVN), 
as the Diem government was then called.^
A third insurgency located in central Viet-Nam broke 
out during this period. It involved ultra-nationalists.
ö 0 The State of Viet-Nam (Viet-Nam Quoc Gia) became the 
Republic of Viet-Nam (Viet-Nam Cong Hoa) on October 26, 1955; 
Voice of Free Vietnam in Vietnamese to Vietnam, 0500 GMT, 
October 26, 1955.
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TABLE 3-2 
THE HOA HAO
I Hai Ngoan
(Lam Thanh Nguyen) group
II Ba Cut
(Le Quang Vinh) group
III Tran Van Soai 
(Nam Lua) group
IV Nguyen Giac Ngo group
AREAS OF GREATEST INFLUENCE AND TERRITORIES HELD IN 1955
SOURCE: ^"Rebellion Against Mv-Diem", in United States - 
Vietnam Relations, Book 2, IV.A.5. Tab.2 / p.8.-----------
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Sometime in January, 1955 the Dai Viet party rallied some
1,000 deserters from the Bao Chinh Doan (national guard)
and established a maquis in the area where Laos joins Quang
Tri and Thua Thien provinces of Viet-Nam. They set up
headquarters near the town of Ba Lang which promptly came
under attack by the Army. The defenders were forced to
flee. In March the Army launched another somewhat more
successful attack against the suspected Dai Viet base area.
This pattern of attack and pursuit was repeated until August,
1955 when Army units effectively overcame the Dai Viet 
61Forces.
The political situation in Saigon was just as chaotic
as Diem put into motion a plan which would depose the Chief
of State and leave himself in full control. The instrument
of this policy, the creation of Diem's brother Ngo Dinh Nhu,
was the "General Assembly of Democratic and Revolutionary
6 2Forces of the Nation".0 The "General Assembly" was formed
Murti, Vietnam Divided, op.cit., p.136; Buttinger, A Dragon 
Embattled, op.cit., Vol. 2, pp.870 and 1105; Ta Xuan Linh,
"How Armed Struggle Began in South Viet Nam", Vietnam Courier 
(March 1974), New Series No.22, p.21; United Press dispatch
from Saigon in The New York Times (March 9, 1955), p.5; 
Associated Press dispatch from Saigon in ibid., (March 11, 1955), 
p.2; Voice of Vietnam in French to Southeast Asia, 1030 GMT,
May 2, 1955; and Voice of the Dai Viet National Liberation 
Forces in Vietnamese to Vietnam, 2300 GMT, October 3, 1955;
0500 GMT, April 20, 1955; 2300 GMT, August 5, 1955; and 2300 
GMT, August 8, 1955.
6 2 Nguyet Dam and Than Phong, Chin Nam Mau Lua Duoi Che Do 
Gia Dinh Tri Ngo Dinh Diem [Nine Years of Blood and Fire 
Under the Nepotism of Ngo Dinh Diem] (Saigon: Tac Gia Xuat
Ban [published by the authors], 1964), pp.48-50; Francis J. 
Corley, "Viet-Nam Since Geneva", Thought [Fordham University 
Quarterly] (Winter 1958/59), Vol.XXXIII, No.131, pp.546-547; 
Buttinger, A Dragon Embattled, op.cit., Vol.2, pp.881-882; 
and "Rebellion Against My-Diem", United States - Vietnam 
Relations, op.cit., Book 2, IV.A.5. Tab. 2, p.18.
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at a mass meeting on April 30. It consisted of 200 persons 
representing 18 political groups. Its aims were to depose 
Bao Dai, to support Diem in his struggle against the sects 
and to oppose French colonialism by demanding the withdrawal 
of the Expeditionary Corps and the formation of a republic. 
Almost as soon as the "General Assembly" was formed a break­
away Revolutionary Committee separated itself from the parent 
group. Its aims were similar to the "General Assembly" 
although couched in more extreme terms.
The height of the confrontation between the Revolutionary
Committee and forces loyal to the ex-Emperor (Bao Dai)
occurred when a delegation of the Revolutionary Committee
left the Saigon Town Hall, where the "General Assembly" was
meeting, and proceeded to Independence Palace to place their
program before the Premier. In the meantime General Nguyen
Van Vy, allegedly acting on orders from Bao Dai executed
a mini-coup deposing Le Van Ty as head of the Army. Vy's
plans fell through when he was taken into custody by the
Revolutionary Committee (some reports say he was almost
6 3executed on the spot). Vy was forced to make a statement 
to a hastily called press conference repudiating his actions.
He also agreed to support the movement calling for the 
dismissal of the Bao Dai and the procalamation of a republic. 
Within hours of his statement Gen. Vy was released after a 
paratroop officer, Cao Van Tri, threatened to storm the palace.
On the next day, May 1st, Gen. Vy flew in units of the 
Imperial Guard from Da-Lat and declared himself back in 
command. He renounced his remarks of the previous night which
63 Warner, The Last Confucian, op.cit., pp.103-104.
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he said were made under duress. He once again affirmed 
his loyalty to Bao Dai. This affair was made even more 
confusing when the French representative, General Ely, 
ordered tanks into the streets in an effort to maintain order. 
The situation for the next several hours remained explosive. 
However, by the end of the day Diem succeeded in enticing 
key aides of Gen. Vy to desert their commander. When Gen.
Vy learned that he had been out-manoeuvred, and that Army 
support for his coup d 1etat had ebbed, he fled to Da-Lat 
and eventually to France. The Army's threat to Diem was 
ended - for the present.
By May 2nd Diem had weathered the worst. He now had
the support of three influential generals, Le Van Ty, Tran
Van Don and Duong Van Minh. Together they served notice on
Bao Dai that his power to direct events from France had come 
64to an end. On the very same day the Army launched an 
attack on the Binh Xuyen which dislodged them from their 
positions in Cholon, Saigon's sister city. Only the 
Revolutionary Committee remained to be brought under control.
Diem sought to undercut the appeal of the Revolutionary 
Committee on May 3rd by convening a caucus of municipal and 
provincial councillors. Their task was to hammer out an 
effective program for a National Political Congress to be 
convened on May 5th to consider the dismissal of Bao Dai.
The Revolutionary Committee called a counter-congress on the 
same day. From this moment the two groups found themselves 
in a policy confrontation, with the Revolutionary Committee 
taking the more extreme stance.
64 Murti, Vietnam Divided, op.cit., p.139; and Dispatch by 
A.M. Rosenthal in Saigon to The New York Times (May 3, 1955), 
pp.1 and 9.
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The Revolutionary Committee was rent by factionalism.
It had been weakened earlier when one of its patrons, Trinh 
Minh The, was killed in the fighting to expel the Binh Xuyen. 
By July, the Government of Viet-Nam felt that it was in a 
strong enough position to conduct police raids on its 
headquarters. By October the group dissolved itself in 
response to a request to do so by Diem. Diem then proceeded 
to harness the popular enthusiasm his policies attracted by 
moving against Bao Dai. In October a referendum deposed 
the former Emperor and a Republic was declared. Ngo Dinh 
Diem was now master of his own house, riding the crest of 
anti-colonial, anti-feudal (i.e. anti-monarchy), non- 
Communist nationalism.
The Lao Dong Party does not seem to have changed its 
policies in response to these events. The wrangling between 
Diem and his opponents merely confirmed their earlier 
analysis about the contradictions inherent in southern 
society. While turmoil continued, the Party's base areas 
were left untouched. There they proceeded to reorganize 
and strengthen both their secret organizations as well as 
the legal and semi-legal groups. At the height of the Binh 
Xuyen crisis they set up a Committee for the Relief of the 
Victims of the Fighting^ which catered to the needs of an 
urban population whose homes had been destroyed. In July on 
the eve of the deadline for consultations, strikes were 
called in various southern cities to underscore the DRVN's 
policy initiatives calling for consultative conference 
and the normalization of relations.
65 Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, p.15; and Radio Hanoi in French, 2330 
GMT, August 31, 1955 reports the arrest of several committee 
members.
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V. THE EIGHTH PLENUM (August 1955)
The Eighth Party plenum was convened from August 13th 
to 20th. According to the final communique, it "examined 
the situation, reviewed the implementation of the 
resolution adopted by the Seventh Conference...and laid 
down new tasks for the entire party and people in the days
i 6 6to come .
The world situation was seen as becoming "to some 
extent less tense" although causes of international tension 
were present, especially in Indochina. There, according 
to the communique, the American imperialists were pushing 
their plans to wreck the peace.
The domestic scene was marked by the "great success of 
the national liberation struggle" which had led to the 
complete liberation of North Viet-Nam. This situation 
created "a firm basis for the entire Vietnamese people to 
struggle for achieving a peaceful, unified, independent, 
democratic and prosperous Vietnam".
The Eighth Plenum received a report on Ho Chi Minh's 
recent visits abroad. The communique noted that "a good result" 
was obtained because the friendship of the peoples of these 
countries had been tightened, the prestige of the DRVN 
heightened and further co-operation "in all spheres" promoted
The text of the communique of the eighth plenum was 
broadcast by Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast 
Asia, 0600 GMT, August 22, 1955 in U.S. FBIS Daily Report 
(August 23, 1955), No.164, pp.CCC8-CCC11; "Lam Cho Nghi 
Quyet Cua Hoi Nghi Trung Uong Lan Thu 8 Tham Nhuan Den Moi 
Dang Vien", [Every Party Member Should Thoroughly Implement 
the Resolution of the Central Committee's 8th Plenum]
Nhan Dan (September 26, 1955), No.572, p.l.
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as a result of the trip. Soviet and Chinese economic
assistance would enable the DRVN to "create new favourable
conditions for its economic and cultural rehabilitation".
Further the Party stated that the USSR and PRC had adopted
views similar to itself concerning the situation in Indochina.
Both Russia and China verbally supported the DRVN's political
struggle to "consolidate peace, achieve unity, and ensure
complete independence and democracy throughout the country".
By way of contrast the situation in the south was grim.
There the American imperialists had stepped up their
interference, encouraging "their agents" to oppose the
Geneva Agreements, to flatly refuse consultations, to commit
provocations against the ICC, to carry out a policy of
terrorism and reprisals and to abolish all democratic
freedoms. The aim of the U.S. was to turn South Viet-Nam
into a U.S. military base. Finally, as a result of American
actions "the French ha[ve] shunned its responsibility and
6 7refused to implement strictly the Geneva Agreements".
As a result of the above analysis, the communique 
continued, the following decisions were taken regarding the 
Party's immediate tasks: (1) America was designated the
"concrete and immediate enemy" of Viet-Nam; (2) a broad 
National United Front "with an appropriate policy" must be 
set up to oppose the American imperialists and to consolidate 
the peace, unify the country and to "prevent the resumption 
of war in Indochina"; (3) the struggle to open consultations 
with the South Viet-Nam authorities must be continued;
(4) the consolidation of the DRVN through agrarian reform and
6 7 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 
0600 GMT, August 22, 1955.
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economic rehabilitation must be conducted and (5) the 
ideological leadership of the Lao Dong Party must be further 
strengthened.^
These decisions, it must be emphasized, were reached 
after reviewing the situation internationally, in the north 
and in the south. It should be clear from the plenum's 
communique that the Party realized only too well the 
significance of the fact that the deadline for holding 
consultations had come and gone. On the one hand, the 
DRVN had received only limited support from its allies.
Both China and Russia were unwilling or unable to do much 
more for the DRVN on this matter, other than issue statements 
regretting the situation. On the other hand, the Diem 
government had indicated quite clearly that elections would 
not be held unless the DRVN could guarantee that they would 
be free. Despite assurances that the matter could be 
discussed, Diem never consulted with the north. The French 
had been supplanted by the United States and were shortly to 
state that they could no longer be held responsible for 
impelementing the Geneva Agreements. America stepped up 
its support for Diem both economically and by training the 
Army of the Republic of Viet-Nam.
The situation in the DRVN was still far from stable.
The Party reaffirmed that priority should be given to the 
consolidation of its power in the north so as to create the 
basis for its efforts to reunify Viet-Nam. Towards this end
Ibid.; excerpts from the resolution of the plenum are 
contained in "Lam Cho Nghi Quyet Cua Hoi Nghi Trung Uong 
Lan Thu 8 Tham Nhuan Den Moi Dang Vien", op.cit., p.l.
Nutt, Troika on Trial, op.cit., Vol.I, pp.184-185.69
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the Party began preparing its cadres for the tasks ahead - 
carrying out agrarian reform and reorganizing and 
modernizing the PAVN.
The chaotic situation in the south was decidedly to
the Party's advantage. To be sure, the official news media
deplored Diem's actions against the sects because it turned
70Vietnamese against Vietnamese. Lao Dong Party control of
the Revolutionary Committee, although alleged, was never 
71proven. It seems probable in fact that the Party was 
taken by surprise in the outpouring of nationalistic fervor.
No doubt covert agents reacted to rather than directed the 
events of early May. In fact the impression created by 
police and intelligence reports covering the months 
following the seventh plenum is one of a low-level, patient 
building-up of both the Party and its allied organizations.
In June one report revealed that Party cells in Saigon were
7 2concentrating on police, administrative and military affairs.
Prior to July 20th, the Party's underground concentrated 
its attention on political struggle activities which would
Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia,
1545 GMT, May 2, 1955.
71 At least three members of the committee were former 
members of the Viet Minh Front and this gave rise for concern 
in some quarters; see: Warner, The Last Confucian, op.cit.,
pp.103-104; French fears of possible Communist influence 
were expressed to Dulles, U.S. Department of State telegram 
from Paris, SECTO 8 (May 8, 1955) to the Secretary of State 
which outlines the French Minister for the Associated States' 
(La Forest) fears that the Revolutionary Committee was under 
the influence of "Viet Minh" cadres (Ho Han Son, Nhi Lang 
and Doan Trung Con) in United States - Vietnam Relations, 
op.cit., Book 10, V.B.3., pp.959-961. These fears were 
discounted by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in The 
Current Saigon Crisis, Special National Intelligence 
Estimate (May 2, 1955), SNIE63.1-2/1 in ibid., pp. 955-958.
72 "Interrogation in 1958 of a prisoner who had been active in 
the 'Resistance' since 1945 until his capture by GVN [i.e. RVN] 
forces in 1956", Working Paper, Appendices, Item 12, p.14; 
attached to the interrogation report is a section labelled 
"Headquarters Comments" [probably the CIA station in Saigon]
w h i  r h  q n m i n a n '  7 p q  a n  i n t - p l  1 i n p n r p  r n n o r  +- Hn-f-psr] C 1.1 n a  1 0 f  ^ ,
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reinforce and echo Ho's calls for North-South consultations.
On July 1st the Standing Committee of the Lien Viet Front in
Nam Bo issued an appeal to the people demanding general 
7 3elections. This was followed by a demonstration on July 
3rd in which about 100 persons were arrested. Leaflets 
appeared calling for a general strike on July 10th. 
Demonstrations in Saigon and My Tho were followed the next 
day, July 11th, by similar actions in Hue and Da-Nang. On 
July 20th the movement reached its peak as the Party mobilized 
people in the area around Saigon to demand consultations.
These actions continued until the end of the month and then 
faded out.
During August, after the 8th Plenum, reports reached
Western intelligence agencies that a directive had been passed
down from the Central Committee to its lower echelons
instructing them to aim their attacks at "My-Diem" (the
7 4Americans and Ngo Dinh Diem). The intention was to bring
about their isolation in the eyes of the people so that a
"less dangerous" administration would be in power to consult
with the DRVN over elections. Shortly thereafter strikes
among transport workers broke out in Da-Nang, Hoi-An,
75Vinh-Diem and Hue. Mixed in with the worker's demands were
Vu Can, "The People's Struggles Against the US-Diem 
Regime", op.cit., pp.75 and 109.
7 4 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Current Intelligence 
Weekly Review (October 27, 1955) cited in "The Role of Hanoi", 
in United States - Vietnam Relations, op.cit., Book 2, IV.A.5. 
Tab 3, p.45.
7 5 Vu Can, "The People's Struggles Against the US-Diem 
Regime", op.cit., p.109; New China News Agency in English,
1800 GMT, September 10, 1955 cites a dispatch (untranscribed) 
from the Vietnam News Agency dated September 9, 1955.
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calls for consultations with the DRVN. These activities
were probably planned to coincide with a scheduled visit
of Ngo Dinh Diem to central Viet-Nam. Leaflets also
appeared in the delta towns of Chau Doc, Rach Gia, Bac Lieu
7 6and Ben Tre with the same message.
The major preoccupation of the 8th Plenum was to set 
up a new National United Front to lead the consolidation of 
the north and the political struggle in the south, given 
the clear indication that it was unlikely that the Geneva 
Agreements would be implemented within the time-frame 
envisaged in July 1954.
VI. CONCLUSION
The time from the end of the Geneva Conference (July 
1954) until the Eighth Plenum (August 1955) may be divided 
into two periods. Party activity during the first period 
(July-September 1954) was characterized by the implementation 
of the cease-fire and regroupment provisions of the Geneva 
Agreements. On most other matters the Party seems to have 
adopted a "wait-and-see" attitude. During the second period 
(September 1954 - August 1955) the Party discharged its 
responsibilities under the Geneva Agreements (military 
regroupment) and then moved on several fronts to bring 
about the consultative conference with representatives of 
"the competent authorities" in the south.
There were three features of this drive to secure 
agreement on consultations: (1) diplomatic activity,
(2) direct approaches to the government in Saigon and
76 Ibid.
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(3) a low-level political struggle movement. The DRVN
made some important gains on the international front. Nehru
of India and U Nu of Burma paid brief visits to Hanoi. These
were reciprocated by Pham Van Dong who called in at New
Delhi and Rangoon enroute to the Bandung Conference.
Nehru's stance in favour of elections in Viet-Nam surely
must have pleased DRVN leaders. No doubt they welcomed all
statements endorsing the prompt carrying out of the political
provisions of the Geneva Agreements whose implementation
77they saw to their own advantage.
DRVN approaches to the Soviet Union and China, however, 
were disappointing. Ho Chi Minh's visits to Peking and 
Moscow during the summer of 1955 must have played an 
important role in convincing Party officials that unification 
would come about primarily on the basis of their own efforts. 
Relations with France were of a similar bitter-sweet quality. 
Initially prospects looked bright as Paris dispatched Jean 
Sainteny to Hanoi to iron out problems connected with the
The reaction of the State of Viet-Nam to various endorsements 
of the electoral provisions of the 1954 Geneva Agreements was 
the reverse; SarDesai writes: "(t)he reaction of the
government of South Vietnam was sharp and bitter to the DRV's 
proposal for holding a conference and to the support given 
by India and the Communist countries to it. Diem's propaganda 
machinery launched an intensive campaign against the 
Communists, the Geneva Agreements, and the Indian and Polish 
delegations on the ICC". Sar Desai, Indian Foreign Policy, 
op.cit., p.89. Diem's insistence that the major obstacle 
to holding elections was that there was no democratic freedoms 
in the north cannot be taken at face value; rather they 
were a calculated propaganda ploy borrowed from the Western 
experience with the Soviet Union over the question of German 
unification. Free elections in Germany would have meant 
unification with a Western-orientated government. Similar 
elections in Viet-Nam would, in all probability, have resulted 
in an electoral victory for Ho Chi Minh. Calls for supervision 
by the United Nations can hardly be taken as serious as 
both parts of Viet-Nam were not even members. In 1954-55, it 
should be recalled, the United States not only had a veto in 
the Security Council but dominated the General Assembly as well.
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considerable French economic interests in the north.
However Sainteny's efforts were undermined by opposition 
within the Mendes-France government as well as by outright 
American hostility. By December 1954 an exasperated Pham
0.Van Dong was moved to remark toAspecially convened press 
conference:
France must choose between Washington and 
Hanoi and only the latter choice will enable 
her to retain political and economic 
positions in the Pacific. But France is 
veering in the direction of Washington.
She went to Manila to sign a pact of 
aggression. France is hesitating. But 
a policy must be based on stable foundations.
One cannot indulge in acrobatics for ever. y
The DRVN's approaches to the State of Viet-Nam were
made initially through semi-governmental bodies. However
the most important initiative was Pham Van Dong's June 6,
1955 public request to the Diem government. No doubt
Diem's refusal was anticipated. In such circumstances the
DRVN could only hope that its diplomacy combined with
pressure from below (i.e., from within South Viet-Nam itself)
would modify this stance. At this time there remained the
likelihood that the Diem government might collapse (although
this became less certain with each passing week).
The political struggle movement in South Viet-Nam
got off to a very low-keyed beginning with the Movement for
the Defense of Peace. Diem's prompt repression of the
movement must have served notice to the Party's leaders in
Jean Sainteny, Ho Chi Minh and His Vietnam: A Personal
Memoir, Translated from the French by Herma Briffault 
(Chicago: Cowles Book Co., Inc., 1972), pp.105-159.
79 Dispatch by Max Clos from Hai Phong in Le Monde (January 
23, 1955), p.8.
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the underground to move cautiously. The Party's fixation 
with demonstrations and such like in favour of consultations 
seems curiously de fac-hed from the major events of this 
period. There is no evidence that the Party sought to 
exploit and profit from the Hinh affair or the Binh Xuyen 
crisis. Initially, at least, these events must have been 
viewed as elements of a self-fulfilling prophecy as the 
"internal contradictions" among the government, Army, 
Revolutionary Committee(s) and sects in South Viet-Nam 
worked themselves out.
One explanation of the Party's aloofness might be 
found in its efforts to restructure the Lien Viet Front into 
an organization suitable for political struggle under the 
terms of the Geneva Agreements. As we have noted, a 
preparatory committee was set up in January in effect to 
work out the details of modifying the program, platform, 
membership, etc. Later in the year, when it became clear 
that consultations were not going to be held on schedule, 
the new goals and objectives of the front took on added 
importance. Chapter four provides the details of the new 
organization which emerged.
The period after May 1955 witnessed the transformation 
of the VWP as an underground organization into a political 
party in control of all of Viet-Nam north of the seventeenth 
parallel. Almost at once the VWP was confronted with the 
staggering tasks of running an economy damaged by years of 
war: goods were scarce, inflation rampant and famine
threatened. Bui Cong Trung, the secretary-general of the 
DRVN's Economic and Financial Commission recalled years
later:
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Without the 207,000 tons of rice which we 
received from the fraternal socialist 
countries (173,000 tons of rice from the 
USSR, and 32,500 tons from China) at the 
end of 1954 and in 1955 and 1956, then we 
could not have stabilized the prices 
which continued to increase greatly, 
especially in 1955. ®
In a separate publication Trung acknowledged:
The Soviet Union supplied us with 170,000 tons 
of refined rice...; the Chinese People's 
Republic furnished us with...rice; other 
countries - the German Democratic Republic, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania,
Rumania and Mongolia - have extended their 
assistance in the past and continue to 
assist us by supplying drugs, fabrics, 
industrial goods, rice and cattle. All this 
allowed us to liquidate famine and epidemics, 
to make a considerable improvement in the 
public health system and to strike a 
crushing blow at the speculators, who 
sharply raised prices on all the most 
important commodities.
Several important tasks immediately confronted Party 
leaders as they absorbed the "newly liberated areas" into 
the DRVN governmental structure. Increased numbers of 
administrative and technical cadres had to be recruited and 
trained. Public order and security had to be established 
throughout the territory. Rail lines and other parts of 
the transport-communications network had to be repaired, 
one of the most far-reaching decisions taken at this time 
concerned extending the provisions of the 1953 land reform
o o Bui Cong Trung, "The Food Problem", Nghien Cuu Kinh Te 
[Economic Research] (February 1961) translated by United 
States Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS), No.10, 
1974, p.13.
81 Bui Cong Trung, "Aid by Countries in the Socialist 
Camp in Restoring and Developing the National Economy of 
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam", in Demokratichevskaya 
Respublika V'yetnam (Moscow: Institute of the People's of
Asia of the Academy of Sciences USSR, 1960), translated by 
U.S. JPRSNo .4,925 (1961), p.24, emphasis added. See also the 
interview with Phan Anh, Minister of Commerce, Vietnam News 
Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 1100 GMT,
December 25, 1956.
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laws (which had been promulgated to increase morale
during the Dien Bien Phu campaign) to areas recently
under French control. In practice this meant reducing
rent and transferring ownership, through land redistribution.
At that time village affairs were still dominated by the
landlords, even in areas under the control of the resistance
government. Thus the Party's decision to move ahead with
a program which differentiated along class lines immediately
provoked confrontation. Accordingly a "movement to suppress
counter-revolutionaries" (on the face of it a public
security measure) was combined with the land reform 
8 3campaign. Within a year, when things got out of hand, 
the Party would acknowledge the error of this decision; 
but in the final quarter of 1955 this combination seemed an 
expedient way of handling two problems at once.
Christine White, "Class and Revolution: Land Reform in
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (1953-1956)", Paper 
delivered to the First Conference of the Asian Studies 
Association of Australia, The University of Melbourne (May 
16, 1976), pp.6-10, and Tran Phuong, "The Land Reform", 
Vietnamese Studies (1965), No.7, Pages of History 1945-1954, 
pp.189-191.
8 3 *Ibid., pp.190-191; "Day Manh Cong Tac Cung Co Mien Bac",
[Promote the Work of Consolidating the North] Nhan Dan (October
3, 1955), No.579, p.l, is an editorial comment on the
resolutions of the 8th plenum.
CHAPTER 4
POLITICAL STRUGGLE AND THE FATHERLAND FRONT 
(September 1955 - April 1956)
I. THE FATHERLAND FRONT AND THE FIFTH SESSION OF THENATIONAL ASSEMBLY
Immediately after the 8th Plenum a special committee, 
originally formed in January, 1955, announced that a 
national congress of the Lien Viet Front would convene on 
September 5th. ^ It was at this congress, as well as at 
the 5th Session of the DRVN's National Assembly, that the 
VWP revealed in detail how it would carry on the struggle 
to reunify Viet-Nam in light of the failure of 
consultations to take place in July.
The National Congress of the Lien Viet Front met from 
September 5-10. Its main preoccupations were outlined in 
the reports delivered by senior officials: Ta Quang Buu
(on the implementation of the Geneva Agreements), Ho Viet 
Thang (on land rent reduction), Phan Anh (on the economy), 
Truong Chinh (on the united front strategy) and Hoang Quoc 
Viet (who submitted a draft program). Two major documents 
accompanied the announcement that a new front, the 
Fatherland Front (Mat Tran To Quoc) had been formed.
"Thong Cao cua Ban van dong Dai Hoi Mat Tran Dan Toe 
Thong Nhat Toan Quoc", [Communique of the Sponsoring 
Committee of the Congress of the National United Front] 
NhanPan (August 23, 1955), No.538, p.l. The sponsoring 
Committee was formed following the National Congress of 
the Viet-Nam National United Front in January, 1955.
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2The first document, the manifesto for the new Front, 
explained that after the signing of the 1954 Geneva 
Agreements the struggle of the Vietnamese people entered 
a "new phase", which was described as follows:
The phase of political struggle to consolidate
peace, achieve unity, and to ensure complete
independence and democracy throughout the
country.
However, because of the "intensified intervention of 
the U.S. imperialists in Indochina, the implementation of 
the Geneva Agreements is being hindered and the peace, unity, 
independence and democracy of our country are being 
threatened". Therefore the Fatherland Front was being 
formed for the purpose of fulfilling three major tasks:
1. to struggle for the strict implementation 
of the Geneva Agreements and for the 
consolidation of peace and the achievement 
of national unification.
2. to consolidate North Viet-Nam from every 
point of view; at the same time uphold 
and push forward the patriotic movement 
of our compatriots in the South.
3. to widen and consolidate the National 
United Front throughout the country; to 
gain the ever more active endorsement and 
support from peace-loving people all over 
the world.
The key features of both the manifesto and the second
3major document, the platform, were the specific details 
they provided on the question of membership in the Front
2 "Tuyen Ngon cua Mat Tran To Quoc Viet Nam", [Manifesto of 
the Viet-Nam Fatherland Front] Nhan Dan (September 14, 
1955), No.560, pp.l and 4.
3 "Cuong Linh cua Mat Tran To Quoc Viet Nam", [Platform 
of the Viet-Nam Fatherland Front] Nhan Dan (September 14, 
1955), No.560, p.2.
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and, more importantly, on the details of reunification now 
that the consultative machinery written into the Geneva 
Agreements had broken down.
According to the manifesto, the Fatherland Front was 
to include "the organizations and individuals affiliated 
with the former Lien Viet Front, and also those who have 
not yet joined the Lien Viet Front who belong ... to 
different social strata and have different political 
affiliations". In particular, this passage referred to 
all citizens "without distinction as to sex, age, nationality, 
social class, political affiliations, and religious creed 
and no matter which side they supported in the past - who 
now favour peace, unification, independence, and democracy. . .."
The platform set forth ten major policies which were 
summarised under the following headings:
1. Achieve National Independence
2. Achieve National Unification
3. Build a Democratic Regime
4. Develop the Economy and Raise Production
5. Carry Out Land Reform
6. Carry Out a Rational Social Policy
7. Promote Culture and Education
8. Consolidate National Defence and Defend the 
Fatherland
9. Carry out a Peaceful and Independent Foreign Policy
10. The Vietnamese People Throughout the Country are
to be Broadly United
It should be obvious that the Fatherland Front was formed 
at this time as the leading mass organization to lead the
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reconstruction of the North as much as to lead the 
reunification struggle in the South. Indeed, the platform 
recognized that "[a]t present, the social and political 
situations in Northern and Southern Vietnam are quite 
different" and that to achieve the peaceful reunification 
of Viet-Nam "we should take into account the concrete 
situation in the two zones as well as the legitimate 
interests and aspirations of various strata of the people".
According to points 2 and 3 of the Front's platform, 
general elections would be held to establish a national 
assembly which in turn would appoint a central coalition 
government. While the details of re-uniting the two zones 
were being worked out the differences between them would be 
recognized by permitting each zone "to issue local laws 
suited to the characteristics of [each] region..."
In other words, the program and platform of the 
Fatherland Front represented a major attempt by the VWP to 
overcome the effects of partition by offering a conciliatory 
approach to the problem of reunification. Implicit in the 
platform was the view that reunification was a complex 
process which would take time to accomplish.
Immediately after the Congress, the Executive 
Committee of the Fatherland Front met and set out a 
program of action for the next few months (September-
4December 1955) which embodied four points:
"Hoi Nghi Lan Thu Nhat Cua Uy Ban Trung Uong Mat Tran To 
Quoc Viet Nam", [The First Conference of the Central 
Committee of the Viet-Nam Fatherland Front] Nhan Dan 
(September 13, 1955), No.559, p.l.
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1. organize local congresses of the Front in 
various regions
2. publicize the Front's platforms and statute 
and organise the people to study them
3. push the present political struggle 
throughout Viet-Nam
4. mobilize the people to carry out all tasks 
to consolidate the North
After the Executive Committee's session the DRVN's 
National Assembly was called into its 5th Session, which 
lasted from September 15th to 20th. Pham Van Dong, DRVN 
vice premier, delivered a major report, part one of which 
addressed itself to the details of the new DRVN reunification 
policy.^
Pham Van Dong recalled and laid renewed emphasis on 
his August 17th letter to the co-chairman of the 1954 
Geneva Conference on Indochina in which he urged them "to 
take all necessary measures" to ensure that the political 
provisions of the Geneva Agreements were carried out. 
Specifically Pham Van Dong was referring to consultations 
between the two zones. He too stressed that "one should 
take into account the present political situation of 
Vietnam: in the Northern and the Southern Zones of
Vietnam there exist two different political regimes".
"Bao Cao cua Chinh Phu Truoc Khoa Hop Thu Nam cua Quoc 
Hoi", [Report of the Government Before the 5th Session of 
the National Assembly] Nhan Dan (September 17, 1955),
No. 56 3, pp.1-3.g
"Thu cua Ong Pham-Van-Dong Bo Truong Bo Ngoai Giao Nuoc 
Viet-nam Dan-Chu Cong-Hoa gui Hai Chu Tich Hoi Nghi Gio-Ne- 
Vo", [Letter of Mr Pham Van Dong, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam to the Two 
Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference] Nhan Dan (September 
15, 1955), No.561, pp.1 and 4.
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Dong's solution was to emphasize the necessity for a "bloc
of nation-wide unity ... the broadest ever seen in our
history". This bloc would consist of: "various
nationalities, social classes and strata, political
parties, religious bodies, and ail patriotic Vietnamese
citizens who desire to see the country become peaceful,
united, independent and democratic. This nation-wide
united bloc would embrace both the North and the South
with all the differences between the two zones". It was
on this basis that Vice Premier Dong was offering to begin
consultations with the State of Viet-Nam, [otherwise, he
feared, the United States and Diem would resume the
fighting]. Pham Van Dong was quite specific on this point:
At present two roads lie before the authorities 
in South Vietnam: either the authorities in
South Vietnam will act in accordance with the 
aspirations of the people and respond to the 
proposal of the government of the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam and agree to open a 
consultative conference; then the government of 
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam will readily 
examine and discuss with the authorities in 
South Vietnam all the issues raised by them in 
a spirit of understanding the conciliation so 
as to come to agreement for the sake of the 
supreme interests of the Fatherland and the 
people. Or the authorities in Vietnam, bent 
on following the U.S. imperialists, will 
continue to wreck the Geneva Agreements, 
reject the holding of consultations and general 
elections, unscrupulously sell out the country, 
and serve as henchmen of the imperialists in an 
attempt to partition the country and prepare 
the resumption of war. The first road is a 
glorious one. The second road is a road full 
of crimes and would surely lead the authorities 
in South Vietnam to bitter failure.
Dong then went on to comment on consultations and general
elections:
The U.S. imperialists and the international 
reactionaries often raise the question: If a
consultative conference is convened and free 
general elections were held, North Vietnam
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will defeat South Vietnam. This is a provocative 
and divisive argument aimed at sabotaging the 
movement for national unification of our people.
The fundamental question here does not lie in 
whether the North or the South would win. The 
fundamental question is that North and South 
should come to agreement on the questions 
relating to the unification of the country.
Who shall win? Neither will the North defeat 
the South nor will the South defeat the North.
Who shall win, then? The Vietnamese people 
shall win! Those defeated will be the U.S. 
imperialist warmongers and their lackeys.
In the ensuing months the VWP would prepare the
northern zone for the crucial fifth phase of mobilization
for land reform, launch an international diplomatic
offensive to reconvene the Geneva Conference and attempt
to rally support in the South around the program of the
Fatherland Front.
II. CREATING POLITICAL STABILITY IN THE SOUTH (August -
October 1955)
At the same time as the DRVN was setting forth its 
design for the future, the State of Viet-Nam, under the 
premiership of Ngo Dinh Diem, was poised ready to deal 
with the triple threat of (1) continued sect rebellion,
(2) problems of governmental legitimacy and (3) the 
communist movement.
The Diem regime had succeeded in April-May 1955 in 
ousting the Binh Xuyen forces from Saigon. They had 
retreated to the Rung Sat swamp area south-east of Saigon 
where they continued their depredations. In late September 
Duong Van Minh was given responsibility for operations 
against them (called Operation Hoang Dieu). In a month­
long campaign Minh succeeded in smashing the Binh Xuyen
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units, reducing their force of 4-5,000 men into much
smaller units. By late October most observers agreed
that the Binh Xuyen armed forces no longer represented
a serious threat to the security of the Saigon government.
At the same time Diem also moved against the Cao
Dai Sect. In early October General Nguyen Thanh Phuong
disarmed the 300-man Papal Guard at the Cao Dai centre
of Tay Ninh and placed Pope Pham Cong Tac under virtual
7house arrest along with his two daughters. Elsewhere, 
troops raided the centre of the Cao Dai Minh Chon Dau Sect
gat Giong Ham in Ca Mau province.
Dispatch from Henry R. Lieberman in Tay Ninh to The New 
York Times (November 6, 1955), p.33; Lancaster, The 
Emancipation of French Indochina, op.cit., p.397.
8 Vietnam News Agency in Vietnamese morse to Vietnam,
0932 GMT, December 14, 1955 and Voice of Vietnam in 
Vietnamese to South Vietnam, 1200 GMT, December 14, 1955.
The Cao Dai sect is not, as is commonly assumed, a unified 
movement. The Minh Chon Dau Cao Dai is a component of one 
of three major groupings within the Cao Dai sect which 
emerged in the 1930's. Various "Holy Sees" were created 
throughout the Mekong Delta in rivalry to the better known 
Holy See in Tay Ninh province. The center of the Minh 
Chon Dao is in Bac Lieu province, adjacent to Ca Mau.
During the Resistance War a grouping of "Twelve Unified 
Sects" was active with the Viet Minh and Lien Viet Fronts. 
Its leader, Cao Trieu Phat, regrouped to the North and 
played an active role in Viet-Nam Fatherland Front. The 
Minh Chon Dau (Bright and True) was one of the 12 sects.
See: R.B. Smith, "An Introduction to Caodaism", Part I.,
"Origins and Early History", Bulletin of the School of 
Oriental and African Studies (1970), Vol.XXXIII, Part 2, 
pp.335-349; R.B. Smith, "An Introduction to Caodaism",
Part II, "Beliefs and Organization", ibid., (1970), Vol. 
XXXIII, Part 3, pp.573-589; and Ralph Smith, "Antecedents 
of the 'Viet Cong'", in Michael Leifer, editor, Nationalism, 
Revolution and Evolution in South-East Asia (Hull: Centre
for Southeast AsiarT Studies, The University of Hull, 1970), 
Hull Monographs on South-East Asia, No.2, pp.1-15. For a 
general discussion see also: Gerald C. Hickey, Village in
Viet-Nam (New Haven: Yale University Press, 196T), pp.
14-15, 66-73, and 291-294; Frances R. Hill, "Millenarian 
Machines in South Vietnam", Contemporary Studies in Society 
and History (July 1971), Vol.3, No.3, pp.324-350; Roy
cont'd
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Operations against various Hoa Hao units declined 
during August and September as SVN armed forces withdrew
9to participate in an American-inspired training program.
This lull in western Nam Bo followed a successful National 
Army drive described in the previous chapter.
Ngo Dinh Diem moved to establish his complete dominance 
on the domestic political scene by scheduling a referendum 
for October 23rd in which the people of South Viet-Nam 
would be given a choice of whether or not to dispose 
Emperor Bao Dai and to name him (Diem) as Chief of State.
It was understood that a successful result for Diem would 
be followed by declaring Viet-Nam a republic, drawing up a 
new constitution and by setting up a National Assembly.
At the same time Diem was clearing the deck domestically, 
he was also taking action with respect to the status of the 
remaining French forces still in Viet-Nam. In July of 1955 
he had dispatched a mission to Paris headed by Nguyen Van 
Chau for this purpose. The talks, suspended to allow the 
French Premier Edgar Faure to attend the Geneva Summit, were
8 cont'd
Jumper, "The Cao Dai of Tay Ninh: The Politics of a
Political-Religious Sect in South Vietnam", in Balkrishna 
G. Gokhale, editor, Asian Studies I - A Collection of 
Papers on Aspects of Asian History and civilization 
(Bombay: Popular Praksshan, 1966), pp.142-154; Roy Jumper, 
"Sects and Communism in South Vietnam", Orbis (Spring 
1959), Vol.III, No.1, pp.85-96; Victor L. Oliver, "Caodaism: 
A Vietnamese Example of Sectarian Development", Ph.D.
Thesis, Syracuse University, 1972; and Fall,"The Political- 
Religious Sects of Vietnam", op.cit.
9 "Mr Diem's Visitor", The Economist (August 27, 1955), 
Vol.176, No.5844, p.684.
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never resumed and on October 13 the mission was recalled.^ 
Despite this set-back it was clear that Diem intended 
to take advantage of the unilateral French declaration^ 
made at the conclusion of the Geneva Conference to request 
the withdrawal of the French forces.
Because of more pressing domestic threats described
in the previous chapter, Diem had not yet gotten around
to giving full attention to the Communist organization in
the rural areas. Under American direction Diem's military
forces had conducted two major operations to "recover"
12the temporary regrouping zones used by PAVN forces. In 
July 1955 in central Viet-Nam an experimental Anti- 
Communist Denunciation Campaign had been launched which 
lasted until the end of August. This was later termed 
"stage one of the first period" and was described as one 
of adjustment in which "responsible organs" were created
Saigon dispatch in The New York Times (October 14, 1955), 
p.5; Murti, Vietnam Divided, op.cit., p.151; and Robert 
MacAlister, "The Great Gamble: United States Policy Towards
South Viet-Nam from July 1954 to July 1956", M.A. Thesis,
The University of Chicago, 1958, p.194.
11 The French had declared, inter alia, its readiness "to 
withdraw its troops from the territory of Cambodia, Laos 
and Viet-Nam, at the request of the Governments concerned 
and within a period which shall be fixed by agreement 
between the parties..."; Great Britain, Further Documents 
Relating to the Discussion of Indo-China at the Geneva 
Conference , Cmd. 92 39~, op.cit.
12 These were Operation Liberty, conducted in the Ca Mau 
regrouping zone, and Operation Giai Phong, conducted in 
the Quang Ngai-Binh Dinh regrouping zone; Lansdale, In 
the Midst of Wars, op.cit., pp.228-243.
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at all levels and staffed by recently trained cadres.
Plans were drawn for stage 2 (1 September - 20 October)
in which "anti-subversion committees and units" were
set-up within the military and among the civilian
population. It was only in stage three (21 October -
20 May 1956) that real progress was made in attacking the
Communists' underground organization. There is some
evidence, however, to indicate that the campaign was
successful much earlier in certain localities. One
defecter reported that 50% of his Tay Ninh provincial
13committee wer^e decimated by the summer of 19 55. Another
source, quoting figures supplied to the ICC by the PAVN
High Command, stated that by the beginning of July 1955
as a result of the Anti-Communist Denunciation Campaign,
482 persons were killed, 149 had disappeared, 692 had
14been wounded and 9,100 imprisoned.
III. POLITICAL STRUGGLE IN THE SOUTH (August - October 1955)
After the July 1955 deadline for the start of 
consultations passed Party leaders in the South began to 
face a mood of pessimism on the part of their supporters.
Race, "The Origins of the Second Indochina War", op.cit., 
p.362. It should be noted that Race's informant, Vo Van An, 
was speaking about a province in which forces loyal to 
Diem had been operating against dissident Cao Dai forces.
14 Burchett, North of the 17th Parallel, op.cit., p.247. 
Although many complaints were made to the ICC, only a 
few were investigated and even fewer resolved. Cases of 
reprisals in violation of the Geneva Agreements were 
established. PAVN figures, of course, must be taken as 
an upper limit. The figures here do not appear grossly 
exaggerated. An extended discussion may be found in 
chapters seven and eight.
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By the Party's own account, this was countered by the 
educational efforts of the cadres and re-emphasis on the 
political struggle movement to demand consultations and 
the holding of general elections.^ During August and 
September sporadic strikes were conducted in the central 
region of Viet-Nam in the towns of Hue, Da-Nang and Hoi 
An and in the Delta provinces of Chau Doc, Rach Gia, Bac 
Lieu and Ben Tre where support was voiced for these demands. 
Later, in 1956, support was elicited for the various calls 
by DRVN officials to reconvene the Geneva Conference.
But much more significant developments were being 
planned in light of the VWP's 8th Plenum and its decision 
to form the Fatherland Front. Obviously the call for the 
inclusion of persons "not yet members" of the Lien Viet 
Front was directed at dissident sect elements in the South 
as well as towards other non-Communist but anti-Diem 
personalities in South Viet-Nam, in France and in the North. ^  
Diem's contemplated referendum represented a thrust at 
undermining simultaneously both the sects' and communists' 
claim to legitimacy. The creation of a Republic with its 
own Constitution and National Assembly would likewise bloc
Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, p.15.
The original Sponsoring Committee was to have included 
members who had not served with the Lien Viet Front in 
the past; Vietnam News Agency in English morse to South­
east Asia, 0530 GMT, January 13, 1955. A subject 
deserving special study is the connection between Party 
officials in France and the considerable group of non- 
Communist Vietnamese political emigres. It was often 
alleged that the VWP was conducting talks with several 
notable personalities, offering them a place in a post- 
Diem government.
the VWP's plans to reunify Viet-Nam and the sects' claims 
to be operating under the orders of the legitimate head of 
state.
Although the precise factual details are still a
17subject of considerable controversy, there is sufficient
evidence at hand to paint the following picture. In
broadest terms the VWP decided to form an alliance with
its own worst enemies, the armed forces of the religious
sects, in an attempt to undermine the Diem government.
In early August it was reported that Van Tien Dung,
a PAVN Colonel-General and former chief of the Viet-Minh
delegation to the ICC in Saigon, had secretly entered the
U Minh maquis in Ca Mau province to confer with members
18of the Nam Bo Regional Committee. The precise nature of
his mission was unclear but it was reported that "a ceremony
19of a military nature" had taken place. ‘ "Communist
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Gareth Porter has alleged that one set of documents 
dealing with Party-Sect cooperation [Republic of Vietnam, 
Ministry of Information, Communist Subversive Activities 
Contrary to the Spirit of the Geneva Agreements, 1956] 
was fabricated by the Diem regime; "Testimony of D. Gareth 
Porter", op.cit., pp.10-11. This author was unable to 
obtain access to this collection when he visited Washington, 
D.C. in December 1975. All attempts to obtain photocopies 
from the curator of the Bernard B. Fall Collection at 
Howard University, where the source is held, have been 
unsuccessful. My evidence for Party-Sect cooperation 
rests on other material, including sources published in 
Hanoi.
18 "Ho Gets Burmese Rice", op.cit., pp.1022-1023, bases 
its information on "radio reports which have not been 
denied"; presumably this refers to Voice of the Dai Viet 
National Liberation Troops in Vietnamese to Vietnam,
2300 GMT, August 8, 1955.
19 Ibid.
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circles" were quoted as denying that an invasion across
the 17th parallel was in the offing but rather that the
Diem regime could be toppled by using "militants now in
the South". Contemporary American intelligence sources
report their awareness of a directive from the VWP to its
subordinate echelons stressing that action directed against
the Diem regime would contribute to weakening the DRVN's
prospective conference partner.^
It was known that the Party retained a military
capability in the South. In late August, in fact, two
2 2companies were reported to be in the U Minh area. One
knowledgeable observer has stated that the Party could
have activated up to 8 regiments (6,000 men) during the
2 3Binh Xuyen crisis (April-May 1955). Was Van Tien Dung's
20 Ibid.
21 United States Central Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Weekly Review (October 27, 1955), op.cit.
2 2 Voice of the Dai Viet National Li beration Troops in 
Vietnamese to Vietnam, 2300 GMT, August 21, 1955; a review 
of American and RVN estimates of "Viet Minh" force strengths 
produced during 1954-1960 concluded: "Viet Minh force
levels in the south were variously estimated by the U.S. 
during this period but never exceeded 10,000; GVN [i.e. RVN] 
estimates, which tended to include all organized dissidents, 
were consistently lower than U.S. estimates, never 
exceeding 8,000. Of these estimated dissidents, no more 
than some 2,000 were considered 'active' by any available 
estimate in the period 1954-1960", in "United States 
Training of the Vietnames National Army", in United States 
- Vietnam Relations, op.cit., Book 2, IV.A.4, pp.7-8.
2 3 Race, War Comes to Long An, op.cit., p.36. Race's 
source is an interview with Vo Van An, in 1954-55 an 
alternate member of the Party's Tay Ninh province committee.
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alleged visit somehow connected with reports in late August
of "Viet Minh infiltration ... into the sectarian armies,
2 4hitherto relatively free of Communist influence"?
During the following month, as one report makes clear,
this seemed to be the case: "The Hoa Hao and the Binh Xuyen
have suffered military defeats but they are not destroyed.
The remnants are tending to join up with the Viet Minh in
the South to form a conglomerate underground opposition to 
2 5Diem". Significantly the same source stated that the 
Cao Dai, the strongest military force, was "clearly watching 
for its moment".
After the 8th Plenum, when the results of Gen. Dung's 
trip would have been available, the VWP Central Committee 
issued instructions to the Nam Bo Regional Committee 
permitting, in the words of a SVN intelligence report, 
"tactics of violence ... to be applied by the Viet Cong
2 6in South Vietnam concurrently with political operations". 
Other intelligence reports mentioned that the dispatch of 
new instructions was accompanied by the trip south of at 
least one very high-level delegation, as well as by 
numerous other, smaller groups concerned with political,
"Mr Diem's Visitor", op.cit., p.684.
2 5 Radio France-Asie in English to Europe, 0830 GMT, 
September 8, 1955.
2 6 "An Intelligence report from an agent of the Government 
of Viet-Nam [sic] who had contact with Vietnamese 
Communist Party members in the Saigon area in 1956", 
Working Paper, Appendices, Item 31, pp.1-2.
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2 7military, propaganda, intelligence and cultural affairs.
There can be no doubt that this intensified activity,
miniscule by later standards, was directly related to the
formation of the Fatherland Front. One political delegation
sent from the North was charged with forming an anti-Diem
and anti-American movement by obtaining the support of
anti-Diem and pro-French elements. A military delegation
was charged with maintaining a base in eastern Nam Bo with
a view towards assisting future infiltration into South
Viet-Nam via Laos and Cambodia. One group of 55 trained
cadres were dispersed upon arrival in the South to
reinforce the inter-province committees, with 15 cadres
being assigned to eastern Nam Bo, 20 to central Nam Bo
30and 20 to western Nam Bo.
The purpose of all this activity was made clear when,
amid reports that the Communists had established a general
31staff for overseeing operations in western Nam Bo, it
"From a conversation between an agent of the government 
of Vietnam [i.e. RVN] and a North Vietnamese [i.e. Communist 
Party cadre] who had good contacts among political groups 
in North and South Vietnam", Working Paper, Appendices,
Item 21, p.l; and "[Intelligence report of] Viet Minh 
collaboration with the Hoa Hao and penetration of the Cao 
Dai and agricultural organizations in the Plaine des Jones, 
October 1955", ibid., Item 205, pp.1-2.
28 Working Paper, Appendices, Item 21, pp.1-2.
29 Ibid.
Working Paper, Appendices, Item 205, pp.1-2.
31 Voice of the Dai Viet National Liberation Troops in 
Vietnamese to Vietnam, 2300 GMT, October 9, 1955.
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was announced that elements of Ba Cut's Hoa Hao armed
forces had linked up with "Viet Minh resistance veterans"
to form a Mat Tran Quoc Gia Giai Phong Viet-Nam or, the
32National Liberation Front of Viet-Nam.' Ba Cut's 
proclamation of October 10, announcing the formation of 
this Front, stated:
Following the ceasefire between the Viet Minh 
and the French, many people in the Viet Minh 
ranks did not want to regroup in the North.
Most of them stayed in the South because of 
their attachment to their native villages 
and families.... Because of the terrorism 
of Ngo Dinh Diem which has lasted for more 
than a year, nearly 30,000 compatriots were 
either arrested, imprisoned or deported. We 
are for the union of all people without 
discrimination with regard to political 
tendencies or religion. We appeal to the 
compatriots to forget all their personal 
interests. We are ready to protect all the 
combatants and cadres who formerly 
participated in the resistance, and who 
want to achieve the independence and 
unification of Vietnam. For ten years, 
despite differences in our political 
tendencies, we have been united in the 
desire to liberate the country. J
At this very moment, the battlefield lull which had settled
over western Nam Bo since the Hoa Hao - National Army
confrontations (May-July) was shattered by a Hoa Hao
(Ba Cut) "counter-offensive" in the vicinity of Tri Ton
in the triprovince area of Long Xuyen, Chau Doc and Rach
Gia. This activity, as subsequent events were to indicate,
was intended to disrupt Diem's October 23rd referendum.
32 Ibid., 0500 GMT, October 18, 1955.
33 Ibid.
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During October 15-17 the Nam Bo Regional Committee
reportedly convened a conference in the Cai Fang area of
Ca Mau province to discuss, among other things, the
formation of a Fatherland Front organization in the 
34South. Representatives of the various sect groups
were invited and it seems that Tran Van Soai and Ba Cut
obliged. Tran Van Tra's proposal for a joint "Viet Minh-
Hoa Hao" military and political command for the Dong Thap
Muoi (Plaine des Jones) region was accepted and planning
begun. According to one report the Nam Bo Committee may
have pledged to contribute one regiment of soldiers for use
35in joint operations against the National Army.
At the same time letters were issued to the President 
of the U.S., the Prime Minister of Britain and the
3 6President of France on behalf of the Hoa Hao forces.
They were obviously designed to undermine Diem's referendum 
as they offered suggestions as to how the current crisis 
might better be solved. Four proposals were made: (1)
creation of a National Council with legislative powers,
(2) formation of a government of National Union, (3) release 
of all political prisoners and (4) the promise to maintain 
security until the formation of the National Council.
Nevertheless Diem proceeded with his plans. Before 
announcing the date for the referendum on October 9th he
Working Paper, Appendices, Item 205, pp.1-2.
35D Ibid.
3 6 Voice of the Dai Viet National Liberation Troops in 
Vietnamese to Vietnam, 0500 GMT, October 29, 1955.
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instructed Cao Dai General Nguyen Thanh Phuong to seize
Tay Ninh city. As we have already mentioned, Pope Pham
Cong Tac's Papal Guard was seized and Tac himself placed
under house arrest. If the Cao Dai Pope had indeed been
watching "for his moment" this preemptive move by Gen.
Phuong kept the bulk of the Cao Dai armed forces on side.
Only one group, the Lien Minh Cao Dai, a force loyal to
37the late Trinh Minh The, broke away. It did not respond
to the overtures of the VWP's southern leaders and
consequently found itself under Hoa Hao (Ba Cut) military
pressure. On the eve of the referendum Lien Minh Cao Dai
units were forced to retreat from positions they had taken
3 8up in the eastern sector of the Dong Thap Muoi.
Further south, in Ca Mau, Diemist forces again raided
the "Holy See" of the Minh Chon Dau sect arresting 32 of
39its dignitaries. These raids were part of a country-wide
pattern of arrests and detention by the Diem government to
minimize the threat of disruption to the referendum. They
40were later denounced by Bao Dai.
It is difficult to assess just what the Communists' 
intentions were regarding the referendum. Rumours abounded 
that they would oppose the ballot by organizing a boycott, 
by defacing the ballots or by urging people to vote for
37 Working Paper, Appendices, Item 205, p. 1.
38 Ibid.
39 Vietnam News Agency in Vietnamese morse to Vietnam, 
0932 GMT, December 14, 1955.
40 Buttinger, A Dragon Embattled, op.cit., Vol.2, p.892.
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Bao Dai. Party histories of this period merely record
that struggle movements were conducted against the
referendum.41 On voting day a widespread series of minor
incidents were reported: shellings of polling places,
grenades tossed into crowds of voters, polling booths
burned, etc. The worst incidents were reported in Cao
Lanh, Sa Dec and Ben Tre, where the Hoa Hao forces of
Tran Van Soai and Ba Cut were said to have been
responsible. According to The Economist, "In view of the
great efforts made by the Viet Minh to organise a boycott
of the referendum, the fact that the percentage of
abstentions were minimal amounted to a powerful rebuff to
42the Communists". This may have been so, but there was
considerable suspicion, not unfounded, that the final results
4 3had been falsified. In this case, the reported results
would have papered over whatever strength the opposition
alliance had demonstrated. One French observer, in fact
credited the notable abstentions in western Nam Bo to the
newly concluded alliance between the Viet Minh [i.e. VWP]
44and Hoa Hao.
Tinh Hinh Phong Trao, p.3.
^  "Vietnam Courts London", The Economist (November 26, 1955), 
Vol.177, No.5857, p.735.
^  Colonel Melvin Hall, "The Dragons Lash Their Tails in
Indo-China", Journal of the Roval Central Asian Society (April 1956
Vol.XLIII, Part'll, pp.113-120; John Osborne, "The Tough
Miracle Man of Vietnam", Life (May 13, 1957), Vol.42, No.19,
p.164; Lancaster, The Emancipation of French Indochina,
op.cit., p.399; and Fall, The Two Viet-Nams, op.cit.,
p.257.
44 Lucien Bodard dispatch from Saigon in France-Soir 
[Paris] (October 26, 1955).
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According to the official results, as announced by
the SVN Minister of the Interior:
The number of voters of both sexes who 
participated in the vote was 5,828,907.
The number of voters deposing Bao Dai and 
naming Premier Ngo Dinh Diem as Chief of 
State was 5,721,735. The number of votes 
not to depose Bao Dai was 63,017. The number 
of persons who did not participate in the 
people's referendum was 131,395. The number 
of spoiled ballots was 44,155.^5
Three days later Diem declared Viet-Nam a Republic and was
promptly recognized by the United States, France, Britain
and some 40 additional states.
IV. SETTING UP THE FATHERLAND FRONT (November 1955 -
February 1956)
The October 23rd referendum deposing Bao Dai and the 
October 26th declaration establishing a Republic of Viet- 
Nam mark a watershed in the development of non-Communist 
politics. These events were swiftly followed by Diem's 
denunciation of the December 1954 Franco-Vietnamese 
agreement on financial and economic matters, by the recall 
of Vietnamese representatives from the Assembly of the 
French Union in Paris and by the dissolution of the 
Revolutionary Committee. Clearly Ngo Dinh Diem had 
successfully weathered the challenges to his regime which 
had been so threatening only a few months before. The 
pro-French, non-Communist opposition ceased to remain a 
credible threat to Diem's authority.
45 Voice of Free Vietnam in Vietnamese to Vietnam, 
0305 GMT, October 26, 1955.
In order to further solidify his position and to 
demonstrate convincingly that the Republic of Viet-Nam 
(RVN) would not be bound by the political terms written
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into the 1954 Geneva Agreements, especially on the question
of general elections, Diem took two major steps. Firstly,
on November 28th he announced by means of a Presidential
decree the formation of a Constitutional Committee on
Elections. Secondly on January 19th, Diem informed the
French that the continued presence of troops on Vietnamese
soil was "incompatible with Viet-Nam's concept of full 
4 6independence". The first step signalled the RVN's 
movement towards the election of a National Assembly, and 
by extension, the drafting of a new Constitution for the 
Republic. The second step was designed to undermine 
France's ability to exert pressure on the RVN to participate 
in talks with the DRVN on general elections. It should be 
recalled that as a signatory to the 1954 Geneva Agreements 
France had certain responsibilities in this regard. ^  Diem 
calculated correctly that if he got the French troops out 
before July 1956 France would be in no position to take up 
its responsibility - an argument later advanced by France 
itself.
Simultaneously with Diem's political maneuvering, the 
VWP was also taking steps to improve its political position.
Fall, The Two Viet-Nams, op.cit., p.319.
47 Under the terms of Article 7 of the Final Declaration; 
for a general account see: Geoffrey Warner, "Interview
with Monsieur NGUYEN HUU CHAU, Paris, 23 May 1973", 
typescript of interview notes, p.l. Chau was at that 
time (1954-55) Secretary of State to the RVN Presidency.
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Over the course of November-December a major effort was
undertaken to enlist as many opposition groups as possible
behind the program of the Fatherland Front. One feature
of this renewed effort was the return to the south of what
4 8must have totalled several hundred regroupees. These
returned cadres had undoubtedly been thoroughly trained
in the Party's new united front line and their appearance
on the scene signalled a renewed emphasis in building up a
popular struggle movement whose objective was to secure
North-South consultations and general elections. There is
some evidence to suggest that senior VWP officials feared
that reunification elections scheduled for July 1956 might
49not take place on time; nevertheless it was still Party 
policy to bring about these elections. Accordingly a twin 
campaign was mounted. On the one hand the Party directed 
action against the RVN's Constituent Assembly elections 
scheduled for March; and on the other hand the Party 
mounted a propaganda campaign in favour of general elections 
by the July 1956 deadline.
"Taken together, available evidence indicates that 
infiltration of regroupees from North to South Vietnam 
began as early as 1955. For example, a U.S. intelligence 
report of November 1955 reported on the arrival of 50 
regroupees in October, 1955; and the Lieutenant Colonel 
mentioned above, an intelligence officer, described trips 
to South Vietnam and back in 1955, 1956, and 1958. However, 
from all indications, the early infiltration was quite 
small scale, involving no more than a few hundred persons 
in all". "Hanoi and the Insurgency in South Vietnam", in 
United States - Vietnam Relations, op.cit., Book 2, IV.A.5 Tab 3, p.34.
49 Particularly after the results of Ho Chi Minh's trips to China and the Soviet Union in mid-1955 became known.
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It was not until late November that the by-laws, 
program and manifesto of the Fatherland Front were sent 
south by the newly elected Central Committee of the 
Fatherland Front in Hanoi.30 The organizational structure 
of the Front in the North was not duplicated in the South; 
it appears as if only a handful of southern leaders were
51charged with responsibility for Fatherland Front affairs.
If the Party intended to fashion a mass organization in the 
South it was singularly unsuccessful. Unfortunately 
available evidence is mute on this point. We do know that 
an executive committee of the Fatherland Front (for Nam Bo) 
was formed in late December and its leaders were reported 
to be: Le Duan (president), Ba Cut and Tran Van Soai 
(vice presidents), Pham Ngoc Thuan, Tran Van Tra, Pham Hung,
52Phan Ngoc Tue, Nguyen Van Vinh and Huynh Tan Phat (members). 
The main purpose of this new Front was, as we have indicated 
earlier, threefold:
50 Working Paper, Appendices, Item 12, p.2.
Ibid., pp.1-2.
5 2 "Interrogation of two Vietnamese Communist captives 
picked up in 1956 by GVN [i.e. RVN] forces", Working Paper, 
Appendices, Item 17, p.l; United States Central Intelligence 
Agency, Memorandum: The Organization, Activities, and
Objectives of the Communist Front in South Vietnam (September 
22 , 1965 - SECRET") , Appendices, p.A-18! which comments on 
Huynh Tan Phat. The latter document was located in 
Douglas Pike, compiler, Vietnam Reference Files (Taipei: 
United States Regional Information Office), File II 
(National Liberation Front -SVN- Subject File), Drawer 
NLF/BIOG. (National Liberation Front Biographical),
Folder NLF/Biog.-I (National Liberation Front/Biographical- 
Leadership) , which the author consulted in May 1972. The 
reference files, which are in the process of being placed 
on microfilm, have since been removed to Washington, D.C.
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1. to struggle for the strict implementation of 
Geneva Agreements
2. to push forward the patriotic movement in 
the South
3. to widen and consolidate the National United 
Front throughout the country.
Yet the emphasis on alliance with the sects and Party
support (training and material) for their military activity
seems contradictory at first glance. One Party member of
the Vinh Long province committee for propaganda and training has
stated that the VWP's main objective "was to struggle to
bring about general elections and reunite the country, by
means of political action, rather than through the use of 
53armed force". But on December 3, 1955, it was reported,
Gen. Tran Quang was appointed chief of "Viet Minh" forces
in Nam Bo replacing Nguyen Van Tay. Gen. Quang's duties
5 4were to upgrade Party-led units to regimental size. In 
eastern Nam Bo "Viet Minh" Battalions 307, 309, 311 and 410 
were ordered to reassemble in the Dong Thap Muoi for this 
reorganization.
Gen. Quang's appointment had been preceded by various 
reports that a large delegation of senior Party officials 
(perhaps 100 men), led by Van Tien Dung, had held a 
meeting with Ba Cut in the Go Bac Chien area of the Dong
Working Paper, Appendices, Item 12.
5 4 "Interrogation of a Viet Minh cadre who deserted in 1956 
and turned himself in to South Vietnamese [i.e. RVN] 
authorities", Working Paper, Appendices, Item 16; and 
"Report of an informant who was employed by the South 
Vietnamese [i.e. RVN] Security Service and in contact 
with a Viet Minh cadre from the Rach Gia area", ibid.,
Item 25-A.
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5 5Thap Muoi. At this time a reorganization of Hoa Hao 
forces was suggested in light of increasing contact between 
these forces and ARVN units. General Dung was said to be 
overseeing the formation of one regiment composed of stay- 
behind Viet Minh veterans as well as recruits from among
5 6Viet Minh forces previously stationed in Laos and Cambodia.
Small numbers of regrouped cadres from the DRVN were also
57reported involved in this reorganization. This new unit,
5 5 "Intelligence summary based on the reports of various 
informants who worked for the South Vietnamese [i.e. RVN] 
Security Service in 1956", ibid., Item 22.
c r For reports on regroupees from Cambodia see: Voice of
the Dai Viet National Liberation Troops in Vietnamese to 
Vietnam, 0500 GMT, November 1, 1955; for reports on 
regroupees from Laos see: Lucien Bodard dispatch from
Hong Kong in France-Soir (December 29, 1955). Various 
reports on the fighting in the vicinity of Voeune Sai in 
Stung Treng province in Cambodia's northeast in August of 
1955 mentioned the participation of "Viet Minh"; see: Saigon
Radio in Vietnamese to Vietnam, 2300 GMT, August 22, 1955; 
Radio Phnom Penh, Cambodian Home Service in French, 2330 
GMT, August 30, 1955; and Radio Vientiane, Laotian Home 
Service in Lao, 1145 GMT, August 30, 1955. Complaints by 
the Cambodian Government were investigated by the Inter­
national Commission for Supervision and Control. The ICC 
was able to uncover no more incriminating evidence than 
"a Viet Minh area organizer" operating in the region, see: 
Fourth Interim Report of the International Commission for 
Supervision and Control m  Cambodia for the Period 1 April 
to 30 September 19 55 , Cambodia No. 1 (19 56) , Command Paper 
Cmd. 9671 (London: H.M.S.O., January 1956), pp.18-20.
It is known that "Khmer-Viet Minh" forces retained their 
bases in Cambodia after July 1954, see: Norodom Sihanouk
and Wilfred Burchett, My War With the C.I.A.: Cambodia's
Fight for Survival (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973) ,
p.151; Interview with Phan The Ngoc, Saigon, Ministry of 
Open Arms, June 8, 1972. Ngoc served in Cambodia during 
this period. For a general account of Party activity see: 
Roger M. Smith, Cambodia's Foreign Policy (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1965), pp.167-168.
57 Working Paper, Appendices, Item 22; see footnote 48 above.
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led by Muoi Tri, was to coordinate action with Hoa Hao 
units. Muoi Tri was eminently suitable for this assignment 
as he had had experience with both the Hoa Hao and Binh
5 8Xuyen armed forces dating back to the Second World War.
At the same time remnants of the Binh Xuyen had managed
to regroup in northern Bien Hoa province and representatives
of a force numbering up to 2,000 made contact with VWP
officials. According to a later Party history:
Diem employed regular, montagnard and Cao Dai 
forces to fight the Binh Xuyen force and pursued 
this force to the Rung Sat. Finally it was 
annihilated. There was only one small element 
left. This element has always maintained 
contact with our forces.59
It is likely that this group was led by Vo Van Mon (Bay Mon), 
a person who achieved prominence in later years.
The apparent contradiction between the Party's emphasis 
on peaceful struggle and its alliances with the various sect 
armed forces can be explained in this way: during the
months of August 1955 to March 1956 the countryside of 
southern Viet-Nam was plunged into chaos as various sect 
forces battled with Diemist military units and, in some cases, 
with each other. The major opponents of Diem's rule were 
the Hoa Hao forces led by Tran Van Soai and Ba Cut as well
Ibid.; Voice of the Dai Viet National Liberation Troops 
in Vietnamese to Vietnam, 0500 GMT, November 2, 1955; 
for background information on Muoi Tri (also known as 
Huynh Van Tri and Huynh Van Chi) see: Warner, The Last
Confucian, op.cit., p.108; and Hilaire du Berrier, 
Background to Betrayal: The Tragedy of Vietnam (Boston:
Western Islands Press, 1965), pp.56-58. For an official 
biography consult: Who's Who of the Republic of South
Viet-Nam (South Vietnam: Giai Phong Editions, 1969),
p. 47.
59 Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, p.5.
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as units of the Binh Xuyen. In addition, certain units
of the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai which had declared their
loyalty to Diem baulked at integration or demobilization
procedures agreed to earlier. Some returned momentarily to
armed dissidence. Such appears to have been the case in
November when fighting erupted between Hoa Hao units
nominally under the control of Lam Thanh Nguyen and the
ARVN in the vicinity of Cai Lay in My Tho province.^ A
unit of 500 men composing the Lien Minh Cao Dai ensconced
themselves in the Duong Minh Chau maquis of western Tay
Ninh province and refused to obey the commands of Gen.
Nguyen Thanh Phuong. As the fighting continued organized
units were broken up and scattered about the countryside.
Some abandoned political objectives and took to banditry;
other units sought refuge in the inaccessible Viet Minh
61resistance base areas. A later history of this period
provides a graphic description of how the sects and communists
were thrown together and put on the defensive:
Diem applied a similar policy towards the armed 
forces of the Binh Xuyen sect in Saigon, the Cao 
Dai in Tay Ninh and the Hoa Hao in the Mekong 
delta. They resisted Diem's onslaughts. Bloody 
battles erupted, especially in Saigon in early 
1955. After being driven out of their bases, 
the Binh Xuven, Cao Dai and Hoa Hao (commonly 
known as 'opposition religious sects') took 
refuge in the countryside. There they met some 
of the patriots and former resistance members 
who had also fled from the ruthless repression 
of Ngo Dinh Diem. Although the two sides had
Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 
1000 GMT, November 24, 1955; and Voice of Vietnam in French 
to Southeast Asia, 2330 GMT, November 23, 1955.
61 Linh, "How Armed Struggle Began in South Viet Nam", 
op.cit., p .21.
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been adversaries in the past the patriots and 
former resistance members showed the leaders 
of the opposition religious sects how to survive: 
to rely on the people's support and return to the 
former resistance bases to organize a protracted 
struggle.
ARVN military action against the sects was accompanied by 
various political measures against the Communist organization. 
At the same time as the sects retreated into the resistance 
base areas, the RVN was moving into the third and most 
effective stage of its anti-Communist Denunciation Campaign. 
The account cited immediately above provides keen insight 
into this episode:
The brutality of the Diem regime went beyond the 
calculations of the patriots and former resistance 
cadres. They were faced with a decisive choice, 
either to limit themselves to peaceful methods of 
struggle, expressed in purely political forms, and 
continue to be wiped out in the bloodbath of the 
white terror, or to combine political struggle with 
taking the most effective measures of self defense.
The situation allowed no further hesitation and 
guided by their long experience in combating the 
oppressors, they chose the second path.
From times immemorial, there has always been some 
form of self-defense organization of the masses in 
the Vietnamese countryside: the 'tuan dinh'
(patrol groups) in the feudal times, the 'dan 
trang' (militia) in the French colonial days, and 
the militia and guerrilla units in the anti-French 
resistance. Carrying forward these traditions, 
able-bodied young men were organized to resist 
Diem's terror. Thus, the first self-defense teams 
were gradually formed in the villages, grouping a 
dozen or score of young men in some places and 
from 30 to 40 in others. They stayed in their 
villages like the other peasants, working the 
fields and taking part in political struggles.
They armed themselves with everything they could 
in order to defend the people in their work in 
the field or during demonstrations. The more the 
enemy intensified its acts of terror, the more 
rapidly the self-defense teams grew, especially 
in the Mekong delta where everyday a most bitter 
confrontation took place.
From the end of 1955 to 1956, as Diem stepped up 
his 'denounce the Communists' campaign, the hunt 
for patriots and former resistance members became 
fiercer. Finding it impossible to live and carry
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on the political struggle in the countryside 
the latter fled to former resistance bases such 
as the Plain of Reeds (southwest of Saigon), 
the U Minh jungle (between Bac Lieu and Rach 
Gia provinces on the Gulf of Thailand) or 
Resistance Zones D and C (north and northeast 
of Saigon). Diem sent his troops after them.
Cornered, they had to organize self-defense 
together with the local population. In their 
first fight for survival the first units of~ 
the Liberation Army took~~shape/ one or two 
companies instrength m  some places and a 
battalion in others....
A number of former members of the resistance who 
had returned to the cities to resume a normal 
life were also persecuted and finally had to 
leave. All these men rallied together, formed 
armed units and occupied some areas to organize 
resistance against the Diem forces such as Lai 
Thieu and Gia Dinh province, or the mountain 
region in Rach Gia province. First created on 
the local populations1 own initiative, they 
later managed to establish contact with the 
people’s armed forces which provided them with 
command. (emphasis added)
The months of October 1955 to March 1956 mark only the
beginning of this process. At this time the Party continued
to implement the instructions it had received in September
permitting the use of armed self-defence with the political
struggle movement. Various resistance base areas in the
central highlands, in the Trung Nam area of Quang Nam
province, in the U Minh region and in War Zone C were 
6 2reorganized. Wartime "factories" and workshops began 
functioning once again, resuming production of a limited
6 2 Voice of the Dai Viet National Liberation Troops in 
Vietnamese to Vietnam, 2300 GMT, October 2, 1955; 0500 
GMT, November 2, 1955; 2300 GMT, November 12, 1955; 0500 
GMT, November 16, 1955; 0500 GMT, November 28, 1955; 0500 
GMT, December 20, 1955; and Voice of the National Army 
(Saigon) in Vietnamese to Vietnam, 1115 GMT, January 19, 
1956.
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supply of mines, grenades and ammunition. ' Buried arms
caches were dug up and arms distributed to the reactivated
village self-defence groups mentioned above. Trenches
and other defence systems were erected to protect the
population from the ensuing conflict. A few detachments
of so-called Tan Viet Minh (new Viet Minh) began operations
with their various Hoa Hao counterparts under the banner of
"lien minh hoa binh" or "peace alliance" and elsewhere
6 4Party cadres directed the training of sect forces.
Not all of the Party-sect military activity was 
defensive in nature. There appears to have been a deliberate 
policy to disrupt the economic connections between Saigon 
and the countryside. Specifically attempts were made to 
siphon off the 10th month rice crop and to block it from
Voice of the Dai Viet National Liberation Troops in 
Vietnamese to Vietnam, 2300 GMT, November 12, 1955; 0500 
GMT, November 16, 1955; and 0500 GMT, November 28, 1955.
"The High Counsellor affirmed that the Viet Minh had left 
camps and dumps with a view to reinstalling its administrat­
ion in this zone and reasserting its control over the 
population. He drew attention to the discovery, on 30 
December 1955, of two major armaments and munitions 
factories about 50 kms. north-west of Kompong Speu. ’Other 
camps which remain to be uncovered and destroyed certainly 
exist’, H.E. Khim Tit wrote". In "Le danger Khmer- 
Vietminh vu il y au douze ans par S.E. Khim Tit", Realities 
Cambodgiennes [Phnom Penh] (February 16, 1968), p.21.
There was nothing in Khim Tit’s report to indicate that 
these sites were actually in use. Confirmation on the 
revival in production comes from Phan The Ngoc, a Party 
cadre who served in Cambodia at the time. Interview with 
Phan The Ngoc, Saigon, Ministry of Open Arms, June 8,
1972.
6 4 Voice of the Dai Viet National Liberation Troops in 
Vietnamese to Vietnam, 0500 GMT, November 2, 1955; and 
2300 GMT, November 12, 1955.
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reaching Saigon. Some of the rice was diverted to Cambodia 
where earnings from its sale were used to finance the 
purchase of military supplies. Smaller amounts of rice 
were even shipped to the North^5 which was experiencing 
severe shortages at that time.
Covert Party agents directed their attention at
penetrating all branches of the RVN's rural administrative
apparatus. Specific targets included village councils and
guard units, ARVN military posts in western Nam Bo, the
police and security services as well as the Ministry of 
6 6Information. Other reports at about the same time remarked 
upon the growing Communist influence in the cities where 
information and propaganda committees were playing an 
important role in publicizing the program of the Fatherland 
Front.
The Party also directed its energies at sabotaging the 
RVN's newly launched civic action program and refugee 
resettlement efforts especially in the Cai Son area of
Vietnam Press (Saigon), "Seizure of a Junk of Rice",
The Times of Viet Nam (April 21, 1956), No.14, p.5;
and Vietnam Press, "North Bound Junk Seized", ibid.,
(May 19, 1956), No.18, p.2.
6 6 Voice of the Dai Viet National Liberation Troops in 
Vietnamese to Vietnam, 0500 GMT, November 16, 1955; 2300 
GMT, December 6, 1955; and 0500 GMT, December 20, 1955. 
United States Department of State, Office of Intelligence 
Research, Intelligence Brief (February 7, 1956) in 
United States - Vietnam Relations, op.cit., Book 10, p.1049, 
states, "the Communists presumably tried to penetrate all 
branches of the Government. The most frequent reports 
suggest heavy penetration of the Information Ministry".
6 7 Voice of the Dai Viet National Liberation Troops in 
Vietnamese to Vietnam, 0500 GMT, November 2, 1955; 0500 
GMT, November 28, 1955; and 0500 GMT, November 29, 1955.
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western Nam Bo. Alleged RVN corruption was also made an
issue. However, as a later Party critique of this political
struggle movement made clear, "The struggles stressed
political slogans demanding a general election" rather than
6 8"slogans of social welfare". It was not until mid-1956
that this emphasis was changed.
Despite this rather long catalogue of Party actions
it must be stressed that they ran into difficulties and
were only partly successful. In November, for example,
American intelligence was privy to captured reports from
Party field operations which contained pessimistic forecasts
for the future. These reports acknowledged that the struggle
could be "long, painful and complex" and that "it is not
69time ... to meet the enemy".
During January and February the opposition alliance 
against Diem began to suffer irreparable reverses. In 
December Diem concentrated elements of 3 ARVN divisions 
totalling 10 battalions in the Rach Gia, Long Xuyen, Chau 
Doc area with the purpose of attacking the combined Hoa Hao 
forces of Tran Van Soai and Ba Cut. He also announced a 
plan to settle 100,000 refugees (mostly regroupees from 
the north) in Long Xuyen, an area regarded as a Hoa Hao 
stronghold. Early skirmishing between these forces soon 
gave way to a general offensive as ARVN Gen. Duong Van Minh, 
fresh from his success against the Binh Xuyen, launched
Tinh Hinh Phong Trap, p.4.
69 United States Central Intelligence Agency, Current 
Intelligence Weekly Review (November 10, 1955) in United 
States - Vietnam Relations, op.cit., Book 2, IV.A.5"!
Tab 3, p.45.
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Operation Nguyen Hue. This military action wore on until 
after the March 7th Constituent Assembly elections when 
Gen. Minh declared western Nam Bo pacified.
In mid-February Tran Van Soai opened negotiations with
RVN officials which resulted later that same months in his
defection to the RVN. Despite attempts to thwart this
704,600 Hoa Hao troops followed their leader. Soai's 
maneuver greatly weakened Ba Cut's position as the latter's 
forces now bore the brunt of ARVN attention.
Also in January the ARVN launched attacks upon the 
break-away Lien Minh Cao Dai forces. These operations, 
conducted in Tay Ninh province, were also used as a 
pretext for asserting Diem's authority over the largest 
of the Cao Dai sects. Although Pham Cong Tac had been 
placed under house arrest by Gen. Nguyen Thanh Phuong,
Phuong himself resisted ARVN attempts to assert control 
over the province. After a few clashes RVN officials were 
able to announced on February 19 that ARVN troops had 
occupied the provincial capital and the seat of the Cao 
Dai sect. Thereafter Cao Dai units were either demobilized 
or retrained and reassigned to other regions in South 
Viet-Nam. On March 18 Diem journeyed to Tay Ninh city to 
accept the surrender of Cao Dai forces, thus marking for the 
time being the end of their threat to his rule. Unhappily 
for Diem, however, amid the confusion of February Pope Pham
Working Paper, Appendices, Item 17; MacAlister, "The 
Great Gamble", op.cit., p.122; and Murti, Vietnam Divided, 
op.cit., p.136, footnote 13.
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Cong Tac had managed to slip across the border into Cambodia
71and to link up with opponents of the Saigon government.
The demise of Ba Cut's Hoa Hao units swiftly followed
that of Tran Van Soai and the Cao Dai. In April Ba Cut
found himself engaged in a fierce battle around the Cai San
area. He was captured on the 13th and eventually beheaded.
By mid-1956 a U.S. National Intelligence Estimate could
observe, "All significant sect resistance in South Vietnam
72has been eliminated".
It is no wonder that in the midst of all this turmoil
that Le Duan was reported to have lost faith with the
Party's self-imposed restraints on the use of military
force. By the end of 1955 he was reported to have urged
the Central Committee to forcibly overthrow the Diem government
7 3as quickly as possible. At the height of the fighting in 
February he conferred with his colleagues on tactics to be 
pursued in future. Once again he stated his view that
On February 22, 1956, it was reported, a meeting of anti- 
Diemists took place in Cambodia which was attended by Ba Cut, 
Le Van Vien, Nguyen Phuc Hau, Nguyen Dai Thang (of the Binh 
Xuyen) and forty-six others; see: Vietnam News Agency in
Vietnamese morse to Vietnam, 0950 GMT, February 23, 1956; 
and Voice of the Dai Viet National Liberation Troops, 0500 
GMT, February 26, 1956.
7 2 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Probable Developments in 
North and South Vietnam Through Mid-1957, National 
Intelligence Estimate (July 17, 1956), NIE No.63-56 in United 
States-Vietnam Relations, op.cit., Book 10, p.1067.
7 3 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency report from Singapore, 
CS-82270 (January 16, 1956) cited in ibid., Book 2, IV.A.5., 
Tab 3, pp.48-49. "CS" may stand for "covert station" or 
"covert source".
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military action was necessary if Viet Nam was to be
reunified and that bases would have to be prepared in the
74Central Highlands to support such a policy.
Sometime in mid-March, after Tran Van Soai had rallied
and the military balance turned in Diem's favour, and after
the March 4th elections had been successfully held, the
Nam Bo Regional Committee held a post-mortem. It was
obvious that the campaign to boycott and disrupt the
elections had failed. According to one observer "The
inability of the Communists to prevent a large turnout of
voters was another illustration of the growing strength of
7 5the Diem regime".
According to a document captured by RVN authorities,
Le Duan addressed a meeting on March 18th and was quoted 
as saying:
Our political struggle in the South will sometimes 
have to be backed up with military action in order 
to show the strength of the forces which won at 
Dien Bien Phu. With political and military 
activities properly carried out, we will surely 
defeat the enemy [Tran Trung] Dung and Diem; and 
the population will cooperate with us. The 
population ascribed the defeat of the Binh Xuyen 
and the Hoa Hao to military causes, but the 
population realized that it was because our 
troops had to move to the north that Diem's 
forces were able to occupy the west. Therefore, 
we should increase our forces in the South and 
develop military action.
"Hanoi and the Insurgency in South Vietnam", ibid., 
p. 49 .
75 MacAlister, "The Great Gamble", op.cit., p.169.
7 6 "Document purportedly issued by Lao Dong Party Central 
Committee for Guidance of Cadres in GVN [i.e. RVN] Zone", Working Paper, Appendices, Item 204.
201
The document made clear that "(a)lthough England, Russia, 
France, China and India are trying to arrange a second 
Geneva Conference to solve the problem of Vietnam [i.e., 
the North will have to make plans to solve the military, 
political and economic problems of the South]. Military 
activity is considered most important in SVN now".
Another document revealed that as a result of Le
Duan's remarks the Nam Bo Regional Committee adopted a
77draft 14-point plan of action. These points can be 
summarized as follows:
1. Military action should be used in support of 
other activities.
2. At least two support bases should be created 
to aid activities in Cambodia and in the 
Central Highlands.
3. Nam Bo and Cambodia, although separate 
countries, are part of the same battlefront, 
therefore budgetary assistance should be 
increased and senior cadres should be 
seconded to Cambodia.
4. The Highlands should be consolidated as a base.
5. The number of battalions should be increased 
from the present 14 to 20. One or two 
companies should be assigned to each district 
and 1 to 3 guerrilla squads to each village. 
Party members who are fit for guerrilla 
service and refuse will be expelled.
6. Village militia and self-defence groups are to 
be given military and political training by 
provincial military commanders.
7. Supplies are to be stockpiled according to the 
needs of local forces.
These points were compiled from: "Translation of a
document found on the person of a political officer with 
Communist forces in Zone 9 of the Western Interzone on 
Nov. 27, 1956", Working Paper, Appendices, Item 19; and ibid., Item 204.
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8. Consolidate the military organizations in 
the western interzone of Nam Bo.
9. Consolidate the military organizations in 
the eastern interzone of Nam Bo.
10. Consolidate the military organizations in 
the central interzone of Nam Bo.
11. Consolidate the leading organizations in 
the Saigon-Cholon special zone.
12. Consolidate the leading organizations in 
Cambodia.
13. Tighten relations with pro-French and anti- 
Diem elements to form a United National Front.
14. Strengthen the Movement for the Protection of 
Peace.
This new plan of action was forwarded to the VWP Central
Committee with the request that the over-all tactics in Nam
Bo be changed to permit a more effective exploitation of the
current situation. Specifically it was suggested that Party
military forces be used in conjunction with (although
subordinated to) a struggle movement organized around
economic issues during the forthcoming rainy season (May-
7 8October/November).
In response VWP leaders in the North stressed the
exploitation of agrarian issues until a longer-range
79strategy could be worked out. In approving some of the 
March proposals of the Nam Bo Regional Committee, the Central 
Committee ordered that this new tactical approach should be 
conducted under the slogan, "Liberate South Viet Nam through
Ibid., Item 31.
79 William S. Turley, "Army, Party and Society in the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam: Civil-Military Relations
in a Mass-Mobilization System", Ph.D. Thesis, the 
University of Washington, 1972, pp.122-123.
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8 0its fields!" In early April senior Party officials in 
Nam Bo convened a special conference.^ In light of these 
instructions they agreed on two propositions:
1. that the policy of using violence through 
the medium of the sect armed forces, 
initiated in September 1955, had not 
achieved satisfactory results.
2. From the standpoint of the DRVN's international 
diplomacy the situation, especially in Nam Bo, 
did not favour the continuance of violence.
Le Duan accordingly instructed those present on the
content of the new political struggle movement based on
8 2agrarian issues. On the political aspects of this 
movement Le Duan instructed the cadres to fulfil these 
tasks:
1. develop support in the villages for the purpose 
of gaining control of local administrative 
committees.
2. popularize the themes of the Fatherland Front 
and win over the rich farmers and landowners,
3. organize rural youth groups as the base for 
their recruitment into "popular forces" as 
needed.
Le Duan also issued instructions that secret grain storage 
areas should be prepared for use when food is scarce and that 
peasants should be urged not to sell their paddy to the 
Saigon government. Le Toan Tu, a senior Party cadre, was 
put in charge of organizing the new agrarian struggle over 
the next three months (May-June-July) with the purpose of 
building up an "all-out struggle for peace" by the deadline
80
81
Working Paper, Appendices, Item 30. 
Ibid.
82 Ibid.
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for general elections. Various intelligence organs were 
instructed to launch diversionary actions in the cities 
and towns so as to keep RVN security officials occupied 
well away from the countryside.
The conference also issued instructions to lower 
echelons recommending that they abandon so-called "illegal 
activities" (holding demonstrations, distributing tracts, 
hanging banderoles etc.) and adopt instead "legal" methods. 
The purpose was to avoid incurring RVN repression. 
"Terrorism" (the elimination of "wicked tyrants") was also
o oprohibited at this time.
V. EXTERNAL FACTORS - THE DRVN'S QUEST FOR SUPPORT 
(August 1955 - April 1956)
A. Economic Problems in the North
On March 31st it was announced that the Politburo of 
the VWP had met recently to discuss the reports on the 20th 
Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) 
by its two delegates, Truong Chinh and Le Due Tho, and had 
decided to call an enlarged conference of the Central 
Committee to discuss this issue. In the interval between 
this announcement and the convening of the 9th Plenum on 
April 19th, A.I. Mikoyan, a deputy premier of the Soviet
Ibid., Appendices, Item 12; Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, p.22.
84 "Communique of the Political Bureau of the Central 
Committee of the Viet-Nam Labor Party", Voice of Vietnam 
at dictation speed in Vietnamese to Southeast Asia, 0015 
GMT, March 31, 1956. The Vietnamese-language original is 
missing from the microfilm collection of Nhan Dan which 
this author consulted at the National Library of Australia in Canberra.
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Council of Ministers, paid a short visit to Hanoi. Both
these events were to have a great impact on the deliberations
of the VWP's Central Committee as it considered, among
other things, events in the South. Before turning to a
discussion of the 9th Plenum it is necessary to mention
both the state of North Viet-Nam's domestic economy as well
as the DRVN's diplomatic efforts to secure the implementation
of the political provisions of the 1954 Geneva Agreements.
Both the 8th Plenum of the VWP (August 13-20 1955) and
the 5th session of the National Assembly (September 15-20)
discussed and announced decisions on the economic situation.
According to the communique of the 8th plenum:
in the consolidation of North Vietnam, due 
importance must be attached to economic 
rehabilitation. The land reform must be 
completed according to schedule and efforts 
must be made to develop production, with the 
increase in farm production as the main 
objective Temphasis added)
According to Pham Van Dong, in his report to the National
Assembly, "economic rehabilitation constitutes the base for
the whole work of the consolidation of North Vietnam".
(emphasis added). Later in his report DOng was more specific
about the "aims and requirements of economic rehabilitation":
to fulfil the two year program of economic 
rehabilitation mainly aimed at raising the 
production level to that of the pre-war period 
in order to heal the war wounds, lessen the 
difficulties of the people, gradually improve 
the material and moral life of the people, and 
thereby create a base for the consolidation of
"Thong Cao cua Hoi Nghi Lan Thu 8 cua Ban Chap Hanh Trung 
Uong Dang Lao Dong Viet-Nam", [Communique of the 8th session 
of the Central Executive Committee of the Viet-Nam Workers' 
Party] NhanDan (August 22, 1955), No.537, p.l.
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North Vietnam from the economic, political, 
and national defense points of view with 
adequate attention to be paid to South 
Vietnam, and foundations to be laid for future planned economic development.86
In late December the DRVN Council of Ministers approved the
State Plan for 1956 which also gave stress "to restoring the
8 7national economy to pre-war levels". Later Nguyen Van 
Tran, the vice-chairman of the National Planning Commission,
provided a full outline of the 1956 State Plan and his
/
summary laid particular emphasis on increasing food product-
8 8ion "as the most centrally important question".
In fact North Viet-Nam was in very serious economic 
strife. One contemporary American analysis asserted that 
"as a result of wartime damage to irrigation facilities 
and an unprecedented series of floods, droughts, and insect 
scourges, the rice deficit in each of the past two years
8 9[1954-55] has amounted to at least 500,000 metric tons".
Ho Chi Minh in his report to the National Assembly 
characteristically went to the point, "Our people must also 
show proof of emulation in favor of an increase of production, 
save from all points of view, especially agricultural
8 6 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 
0528 GMT, September 17, 1955.
8 7 "Thong Cao cua Hoi Dong Chinh Phu ve ' Ke Hoach Nha Nuoc 
1956' cua Nuoc Viet Nam Dan Chu Cong Hoa", [Communique of 
the Government Council of Ministers Concerning 'The 1956 
State Plan'] Nhan Dan (December 31, 1955), No.668, p.l.
8 8 Vietnam News Agency in Vietnamese morse to Vietnam, 0845 
GMT, January 17, 1955.
89 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Probable Developments 
in North and South Vietnam Through Mid-1957 (July 17, 1956), 
NIE No.63-56, op.cit., p.1069.
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production to avert the danger of famine and to provide a 
9 0food reserve" (emphasis added). The solution to this 
perennial problem lay in two directions: carrying out a
thorough-going agrarian reform at home and seeking 
assistance from abroad. In November 1955 the VWP Secretary- 
General, Truong Chinh announced that the 5th wave of mass 
mobilization for land reform had begun. The purpose of the 
land reform was basically two-fold: (1) to change the
nature of rural authority by making the supporters of the 
revolution, the poor and landless peasants, owners of their 
own land (and by displacing the influence of landlords and 
rich peasants by redistributing their land), (2) and
thereby increase total production.
External aid to the DRVN came mainly from two sources: 
Russia and China. As a result of agreement between Hanoi 
and Moscow, the Soviets bought and shipped rice from Burma 
to North Viet-Nam. One report stated that by the end of
911955, 150,000 tons of Burmese rice should have reached Hanoi. 
This was reckoned to be 50,000 tons more than the usual 
deficit.
The American analysis mentioned above stated that 
"imports through April 1956 consisting of token shipments 
from Communist China and some 200,000 tons of Burmese rice 
purchased by the USSR, have fallen far short of the minimum
"Bao Cao cua Ho Chu Tich Truoc Quoc Hoi", [Speech by 
Chairman Ho before the National Assembly] Nhan Dan 
(September 21, 1955), No.567, p.l.
91 Ho Gets Burmese Rice", op.cit., p.1022.
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9 2requirements". It was expected however that the 
situation would improve in 1956-57 as the USSR had agreed 
to purchase 400,000 tons of Burmese rice each year through 
1959 .
There were other problems concerned with rehabilitating
North Viet-Nam's economy, but these need not concern us. The
point being that at the time of the 9th Plenum in April 1956
North Viet-Nam was still preoccupied with domestic matters
which took precedence over developments in the South. It
seems that as early as September 1955 there was even some
criticism that too much attention was being paid to the
North at the expense of developments in the South. Witness
these words by Ho Chi Minh,
The work of building up a peaceful, united, 
independent, democratic and strong Vietnam 
can certinaly be carried out. Concerning 
this I would like to answer one question:
Even though we are determined not to neglect 
the demands of the North while paying attent­
ion to the south, why do we strive to 
consolidate the North in order to be able to 
pay attention to the South?
The reason is very simple; as I had occasion 
to say before the Congress of the Fatherland 
Front: for a new house to be stable it must 
have a firm foundation; for a new plant to 
grow, it must have strong roots. The North 
is the foundation, the roots of the struggle 
forces of our entire people, that is why we 
must make the roots really firm, really strong.^
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Probable Developments 
in North and South Vietnam Through Mid-1957 (July 17, 1956), 
NIE No.63-56, op.cit., p . 1069 .
9 3 "Bao Cao cua Ho Chu Tich Truoc Quoc Hoi", op.cit.
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B. The Geneva Agreements: Problems of Implementation
The DRVN's efforts to secure the implementation of the 
political provisions of the 1954 Geneva Agreements were 
unsuccessful, mainly due to the lack of leverage which North 
Viet^-Nam could exert on either of her two main allies, Russia 
and China, or on France.
The details of the DRVN's public maneuvering on the
question of consultations and general elections has been
9 4admirably drawn together elsewhere, and it will not be
necessary to repeat this history here. Of interest to us
is the emerging pattern of Soviet and French indifference
to assuming their various responsibilities as co-chairman
and signatory, respectively of the 1954-Geneva Agreements.
It has been suggested that Soviet indifference towards
securing Viet-Nam's unity arose out of a conflict of
interest with the DRVN. Specifically, Russia was prepared
to concede the maintenance of the existing division of
Viet-Nam and Korea as a tacit quid pro quo for the
continued division of Germany. According to Brian Crozier:
The new Communist policy reached its natural 
conclusion at the local level in September 1955, 
when the World Communist 'line' for divided 
countries (already accepted for Germany and 
Korea) was officially adopted for Vietnam as 
well. The governing principle of this 'line' 
is that the reunification of a divided country 
is a matter to be decided between the governments 
of both sections of the country - a policy which
9 4 Weinstein, Vietnam's Unheld Elections, op.cit.; SarDesai, 
Indian Foreign Policy, op.cit., pp.75-116; and Fifield,
The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia, op.cit., pp.293-344.
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in Germany, the most important of divided 
countries, offers the advantage of avoiding 
free general elections in which the Communist- 
controlled section might lose its identity.95
If Crozier is correct, this most certainly explains the
Soviet posture of providing public support - however limited
- for the DRVN, while in private, in its capacity as one of
the Geneva Conference co-chairmen, refusing to advance the
DRVN1s case. The following examples will illustrate this
point.
In the face of Diem's refusal to hold consultations
with the North (which received American backing), Pham Van
Dong, on August 17th addressed a note to the Geneva
Conference co-chairman (Eden and Molotov) asking them "to
take all necessary measures" to ensure that a consultative
9 6conference was convened. On September 20th Britain 
circulated this note to all the Conference participants. 
Soviet comment on this note came four days later when 
Molotov addressed a session of the United Nations General 
Assembly. His remarks on Viet-Nam were buried in the 
fourth section of a six-section speech. Section IV, 
headed "Unsettled Problems of Asia and the Far East", 
included five items of which Indochina was number 4 (points 
1-3 were: Taiwan, China's legitimate rights and Korea).
9 5 Brian Crozier, "The International Situation in Indochina", 
Pacific Affairs (December 1956), Vol.XXIX, No.4, p.310. 
Crozier may have relied on sources in the British Foreign 
Office.
9 6 Cf. Weinstein, Vietnam's Unheld Elections, op.cit., p.35; 
Murti, Vietnam Divided, op.cit., p.190; a copy of the text 
may be located in Nhan Dan (September 17, 1955) cited in 
footnote 5 above.
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According to Molotov:
On the whole, the principal provisions of the 
Geneva Agreements on Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia 
are being fulfilled though not without delay.
Nevertheless it should be pointed out that far 
from everything is being done to solve adeguately 
the important political problems arising out of 
the said agreements. It is common knowledge that 
the consultations on general elections in 
Vietnam envisaged by the Geneva Agreements have 
not yet started. Evidently, the reason for that 
lies in the attitude of the South Vietnam 
authorities, who are trying to avoid implementing 
the Geneva Agreements and still declining to take 
part in these consultations.
We are entitled to expect that steps will be taken 
to carry out the Geneva Agreements on Indochina and 
that a breakdown of the consultation between the 
representatives of the North and South Vietnam will 
be prevented. This is essential if the general 
elections are to be held within the prescribed 
time limit to unite the country by restoring its 
national unity.97
While in New York Molotov met with Macmillan and 
raised the matter of Diem's failure to agree to consultations. 
According to The Economist Molotov did not renew his earlier 
suggestion (made in July 1955) for a meeting of conference 
participants to discuss this obstruction and, in fact,
appeared quite willing to leave the matter in Macmillan's
, , 98hands.
Molotov and Macmillan met later (in November 1955) at 
the Big 4 Foreign Ministers meeting in Geneva. By that 
time the SVN's reply to Pham Van Dong's August 17th letter 
had been received. The SVN position remained unchanged.
"Text of the Statement by Molotov at Meeting of United 
Nations General Assembly", The New York Times (September 
24, 1955), pp.6-7.
9 8 "'Happy Talk' in Indo-China", The Economist (October 15, 
1955), Vol.177, No.5851, p.199.
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While in Geneva Molotov raised the question of elections
with both Macmillan and Pinay, the French Foreign Minister
as press reports indicated. Yet new information has come
to hand which reveals that:
In November 1955 as official documents when later 
released will evidence, Molotov bluntly dismissed 
the Indochina item from the agenda of the Geneva 
Foreign Ministers' Conference; even the United 
States had been willing to have the matter discussed. 
Diem's anti-consultation and anti-election posture 
was thereby assured of success, and the perception 
grew in Washington that, by tacit agreement of the 
superpowers, there were to be two Viet-Nams as 
there were two Koreas, two Germanys and two 
Chinas.99
Subsequent events appear to confirm this viewpoint. 
Despite at least three additional DRVN notes to the Geneva 
Conference co-chairmen (November 25th, February 14th and 
April 9th),100 as well as a Chinese call for reconvening the 
Geneva Conference (made January 26th),101 the Soviet attitude
Paul Kattenburg, "Viet Nam and U.S. Diplomacy 1940-1970", 
Orbis (Fall 1971), Vol.XV, No.3, pp.822-823; the documents 
to which Kattenburg refers are the texts of cables sent by 
the U.S. Embassy in Geneva to the Department of State in 
Washington reporting on these developments; Interview with 
Paul Kattenburg, New York City, September 30, 1974.
10°"Note of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic 
Republic of Viet-Nam to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
the Soviet Union, Co-chairman of the 1954 Geneva Conference 
on Indo-China, on November 25, 1955", in Democratic Republic 
of Viet-Nam, Documents Related to the Implementation of the 
Geneva Agreements Concerning Viet-Nam (Hanoi: Press and
Information Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1956), 
pp.57-61; "Note of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the 
Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam to the Two Co-chairmen of 
the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indo-China, February 11, 1956", 
in ibid., pp.117-121; and "Note of the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam to the Two 
Co-chairmen of the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indo-China,
April 9, 1956", in ibid., pp.126-128. A copy of this 
publication was located in the U.S. Library of Congress.
101 New China News Agency in English morse to Europe, 1520 
GMT, January 30, 1956; and Dispatch by Henry R. Lieberman 
from Hong Kong in The New York Times (January 31, 1956)
pp.1-2.
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remained unaltered. In April when Lord Reading (the
British Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs) and A. Gromyko
(the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister) met in London to discuss
this issue, the Russians in fact revealed a hardened position.
Russian acceptance of the British proposal for talks solely
between "the co-chairmen" in effect meant a quick death for
efforts to reconvene a Geneva Conference on Indochina -
10 2despite Soviet public support for the idea. The con­
clusion of these talks came on May 8th when the co-chairman
addressed letters, in identical terms, to both North and
10 3South Viet-Nam. These letters made clear three points:
(1) the USSR agreed with the U.K. that holding reunification 
elections was less important than maintaining peace; (2) that 
the Soviet Union had agreed to treat the two Viet-Nam's as 
sovereign equals and (3) that the USSR had accepted the 
inevitability of partition by so doing.
A high level American intelligence analysis of the Gromyko-
Reading talks summarised their results in this way:
The UK and the USSR, as co-chairmen of the Geneva 
Conference, met in London in April and May 1956 
and reaffirmed support for the political settle­
ment foreseen at Geneva but implicitly approved 
postponement of its implementation, including 
the nationwide elections. The co-chairmen 
called upon all parties to preserve the status 
quo and requested the International Supervisory 
and Control Commission (ICC) to continue 
supervising the Armistice. Thus no steps have
TASS (Moscow) in Russian Hellschreiber to Europe,
1750 GMT, April 5, 1956, in U.S. FBIS Daily Report (April 6, 
1956), No.68, pp.BB1-BB4.
103 Cf. Great Britain, Documents Relating to British 
Involvement in the Indo-China Conflict, 1945-1965"! 
Miscellaneous No.25 (1965), Command Paper Cmnd. 2834 
(London: H.M.S.O., 1966), pp.96-99.
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been taken to bring about unification or a 
political settlement in Vietnam, and the 
partitioning of Vietnam has been tacitly 
accepted by the Geneva Conference powers for 
an indefinite period of time.1^4
A later section of this analysis offered these further 
comments:
The Soviet position, as it developed at the 
April-May Geneva co-chairmen talks, accepts 
maintenance of the status quo for the time 
being ... the Soviet Union has shown no 
disposition to support the DRV's basic 
objective of securing control of all 
Vietnam at the risk of jeopardizing Soviet 
policy objectives in other areas or the Bloc's 
campaign of emphasizing "friendship" and 
reducing tensions.
C. Mikoyan's Visit (2-6 April 1956)
Mikoyan's visit to the DRVN in early April 1956 marked
the first visit by a senior Russian government official to
North Viet-Nam. Earlier (in December 1955) Khrushchev and
Bulganin, who had made an Asian tour through India, Burma
and Afghanistan, did not visit the DRVN - perhaps "notably".
Throughout 1954 and 1955 Soviet-Vietnamese state relations
106could best be described as "correct". It was not until
February 8, 1955, when Molotov delivered a foreign policy 
report to the Supreme Soviet that the Democratic Republic 
of Viet-Nam was listed as a member of the Socialist Camp.
10 4 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Probable Developments 
in North and South Vietnam Through Mid-1957 (July 17, 1956) 
NIE No.63-56, op.cit., p.1068.
Cameron, "The Soviet Union and Vietnam", op.cit., p.201
Ibid . , p. 200 .
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However slogans issued subsequently on the occasion of
May Day (1955) and the October anniversary of the Russian
Revolution did not list the DRVN among those countries
"building socialism". The Soviet position on Vietnamese
reunification, discussed previously, was made quite clear
in its slogans for May Day. Mention of the DRVN came after
Korea and before East Germany; whereas statements were made
on the struggle to reunify these two countries the slogan
10 7on Viet-Nam omitted any reference to this issue.
On March 23rd the DRVN announced that Mikoyan would 
soon visit Hanoi. The official VWP organ Nhan Dan 
promptly hailed this visit in an editorial "as an event 
of great significance". Both this editorial and the 
composition of the Russian delegation suggest that economic 
issues were possible items on the agenda. According to Nhan 
Dan, Mikoyan's visit came at a time when "the Vietnamese
Molotov's report may be located in TASS (Moscow) 
dictation in Russian to Provincial Press, 1705 GMT, 
February 8, 1955 in U.S. FBIS Daily Report (Feb.9, 1955) 
No.28, pp.CCl-CC36; slogans broadcast for May Day 1955 
were carried by TASS (Moscow) in Russian Hellschreiber to 
Europe, 1500 GMT, April 20, 1955 in U.S. FBIS Daily Report 
(April 21, 1955), No.78, pp.BBl-BB9; the 1954 slogans for 
the Russian Revolution were carried by TASS (Moscow) 
dictation in Russian to Provincial Press, 1700 GMT,
October 23, 1954 in U.S. FBIS Daily Report (October 25, 
1954), No.207, pp.CCl-CC8. The slogans for the 38th 
anniversary of the Russian Revolution did mention the 
issue of unification. Viet-Nam was listed eleventh 
(after Korea and before East Germany), the slogan read: 
"(f)raternal greetings to the heroic people of the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam, fighting for the recon­
struction of the national economy, for peace, for the 
national unification of Vietnam on a democratic basis". 
TASS (Moscow) dictation in Russian to Provincial Press, 1707 GMT, October 24, 1955 in U.S. FBIS Daily Report 
(October 25, 1955), No.208, pp.CCl-CC9.
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people are endeavoring to fulfil the 1956 State Plan, to
achieve agrarian reform and push forward their political
struggle for urging correct implementation of the Geneva
Agreements ..." The Soviet delegation included, besides
Mikoyan, S.R. Rashidov, vice-president of the presidium of
the Supreme Soviet; P.A. Maletin, deputy director of the
General Department of Economic Relations; Spandarian, a
representative of the Ministry of Foreign Trade assigned
to Viet-Nam and two embassy officials stationed in Hanoi,
109the Soviet Ambassador and Embassy counsellor.
As there was no joint communique issued at the end of 
Mikoyan's visit we are forced to speculate on possible 
areas of Soviet-Vietnamese disagreement as well as other 
items under discussion. The Nhan Dan editorial of March 
23rd with its reference to the Geneva Agreements, suggests 
that the Soviet Union's role as co-chairman was discussed.
In particular we might assume that the forthcoming Reading- 
Gromyko talks was an item of particular Vietnamese interest. 
It would seem likely, therefore, that if the VWP delegation 
to the 20th Congress of the CPSU was not fully briefed on 
the Soviet position,1 that Mikoyan took this opportunity
"Mot Su Kien Co Y Nghia Lon", [An Event of Great 
Significance] Nhan Dan (March 23, 1956), No.750, p.l.
"Ho Chu Tich Thet Tiec Dong Chi Mo-coi-ang va cac 
Dong Chi Trong Doan Dai Bieu Chinh Phu Lien-Xo", [Chairman 
Ho Welcomes Comrade Mikoyan and Other Comrades in the Group 
of Soviet Government Representatives] Nhan Dan (April 3, 
1956), No.761, p.l.
Cameron, "The Soviet Union and Vietnam", op.cit., 
p.201, states: "(n)or was the Vietnam problem accorded any 
attention at the Twentieth CPSU Congress in February 1956". 
This does not preclude private discussions however.
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explain his government's stand with respect to Vietnamese
reunification. Of all the possible issues that might have
come under discussion, only this one seems likely to have
caused sufficient disagreement between the two parties to
have prevented the issuance of the customary joint
communique. It seems doubtful that the initiative came
from Mikoyan's side as the Russians most certainly would
have agreed to some vague statement on the matter. We
might also speculate that the failure to sign some sort
111of economic-trade agreement, which was expected, arose
out of Vietnamese concern not to be seen as acquiescing to
the Russians in exchange for needed economic assistance.
One further item was almost certainly discussed: the
recently held CPSU's 20th Congress at which Khrushchev
112denounced Stalin and at which he also set forth his 
policy of peaceful coexistence. As we now know the 20th 
Congress marked the beginnings of the Sino-Soviet dispute; 
in fact the Chinese who had been silent on these issues, 
published their reaction on April 5 while Mikoyan was still
"DRV propaganda suggested some expectation that new 
aid or economic agreements might result". U.S. Central 
Intelligence Agency, Probable Developments in North and 
South Vietnam Through Mid-1957 (July 17, 1956) NIE No.63-56, 
op.cit., p.1071.
112 The text of Khrushchev's speech, as released by the 
U.S. Department of State on June 4, 1956, may be found in 
Talbot, Khrushchev Remembers, op.cit., pp.503-562. A 
Reuters dispatch from Hong Kong in The New York Times 
(May 26, 1957), p.36, stated: "(i)t was apparently the
visit of A.I. Mokoyan, a deputy premier, that encouraged 
North Vietnam to allow a greater freedom for its 
intellectuals. Mikoyan brought with him the new anti- 
Stalin policy set forth in February 1956 by N.S. Khrushchev".
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113in Hanoi. It is unlikely that these events were in any
way related; rather we need only observe that Hanoi was by
now increasingly confronted with the difficult task of
pursuing her own interests, as a junior member of the
socialist damp, in the face of ideological differences
between her two major allies. No doubt the previous stormy
pattern of Soviet-Yugoslav relations served as a warning
114should North Viet-Nam choose to "go it alone". This
option was most likely foreclosed from the beginning as 
both Soviet and Chinese aid and diplomatic assistance 
were sought, and as the DRVN attempted to rehabilitate her 
economy and to reunify the country by peaceful means.
Khrushchev's formulation of a policy on peaceful 
coexistence, however, had a more direct impact on the VWP.
In his speech to the 20th Party Congress Khrushchev argued 
peaceful coexistence was "a fundamental principle" of Soviet 
policy and that in the present era there were only t w o  
policies a nation could pursue "either peaceful co-existence
"On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of 
the Proletariat", People's Daily (April 5, 1956) reprinted 
in People's China (April 16, 1956), pp.4-12; see the 
discussion in Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 
1956-61 (New York: Atheneum, 1964), pp.42-46.
114 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Probable Developments 
in North and South Vietnam Through Mid-1957 (July 17, 1956), 
NIE No.63-56, op.cit., p.1074, states: "(t)he DRV on 
occasion acts in less conformity with the Bloc than the 
European Satellites". Reports that a possible "pro- 
Titoist" group existed in the DRVN leadership may be found 
in a suggestive article entitled, "Uncle Ho's Garden: NewSpring Perennials to be Set Out", The Times of Viet Nam 
(December 1, 1956), No.46, p.5; and Fifield, The Diplomacy 
of Southeast Asia, op.cit., p.338.
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or the most destructive war in history. There is no 
third way" . 115
Of particular interest to Vietnamese leaders was 
Khrushchev's exposition as to how revolutionaries might 
gain power. Implicit in his remarks was that a sharp 
parliamentary struggle offered the best path, although 
the potential for violence was ever present. Again, in 
Khrushchev's words:
Leninism teaches us that the ruling classes will 
not surrender their power voluntarily. And the 
greater or lesser degree of intensity which the 
struggle may assume, the use or the non-use of 
violence in the transition to socialism, depends 
on the resistance of the exploiters, or whether 
the exploiting class itself resorts to violence, 
rather than on the proletariat.
In this connection the question arises of whether 
it is possible to go over to socialism by using 
parliamentary means.
After arguing that the present situation differed from that 
when the Bolshevik's seized power, Khrushchev concluded that 
"in a number of capitalist countries" the working class could 
rally the peasantry, intelligentsia and other patriotic 
forces and "capture a stable majority in parliament, and 
transform the latter from an organ of bourgeois democracy 
into a genuine instrument of the people's will".
No doubt that VWP leaders, after hearing Mikoyan's 
report on the 20th Congress, wondered what implications all 
of this bore for Viet-Nam. In this regard it is instructive
"Khrushchev's Twentieth Congress Speech", in G.F. Hudson, 
Richard Lowenthal and Roderick MacFarquhar, The Sino-Soviet 
Dispute (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), p.43.
116 Ibid., p .45.
to compare the different emphasis given by Mikoyan and 
Ho Chi Minh in their speeches before a rally in Hanoi's 
Ba Dinh Square on April 3rd.
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Mikoyan stressed two points: (1) the DRVN should
heal the wounds of the war and develop the national
economy and (2) achieve the reunification of Vietnam by
117peaceful and democratic means. Ho Chi Minh also spoke
of consolidating the north and achieving the reunification
of the country "on the basis of independence and democracy
by peaceful means". Ho however linked these two
propositions: consolidation of the north meant laying a
118firm basis for the reunification struggle. Whereas
Mikoyan had been mute concerning how Vietnamese reunification 
would occur, Ho Chi Minh laid great stress on implementing 
the political provisions of the 1954 Geneva Agreements 
(regarding consultations and general elections) and on 
achieving unity in the struggle for reunification "on the 
basis of the political program of the Viet-Nam Fatherland 
Front".
VI. THE NINTH PLENUM (April 19-24, 1956)
As we have noted above, an interchange on policy matters 
occurred between the Nam Bo Regional Committee and VWP 
leaders in the North during March and early April - that is,
TASS (Moscow) in English Hellschreiber to Europe, 0910 
GMT, April 4, 1956; and Vietnam News Agency in English morse 
to Southeast Asia, 0500 GMT, April 4, 1956.
118 "Bai Noi cua Ho Chu Tich Trong Cuoc Mit Tinh cua Nhan Dan 
Hanoi Mung Doan Dai Bieu Chinh Phu Lien-Xo", [Text of Speech 
by Chairman Ho at a Meeting of the People of Hanoi to Greet 
a Delegation of Soviet Government Representatives] Nhan Dan 
(April 4, 1956), No.762, p.l.
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before the 9th Plenum. Since we know that the Political
Bureau met sometime during March to hear reports on the 20th
Congress of the CPSU, it seems likely that the instructions
sent to the South at that time reflected the new policy on
reunification which was being hammered out.
It is clear from remarks made by Truong Chinh that
there was opposition in some quarters to the present line
of peaceful struggle. Le Duan and others on the Nam Bo
Regional Committee were the most likely source of this.
According to Truong Chinh
Our policy is to reunify the country on the basis 
of independence and democracy and by peaceful 
means. The Viet Nam Workers' Party has, along 
with other political parties, mass organizations, 
and personalities in the Viet Nam Fatherland 
Front, adopted the Front's political program 
'to struggle to build up a peaceful, unified, 
independent, democratic, prosperous and strong 
Viet Nam'.
However, there are some people who do not yet 
believe in the correctness of this political 
program and in the~policy of peaceful reuniT- 
lcation of the country, holding that these are 
illusory and reformist. The view of the 20th 
Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union on the forms of transition to socialism 
in different countries, and on the possibility 
of preventing war in the present era, has 
provided us with new reasons to be confident 
in the correctness of the policy of the Viet 
Nam Worker's Party and Fatherland Front in the 
struggle for national reunification.1
In other words, at that time the VWP decided against using
their forces in the South to overthrow the Diem regime by
"Bao Cao cua Dong Chi Truong Chinh o Hoi Nghi Trung 
Uong Lan Thu 9 mo rong (19-24.4.1956)", [Report by Comrade 
Truong Chinh at the 9th Enlarged Session of the Central 
Committee (19-24 April 1956)] Nhan Dan (April 28, 1956), No.786, p.3. Emphasis added.
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military means. The party did not stop its fellow-
travelling with the Hoa Hao (Ba Cut) armed forces, however.
Presumably it made a distinction between directly involving
the Party in leading military action and supporting whatever
action the opposition sects chose to take. In fact, when
it was rumored that the VWP was supplying the Hoa Hao with
12 0military forces, DRVN spokesmen officially denied it.
No doubt excessive publicity on this matter would give the
Diem regime just the excuse it needed to continue its refusal
to enter into consultations with the North. Party officials
may have also feared that too great an involvement in
military activity would trigger off retaliation from either
or both the ARVN and the United States.
At the beginning of April the "Voice of Viet Nam" began
121broadcasting in Bahnar, Jarai and Rhade. These are
languages spoken by three of the largest montagnard group­
ings in South Viet-Nam's Central Highlands. No doubt they 
were begun to assist Party cadres in their task of 
implementing points 2 and 4 of Le Duan's draft 14-point 
action program. As we shall see, VWP policy had evolved 
to the point where direct military involvement was ruled 
out but organizational work to consolidate the Party's 
military position and "to prepare the proletarian class
See the statement by a spokesman of the People's Army 
High Command, Vietnam News Agency in English morse to 
Southeast Asia, 1042 GMT, December 3, 1955.
121 Voice of Vietnam in Bahnar to South Vietnam, 0845 GMT, 
April 1, 1956; in Rhade to the South Vietnam Highlands, 
0845 GMT, April 1, 1956; and in Jarai to the South Vietnam 
Highlands, 0845 GMT, April 8, 1956.
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for armed struggle" was not. Thus the option of using 
armed force was retained at the same time that the Party 
was emphasizing that reunification would come about by 
peaceful means by relying on the 1954 Geneva Agreements 
and the program of the Fatherland Front.
The VWP's 9th Plenum was in fact an enlarged meeting
of the Central Committee to which the secretaries of Hai
Phong, Hanoi, and various interzonal, regional and village
committees as well as "a certain number of responsible
12 2cadres" had been invited. The main item for discussion
was a report delivered by Truong Chinh on the CPSU's 20th 
Congress. No doubt Mikoyan's visit was also discussed 
although no mention of it was made in any of the published 
materials on the 9th Plenum. Truong Chinh had the 
unenviable task of relating these developments to the 
concrete situation in Viet-Nam as well as of explaining the
Politburo's views on the matter.
12 3Truong Chinh's report touched on three parameters 
which, as has already been indicated, affected the options open 
to Party decision makers: external economic aid, domestic
economic (especially agricultural) problems and national 
defence. Truong Chinh noted that the DRVN enjoyed
"Hoi Nghi Ban Chap Hanh Trung Uong Dang Lao Dong Viet- 
Nam Lan Thu 9 (mo rong) Da Thanh Cong Va Be Mac", [The 9th 
(enlarged) Session of the Central Executive Committee of 
the Viet-Nam Workers' Party Has Achieved Success and 
Adjourned] Nhan Dan (April 27, 1956), No.785, p.l.
123 "Bao Cao cua Dong Chi Truong Chinh o Hoi Nghi Trung 
Uong Lan Thu 9 mo rong", op.cit.; unattributed quotations 
in the text are taken from this source.
224
assistance in economic rehabilitation and cultural 
development "aimed at healing the wounds of war and 
raising the people's living standards" from Russia, China 
and other members of the socialist camp. In fact, "the 
economy of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam is part 
of the economic system of the Socialist camp".
The Secretary-General's remarks on domestic economic 
conditions pointed out that the economy of the DRVN "is 
still at a low level" and the "living standard of our 
people is still very low". He concluded that "we must 
therefore endeavor now to restore and develop agriculture, 
handicrafts and small industry and to fulfill the target 
set by the 1956 State Plan". Later in his remarks Truong 
Chinh hinted at possible disagreement within the Party 
over the approach he had just outlined by those who would 
emphasize the development of heavy industry. According to 
Truong Chinh, "We oppose the idea of underestimating 
agriculture, depreciating the restoration and development 
of light industry, and hurrying up the building of heavy 
industry, thereby failing to improve the well-being of the 
people and to create a firm basis for the development of 
the national economy".
Truong Chinh's remarks on national defence revealed a
serious concern with both internal security and the
possibility of attack from the South. On the matter of
internal security the Secretary-General stated,
In North Viet Nam we have the conditions to 
advance toward socialism by peaceful means.But this does not mean that we will not use 
force to deal with any enemies who wreck 
public order and security or who carry out 
military interference in North Viet Nam.
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These remarks must be seen in light of the following
evidence. In September 1955 it was reported that armed
resistance to the DRVN's authority had broken out in
Hai Phono, Nong Cong and Hoi Xua and that bombs had been
12 4set off in Hanoi. It might be possible to dismiss
this particular report as being part of a psychological
warfare campaign mounted by the anti-Communist Revolutionary
Committee in Saigon. Yet reports of armed opposition to
the DRVN by tribal groups in the north and northwest were
125confirmed by American intelligence sources at that time.
We do know that American officials were involved in
organizing sabotage activities in the North in the post- 
12 6Geneva period. Truong Chinh's remarks indicate quite
clearly that these activities were taken seriously.
Concerning the possibility of attack on the DRVN
Truong Chinh had this to say:
our policy is to achieve national reunification 
through free nation-wide general elections.
Nevertheless we cannot belittle the question of 
consolidating national defense. We do not neglect 
the fact that South Viet Nam is being taken over 
by the American imperialists. They are helping 
Ngo Dinh Diem to increase his military forces and 
are preparing to include South Viet Nam in the 
aggressive SEATO bloc.
12 4 People's Radio, Revolutionarv Committee (Saigon) in 
Vietnamese to Vietnam, 1330 GMT, September 27, 1955.
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Probable Developments 
in North and South Vietnam Through Mid-1957 (July 17, 1956), 
NIE No.63-56, op.cit., p.1069.
12 6 Cf. "Landsdale Team's Report on Covert Saigon Mission 
'54 and '55", op.cit.; the U.S. aim appears to have been to 
create difficulty for the DRVN administration prior to the 
1956 electoral deadline.
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The Ngo Dinh Diem administration is bent on 
repudiating the Geneva Agreements, and what 
is more, has increasingly called for a 'March 
to the North'. That is why we must endeavor 
to consolidate our national defense and be ready 
to deal with all eventualities.
The Secretary-General's views represented a long
standing fear on the part of the VWP leadership, extending
back to the Resistance War, that America would either attack
North Viet-Nam or support an ARVN attempt to do so. These
perceptions were reinforced bv South Viet-Nam's inclusion
under the SEATO protective umbrella, as well as by a U.S.
training program which upgraded ARVN units to divisional
size. During 1955 DRVN officials observed a parade of
high-ranking American officials pass through Saigon (see
Table 4.1) as well as a series of SEATO meetings which
12 7discussed Viet-Nam's security.
In the latter half of 1955 DRVN propaganda began to
attack what it alleged was a campaign "to march to the north"
and "to fill in the Ben Hai river" (separating the two
zones). ARVN Chief of Staff Gen. Le Van Ty was alleged
to have made these remarks after an inspection tour of
the demilitarized zone (DMZ) in December 1955, although
the campaign was linked to Gen. O'Daniel's visit to Saigon 
12 8in August. Also, according to DRVN allegations,
Held in Maila (September 1955), Pearl Harbor (1-15 
November 1955), Bangkok (November 25, 1955) and Karachi 
(March 6, 1956).
12 8 Burchett, North of the 17th Parallel, op.cit., p.248; 
for an account of General Le Van Ty*s trip see: Vietnam
News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 1100 GMT, 
August 7, 1958.
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Table 4.1
Visits to South Viet-Nam by Senior American Officials 
August 1955 - March 1956
Date of Arrival Name Position
*August 1955 Maj. Gen. O'Daniel ex-commander TRIM
14 September 1955 Gen. Mark W. Clark Commanding General 
Armed Forces Pacific
12 November 1955 Admiral F.B. Stump Commander--in-Chief,
U.S. Navy 
Pacific
in the
17 December 1955 Wilber M. Brucker Secretary of the Army
28 December 1955 Admiral Radford Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff
12 January 1956 Donald Quarles Secretary
Force
of the Air
14 March 1956 J.F. Dulles Secretary of State
29 March 1956 Admiral Arleigh Chief of Naval
A. Burke Operations
*Training Relations
Instruction Mission
violations along the DMZ, including armed intrusions,
129increased rapidly at this time.
The policy on reunification which emerged at the 9th 
Plenum represented a careful weighing of these three 
factors: (1) the DRVN as a member of the socialist camp,
tied as it was by certain links of economic dependency on
Various complaints were lodged by the PAVN High Command 
to the Central Joint Armistice Commission; see: Vietnam
News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 1100 GMT, 
September 14, 1955 for example. Vietnam News Agency in 
English morse to Southeast Asia, 0545 GMT, December 5,
1955 carries a PAVN protest to the International Commission.
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Russia (for Burmese rice for example), had an obligation
to respect Khrushchev's new line on peaceful coexistence,
(2) faced with serious domestic economic and security
problems the VWP had to first consolidate its own control
over the territory of the DRVN as a matter of priority
and (3) faced with certain external threats to its
security the DRVN chose to consolidate its own capacity
for self-defence and to rely on Soviet and Chinese
initiatives to reduce tension in the world in general and
in Indochina in particular. According to the resolution
adopted by the 9th P l e n u m , t h e  VWP recognized the
"possibility" of preventing war and the "possiblity" that
Viet-Nam might be reunified by peaceful means but chose to
underscore its own peculiar dilemma in this way:
In light of the 20th Congress of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union, our Party will take 
into account the new possibilities of the 
present revolutionary struggle. While recogniz­
ing the possibilities of preventing war, we do 
not forget that as long as imperialism exists 
the economic basis of war continues to exist. 
Therefore the peoples of the world must 
constantly reinforce their struggle for peace 
and remain vigilant to the plots of the warmongers.
While recognizing that a number of countries have 
the potential to advance towards socialism by 
peaceful means, we must bear in mind that where 
the bourgeoisie still controls a powerful army 
and police machinery and is determined to use 
violence to repress the revolutionary movement, 
an armed struggle for power is inevitable.
Therefore the proletariat must be well prepared in advance.
"Nghi Quyet cua Hoi Nghi Ban Chap Hanh Trung Uong Dang 
Lao Dong Viet-Nam Lan Thu 9 (mo rong) [19-24.4.1956]", 
[Resolution of the 9th Enlarged Session of the Central 
Executive Committee of the Viet-Nam Workers' Party 
(19-24 April 1956)] Nhan Dan, (April 27, 1956), No.785,p. 1.
229
In light of the 20th Congress of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union, our Party reaffirms 
its confidence in the policy of consolidating 
the North, and the struggle for the reunification 
of the country on the basis of independence and 
democracy by peaceful means as completely 
correct. However there exists in the other half 
of our country reactionary forces who are plotting 
war. Therefore we must enhance our vigilance, 
consolidate national defense and prepare for all 
eventualities.131
While it might be argued that this passage merely
reflected the VWP's giving lip-service to Khrushchev's
ideological formulation, Ho Chi Minh, in his closing address
to the 9th Plenum, linked it directly to the situation in
Viet-Nam. According to Ho:
While recognizing that in certain countries the 
road to socialism may be a peaceful one, we should 
be aware of this fact: in countries where the
machinery of state, the armed forces, and the 
police of the bourgeois class are still strong, 
the proletarian class still has to prepare for 
armed struggle.
While recognizing the possibility of reunifying 
Viet Nam by peaceful means, we should always 
remember that our people's principal enemies are 
the American imperialists and their agents who 
still occupy half our country and are preparing 
for war; therefore, we should firmly hold aloft 
the banner of peace and enhance our vigilance 
(we should be in a position to change the form 
of the struggle ).132
131 . ,Ibid.
132 According to American intelligence the underlined portion 
of the speech was written into the text on publication in 
1961/62. What Ho Chi Minh said at that time (in 1956) is 
indicated by the words in parentheses; see: U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Weekly Review 
(May 10, 1956) in United States - Vietnam Relations, 
op.cit., Book 2, IV.A.5 Tab 3, p.47. For a copy of the 
speech as it was published in 1962 consult: Ho Chi Minh,
Selected Works (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing
House, 1962), Vol.IV, pp.153-156. The phrase in question 
reads, "we should firmly hold aloft the banner of peace, 
and enhance our vigilance". The first uaragraph is a 
paraphrase of Khrushchev's formulation which, I believe,
Ho signalled out for attention.
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The 9th Plenum also discussed the very important issues
arising out of Khrushchev's secret speech denouncing Stalin
(the cult of the individual, democracy in the Party and
criticism/self criticism). Of particular interest, in
light of later developments in Sino-Soviet relations, was
the VWP's characterization of Stalin. The resolution of
9th Plenum adopted what has subsequently been labelled the
13 3Chinese or "balanced view" of Stalin:
Stalin was one of the most outstanding Marxists.
He scored great achievements for the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet people, 
the Socialist movement, and the national 
liberation movement of all countries in the 
world. But in the latter part of his life 
Stalin committed a number of serious mistakes 
which he failed to recognize. Therefore, while 
confirming the role and great achievements of 
Stalin, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
has also pointed out his mistakes so as to 
resolutely correct their consequences....
VII. CONCLUSION
The VWP's 9th Plenum recognized that the reunification 
of Viet-Nam would have to take place within a different 
time-frame from that envisaged in July 1954 at the Geneva 
Conference. For the moment, any policy changes on this 
matter would have to wait for improvement in the economic 
and internal security of the North as well as changes in the 
international environment more conducive to a relaxation of 
tensions and peaceful settlement of outstanding issues.
The VWP did not initiate a full-scale review of reunification
13 3 'Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, op.cit., pp.43-49; 
and David Floyd, Mao Against Khrushchev (New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, 1964)~ P P •17-31 and 231-235.
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strategy at the Plenum as other issues, such as those 
arising from the CPSU's 20th Congress, commanded attention. 
Primary emphasis continued to be placed on socialist 
construction in the North; "paying attention to the South" 
meant taking into consideration changes in the balance of 
forces there. Although the first voices of disenchantment 
with this emphasis were heard, the VWP resolved to continue 
its campaign for the reunification of the country "by 
peaceful means". Approval was also given to certain steps 
(advocated by Le Duan) that would allow a consolidation of 
the Party's forces and which would provide a basis for 
"political violence" should that ever become necessary. 
These steps were to be undertaken by cadres in the South 
using their own resources; the return of regrouped cadres 
was slight indeed and their main task seems to have been 
to apply the program of the Fatherland Front to the 
situation in the South. Efforts over the next three months 
were directed at carrying out these policies in time for 
maximum impact in July 1956, the deadline set for nation­
wide general elections.
CHAPTER 5
POLITICAL STRUGGLE REAFFIRMED (May - September 1956)
I. THE AFTERMATH OF THE 9TH PLENUM: POLITICAL STRUGGLE
(May - June 1956)
During the course of 1956 senior Party cadres in the
south drafted a major document entitled, "On the Revolution in
South Viet-Nam".1 Its authorship has been ascribed to
2Le Duan and Pham Hung". Since internal evidence in the 
documents suggests it was drafted no earlier than November 
1956 it seems reasonable to assume that it had been in 
preparation some time before then. The 10th Plenum, held 
in September 1956, was preoccupied with problems arising 
from the land reform campaign. As the VWP Politburo had 
the authority to commission such a study at any time it is 
unnecessary to link the decision to call for a review of 
southern policy to any particular meeting of the Central 
Committee. Nevertheless one can speculate that cadres 
in Nam Bo were called upon to prepare a major policy review 
sometime after the 9th Plenum. Because of the crisis 
atmosphere prevailing in September it seems reasonable to
 ^Linh, "How Armed Struggle Began in South Viet Nam, op.cit.,
p . 22 .
2 Experiences of the South Vietnam Revolutionary Movement 
During the Past Several Years (circa 1963). Working Paper 
Item 301, p.3, states "At the end of 1956 the popularization 
of the volume by Comrade [Le] Duan entitled 'The South 
Vietnam Revolutionary Path"...; Nhu Phong, "List of Public 
Figures Presently Making Up the Top Leadership in North Vietnam" (Saigon: mimeographed, 1972), p.13, states in
Pham Hung's biographical section, without citation,
"Co-author with Le Duan of 'The Revolutionary Lines for 
South Vietnam'".
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suggest that while a draft of the document may have been 
submitted at the 10th Plenum, it was more likely to have 
been discussed at the 11th Plenum in December. In either 
case what is important was that VWP leaders were already 
casting about for policy options after their hope for 
mid-year elections had been dashed.
As we have noted in the previous chapter, in early 
April the VWP had rejected suggestions for a step up in 
violence in Nam Bo. At the same time it was certainly 
clear to them that there was little hope for securing the 
Republic of Viet-Nam's compliance of the election 
modalities. The 9th Plenum had marked a crucial moment of 
truth: the Party's line on reunification, set in September
1954, had been a failure. From what followed it seems 
likely that the Party's organization in the south was 
ordered to conduct a holding operation until new plans 
could be formulated. Meanwhile attempts were made to shift 
the focus of Party activities from a preoccupation with the 
terms of the Geneva Agreements to other matters involving 
much broader issues as working conditions and social 
welfare.
Following the 9th Plenum the Party orchestrated two 
quite separate political struggle movements. The first 
movement was focused on the July electoral deadline. Even 
though senior Party officials now assumed that elections 
would not be held as scheduled they still maintained that 
the Agreements formed the basis for legal political 
activities. In addition, echoes of popular discontent 
could be expected to be heard, albeit faintly, on the 
international scene thus reinforcing DRVN diplomatic moves.
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The issue was raised in May when banners bearing
slogans calling for "consultations" and "unification"
3were reported at a mammoth May Day parade in Saigon.
According to a la ter account:
A movement for North-South consultations with 
a view to general elections and the restoration 
of normal relations between the two zones was 
founded in Saigon in June 1956. It reached its 
climax in [sic] July 10, 1956, ten days before 
the date for general elections provided for in 
the Geneva Agreements. Strikes in factories 
and markets were held in support of this 
movement with the participation of the great 
majority [sic] of the Saigon population. The 
struggle continued until August in an atmosphere 
of white terror practised by the Diem regime.4
In July a massive effort was launched in the rural
areas where meetings, parades and demonstrations were held.
Leaflets, banners, and slogans painted on walls and houses
demanding "consultations", "unification" and an "end to
terrorism" made their appearance.
Various village councils passed resolutions and
circulated petitions, many of which were presented to the
International Commission for Supervision and Control.
However when all these activities are compared to the
Party-initiated "movement for better living conditions"
Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 
1100 GMT, (April 30, 1957); Tinh Hinh Phong Trap, p.3; 
for additional accounts of the political struggle movement 
at this time consult: Nguyen Khac Vien, "The Peasants'
Struggle (1954-1960)", Vietnamese Studies No.8 (1966), 
pp.50-77; and Vu Can, "The People's Struggle Against the 
US-Diem Regime", op.cit.
4 "Saigon, Bastion of the Anti-US Struggle", Vietnam 
Courier (June 1975), New Series, No.37, p.25; Voice of Vietnam in Vietnamese to South Vietnam, 0500 GMT,
August 17, 1956.
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it seems evident that the former were mechanical protests
designed to garner the maximum propaganda affect. Whatever
revolutionary fervour was built up during this short period
was certinaly dashed when the failure of the campaign
became obvious. The July 20th deadline came and went
leaving in its wake a disillusioned rank-and-file. The
Party was trapped between its commitment to the Geneva
Agreements and the knowledge that the Agreements most
crucial political provisions would not be implemented.
One American government study, based on interviews with
Party members, concluded that the failure to hold elections
in 1956 "came as a sharp disappointment to Hanoi whose
political program for two years had been aimed at precisely
5the goal of winning them..." It was only natural that the 
Party would turn to other issues to retain its mass support.
In the previous chapter it was mentioned that in 
early April, anticipating the events just described, the 
Party took steps to put its urban organization into 
operation. This clandestine network had been built up 
since the period of regroupment (1954-55) when the Party 
prudently assigned cadres to the cities. An official history 
of this period states
In the province capitals, district seats, Saigon 
and some other areas, we succeeded in exploiting 
the enemy's legal organizations, such as worker 
and schoolboy unions, women's associations, etc. 
...Through these organizations we successfully 
guided the people to struggle, thereby gaining 
a number of necessary benefits for them and, at 
the same time, recruited many key personnel forthe Revolution.^
United States Department of State, A Threat to Peace, 
op.cit., pp.3-4.
r Tinh Hinh Phong Trap, p.15.
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In June 1956, that is after the deliberations of the 9th 
Plenum were known, the Nam Bo Regional Committee held 
its first congress at which it reviewed the results of
7the political struggle movement. The conclusions reached 
at this gathering were not unexpectedly brought into 
accord with higher policies. In fact the difficulties 
experienced in the conduct of political struggle were now 
ascribed not to the failure to employ revolutionary violence, 
but to the underestimation of the worth of the so-called
"social welfare slogans [ready issues]". A Party review 
of the post-Geneva political struggle movement commented on 
these events in this way:
From the restoration of peace to the middle of 1956, 
the struggle movement stressed general elections 
more than social welfare. However, after corrective 
action the slogans [emphasizing] social welfare and 
democracy were given more prominence, but this was 
still not enough. Meanwhile conditions were 
favorable for the motivation of the struggle for 
the normalization of North-South relations, peace 
and national reuni fication.... At the start of this 
period the struggle movement stressed slogans 
demanding general elections; but when there was 
no hope for these elections, the struggle movement 
stressed social welfare slogans, the slogans of
democracy were still neglected §
The first congress also reviewed the results of Party
action on social welfare issues particularly in the urban 
areas. During the six-week period between May and mid-June 
major strikes involving perhaps as many as 27,000 workers 
broke out in various industries: the metal trades, water
power, shoe trade, waterside workers and on rubber
Ibid., pp.4 and 6. 
Ibid., p .4.
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plantations (in Thu Dau Mot, Dau Tieng and Ba Ria). The 
major issues in all cases (besides echoing support for 
consultations) revolved around specific grievances related 
to working conditions (see Table 5-1). For example, employees 
of Charner and Eiffell (metal companies) went out on strike 
demanding higher wages, family allowances, sick care and 
other benefits as well as the abolishment of the foreman 
system. This urban offensive continued well into August. 
However, in the face of police reaction and other forms 
of repression the movement could not sustain itself. The 
political struggle movement related to the Geneva Agreements 
was similarly affected. This meant that a crucial turning 
point had been reached as the RVN brought increased forces 
over to the offensive.
II. THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS: CONSULTATIONS AND ELECTIONS
As we have noted in chapter four, DRVN attempts in 
1955 to begin electoral consultations with the "competent 
authorities" in the South were unsuccessful. On the one 
hand the Diem government gave lip-service to the 
principle of elections while at the same time refusing to 
enter into consultations with the North. The SVN's 
position was maintained in the face of Western pressure 
to enter into negotiations with the DRVN in the expectation 
that demands for secret balloting, international supervision,
9 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia,
0532 GMT, June 12, 1956; and Voice of Vietnam dictation 
in Vietnamese to Southeast Asia, August 2, 1956 in U.S.
FBIS, Daily Report, (August 8, 1956), No.154, p.CCC4.
9
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TABLE 5-1
LABOUR UNREST IN SOUTH VIETNAM, MAY - SEPTEMBER 1956
Month: Location: Description:
1 May Saigon May Day demonstration; banners 
and slogans appear demanding 
elections and reunification
8 May Bien Hoa Communist labor organizers 
arrested in the Binh Son 
plantation (Long Thanh 
district)
May Saigon metal workers go on strike; 
they demand: abolishment of
foreman system, higher wages, 
family allowances, sick leave, 
and the application of 
provisions of the social 
welfare laws
May Cholon Sympathy strike by water 
power workers
May Saigon Shoe trade workers strike; 
demand the halt of the 
importing of foreignKmanufact- 
ured shoes and sandals and an 
end to unemployment.
13-15 May Saigon waterside workers strike; they 
demand the end to the foreman 
system and an improvement in 
their living conditions
15 May Thu Dau Mot rubber plantation workers 
strike; demand unconditional 
reinstatement of dismissed 
workers
16 May Thu Dau Mot sympathy strike by workers at
nearby plantation
Ba Ria strike by rubber workers for
better working conditions
rubber workers strike, they 
demand the restoration and 
care of the graves of 
deceased plantation workers
Dau Tieng
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TABLE 5-1 continued
Month: Location: Description:
Saigon disruption in various industries,- 
demands for an 8-hour day, better 
conditions, and higher wages
8 June Loc Ninh workers arrested by Army units
9 June Binh Duong, 
Phuoc Hoa
leaders of the rubber workers' 
union arrested; 137 workers 
dismissed
13 June Dau Tieng rubber workers' executive 
committee reported missing
25 June Saigon Vietnamese Confederation of 
Christian Trade Unions issues 
strike threat over arrests of 
unionists
19 July Saigon workers at Standard Vacuum 
Oil Co. strike, demand salary 
increase, overtime pay rise, 
sickness compensation
22 July Saigon workers' delegation holds 
meeting in Khanh Hoi; 
resolution calls for an end 
to unemployment, reduction of 
fines, improvement in workers' 
living conditions (water and 
electricity to be provided), 
improvement in sanitation 
facilities, freedom of assoc­
iation, public meeting and the 
right to organize unions, an 
end to arrests
2 August Thu Dau Mot, 
Gia Dinh
strike by sugar cane factory 
workers, they demand a wage 
rise
2 August Saigon Messageries Maritimes employees 
strike, demand reinstatement 
of dismissed workers
2 August Bu Dop strike on rubber plantation; 
demand that a hospital be 
built, and that workers' 
quarters be supplied with 
electricitv
TABLE 5-1 continued
Month: Location: Description:
4-10 August Saigon tally clerks at Saigon port 
go on strike; demand higher 
wages, labour insurance and 
overtime rates
August - 
September
Cholon workers at 38 rice husking 
factories and rice stores 
strike; demand higher wages, 
abolishment of arbitrary 
sackings and an improvement 
in sanitary conditions
Saigon East Asian Saw Mill employees 
strike, demand wage increase
>
Overseas Air France workers 
strike, demand wage increase 
and reinstatement of dismissed 
workers
SOURCES: Journal d ' Extreme-Orient (May-September 1956); 
Vietnam News Agency broadcasts (May-September 1956) ; The 
Times [London] (June 25, 1956), p.6; and Tinh Hinh Phong 
Trao Dau Tranh Chinh Tri o Nam Bo.
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and democratic freedoms would be rejected. This strategy 
was outlined by John Foster Dulles, U.S. Secretary of State, 
in a telegram sent to American embassies in Paris and 
Saigon in April 1955:
Our proposal is based on Eden's plan put forward 
at [the] Berlin Conference for All German elections 
and has already been approved by France for us 
[in] Germany and rejected by the Communists. The 
basic principle is that Free Viet Nam will insist 
to the Viet Minh [DRVN] that unless agreement is 
first reached by the latter's acceptance of the 
safeguards spelled out, that no repeat no further 
discussions are possible regarding the type of 
elections, the issues to be voted on or any other 
factors. After we have Diem's general acceptance 
we can proceed [to] inform UK and France of this 
plan which we think [is the] only formula which 
ensures [a] satisfactory response to [the] Geneva 
Agreement and at [the] same time [is a] plan which 
is unassailable in intent but probably unacceptable 
to [the] Communists because of provisions for 
strict compliance to ensure genuinely free 
elections.
United States Department of State telegram (April 6, 1955), 
Dulles 4361, to the American Embassy in Saigon and repeated 
for the information of the American Embassy in Paris in 
United States - Vietnam Relations, op.cit., Book 10, p.892. 
Interestingly the views of the Secretary of State were not 
shared by officials in the International Security Affairs 
section of the Department of Defense; in a draft paper out­
lining recommendations to the State Department they wrote: 
"(i)n considering the questions of elections, the assumption 
that the Viet Minh would not agree to free elections could 
well be erroneous despite the consistent Communist rejection 
of election proposals for the unification of Germany, Austria 
and Korea. In other countries, the Communist[s] control only 
a minority of the population, whereas in Viet-Nam they 
control the majoritv. In addition, they have residual 
popular support in areas outside their control and they may 
feel that their agreement to elections held under conditions 
which might be termed 'free' would inevitably rebound to 
their advantage.... Thus, the Communists might be so 
confident of success that they would be willing to permit 
'free' elections under international supervision albeit 
continuing to utilize all the standard communist processes 
and tactics in an attempt to assure the outcome they would 
desire. Should they do so, there is no reason to doubt at 
this time that they would win easily in the 1956 elections". 
See: letter from the U.S. Department of Defense,
International Security Affairs (April 22, 1955) to the 
U.S. Department of State in ibid., p.936.
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The Diem government, however, was extremely fearful 
of adopting this tactic lest it come under pressure to 
implement other provisions of the Geneva Agreement a 
document which, the SVN repeatedly stressed, it did 
not sign or agree to. There are other considerations 
which may have influenced Diem's stance. Not only was his 
government in a weak position; but consultations with the 
Communists would undoubtedly have sparked panic among the 
predominately Catholic anti-Communist refugees, eroding 
the government's base of support. Simultaneously, the 
Party underground could be expected to exercise its 
influence on the domestic scene should talks start.
Faced with these pressures, as well as bias - in the SVN's 
view - in the operation of the ICC, it is easy to explain 
why the Diem government remained adament in refusing 
consultations.^
On the other hand, France v/as rapidly divesting
herself of all responsibilities under the 1954 Agreements.
Initially France was expected to retain her Expeditionary
Corps in South Viet-Nam to oversee the implementation of
the Geneva Agreements and to serve as a deterrent to an
invasion from the north. However during 1955, the demands
of the war in Algeria caused a rapid withdrawal of French
troops (and American-supplied military equipment) from
Viet-Nam. This process meant that the security of the
12Diem government was in jeopardy. Therefore the SVN
Nutt, Troika on Trial, op.cit., Vol.I, pp.350-352.
12 Ibid., pp.219-220.
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attempted to secure a statement from France pledging
support in case of attack. When this was not forthcoming
the SVN exerted even stronger pressures on the French to
relinquish control over Vietnamese units still technically
13a part of the French Union Forces. The SVN also sought
membership in SEATO but this was quickly dropped after
Dulles visited Saigon in March 1956 and assured Diem of
American support in case of invasion.^
Eventually the SVN invoked France's declaration,
made at the conclusion of the Geneva Conference, to respect
the sovereignty of the SVN and to withdraw its military
forces if so requested. The news that France intended to
dissolve her High Command by April 15th provoked an
immediate reaction from India, chairman of the ICC. In a
note dated March 23rd she informed the co-chairmen:
It will be recalled that a representative of the 
Commander-in-Chief of the French Union Forces 
signed the agreement pertaining to Viet-Nam and 
Laos, assumed responsibility for the execution 
of the agreement and pledged the co-operation 
of the Franco-Viet-Namese Command with the 
International Supervisory Commission to help 
administer it. Neither the French authorities 
nor the Viet-Nam authorities have made any 
proposals as to the manner in which the 
Commission could continue to supervise the 
Cease-fire Agreement after the withdrawal of
Dispatch by Harold Callender from Paris in The New York 
Times (June 13, 1955), p.4; dispatch by Harold Callender 
from Paris in ibid. (June 14, 1955), p.5; Paris dispatch in 
ibid. (June 26, 1955), p.6; dispatch from Paris by Thomas 
F. Brady in ibid. (July 3, 1955), p.2; and Saigon dispatch 
in ibid. (July 3, 1955), p.2.
14 Associated Press dispatch from Saigon in ibid. (March 15, 
1956), p.12; for SVN approaches towards SEATO, see: Robert
Alden dispatch from Saigon in ibid. (March 9, 1956), p.5.
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the French High Command. Although the South 
Viet-Namese authorities have promised to give 
practical co-operation and to take over the 
responsibility for the security of the 
Commission from the 1st April onwards, they 
are not prepared to assume the legal oblig­
ations of the French High Command as successors 
of the French Power in South Viet-Nam.
In the circumstances, the Commission views 
with serious concern the prospect to supervise 
an agreement which will cease to have any 
legal basis since one party to the agreement 
- the French High Command - will have 
disappeared. It is clear that the Commission 
will be unable to hold the South Viet-Nam 
accountable, unless it accepts the full 
residuary obligations undertaken by the French 
High Command.
The Commission, therefore, desires that the 
two Co-Chairmen should consider the situation 
as early as possible and, in any case, before 
the 15th of April, 1956 , with a viev; to 
resolve the legal lacuna and to enable the 
Commission to discharge the functions entrusted 
to it by the Geneva Conference on Indo-China. -*-5
Earlier, in the wake of Diem's rejection of consultation
and the anti-ICC riots in Saigon (July 1955), Poland and
India, in the fourth interim report of the ICC had rejected
Saigon's offer of "practical cooperation" with the
Commission. In the words of the report:
We would like to add in this connection that 
during our discussions with the Government of 
the State of Viet-Nam, we have been told that 
it will give full protection and practical 
co-operation to the Commission as an 
International Peace Commission but will not 
make a formal or public declaration to that 
effect in view of the position taken up by 
it with reference to the Geneva Agreement and 
the Final Declaration. It is obvious that the 
International Commission which has, in the 
discharge of its responsibilities under the 
Agreement, to undertake various tasks which,
Great Britain, Documents Relating to British Involvement 
in the Indo-China Conflict 1945-1965, Cmnd. 2834, op.cit., 
pp.9 3-9 4.
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in effect, result in the curtailment of the 
sovereignty of both administrations in the 
North and in the South, cannot carry on its 
activities in the face of the declared 
opposition of the Government of the State 
of Viet-Nam to the Geneva Agreement merely 
on the basis of a personal or practical 
understanding which can be revoked at any 
time. In any case, any ad hoc arrangement 
outside the Agreement, however effective, 
naturally amounts to revocation of the 
Agreement and the Commission cannot be aparty to any such arrangement.
Prime Minister Nehru also expressed his country's views
to the Geneva Conference co-chairmen, warning them that
India would not participate as chairman of the ICC unless
all the Geneva Conference participants accepted the 1954 
17Agreements. He also advanced the argument that the 
State of Viet-Nam, in India's view, was the successor to 
France and therefore bound to undertake all the political.
18and military responsibilities heretofore assumed by France.
As a result of these developments the co-chairmen
(Britain and the USSR) on December 21, 1955, addressed
letters to all the conference participants and members of
the ICC, requesting their views as to how the implementation
19of the 1954 Agreements might be improved. France replied 
that although it had residual responsibilites (control of
Fourth Interim Report of the International Commission for 
Supervision and Control m  Vietnam, Vietnam No.3 (1955), 
Command Paper Cmd. 9654 (London: H.M.S.O., December 1955).
17 Nutt, Troika on Trial, op.cit., Vol.I, p.356; and 
SarDesai, Indian Foreign Policy, op.cit., p.98.
1 p Nutt, Troika on Trial, op.cit., Vol.I, p.357.
19 Ibid., p.359; and SarDesai, Indian Foreign Policy, 
op.cit., p.98.
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the DMZ, security for the ICC) under the provisions of the
Agreements, these would end if the structure of the French
High Command was altered (which is precisely what Diem
had in mind to accomplish prior to July 1956). Secondly,
France stated that it regarded its obligations as in no way
exceeding those of the other conference participants who
2 0had agreed to the Final Declaration.
The Communist countries, Poland, China and the USSR, 
all supported in varying degrees the DRVN's call for 
convening of a new Geneva Conference to include the
21original nine participants plus the three ICC members.
As we have noted in the previous chapter, this approach 
was effectively scuttled when Britain proposed, and the 
Soviet Union accepted, that the co-chairmen meet and discuss 
the problems of Indo-China. After receipt of the Indian 
note of March 23rd, mentioned above, Lord Reading and 
Andrei Gromyko agreed to meet in London during April and May 
(1956). On the eve of these talks France announced that it 
would dissolve its High Command in Viet-Nam.
In summary, the combination of France's withdrawal, 
Indian warnings, and SVN obstinancy all threatened to 
upset the framework of the 1954 Geneva Agreements. In
Nutt, Troika on Trial,op.cit., p.359.
21 Great Britain, Vietnam and the Geneva Agreements: 
Documents Concerning The Discussion Between the Representat­
ives of Her Majesty's Government and the Government of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Held in London in 
April and May 1956, Vietnam No.2, (1956) Command Paper,
Cmd. 9763 (London: H.M.S.O., May 1956), p.4; dispatch from
Singapore in The New York Times (July 21, 1955), p.6; 
dispatch from Hong Kong in ibid. (January 31, 1956), 
pp.l and 2; and dispatch by Welles Hangen from Moscow in 
ibid. (March 4, 1956), p.21.
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these circumstances the co-chairmen, in an attempt to
prevent the resumption of armed conflict, stated that the
preservation of peace in Indochina was more important than
carrying out on schedule the political provisions of the 
2 21954 accords. In addition to the letters addressed to
the governments of the DRVN and SVN (discussed in chapter
four), the co-chairmen also wrote to France and the
International Commission. France replied that she was
willing to lend her good offices to the continued support
of the ICC and the Joint Commission (part of the Geneva
machinery) but that she would assume no further responsibil- 
2 3ities. India, in a reversal of its 1955 position, agreed
to continue as ICC chairman despite SVN's refusal to
publicly acknowledge responsibilities under the 1954
24Agreements as France's successor. The SVN did not reply
for in its view the letter from Britain and the Soviet Union
was seen as an endorsement for its statement of April 6th
offering to cooperate with the ICC and to respect the
ceasefire. The SVN also stated (a view which Britain
circulated privately) that the newly elected National
Assembly should decide the SVN's policy on North-South 
25consultations.
Dispatch from London in ibid. (May 11, 1956), p.2. The 
letter of the co-chairmen stated " [p]ending the holding of 
free elections for the reunification of Viet-Nam, the two 
Co-Chairmen attach great importance to the maintenance of 
the cease-fire under the continued supervision of the 
International Commission for Viet-Nam".
^  Nutt, Troika on Trial, op.cit., Vol.I, p.363.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
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III. INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY: DRVN INITIATIVES
In the wake of Mikoyan's April 1956 visit to North 
Viet-Nam, the VWP leaders hammered out and then unveiled 
a series of diplomatic initiatives designed to dramatize 
their commitment to the political terms embedded in the 
Geneva Agreements. There were two main aspects to this 
new offensive: (1) an intense interaction with the
co-chairmen and (2) a series of specific proposals designed 
to ensnare the Diem regime in bilaterial consultations with 
the DRVN. Needless to say both approaches failed and by 
mid-year senior Party officials were confronted with 
internal dissatisfaction over the course of these policies.
A. Approaches to the Co-chairmen
By the time of the ninth plenum the VWP leadership 
had been appraised of Soviet reluctance to give more than 
perfunctory support to the DRVN in its attempts to start 
consultations with the Diem government. Therefore the 
results of the Reading-Gromyko talks in London in April and 
May (1956) came as no surprise. In fact while the Geneva 
Conference co-chairmen were still deliberating senior VWP 
leaders gave public expression to two themes which were to 
come into increasing prominence. In late April on the 
occasion of Lenin's birthday anniversary, VWP Secretary 
General Truong Chinh called upon France and the RVN to 
respect the Agreements, and in particular called upon the 
Diem regime to "open a political consultative conference 
with the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
to discuss the question of free general elections throughout
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n £the country". On May Day Pham Van Dong gave stress to 
the second theme, the reconvening of a new Geneva Conference. 
In his words,
[a]t present, the implementation of the Geneva 
Agreements is being seriously sabotaged, the 
reunification of Vietnam through free general 
elections is being hampered and peace in 
Vietnam is being jeopardized. That is a very 
important and urgent question which must be 
solved and only a new Geneva Conference can 
solve it.27
On May 8th Lord Reading and Andrei Gromyko, acting in
their capacity as co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference,
sent out four letters, one each to France, the ICC, the
2 8DRVN and the RVN. Letters to the latter were drafted
in identical terms which led observers at the time to
conclude that the Soviet Union was signalling its acceptance
of Viet-Nam's partition. In other words, the Soviet Foreign
Minister did not object to affixing his signature to a
document which addressed the governments of both the DRVN
2 9and RVN as equals.
2 6 Vietnam News Agency in Vietnamese morse to South Vietnam, 
0638 GMT, April 27, 1956.
2 7 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 
0645 GMT, May 1, 1956.
2 8 Great Britain, Documents Relating to British Involvement 
in the Indo-China Conflict 1945-1965, Cmnd. 2834, op.cit., 
pp.96-99.
29 United States Central Intelligence Agency, Probable 
Developments in North and South Vietnam Through Mid-1957, 
(July 17, 1956) NIE, No.63-56, op.cit., pp.1068 and 1071; 
Murti, Vietnam Divided, op.cit., pp.176-177; and Dispatch 
from London in The New York Times (May 11, 1956), p.2.
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The letter of May 8th called upon the DRVN and the RVN
to make every effort to implement the Geneva 
Agreements on Vietnam, to prevent any future 
violations of the military provisions of these 
agreements, and also to ensure the implementation 
of the political provisions and principles embodied 
in the final declaration of the Geneva Conference.
To this end the authorities of both parts of 
Vietnam are invited to transmit to the co-chairmen 
as soon as possible either jointly or separately 
•their views about the time required for the opening 
of consultations on the organization of nationwide 
elections in Vietnam and the time required for 
holding elections as a means of achieving the 
unification of Vietnam.30 (emphasis added)
In short, England and more significantly Russia had accepted
the status quo and the implied postponement of the electoral
provisions of the Geneva Agreements.
The co-chairmen, in their other letters, raised several
additional issues the most important of which was the
continuance of the ICC. The Commission was requested to
continue operating until elections were held and France
was prevailed upon to continue supplying and otherwise
assisting the ICC's in-country teams. Both North and South
Viet-Namwere asked to give the Commission "all possible
assistance".
Despite the fact that the Reading-Gromyko talks were
so disappointing to the DRVN there was nevertheless one
ray of hope. Paragraph 6 of the May 8th letter stated
that the co-chairmen would continue to consult
and if necessary in the light of the situation 
[in Vietnam] they will also discuss measures 
which should be taken to ensure the fulfillment 
of the Geneva Agreements on Vietnam, including 
the proposal to convene a new conference of
Great Britain, Documents Relating to British Involvement 
in the Indo-China Conflict 1945-1965, Cmnd. 2834, op.cit., 
p. 9 6
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members of the original Geneva Conference and 
of the states represented in the International Commission on Indochina.31
In light of this passage Pham Van Dong addressed a letter
32to Ngo Dinh Diem on May 11th proposing consultations.
When it became obvious that this approach had been rejected
Dong wrote to the co-chairmen on June 4th strongly hinting
that his government would formally request a new conference
"[i]f the South Viet-nam authorities continue to reject
3 3the holding of consultations and general elections". Two 
days earlier, however, Chou En-lai had stated that even 
though the People's Republic of China had proposed a new 
conference his Government would "wait to see how recent
34proposals by Britain and the Soviet Union....worked out".
In light of Chinese and Soviet attitudes the DRVN had to
content itself with statements for the record. On July 13,
that is one week before the scheduled election deadline,
Pham Van Dong drafted another letter to the conference
co-chairmen calling for the convening of a consultative 
35conference. A separate letter of the same date was sent
Ibid., p.97.
3 2 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia 
1122 GMT, May 12, 1956.
3 3 Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Documents related to 
the Implementation of the Geneva Agreements Concerning 
Viet-Nam, op.cit., pp.146-149.
34 Reuters dispatch from Peking in The New York Times 
(June 2, 1956), pp.1 and 4; carries a report of a 70 
minute interview with the Chinese Premier.
35 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 
1140 GMT, July 16, 1956.
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to the French Foreign Minister (C. Pineau) to point out
3 6French obligations.
On July 21, the day after the election deadline, the
Soviet Union approached the British government proposing
that they as co-chairmen address a note to the SVN
requesting that the RVN communicate without delav its
considerations concerning dates for the start of
consultations as well as for the holding of general 
37elections. This initiative was immediately endorsed by
Nhan Dan on July 23rd. Pham Van Dong formally placed his
government's views on the record early the following month.
In a letter dated August 10th addressed to the Geneva
Conference co-chairmen he endorsed the Soviet note and
called upon the co-chairmen to recommend to the RVN the
3 8dates for the convening of a consultative conference.
B. Policy Towards the Republic of Viet-Nam
In the period from April to July (1956) the DRVN publicly
committed itself to a series of specific proposals on
consultations and elections with the RVN. These statements
were designed to counteract the argument that free elections
39were impossible in the Communist ruled north. They had
Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia,
0500 GMT, July 19, 1956.
37 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia,
0500 GMT, July 23, 1956.
3 8 Vietnam News Agencv in English morse to Southeast Asia,
0512 GMT, August 14, 1956.
39 Similar proposals had been made earlier; according to Murti, 
Vietnam Divided, p.187, Ho Chi Minh, writing under the 
pseudonym 'C.B.', had addressed two letters to Nhan Dan 
(November 17, 1955 and February 25, 1956) providing
definitions for free elections.
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the secondary purpose of undercutting the RVN's position 
by offering concessions in the hopes that elements of the 
RVN could be won over into at least agreeing to open 
consultations. In retrospect, and because previous accounts 
of this period have neglected these proposals, it is 
worthwhile giving the matter close attention.
We have reviewed the DRVN's letter to Diem (May 11th) 
proposing consultations. On June 13th the Voice of 
Vietnam introduced a new item in the debate. In order to 
counter the view that free elections could not be held in 
the North it invited a delegation of "representatives of 
the people, army and the administration to the North to 
see whether or not there is freedom there before holding 
general elections". ® On July 6th Ho Chi Minh, no less, 
made an appeal to the nation in which he proposed two 
steps to bring about national unity:
(1) Normal relations and freedom of travel 
between the two zones to be restored, 
facilities to be restored; facilities to 
be provided for contacts between various 
political, economic, cultural, and social 
organizations of the North and of the South.
(2) A consultative conference to be held between 
representatives of the administration of 
both zones to discuss the issue of free general elections for the reunification
of the country, on the basis of the Geneva Agreements.41
Four days later the Voice of Vietnam quoted President Ho as 
saying that there were sound economic reasons why Viet-Nam 
should be unified:
40 Voice of Vietnam in Vietnamese to Southeast Asia,0430 GMT, June 13, 1956.
41 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 1230 GMT, July 6, 1956.
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[t]he South is rich in rice and rubber; the 
North possesses rich minerals. Commercial 
exchange between the two regions would help 
our national economy toward a powerful 
development.4 2
As was to be expected the RVN refused to take up the
DRVN's offers. July 20th came and went presenting no
further opportunity for the North to bring effective pressure
to bear on Diem to respect the political provisions of the
Geneva Agreements. Reports at that time indicated a certain
anxiety in the Western camp which partly expected some
overt DRVN reaction. In fact intelligence reports pointed
out that units of the People's Army of Viet-Nam stationed
4 3near the DMZ had pulled back into defensive positions.
As time passed RVN and US observers took the DRVN's lack of 
response as evidence that it too had accepted the status quo.
In reality VWP leaders, after setting their priorities 
and after assessing the balance of forces had concluded, 
in Ho Chi Minh's words
Our policy is: to consolidate the North and
to keep in mind the South.
To build a good house, we must build a strong 
foundation. To have a vigorous plant with 
green leaves, beautiful flowers and good fruit, 
we must take good care of it and feed the root.
42 Voice of Vietnam in Vietnamese to Southeast Asia, 1100 
GMT, July 10, 1956.
4 3 Harold Hinton, Communist China in World Politics, 
op.cit., p.31; the information on pavn troops 
movements is provided in CIA and National Security 
Council briefings of July 2 and 10, 1956 cited in 
United States - Vietnam Relations, Book 2, IV.A.5, Tab 3, 
p.47, footnote 157. A copy of the unpublished footnotes 
is in the author's possession.
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The North is the foundation, the root of the 
struggle for complete national liberation and 
the reunification of the country. That is 
why everything we are doing in the North is 
aimed at strengthening both the North and the 
South. Therefore, to work here [this appeal 
was directed at southern regroupees then in 
the North] is the same as struggling in the 
South: it is to struggle for the South andfor the whole of Viet-Nam.44
Nevertheless, according to Ho, "our present political
struggle, although long and hard, will certainly be
victorious".45
On July 20th Nhan Dan once more called for the convening
of a new Geneva Conference "in view of the present grave 
4 6situation". Two days later Ton Due Thang, a senior VWP 
and DRVN official and a native of the Mekong Delta, signalled 
a further shift in his government's position.47 The DRVN 
was still committed to seeking the implementation of the 
Geneva Agreements by various approaches to the co-chairmen. 
However, possibly in recognition of the fact that North- 
South consultations were a long way off, Thang suggested 
several areas of contact which could be started. He 
renewed the call for representatives of the South to come 
North to discuss how "normal economic cultural, and social
Ho Chi Minh, "Letter to the Cadres from South Vietnam 
Regrouped in the North", Selected Works, Vol.IV, op.cit., 
pp.157-161; it was this letter, among other indications, 
which led American observers to conclude that the DRVN had 
resigned itself to partition, see: United States - Vietnam
Relations, op.cit., Book 2, IV.A.5., Tab 3, pp.24 and 47.
45 Ho Chi Minh,“Letter to the Cadres from South Vietnam 
Regrouped in the North", op.cit.
46 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 
0500 GMT, July 20, 1956.
4? Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 
0530 GMT, July 22, 1956; unattributed quotations are taken 
from this source.
256
relations" could be restored. He proposed a meeting between 
the appropriate "competent organizations" to negotiate a 
fixed ratio of currency as well as "an exchange of raw 
materials and goods beneficial to the economy and people's 
life" in both parts of the country. For instance North 
Viet-Namwould consume South Viet-Nam's rubber, coconut oil, 
etc. while South Viet-Nam would consume North Viet-Nam's 
cement, coal and other products.
On a more personal note Thang proposed that the
exchange of family post-cards, which had been agreed upon
earlier, be expanded to include letters, and that northern
refugees currently in the South "whether they be army
personnel or civilians" be permitted to visit the North "to
see their birthplaces, their parents, their wives and
children, and their other relatives". And, as a clear
indication of his government's long range view on national
unification, Thang revealed that "[t]he houses, land, and
other properties left behind by these compatriots [refugees
to the South] in the North are being carefully looked after
by the Government and people here".
There is some evidence that the DRVN may have offered
privately to postpone the elections. This would account
for the views of Thang and others who implied that
unification, while still possible, was a distant objective.
Jean Lacouture has written:
[i]n 1955 and 1956 the leaders of the Vietnamese 
People's Republic [i.e. the DRVN] made it known 
in Saigon, on several occasions and through 
several intermediaries, that they were ready 
to postpone the plebiscite and to appeal to a 
foreign arbiter.48
48 Lacouture, Between Two Truces, op.cit., p.68.
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Dennis Bloodworth was able to acquire further details.
According to one of his dispatches:
Ho Chi Minh...has offered - on condition - to 
stop pressing for the unification of North and 
South Vietnam for the next five years, or even longer.
His conditions are that the Government of the 
Southern Premier, Ngo Dinh Diem, shall be 
replaced by one favouring economic co-existence 
with the Communist North, and that all American 
economic and military aid personnel be withdrawn from the South.
According to opposition sources in Saigon, the 
offer has been made to anti-Diem Nationalists 
and sect leaders who, in a semi-clandestine 
exchange of views, have stipulated that the 
Colombo Powers be asked to guarantee the 
integrity of the South under such a scheme.
The Vietminh replied by agreeing to this condition.
Although Ngo Dinh Diem has been maintained 
firmly in power by continued and unreserved 
American support and the Nationalists cannot, 
therefore, implement this offer, the Vietminh 
proposal provides them with an important 
propaganda weapon.^
If these unofficial approaches were made, they would 
have been a reflection of the VWP's view that there were 
"some elements" within the State of Viet-Nam who opposed 
the policies of the Diem government on North-South 
consultations. For example a press report in The Times 
(London) stated:
[t]he South Viet Nam Government is understood on 
good authority to have had difficulty in replying 
to the Co-chairmen's proposal [of May 8th] because 
of internal divisions - between the moderates who 
favour talks with the North, and the extremists 
who reject any contact with the Communists.
Dennis Bloodworth dispatch from Saigon in The Observer (January 15, 1956), p.l.
50 Saigon dispatch in The Times (May 28, 1956), p.8e.
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Later in the year, Bui Van Thinh, initially close to Diem's
inner circle, was sent abroad. News reports from Hanoi
suggested that his fall from power was connected with such
51disputes within the RVN government. There were, of course, 
a variety of non-government politicians who were active 
in maintaining contacts with all sides. The Dai Viet radio 
reported, for example:
It is reported that political activities led by 
Tran Van Huu [a former SVN Premier] and Nguyen 
Manh Ha are being plotted in the capital of 
Cambodia.... An important conference was convened 
in Phnom Penh on February 22-26 to discuss their 
attitude, possibly to form an action committee 
or a government in exile to be set up in the 
western region of South Vietnam from where it 
will negotiate with the Viet Minh. It is known 
that Huu favors relations with the Viet Minh 
while Nguyen Manh Ha is a well known Communist 
....These two people held this meeting with the 
participation of representatives of Ba Cut, Nam Lau, Bay Vien...[all prominent sect leaders].52
The object of this semi-secret maneuvering, from the
Party's view, of course, was to negotiate an acceptable
arrangement with non-Communist politicians in an effort to
undermine Diem's position.
In summary, DRVN attempts to bring about the implement­
ation of the political provisions of the 1954 Geneva Agree­
ments on schedule or at some future date, were unsuccessful 
on both the internal and domestic levels. Externally the 
USSR provided minimal support for the DRVN's diplomatic 
efforts, preferring instead the status quo in Indochina and 
detente with the West. China too seems to have been
51 Voice of Vietnam in Cambodian to Southeast Asia, 0400 
GMT, July 6, 1956.
52 Voice of the Dai Viet National Liberation Troops in 
Vietnamese to Vietnam, 0500 GMT, February 26, 1956.
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concerned to maintain peace in the region. Both Cambodia
and Laos accorded diplomatic recognition to Peking during
this period (as also with Moscow). China also appears to
have been instrumental in getting the DRVN to sign a joint
statement with the Royal Lao Government in which they both
acknowledged the sovereignty, territorial unity and
5 3integrity of the other. As we have seen, China let the 
issue of convening a new Geneva conference drop.
France managed to extricate herself from her responsib­
ilities in Indochina. In May Premier G. Mollet and his 
Foreign Minister, C. Pineau, held talks in Moscow with 
Premier Bulganin and Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister. 
Both sides welcomed the May 8th letter of the Geneva 
Conference co-chairmen and in their final communique 
committed themselves to the status quo in Viet-Nam 
(indefinite partition without elections).^
Indian policy turned in a direction less favourable to 
the DRVN. Initially India thought that peace in Indochina 
could be maintained best by implementing the 1954 Agreements. 
With the passage of time which witnessed increased political 
stability in the South, India came to accept the view that 
peace could be maintained best by not upsetting the status 
quo by trying to force the question of a political settle­
ment. Nehru, when questioned on this issue before the 
Indian Parliament in July 1956, merely stated that as far
5 3 Fifield, The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia, op.cit., 
pp.353-356.
5 4 "Joint French-Soviet Communique" as carried by Reuters 
in a dispatch from London in The New York Times (May 20,
1956), p.2.
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as India was concerned it was aware that the DRVN had made
certain proposals and that these had not been favourably
55received by the State of Viet-Nam.
All of these factors taken together present a clear 
picture of the international system drifting into a phase 
of detente rendering the sharpening of tensions over the 
issue of Viet-Nam's unification out of the question for 
the DRVN's major allies.^ In mid-1956, in short, the 
Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam was left without firm 
international support for its policy objectives.
IV. DOMESTIC AFFAIRS IN THE SOUTH: DIEM TAKES THE OFFENSIVE.
Ever since his appointment as Premier in July 1954 Ngo 
Dinh Diem consistently denounced the Geneva Agreements and 
insisted that his government was not bound by their terms. 
Despite the momentary wavering of the United States govern­
ment which initially acted as if the threat of a Communist
57electoral vistory was real, Diem never consented to start
Dispatch from New Delhi in ibid. (July 28, 1956), p.3.
It should be recalled that talks between the United States 
and the People's Republic of China at the ambassadorial 
level had begun in Geneva in August 1955; Hinton, Communist 
China in World Politics, op.cit., p.255*
57 The question of the American government's attitude towards 
the July 1956 election has never been fully explored.
According to analysts writing in the Pentagon Papers: "the
U.S., which had expected elections to be held, and up until 
May 1955 had fully supported them, shifted its position and 
in the face of Diem's opposition, and of the evidence then 
accumulated about the oppressive nature of the regime in 
North Vietnam". See: "Evolution of the War: Origins of
the Insurgency", in United States - Vietnam Relations, op.cit., 
Book 2, Summary IV.A.5., p .5. For an alternative view 
consult: H. Bradford Westerfield, "What Use Are Three
Versions of the Pentagon Papers?", American Political 
Science Review (June 1975), Vol.LXIX, No.2, pp.690-691.
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talks with the DRVN. By early 1956 he was firmly in
5 8political control, having turned back the various 
challenges to his regime described earlier. Nevertheless 
Diem pressed on with the consolidation of his power base, 
reducing the remaining sect forces even further until they 
became fugitives operating astride the border with Cambodia. 
With the sect dissidence reduced to such a condition Diem 
increasingly turned his attention towards those areas of 
rural Viet-Nam where the Party and its supporters had 
maintained their influence. By the end of the year the 
combined effects of an officially sponsored Anti-Communist 
Denunciation Campaign (ACDC) as well as various full-scale 
military operations had similarly reduced the Party's 
fortunes. It was obvious to all that the Republic of 
Viet-Namhad survived its painful birth and that the 
initiative had passed to Diem. The United States provided 
a full measure of support as the adolescent Republic was 
poised to enter what later became known as the so-called 
"miracle years".
A. The Sect Remnants: The Hoa Hao and the Lien
Minh Cao Dai.
Viet-Nam National Army military units pursued 
the remnants of Ba Cut's Hoa Hao forces throughout April
5 8 William A. Nighswonger, Rural Pacification in Vietnam 
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p.13; United States
Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research, "The 
General Situation in South Vietnam", Intelligence Brief,
No.1876 (February 7, 1956) in United States-Vietnam ReTations, 
op.cit.. Book 10, pp.1048-1050.
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and May. It was a one-sided affair, for with the capture 
of Ba Cut, his lieutenants appeared incapable of reviving 
the anti-Diem struggle. Increasingly these key dissident 
leaders surrendered or were captured, whereupon some of 
their men came under Party influence and leadership.
For example, on April 28th nearly 500 men, including
36 officers of the Le Quang and Nguyen Hue regiments,
turned themselves in at Can Tho; two days later Lt. Co.
Re-surrendered along with 300 of his men (Le Quang Regiment)
at Cai Von. These were followed in early May when an
additional group of 110 Dan Quan (People's Militia),
regional Hoa Hao forces, surrendered en masse to RVN
authorities. On May 25th Pham Cong Cam, the new Hoa Hao
chief of staff, was killed in a skirmish with ARVN forces
59operating in Long Xuyen province. Thirty more soldiers 
surrendered at Can Tho on June 1st. On May 16th Duong The 
Xuong, a leading Hoa Hao official, was captured in Sadec 
province. This was followed on July 22nd by the capture 
of most of the staff of the 207th battalion of the Le Loi 
Regiment. With these events the Hoa Hao insurgency was 
well and truly broken.^
59 United Press dispatch from Saigon in The New York Times 
(May 26 , 1956), p.6; Cam operated under the-alTas-"^
'Ba Bung'.
6 0 Associated Press dispatch from Can Tho in ibid., (June 12, 
1956), p.6; United Press dispatch from Saigon in ibid.,
(June 28, 1956) p.5; Associated Press dispatch from Paris 
in ibid., (July 5, 1956), p.4; Associated Press dispatch 
from Saigon in ibid., (July 10, 1956), p.4; and Reuters 
dispatch from Saigon in ibid., (July 13, 1956), p.4.
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Units of the Lien Minh Cao Dai fared slightly better. 
They managed to elude combat with ARVN forces by slipping 
across the border into Cambodia; in May there were reports 
that ARVN troops were carrying the fighting into Cambodian 
territory as part of their policy of "hot pursuit". These 
episodes led to a diplomatic incident between RVN and 
Cambodia.^  ^
In August over 300 men of the Lien Minh Cao Dai
placed themselves under the protection of the Royal Khmer
government by allowing themselves to be disarmed by units
of the Cambodian Army. The RVN tried unsuccessfully to
brand these men as Communists (Viet-Cong), a charge the
6 2Khmer government stoutly refuted. This incident clearly 
marked the end of armed Cao Dai dissidence which, as we 
have seen, as slight by comparison with that of the Hoa 
Hao (see Table 5-2 for force estimates in mid-1956).
6 3B. The Anti-Communist Denunciation Campaign.
In May of 1956, at a conference of officials connected 
with the Anti-Communist Denunciation Campaign, Tran Chanh
Cach Mang Quoc Gia (May 26, 1956) and Preacheachon (May 
18, 1956) cited by the Voice of Vietnam in Cambodian to 
Southeast Asia, 0400 GMT, June 3, 1956; Radio Hanoi in 
Vietnamese, 0115 GMT, August 24, 1956; Journal d*Extreme 
-Orient (August 14, 1956), p.5; ibid., (August 27, 1956), 
p.5; Radio Hanoi in English, 1445 GMT, August 24, 1956; and 
Voice of Vietnam in Vietnamese to South Vietnam, 0500 GMT, 
September 11, 1956.
6 2 "Sur une depeche traitant de refugies militaries au 
Cambodge", Journal d'Extreme-Orient (August 27, 1956), p.5.
6 3 For general remarks on this campaign see: Nighswonger,
op.cit., pp.35-36; Robert Scigliano, South Vietnam: Nation
Under Stress (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1964),
cont'd
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TABLE 5-2
ESTIMATES OF THE MILITARY STRENGTH OF
(JULY 1956)
DISSIDENT SECT FORCES
UNIT: LOCATION:
1. The Hoa Hao (12 battalions)
Battalion 213, Le Quang Regiment Plain of Reeds
Battalion 206, Le Loi Regiment Plain of Reeds
Battalion 215, Le Quang Regiment north of Chau Doc
Phan Thanh Gian Battalion north of Chau Doc
Battalion 209, Bac Tien Regiment north of Chau Doc
Battalion 19 north of Chau Doc
Nguyen Trai Battalion north of Chau Doc
Tay Do Battalion north of Chau Doc
Battalion 207, Le Loi Regiment south of Chau Doc
Battalion 20 south of Long Xuyen
Battalion 21 east of Rach Gia
Hong Chau Battalion north of Can Tho
TOTAL SIZE: N = 1,000
2. The Cao Dai (8 battalions)
5 battalions of the Trinh Minh southwest Tay Ninh
The Regiment** province
6th Battalion, Trinh Minh The southeast of Trang
Regiment Bang on the eastern 
edge of the Plain 
of Reeds
SUB-TOTAL N = 300
1st Battalion north of Katum in 
Cambodia
32nd Battalion north of Katum in 
Cambodia
SUB-TOTAL N = 150
TOTAL SIZE N = 450
3. The Binh Xuyen (2 platoons)
2 platoons northwest of Bien Hoa 
northeast of Bien Hoa
TOTAL SIZE N = 50
*■ The designation "battalion" for Hoa Hao forces may be 
misleading. It was retained by U.S. military observers 
for ease of unit identification (i.e. for continuity in 
reporting). Battalion strength at this time varied 
between 30-40 men.
Renamed at this time as the Hong Huong Regiment.
SOURCE: "The July 1956 Situation Report submitted by the U.S.
Army Attache in Saigon", Working Paper, Item 25-B.
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Thanh, head of the Department of Information, boasted that
the ACDC had "entirely destroyed the predominant communist
6 4influence of the previous nine years". He went on to
document this view by providing the following figures:
94,041 communist cadres rallied to the RVN and 5,613
6 5cadres surrendered. In addition, 119,954 weapons had been
captured, 75 tons of documents uncovered and 707 secret
arms caches unearthed. Obviously the figures were grossly
exaggerated, as were other figures provided by the Committee
for the Denunciation of Communist Subversive Activities
(see Tables 5-3 and 5-4). Party sources indicated that by
February 1956 a total of 40,768 persons had been arrested
6 6in addition to 732 reported missing. It would appear
63 cont'd
pp.167-169; and Committee for the Denunciation of Communist 
Subversive Activities, Achievement of the Campaign of 
Denunciation of Communist Subversive Activities, First 
Phase (Saigon: The People's Directive Committee for the
National Congress of Denunciation of Communist Subversive 
Activities, May 1956).
6 4 Cited by Scigliano, South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress,
op.cit., p.168.
6 5 U.S. Operations Mission to Vietnam, Saigon Daily News 
Round-up (May 14, 1956), p.3 cited in ibid.; alternative 
figures are provided in Committee for the Denunciation of 
Communist Subversive Activities, Achievements of the 
Campaign, op.cit., p.116, which lists 15,473 Communists 
as having been denounced, 5,906 Communists surrendered 
and 87,456 Communists who broke with the Party; this is 
quoted approvingly by Vu Can, "The People's Struggles 
Against the US-Diem Regime", op.cit., p.61.
6 6 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 
1100 GMT, May 8, 1956. The figures are for the period 
July 1954-February 1956 and include, in addition to the 
ones cited in the text, 1,563 persons killed and 4,636 
persons wounded by the RVN authorities in the course of 
the ACDC.
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that all opponents of the Diem regime, Communist cadres and
non-Party sympathizers as well as sect adherents, were
included in the ACDC's tables. No doubt some of the
figures were fabricated by officials anxious to please
(for example Phu Yen province alone accounts for over 70%
of all defectors). It is difficult to explain the number
of provinces for which no data was recorded. On the other
hand RVN officials, if they believed their claims, grossly
overestimated the effectiveness of their anti-Communist
suppression because thev failed to take into account the
extensive nature of the Communist underground organization
and the wide network of supporters which sustained it. In
brief, RVN claims that they had destroyed the Communist
underground in mid-1956 were premature to say the least.
Nhan Dan, the Party's newspaper, did admit, however, that
"the struggles of our people are complicated by the actions
6 7of the Diem regime". On May 20th it was announced that 
the Anti-Communist Denunciation Campaign would enter 
"period II, stage I" whose purpose would be "to destroy 
the whole network secretly woven by the adversary which
r ocovers the whole of free Vietnam".
During July attention was turned to the provinces in 
central Viet-Nam, especially in areas of Communist strength
"Our Fatherland Will Be Reunited At Any Cost", Nhan Dan 
(June 10, 1956) as broadcast by Voice of Vietnam in 
Vietnamese to Southeast Asia, 0145 GMT, June 13, 1956.In another broadcast the Party ridiculed Tran Chan Thanh's 
figures as "only the imagination and fantasy of the SVN 
authorities", ibid., in Vietnamese to South Vietnam,0500 GMT, May 30, 1956.
6 8 The Fight Against the Subversive Communist Activities in Vietnam (Saigon: Review Horizons Special Edition, T956) ,
p. 4.
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ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE ANTI
TABLE 5-3
-COMMUNIST DENUNCIATION CAMPAIGN (May 1956)
Number of Campaign
Directorates Communists Communist Surrendered Arms
P r o v i n c e : Established: D e n o unced: Def e c t o r s : Communists: Cache
CENTRAL VIETNAM
Binh Dinh 0 1,182 7,519 0 1
Binh Thuan 0 1,060 2 141 3
Khanh Hoa 14 438 1,103 0 5
Ninh Thuan 0 280 0 367 0
Phu Yen 0 280 9,201 0 17
Quang Nam 746 2,572 65,371 332 150
Quang Ngai 0 14 0 0 0
Quang Tri 0 471 0 106 14
Thua Thien 13 6,470 460 0 504
773 12,767 83,666 946 694
HIGHLANDS
Donnai 3 9 0 0 1
Pleiku 106 15 118 0 0
Dalat 0 13 8 0 0
Kontum 0 3 23 0 0
109 60 149 0 1
SOUTHERN VIETNAM
Bac Lieu 27 66 133 300 0
Ba Ria 0 47 30 0 3
Ben Tre 147 641 501 0 12
Bien Hoa 157 322 34 0 2
Can Tho 58 207 18 0 0
Chau Doc 3 1 11 0 0
Cho Lon 82 11 1,500 0 0
Gia Dinh 212 258 1,181 0 0
Go Cong 39 5 0 74 0
Ha Tien 3 31 48 41 0
Long Xuyen 0 27 17 0 0
My Tho 211 240 124 0 0
Rach Gia 3 0 0 0 0
Sa Dec 0 64 0 0 2
Soc Trang 92 368 24 4,481 0
Tan An 114 68 0 0 4
Tay Ninh 0 21 0 31 1
Thu Dau Mot 128 37 0 0 0
Tra Vinh 15 43 2 5 0
Vinh Long 21 102 8 0 0
Vung Tau 0 90 0 0 0
Phong Thanh 0 57 0 26 0
1,314 2,706 3,641 4,956 24
SOURCE: Committee for the Denunciation of Communist Subversive A c tivities,
Achievement of the Campaign of Denunciation of Communist Subversive
Activities (Saigon: The People's Directive, May 1956).
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TABLE 5-4
ACHIEVEMENT OF THE ANTI-COMMUNIST DENUNCIATION CAMPAIGN - A SUMMARY
(May 1956)
Anti-
Directorates Communists Communists Surrendered Arms Communist
Region: Established: Denounced: Defectors: Communists: Caches: Meetings:
Central 773 12,767 83,666 943 694 3,042
Southern 1,314 2,706 3,641 4,958 24 425
Highlands; 109 60 149 0 1 108
TOTAL: 2,196 15,473 87,456 5,901 719 3,576
SOURCE: Committee for the Denunciation of Communist Subversive Activities,
Achievements of the Campaign of Denunciation of Communist Subversive 
Activities, (Saigon: The Poeple's Directive, May 1956).
(Quang Nam, Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces). Operations 
in this area were similar to what had gone on before. A 
three-pronged offensive involving Army units, security 
service personnel and mobile propaganda teams worked over 
an area classifying the population according to their past 
political commitments. Anti-communist indoctrination 
courses were run in which the people were subject to numerous 
lectures. Later anti-communist meetings were convened in 
the villages at which alleged former Communist cadres 
recounted their past activities and declared their support 
for the Diem government. Alleged Communist agents stepped 
forward declaring their repentance for their past misdeeds
See "Rebellion Against My-Diem", in United States - 
Vietnam Relations, op.cit., Book 2, IV.A .5., Tab 2, 
p. 5 0 .
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conversion to anti-Communism. At some meetings individuals
were denounced from the crowd as "Viet-Cong" whereupon they
were taken away to begin the cycle of activity just described.
Suspected Communists were hauled off to political
re-education centers where they were forced to undergo
political re-training courses. Many, in fact, remained under
administrative detention (an tri) for up to two years.
Others, it was alleged, were executed. There can be no
doubt that the ACDC was accompanied by widespread abuse
which the underground cadres tried to turn to their
advantage. However the scope of the opposition to this
campaign was ineffectual. In fact the anti-Communist
repression was so widespread that authentic Communist
officials were trapped in the dragnet alongside the innocent.
According to Tran Chanh Thanh, by May (1956) some
15,000 - 20,000 individuals, considered either Communist or
pro-Communist, had been detained in these political re-
70education centers in the period from July 1954. One
French observer, Philippe Devillers, estimated that by the
end of 1956 the number of political prisoners stood at 
7150,000. Undoubtedly included among this number were other 
opponents of the Diem regime besides Communists.
Diem followed Ordinance No.6 (January 1956) with further 
laws to restrict and hinder his political opponents. Whereas
Osborne, "The Tough Miracle Man of Vietnam", op.cit.,
p. 166 .
71 In a lecture at a seminar entitled, "International 
Politics of Southeast Asia" Cornell University (August 
1965) cited in Kahin and Lewis, The United States in Vietnam, 
op.cit., p.100 and 121.
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Ordinance No. 6 permitted government officials to place
under arrest and detention anyone considered a danger "to
the defense of the state and public order", Ordinance No.
47 (August 21, 1956) made it illegal to act on behalf of
72any organization designated as Communist. Conviction 
under this decree carried with it the death penalty. We 
have already observed in the case of the Lien Minh Cao Dai 
how loosely the term "Communist" could be applied.
C. Military Operations
Hand in hand with "period II, stage 1" the political 
side of the ACDC went various military operations: Thoai
Ngoc Hau (14 June, 1956 - 24 February, 1957), Nguyen Hue 
(29 December, 1955 - 31 May, 1956) and Truong Tan Buu 
(17 July, 1956 - 15 February, 1957). In fact subsumed 
under the name of each operation were several ARVN 
initiatives which took place in various regions at different 
levels of intensity. The main purpose of each operation seems 
to have been to seek out and destroy any military force 
judged in opposition to the State of Viet-Nam. In practice 
this meant engaging and defeating bandits, the various sect 
forces and their Communist allies. In the course of these 
operations ARVN units entered heretofore sacrosanct 
Communist base areas, uncovering supply and ammunition 
caches as well as greatly disrupting the Communist organiza­
tional structure. Many cadres were forced to flee their
Osborne, "The Tough Miracle Man of Vietnam", op.cit., 
p.164-165; and Kahin and Lewis; The United States in 
Vietnam, op.cit., pp.100-101.
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area of assignment thereby greatly paralyzing any attempt 
at a concerted response.
(1) Operation Nguyen Hue
During the period January - June 1956 ARVN forces, 
under the command of General Duong Van Minh, conducted 
operations against Hoa Hao units operating in the Plain of 
Reeds. The operation was code named "Nguyen Hue". By May 
10th this area was declared pacified by the Voice of the 
Armed Forces radio and the center of operations turned to
7 3the provinces of western Nam Bo and the Ca Mau peninsula.
There the Hoa Hao forces disintegrated under ARVN pressure,
sparking the defections and surrenders described above.
However the shift of operations also meant that ARVN
units were encroaching on Communist strongholds in the U
7 4Minh forest area for the first time. During late April 
and all of May, in fact, the prime preoccupation of ARVN 
seems to have been to savage the Communist underground rather 
than the Hoa Hao. On May 31 General Minh declared that 
Operation Nguyen Hue was completed. His troops had, it 
was reported, "destroyed all Viet Minh Communist 
administrative organizations and annihilated the Communist 
mobile armed groups which formerly controlled the U Minh
73 Voice of the Armed Forces in Vietnamese to Vietnam, 1115 
GMT, May 10, 1956.
74 "These campaigns were very important. They were aimed at 
attacking the people. Main force, regional force, popular 
force and Nung units were assigned to conduct operations 
deep within our former resistance base areas", Tinh Hinh 
Nam Bo, p.7.
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7 5Thuong and U Minh Ha areas". The official results of 
Operation Nguyen Hue are summarized in Table 5-5.
(2) Operation Thoai Ngoc Hau
Almost immediately after General Minh declared the end 
of Operation Nguyen Hue he assumed command of another 
operation, code namedvVThoai Ngoc Hau*1, which concentrated 
its attention in central and western Nam Bo. In particular 
a major pacification program was launched in the provinces 
of Can Tho, My Tho, Soc Trang and Vinh Long, during the 
months of July and August. So-called mopping-up actions 
continued in Sa Dec, Chau Doc, Long Xuyen, Ca Mau, Dong 
Thap Muoi and Rach Gia until February 1957 when the 
operation was officially terminated.
In the course of Operation Thaoi Ngoc Hau General Minh 
set up various self-defence groups which were charged with 
responsibility for security when the regulars departed. 
Various civic action programs were carried out, among them 
were road construction and repair as well as various 
facilities to be used in physical education and sporting 
activities. An intensive psychological warfare campaign 
was waged with the dual purpose of inducing defections and 
securing the support of the people. A summary of results 
may be found in Table 5-5.
75 Vietnam Press, "Cleanup Operation on the Plain of Camau", 
The Times of Viet-Nam Weekly, (May 5, 1956), Vol.I, No.16, 
p.2; and Vietnam Press, "Operation 'Nguyen Hue' Ends", 
ibid., (June 2, 1956), Vol.I, No.20, p.4.
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(3) Operation Truong Tan Buu
Operation Truong Tan Buu began officially on July 17,
1956 under the command of General Mai Huu Xuan. It ended
on February 15, 1957. The prime area of operation was in
eastern Nam Bo. During July and August ARVN units combed
the provinces of Thu Dau Mot, Gia Dinh, Cholon, Bien Hoa,
Tay Ninh, Ba Ria, Vung Tau and Ham Tan and Tan Linh districts
of Binh Thuan. It appeared obvious from the various
communiques issued as the operation progressed that both
Binh Xuyen dissidents and Communist cadres were the object.
From the point of view of ARVN several notable successes
were scored: Nguyen Van Phu, one of the top Binh Xuyen
leaders (called the "Ba Cut of the East") was killed in
early August; while later that month several provincial level
7 6Communist officials fell victim. Several arms caches were 
uncovered (see Table 5-3).
During August when the wave of strikes swept the 
rubber estates in eastern Nam Bo, units assigned to 
Operation Truong Tan Buu were quickly ordered into action. 
Accordingly Communist and non-Communist labor leaders 
were rounded up thus sparking additional sympathy strikes.
A later Party review of this period recounted, "we suffered 
in every area. Specifically, the forces of the Quan Dang Bo
7 6 Vietnam Press cited by United Press in a dispatch from 
Saigon in The New York Times (August 10, 1956), p.4; 
for reports on Communist cadres caught see Journal 
d1 Extreme-Orient (August 13 , 1956), p.5; ibid., (August 23, 
1956), p.5; and Vietnam Press cited in ibid., (August 29, 
1956), p.5.
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(military forces of the Party's organization) in Thu Due,
Lai Thieu and Long Thanh were destroyed by the Truong Tan 
7 7Buu campaign". Table 5-5 summarizes the results of 
this operation.
TABLE 5-5
MILITARY OPERATIONS LAUNCHED IN 1956: SUMMARY OF RESULTS
Operation:
aNguyen Hue 
Thoai Ngoc Hau3 
Truong Tan Buu3
Arrested:
1,005
2,117
882
Killed: 
681 
441 
102
Wounded: 
63
Rallied: Prisoners
4,004 1,224 63 - -
bNguyen Hue 8,649 - - - -
QThoai Ngoc Hau 124 106 60 147 115
Truong Tan Buu 261 24 - 174 32
9,034 130 60 321 147
SOURCES:
£ Vo Nguyen Giap, Memorandum presented to the ICC (March 6, 1959); 
Vietnamese Studies/ Nos. 18/19. No figures given for "rallied" and 
"prisoners".
December 29, 1955-May 31, 1956. The Times of Viet-Nam Weekly, No.21 
(June 9, 1958). Figures for those "arrested" include those designated 
"surrendered" and "captured".
c June 28 - August 31, 1956. Figures compiled from the relevant 
issues of the Journal d1Extreme-Orient.
July 17 - September 15, 1956. Figures compiled from the relevant 
issues of the Journal d'Extreme-Orient.
77 Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, p.25.
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D. Other Domestic Developments in the Republic of 
Vietnam.
In June 1956 the Ministry of the Interior, acting on
instructions from President Ngo Dinh Diem, abolished the
elected village administrative councils (hoi dong huong chinh)
which had been set-up by Bao Dai in 1953. It is probably
too much of an exaggeration to conclude, as have two
American observers, that "[a]t one stroke the autonomy that
South Viet-Nam's 2,560 villages had enjoyed even under the
79French rule was swept away..." For example research by 
Jeffrey Race into conditions in Long An province revealed 
that
this memorandum [of June 1956] only ratified an existing 
situation: in large areas of Long An councils
had been appointed because elections could not 
be held under the 1953 (or earlier) legislation, 
and such councils as had been elected had for 
the most part disappeared by 1955.80
The significance of this administrative act was two fold:
(1) the abolishment of elections prevented Communists or
pro-Communists from penetrating the RVN administrative
structure at the most basic level and (2) it was the
responsibility of loyal provincial governors, appointed at
Diem's pleasure, to select the new village leadership.
As has been observed elsewhere Diem had a tendency to appoint
Cf. Nighswonger, Rural Pacification in Vietnam, op.cit., 
p . 41; and Shaplen, The Lost Revolution  ^ op.cit., p.133.
79 Kahin and Lewis, The United States in Vietnam, op.cit., 
p.104; see also Scigliano, op.cit., p.32.
80 Race, War Comes to Long An, op.cit., p.21.
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outsiders, that is predominately Catholics from central and
northern Viet-Nam, to leadership positions. Over time the
RVN structure "assumed the aspect of a carpetbag government
81in its disproportion of Northerners and Centralists..."
This was to create problems in the future. Kahin and 
Lewis have observed:
Frequently Diem's government ousted able and 
popular district and village officials with 
strong local ties from their positions in the 
rural areas because they had served the Viet- 
minh administration. They were replaced by 
outsiders who, in addition to lacking legitimacy 
in terms of customary local criteria, were all 
too often both oppressive and corrupt. Charged 
with the responsibility for carrying out Diem's 
agrarian policies, they also presided over 
denunciation campaigns and answered for those 
to the Saigon government rather than to the old 
village councils. It was inevitable that these 
newly appointed village chiefs would soon 
become the focal point for peasant resentment...
These tensions between "outside refugees" and local
southerners were soon to arise as a result of RVN
resettlement schemes. For example, immediately after the
pacification of the Plain of Reeds was proclaimed, the RVN
announced that some 150,000 hectares of rice land were now
8 3available for resettlement. A Land Reform Office was
Kahin and Lewis, The United States in Vietnam, op.cit., 
p.104; This assertion has not been quantified however. It 
is unknown how many province chiefs were either/or 
Catholics and northerners and centrists. Most likely 
their influence was felt at province level, less so at 
district level and only slightly at the village level. 
Refugee villages, scattered throughout the Delta would 
have been headed by northerners and centrists. For 
influence at higher levels of government see: Roy Jumper,
"Mandarin Bureaucracy and Politics in South Vietnam", 
Pacific Affairs (March 1957), Vol.XXX, No.l, p.56.
8 2 Kahin and Lewis, The United States in Vietnam, loc.cit.
8 3 Voice of the Armed Forces in Vietnamese to Vietnam, 1115 GMT (May 10, 1956). i
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accordingly charged with responsibility for resettling 
refugees there; these were to include mainly persons from 
north of the 17th parallel as well as poor peasants from 
the south and disabled former servicemen. The seeds of 
future rural tension were accordingly planted.
E. U.S. Support for Diem
Leaders of the VWP had been constantly preoccupied with 
American support for the Diem government and the potential 
threat that this posed for them. It had been obvious for 
some time that France was no longer in a position to influence 
local events. A later Party history which reviewed this 
period concluded that "by mid-1956 the US-Diem clique 
eliminated the French and pro-French forces out of the 
important political and military and public security fields". 
Diem, the review observed, was in full control of the 
administrative machinery from the central (i.e. Saigon) to 
the district level. In so far as VWP strategy had helped to 
encourage accomodation with this group, Diem's successes 
represented their failure.
The pattern of visits by high-level American represent­
atives continued. The day after the French High Command 
was officially dissolved, Admiral Arleigh E. Burke, Chief
of Naval Operations, arrived in Saigon to confer with
8 5the RVN President. Immediately proceeding the July 
8 4 Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, p.56.
8 5 Associated Press dispatch from Saigon in The New York 
Times (April 30, 1956), p.2.
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TABLE 5-6
VISITS TO SOUTH VIET-NAM BY SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIALS
(April - September 1956)
Date: Name: Position:
April 29 Admiral A.E. Burke Chief of Naval 
Operations
May 5 T.G. Gates 
J.H. Smith 
R.E. Rose
Undersecretary, Navy 
Assistant Secretary, . 
Rear Admiral, USN
May 22-24 W.S. Robertson Deputy Secretary, 
Defence
July 6-7 Richard M. Nixon Vice President
July 26 Admiral A.W. Radford Chairman Joint Chiefs 
of Staff
August 17- 
September 7
General M. O'Daniel ex-commander, TRIM
September 14 Admiral Felix Stump Commander-in-Chief, 
US Navy (Pacific)
election deadline, and on the second anniversary of Diem in
office, Vice President Richard Nixon arrived in Viet-Nam
to extend an invitation to Ngo Dinh Diem to visit America
8 6at the request of President Eisenhower. Table 5-6 
summarizes the other delegations which called in at that 
time. The obvious conclusion that DRVN leaders drew from 
these facts was that the United States was expressing 
especially strong support for the state of Viet-Nam and 
its President.
Dispatch by Robert Alden from Saigon in The New York 
Times (July 7, 1956).
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V. THE "DIEU LANG" PHASE: POLITICAL STRUGGLE IN THE SOUTH
(July-September 1956)
Sometime during 1956, most probably during the month
of June, the Nam Bo Regional Committee held its first 
8 7congress. This meeting thrashed out the Party's options 
for the period following the July election deadline.
Western intelligence agencies had already detected indications 
that morale was on the decline and that disagreement over 
policy was spreading. One group advocated a resumption of 
armed struggle. Another group became so disillusioned that 
they ceased working and became inactive.
In one sense the Party was responsible as it had 
encouraged the belief that reunification elections would 
be held in mid-1956. When this deadline passed there was 
marked disappointment to be sure; perhaps more significantly 
however was the exposure of the Party's weakness in these 
circumstances. In other words, not only had the Party 
built up false hopes; but it pursued a policy which in the 
end exposed its powerlessness when the aspirations it had 
encouraged were not met. One official American government 
study sums up this point succintly:
8 7 According to Tinh Hinh Phong Trap; p.6 the Nam Bo 
Regional Committee met sometime in June to discuss the 
short-comings of the previous period of political struggle; 
according to the Republic of Vietnam, Ministry of National 
Defense, Joint General Staff, J2, Study of the Activation 
and Activities of R (Saigon: Combined Documentation
Exploitation Center, 1969), No.075/69, p.14, which relies 
on captured documents, the Nam Bo Party Committee held 
meetings "first in 1956, second in 1957 and third in 1958"; 
these items and other items point to mid-1956 as the 
crucial period. Cf. Voice of Vietnam in Vietnamese to 
Southeast Asia, 0430 GMT, June 13, 1956.
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The failure of 1956 was a severe blow to the 
morale of the Viet Cong organization in the 
South. Defections were numerous. Some broke 
away because of disillusion with the Hanoi 
regime, others because they realized that 
there was hope for a non-Communist orientation 
for their country [sic], still others because 
they opposed a new resort to force after the 
long years of fighting.88
No records of the decisions taken at the first congress
of the Nam Bo Regional Committee have as yet been made public.
It seems probable that a draft of a major policy review
("On the Revolution in the South") was discussed. There
is additional evidence too that Party leaders in the north
had made it clear that nothing drastic should be undertaken.
For example, one intelligence report stated that Party
cadres in the south had received orders which stressed "an
89ideology of lying low for a long time".
In July the Party's newspaper Nhan Dan published a
frank editorial on divisions within the VWP over southern
strategy. Perhaps the editorial was a summary of major
tendencies which emerged from the Regional Committee's
congress. Whatever the case, other documents indicated
that Party policy towards the south, which had been
authoritatively set by the Politburo in September 1954,
9 0had remained virtually unchanged for nearly two years.
United States Department of State, A Threat to Peace, 
op.cit., p.4.
89 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and National Security 
Council briefs of July 2nd and 19th, 1956 cited in United 
States - Vietnam Relations, op.cit., Book 2, IV.A.5., Tab 3, 
p.47, Footnote 157.
9 0 "From the end of 1954 until 1956 most of the Party 
regional committee's plans, under a resolution of this 
period, did not chance", Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, p.30.
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Since the Nhan Dan editorial specifically drew attention
to the Politburo's September 1954 resolution and indicated
that circumstances had changed in the meantime ("the
implementation of the Geneva Agreement is encountering
serious obstacles, peace is being threatened, national
unification is facing big difficulties, and free general
elections throughout the country cannot be materialized in 
91July 1956") it seems reasonable to conclude that a major
policy review was underway. No doubt the Central Committee’s
next scheduled plenum, the tenth, was the forum where these
differences would be reconciled by a new policy formulation.
According to the editorial, during the Resistance War
[W]hen the struggle of our people met with 
difficulties, there often appeared in the minds 
of our people and cadres many complex emotions.
When the Resistance began there were many doubts.
Some people were not confident of victory, 
others were impatient and wanted to win quickly.
When the situation changed and the Resistance 
dragged on there were fears of long hardships.
People became impatient and subjective to the 
point of depression. Especially in campaigns in 
the enemy's rear areas where guerrilla warfare 
was carried on under cruel conditions. With the 
enemy's repeated mopping-up operations and our 
successive losses, pessimism and lack of 
confidence were prevalent. Similarly, when we 
won big battles on our main fronts, we easily 
became subjective.
A major experience, it can be said a principal 
experience, in ideological leadership at that 
time was the control of false and wrong ideas; 
the education and nurturing of the spirit of 
long resistance and the conquest of pessimism
"Nang Cao Chi Khi Phan Dau, Tich Cue Cung Co Mien Bac 
Vung Manh, Tiep Tue Dau Tranh De Gianh Thong Nhat Nuoc 
Nha", (Enhance the Will to Struggle, Actively Consolidate 
and Strengthen the North, Continue the Struggle for the 
Realization of National Unity) Nhan Dan, No.870 (July 22, 
1956), pp.l and 4. Unattributed quotations in the text 
are from this source.
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and impatience. This was a decisive condition 
in the firm maintanience of the struggle to gainfinal victory.92
In reviewing the present situation in which the armed 
struggle had been replaced by political struggle, Nhan Dan 
pointed out that similar "complex ideas and illusions" 
had arisen among the cadres. Four tendencies in 
particular were pointed out:
(1) There are a number of compatriots who have 
always been simple in their thoughts. They did 
not figure out all the schemes of the enemy and 
were therefore sure in their minds that when the 
two years time was over, elections would 
certainly be held. Subjective propaganda in a 
number of regions also helped breed this 
simplemindedness among a number of compatriots.
The two years' time is over and the elections 
have not been realized. Hence some people have 
become pessimistic and disappointed.
(2) There are a number of compatriots who lack 
confidence in the future of the struggle for 
national unification because they see that the 
enemy is daily consolidating his forces and going 
all out to terrorize and massacre our compatriots 
in South Vietnam.
(3) There are a number of compatriots who believe 
in victory but do not believe in peaceful methods.
We must understand that the reestablishment of 
peace in Indochina is an achievement for us and
a defeat for the imperialist warmongers.
(4) Then there are a number of compatriots who 
believe in the final victory but are reluctant 
to carry on a long and hard struggle and who 
are anxious to find a more effective method of 
achieving national unification more quickly....
The editorial concluded, " [m]ore than ever before we must
now intensify our tasks of propaganda and education among
the people to patiently, deeply and widely control the above
mentioned wrong ideas and false illusions. Thus we can
enhance the will to struggle in the Party and among the people".
92 Ibid.
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According to a Party history, in mid-1956 the Nam Bo
Regional Committee considered information provided by the
VWP Central Committee. Accordingly it reached the
conclusion that South Viet-Nam was becoming a colony of the
American imperialists, that Diem was establishing a
fascist regime and that it was the duty of Vietnamese in
Nam Bo to promote a revolutionary war against them. The
Regional Committee's plans to reorganize and revitalize the
Party's organization were later criticized for not giving
greater emphasis to armed force. This same history written
with the benefit of hindsight after the line had been
changed to armed struggle stated:
The Regional Party Committee was also aware of 
the plans of the imperialists. It realized that 
the Nam Bo population had to promote a revolut­
ionary war against them. However, it did not 
change its unfavorable political policies. It 
continued to motivate the people to participate 
in the struggles which requested negotiations 
and general elections.9 3
As we have recounted earlier this approach ran afoul of 
the RVN's Anti-Communist Denunciation Campaign as well as the 
various military operations. One Party member reported that 
the Tay Ninh Party province committee had ninety percent 
of its cells smashed by the summer of 1956 and that a 
similar ratio prevailed across the country. In central 
Viet-Nam, he alleged, the situation was worse. The Party 
was just entering its "dark period" according to this 
source (a deputy secretary of the western Nam Bo inter­
province committee) "because of a lack of faith in the
93 Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, p .30.
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future and in the Party's judgment/ which had proved
9 4[to be] completely wrong". The situation was to grow 
worse over the ensuing months.
TABLE 5-7
PARTY-CONTROLLED MILITARY FORCES IN SOUTH VIET-NAM (July 1956)
CENTRAL VIET-NAM
Hue region 200
Da-Nang area 900
the Plateau region 300
the coastal region 1,300
sub-total:
SOUTHERN VIET-NAM
Sadec - Can Tho 300
Plain of Reeds 600
Western Ca-Mau 350
War Zone D (north of 
Bien Hoa) 200
Gia Dinh 150
sub-total
TOTAL:
2/700
1/600
4/300
SOURCE: "The July 1956 Situation Report submitted by the
U.S. Army Attache (Colonel L.B. Woodbury) in Saigon",
Working Paper, Item 25-B; this should be compared with the 
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency's National Intelligence 
Estimate, No.63-56 (July 17, 1956) which stated, "Reports 
on Communist strength in the south over the past year have 
ranged from 5,000 to 10,000. Our best estimate of current 
strength is 8,000 to 10,000 with approximately 5,000 
organized in skeletal company and battalion sized units which 
could be expanded through recruitment. These armed forces 
are generally scattered through the mountains paralleling 
the Annam coast and the remote swampy regions of Cochin-China". 
Col. Woodbury commented in his report, "Above estimate 
[N = 4,300] is 1,300 larger than that contained in [the]
May SITREP [Situation Report] but is still thought to be an 
optimistic estimate by this office".
(footnote 94 on p.285)
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The attempt to rebuild the Party and to revitalize the
Party-controlled military units were carried out under the
slogan "to lie patiently in ambush, gathering one's forces,
waiting to strike at the right moment [to bring about] the
General Uprising to liberate southern Vietnam (truong ky
mai phuc sue tich luc luong don lay thoi co tong khoi nghia
9 5giai phong mien nam)". According to the U.S. Army attache 
stationed in Saigon at that time, the total "Viet Minh" 
military strength in southern Viet-Nam in July 1956 was
4.300 (see Table 5-7). Colonel Woodbury's estimate of
4.300 is very close to the CIA's estimate of "approximately 
5,000 [Communist] organized in skeletal and battalion sized 
units" [see Table 5-7] thus suggesting that intelligence 
analysts were misleading themselves by applying so narrow
a definition of what constituted Communist forces during 
this period. Their approach totally ignored the various 
categories of paramilitary and guerrilla forces which 
could be mobilized in support of main force units. Years 
later Pentagon analysts puzzling over the rapid growth of 
Communist military strength in 1960-61 concluded:
Race, War Comes to Long An, op.cit., p.74; unfortunately 
the transcript of this interview is not contained in Race's 
Vietnamese Materials.
9 5 A portion of this slogan was cited by Race in his War 
Comes to Long An, op.cit., p.39; the remainder of the slogan 
was provided to me by a ranking Communist Party cadre, Bui 
Cong Tuong, who was chief of the training and propaganda 
section of the Long-Chau-Ha tri-province committee. Tuong 
cited the slogan and when shown Race's version insisted that 
his was the correct (and most complete) one. Tuong was 
active in the political struggle movement in Ben Tre province in the period following the Geneva Conference; Interview 
with Bui Cong Tuong in the Ministry of Open Arms, Saigon, 
June 9, 1972.
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The statistical picture...of an insurgent force 
declining in numbers from 1954 through 1959, 
and then mushrooming rapidly in 1960 and there­
after, is obviously misleading. What U.S. 
intelligence focused on in the immediate 
aftermath of Geneva were the remnants of the 
Viet Minh military force [i.e. PAVN] following 
regroupment. These, whatever their strength, 
probably represented only a fraction of the 
numbers of former Viet Minh in active opposition 
to the GVN [i.e. RVN] after 1956, and apparently 
did not reflect the total numbers of armed 
dissidents from 1957 onward, nor the locally 
recruited political and logistic apparatus which 
supported the Viet Cong [i.e. Party] "armed 
propaganda teams", or guerrilla bands. The 
phenomenal growth of the Viet Cong, given the 
low estimates on infiltration from North Vietnam 
(some 5,000 through 1960), means either tha[t] 
the DRV cadres were extraordinarily effective in 
organizing and motivating rural people among whom 
U.S. intelligence detected little unrest through 
mid-1960, or that U.S. estimates were low. The 
latter seems probable.96
The Regional Committee was later criticized for its
actions regarding these units. According to the Party
history cited immediately above,
The Nam Bo Committee also decided to maintain 
the armed forces of the religious sects, but 
they did not activate any other forces. This 
meant that the Regional Party Committee did 
not thoroughly understand the role of the armed 
forces in the revolutionary struggle. The self- 
defense problem was not totally discussed because 
the Party did not have a clear view on the 
activation of many military forces...^
(emphasis added)
"U.S. Perceptions of the Insurgency, 1954-1960", in 
United States - Vietnam Relations, op.cit., Book 2, IV.A.5. 
Tab 4, p.26; Colonel Woodbury is identified as the author 
of the July 1956 SITREP in "Rebellion Against My-Diem", 
ibid., Tab 2, p.45, footnote 111. No mention is made in 
the SITREP of Long Khanh, Ba Ria, Binh Tuy, and Rung Sat, 
all Communist strongholds.
97 Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, p.30.
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These criticisms, however, were made several years 
later and carried with them the considerable benefit of 
hindsight. In fact the Party's review of this period was 
commissioned to support the change over to armed struggle 
in 1959-60. In mid-1956 the Party was primarily concerned 
with problems in the north and the problems of the southern 
Party organization were accorded a lower priority. Its 
responsibility was to fashion a new long-haul strategy to 
keep the Party's underground infrastructure in being so 
that when priorities changed there would be an effective 
instrument in Nam Bo to execute them. Over the course of 
the next six months, most observers agree, the Nam Bo 
Committee concentrated its attention on reorganizing and 
building up its clandestine political organization.98 
According to a later RVN Ministry of Defence Study of this 
period, " [tjhat was the first step in the 'attention to the 
South' phase. Long-range preparations consisted of 
planting personnel in [the Saigon government bureaucracy], 
setting up agencies, and in particular, reorganizing political 
and military forces. The short-range preparations consisted 
of the promulgation of resolutions, strategies and guide-
99lines in the armed struggle for the liberation of the South".
This extensive Party reorganization was expressed in 
the Vietnamese phrase "dieu lang". Cadres with legal status
Race,War Comes to Long An, op.cit., p.39; Modelski, "The 
Viet Minh Complex", op.cit., p.198, and Donald S. Zagoria, 
Vietnam Triangle: Moscow/Peking/Hanoi (New York: Pegasus,T9'67) , p. US’:
9 9 Republic of Vietnam, Ministrv of National Defense, Study 
of the Activation and Activities of R, op.cit., p.18.
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were ordered to stop functioning and either move elsewhere
(dieu - to flee) or remain quietly in place (lang - to be
stationary). This marked the first phase of underground
activity, according to Party historians, because for the
first time the administrative machinery at province and
district levels was under the control of the Diem government.
As the full weight of the anti-Communist campaign and the
various military operations bore down on the Party, its
effectiveness diminished. According to one account,
Party members gradually decreased in number.
The key personnel in our organizations developed 
slowly. This prevented the Party from replenishing 
them. The remaining personnel had a large area 
of responsibility and much work to do. For that 
reason they were easily arrested or tracked down.
Many Party members had to live in tunnels the 
year round. They only appeared at night.101
On the military front, as we have seen, the Party had
been instructed not to recruit new units. No doubt senior
leaders were reluctant to sanction such a development
which inevitably would have increased the demand for
additional supplies and material from the North. An
American intelligence estimate, dated mid-1956, confirmed
that although "some cadres and supplies are being
infiltrated across the 17th parallel the D.R.V. [Democratic
Republic of Viet-Nam] probably has not sent any large
10 2scale reinforcements or supply to the South".
Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, p.5; according to Le Van Chan, as inter­
viewed by Jeffrey Race, "there were numerous military campaigns 
in the rural areas, and the government began to install its 
village and hamlet apparatus in remote rural areas where the 
French never dared set foot" , cited in War Comes to Long An, 
op.cit., p.99. Interview with Bui Cong Tuong, Saigon, June 9, 1972.
® ^ Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, p . 2 5 .
10 2 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Probable Developments 
in North and South Vietnam Through Mid-1957, (July 17,
1956) NIE No.63-56, op.cit., p.1077.
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On July 22, 1956 leaflets appeared announcing the
formation of a Vietnamese People's Liberation Movement
(Phong Trap Giai Phong Nhan Dan Viet Nam). The announcement
did not link this Movement (phong trap, not "front" mat tran)
10 3to the Party or its Nam Bo Regional Committee. However
if the newly founded Liberation Movement was Party- 
inspired it undoubtedly was a cover name for the amalgam of 
remnant sect forces now under Party control. The stated 
aims of the Movement included the overthrow of the Diem 
government, the creation of a democratic government and 
peaceful national reunification. Yet references in the 
leaflet linking "national and international" opposition 
forces hint at the involvement of sect and/or pro-French 
opposition elements. Very little has been heard of this 
group subsequently.
The main military activity engaged in by the Nam Bo 
Regional Committee, besides quartering and reorganizing 
the sect remnants, was the formation of self-defence 
units "aimed at countering bandits, uniting the people, 
maintaining order and security in the hamlets, and
10 3 According to Race, War Comes to Long An, p.85, "During 
this period in the Long An area, much of the Party's 
political activity...was carried on under the name of 
'The Vietnamese People's Liberation Movement', which 
appeared in 1956"; the document in question is a hand 
written one which could have been prepared by anyone as 
it bears no distinctive markings or identifying features; 
no doubt the Diemist Cong An (Security Service) considered 
all opponents of the government, especially armed elements, 
as Communist thus confusing the point being made here.
Cf. "Hieu Trieu Goi DQng Bao Quoc Noi va Ha Ngoai",
(Appeal to Compatriots at Home and Abroad) contained 
in Race, compiler, Vietnamese Materials, Microfilm Reel 
No.1, Race document No.1001.
290
Q
opposing the enemy's terrorism and robbery by the Hoa Hao
104and Cao Dai forces".
VI. THE 10th PLENUM (September 1956)
According to the historian Ta Xuan Linh "the leaders in
Nam Bo compiled an important document at the end of 1956
10 5entitled 'On the Revolution in South Viet Nam'". ' As
Linh's account appears to be authoritative, it seems
likely that William Turley is in error when he concluded
that the document in question was written by the VWP Central
Committee "to answer pressures from the S o u t h " . T u r l e y
also appears to be in error when he suggests that "On the
Revolution in South Viet-Nam" was approved at the VWP's 10th
10 7Plenum as the copy of the document which he used makes 
reference to the "recent" American presidential elections 
held in November, two months later.
As early as March-April 1956, as we have seen, VWP 
cadres assigned to the South (Le Duan in particular) had
Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, p.16.
105 Linh, "How Armed Struggle Began in South Viet Nam", 
op.cit., p.22.
Ibid., Linh, a historian in the DRVN, was writing in 
the semi-official English-language journal Vietnam Courier; 
he has also published in Nghien Cuu Lieh Su (Historical 
Research) the official organ of the DRVN Social Science 
Committee; Turley, "Army, Party and Society in the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam, op.cit., p.123, footnote 
79 and 127.
Turley used a copy of the document entitled "Duong Loi 
Cach Mang Mien Nam" (The Path of Revolution in the South) contained in the Race collection of Vietnamese Materials, 
Microfilm Reel No.l, Race document No.1002.
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voiced misgivings about the Party's policy for the region. 
Both the state of the Party's organization and morale took 
a decided turn for the worse throughout the course of the 
year. After the July election deadline had passed serious 
dissent arose within the Party's ranks. For example, one 
Party history stated:
Particularly after July 20, 1956 the key cadres 
and Party members in South Vietnam asked questions 
which demanded answers: Can we still continue
the struggle to demand the implementation of the 
Geneva Agreement given the existing regime in 
South Vietnam? If not, what must be done? A 
mood of skepticism and nonconfidence in the 
orientation of the struggle began to seep into 
the Par' apparatus and among some of the
As a result of this situation the most plausible view 
appears to be that Le Duan and other senior cadres were 
requested to prepare a reassessment, with policy recommend­
ations, for review by the Central Committee. By this time 
it had become customary for the VWP to hold bi-annual 
sessions of the Central Committee. It is possible that 
a draft document on Nam Bo could have been prepared for 
submission at the 10th Plenum, which met in September 
(1956). Although this may very well have been the case 
much more important issues pre-empted a full discussion of 
these proposals. They were then rescheduled for discussion 
at the next plenum which, as it turns out, met only three 
months later in December. In the meantime the Politburo 
gave the matter its attention. The 11th Plenum marks 
the first time since July 1954 that three plenary sessions
10 8 Working Paper, Appendices, Item 301, pp.2-3.
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of the Central Committee were convened in one year, a 
situation which was not to be repeated until 1959. The 
10th Plenum dealt with pressing problems arising from the 
agrarian reform movement while the 11th Plenum, convened 
to discuss the turmoil in Nghe An province, also approved 
policy changes affecting the South.
It is not necessary to review in detail the course of 
the agrarian reform movement conducted by the VWP since 
1953 which has now provoked such c o n t r o v e r s y . W e  need
For example:
1954: 6th plenum (July)
1955: 7th plenum (March) 8th plenum (August)
1956: 9th plenum (April) 10th plenum (September)
11th plenum (December)
1957: 12th plenum (March) 13th plenum (December)
1958: 14th plenum (November)
1959: 15th plenum (January) 16th plenum (April)
17th plenum (October)
1960: 18th plenum (July)
There are two major points to be made with respect to 
the literature on land reform: (1) it demonstrates that the
crisis in the North was a very serious one which fully 
preoccupied Party leaders; and (2) all the figures on the 
numbers of persons executed or otherwise killed are either 
pure guesswork and/or to some extent based on mistranslations 
and "black propaganda" (Nguven Manh Tuong speech). The 
following list are some of the more pertinent sources in 
this controversy (compiled chronologically): Fall, The
Viet-Minh Regime, op.cit., pp. 119-138; J. Price Gittinger, 
"Communist Land Policy in North Viet Nam", Far Eastern 
Survey (August 1959), Vol.XXVIII, No.8, pp.113-126; Gerard 
Tongas, J'ai Vecu dans l'Enfer Communiste au Nord Vietnam 
et J'ai Choisi la Liberte (Paris: Nouvelles Editions
Debresse, 1960); Honey, North Vietnam Today, op.cit., 
pp.105-127 (chapters by William Kaye and Hoang Van Chi);
Hoang Van Chi, From Colonialism to Communism, op.cit.;
George Carver, "The Faceless Viet Cong", Foreign Affairs 
(April 1966), Vol.44, pp.347-372; Hoang Van Chi, Tu Thuc 
Dan Den Cong San [From Colonialism to Communism] (Saigon:
Chan Troi Moi, 1966); Buttinger, A Dragon Embattled, op.cit., 
Vol.2, chapter 11; Fall, The Two Viet-Nams, op.cit., chapter 8; Christine White, Land Reform in North Vietnam (Washington, 
D.C.: Agency for International Development, Spring Review
Country Paper, June 1970); Anita L. Nutt, On the Question 
of Communist Reprisals in Vietnam, p.4416 (Santa Monica:
The RAND Corporation, August 1970) ; Diane Johnstone
cont'd
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only observe that after the partitioning of Viet-Nam the 
VWP was given control over land and people which had 
previously been outside the Party's sphere of influence.
In trying to grapple with the myriad of problems in rural 
areas after 1954 the Party chose to compress into fewer 
stages its program for agrarian reform. The chosen 
instruments for this phase were specially created agrarian 
reform teams which drew their membership and authority 
from outside the existing local Party organization. In 
November 1955 the crucial fifth wave of mass mobilization 
for agrarian reform was launched. Disastrously, as it 
turned out, the Party decided to graft onto this wave another 
campaign designed to weed out spies, reactionaries, and 
counter-revolutionaries.
110 (cont'd)
interview with Nguyen Huu Chau, dispatch from Orleans, France 
in St. Louis Post-Dispatch (September 24, 1972), p.2A;
D. Gareth Porter, The Myth of the Bloodbath: North
Vietnam's Land Reform Reconsidered, International Relations 
of East Asia Project, Interim Report No.2 (Ithaca: Cornell
University, September 1972); Robert F. Turner, "Expert 
Punctures 'No Bloodbath' Myth", Human Events (November 11, 
1972); "The Human Cost of Communism in Vietnam, II: The
Myth of No Bloodbath", Hearing Before The Subcommittee to 
Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act 
and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the 
Judiciary, United States Senate, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, 
January 5, 1973. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1973); Daniel E. Teodoru, "The Bloodbath Hypothesis: 
The Maoist Pattern in North Vietnam's Radical Land Reform", 
Southeast Asian Perspectives (March 1973), No. 9, pp.1-79; 
"Testimony of D. Gareth Porter", op.cit.; D. Gareth Porter, 
"The Myth of the Bloodbath: North Vietnam's Land Reform
Reconsidered", Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 
(September 1973), Vol.5, No.2, pp.2-15; Christine P. White, 
"Critique of U.S. Senate Hearing: The Human Cost ofCommunist in Vietnam, II: The Myth of No Bloodbath71”,
typescript (November 1973); and White, "Land Reform in the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam", op.cit.; Edwin E. Moise, 
"Land Reform and Land Reform Errors in North Vietnam",
Pacific Affairs (Spring 1975), Vol*49, No.l, pp. 70-92.
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As the agrarian reform movement proceeded it was 
evident that the quality of administrative cadres was 
sadly lacking. Errors and mistakes were committed and 
numerous individuals were erroneously punished and even 
imprisoned. By early April 1956 the first murmurs of 
dissent were heard. These protests and grievances were 
acknowledged in the Party press over the next few months 
but still the VWP made no major effort to halt or to 
overcome these mistakes. By mid-year it was evident that 
serious problems were being created which were affecting 
both the Party (and its inner workings) as well as the 
relations between the rural folk and local Party organs.
On August 17, 1956 Ho Chi Minh, the DRVN President, 
candidly admitted that
[S]ome cadres do not vet comprehend the policies 
and correctly cultivate the mass line. Because 
the Party Central Committee and Government 
leadership have had substantial weaknesses... 
land reform has caused deficiencies and errors 
in the tasks of achieving rural unity...HI
Ho went on to acknowledge these errors and announced that
the Central Committee had already formulated plans to
"rectify" them. Those who had been wrongly classified
would be correctly reclassified; those who had been wrongly
punished would have their grievances attended to (dismissed
cadres would reinstated, political rights restored, etc.).
"Thu cua Ho Chu Tich Goi Dong Bao Nong Thon va Can Bo 
Nhan Dip Cai Cach Ruong Dat o Mien Bac Can Ban Thanh Cong" 
[Letter to Rural Compatriots and Cadres from President Ho 
on the Occasion of the Basic Success of Land Reform in 
North Vietnam], Nhan Dan, No.897 (August 18, 1956),
P-1-
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These and other errors were publicly discussed by Ho on
112DRVN National Day (September 2nd) and in the Party press.
Sometime during late September, most likely after the 
VWP delegation returned from the 8th Congress of the
113Chinese Communist Party (which ended on September 27th),
For Ho Chi Minh's speech see Voice of Vietnam in 
Vietnamese to Southeast Asia, 0030 GMT (September 2, 1956); 
"Let Us Positively Carry Out the Appeal Launched by 
President Ho", Nhan Dan (September 6, 1956) broadcast by 
the Voice of Vietnam in Vietnamese to Southeast Asia, 1100 
GMT (September 6, 1956); the full weight of these admissions 
was given by Vo Nguyen Giap in a speech to the public (and 
not at the 10th 'congress' [read plenum] as is often alleged 
in the literature) on October 29, 1956; remarkably no 
complete translation of this speech exists in English and 
those author's who have relied on Hoang Van Chi's 
selective and erroneous translation have been seriously 
misled, see D. Gareth Porter, "The Myth of the Bloodbath", 
Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, op.cit., p.9 for a 
partial list of corrections; for the original consult Vo 
Nguyen Giap, "Bai Noi Chuyen Cua Dong Chi Vo-Nguyen-Giap 
Uy Vien Bo Chinh Tri Trung Uong Dang Lao Dong Viet-Nam Ve 
Nghi Quyet Cua Hoi Nghi Trung Uong Lan Thu 10 tai cuoc 
mit tinh 29-10-1956 cua Nhan Dan Thu Do" [Speech by Comrade Vo Nguyen Giap, Member of the Political Bureau of 
the Central Committee of the Viet-Nam Workers' Party, 
Concerning the Resolution of the 10th Plenary Session of 
the Central Committee, delivered at a meeting of the 
people of the capital on October 29, 1956], Nhan Dan,
No.970 (October 31, 1956), pp.1-3.
113 The 8th Congress of the CCP lasted until September 27th 
and was attended by a delegation of the VWP led by Hoang 
Quoc Viet, a reference in the communique of the 10th plenum 
hailing the success of the 20th Congress of the CPSU as 
well as the 8th Congress of the CCP suggests the VWP 
convened a meeting the Central Committee immediately after 
the Chinese Congress finished; for an account of the 8th 
Congress consult, Eighth National Congress of the 
Communist Party of China, Documents, 3 volumes (Peking: 
Foreign Languages Press, 1956") and "A Congress of Great 
Historic Significance", editorial in the People's Daily 
(September 29, 1956) reprinted in People's China, No.20 
(October 16, 1956), pp.4-8.
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the VWP held its 10th Plenum. The decisions taken at this
meeting were indeed momentous for on October 29th the VWP
held an unprecedented press conference at which it
released a communique reporting on the plenum's decisions.
This communique was blunt and to the point:
besides the great success obtained mistakes and 
shortcomings have been committed during the 
past period. In agrarian reform and the 
readjustment of organizations, grave mistakes 
have been committed. The 10th plenum of the 
Central Committee of the Vietnam Workers'
Party has analyzed the results of land reform 
and the readjustment of organizations and 
carried out a stern examination of the mistakes 
committed in these two tasks. It has found the 
causes of these mistakes and has adopted measures for correcting them.114
The communique then went on to enumerate the errors and
mistakes committed in the movement for rent reduction, the
agrarian reform campaign and in the readjustment of
organizations. They were labelled "leftist deviations"
primary blame for which was attached to "shortcomings in
leadership". Specifically,
[t]he 10th session of the Central Committee of 
the Vietnam Workers' Party "recognizes that 
these mistakes are due to shortcomings in 
leadership". That is why the Central Committee 
of the Party bears responsibility for these 
mistakes. The Central Committee members directly 
responsible for the mistakes committed in the 
guidance of the execution of the Party's 
policies have made a self-criticism of their 
mistakes and shortcomings before the Central 
Committee. The latter has taken appropriate 
disciplinary measures against these members.
"Thong Cao cua Hoi Nghi Lan Thu 10 (mo rong) cua Ban 
Chap Hanh Trung Uong Dang Lao Dong Viet-Nam" [Communique 
of the 10th enlarged Session of the Central Executive 
Committee of the Viet-Nam Workers' Party], Nhan Dan,No.900 (October 30, 1956), p.l and 4.
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Separate announcements carried the startling news that
Truong Chinh had resigned his post as VWP Secretary 
115General; that Ho Viet Thang, the head of the Standing 
Committee of the Party group on the Central Land Reform 
Committee, had been dismissed from the Central Committee; 
and that Le Van Luong, head of the Central Organization 
Board (and therefore in charge of overseeing the 
readjustment of organizations at the local level) had 
been stripped of his membership in the VWP's Politburo as 
well as his membership on the Central Committee's 
Secretariat. 116
According to the press conference communique, three 
other issues were discussed at the 10th Plenum: (1) questions
of democratic practice, liberties and legality; (2) 
improvement in the standard of living for workers, army 
personnel, cadres and civil servants; and (3) the struggle 
for the reunification of Viet-Nam "on the basis of independence, 
democracy and by peaceful means". Point three was the only
115 "Thong Cao cua Hoi Nghi. Lan Thu 10 cua Ban Chap Hanh 
Trung Uong Dang Lao Dong Viet-Nam Ve Viec Cu Lai Tong Bi 
Thu Ban Chap Hanh Trung Uong" [Communique of the 10th 
Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the 
Vietnam Workers' Party Concerning the Appointment of the 
Secretary General of the Central Executive Committee],
Nhan Dan, No.900 (October 30, 1956), p.l.
116 "Thong Cao Cua Hoi Nghi Lan Thu 10 cua Ban Chap Hanh 
Trung Uong Dang Lao Dong Viet-Nam ve Viec Thi Hanh Ky Luat 
Doi Voi Nhung Dong Chi Uy Vien Trung Uong Pham Sai Lam 
Trong Viec Chi Dao Cong Tac Cai Cach Ruong Dat va Chinh 
Don To Chuc" [Communique of the 10th Plenary Session of 
the Central Executive Committee of the Vietnam Workers' 
Party Concerning Carrying Out Discipline Towards Comrade 
Members of the Central Committee for Mistakes in the Work 
of Carrying Out the Tasks of Agrarian Reform and Reorgan­
ization of Organizations] Nhan Dan, No.900 (October 30, 
1956), p.l.
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indication that southern affairs had been discussed. No 
decisions were announced. The final sections of the 
communique made it clear that these and other pressing 
issues were now the responsibility of the Politburo. In the 
words of the communique: "[t]o prepare for the next session
of the Central Committee, the 10th Plenum has entrusted the 
Politburo with preparing a plan on two important problems:
(1) the line and policy of economic construction in the 
North and (]) the convening of the Third Congress of the 
Party".
According to later American intelligence analysis several
other leadership changes took place at this time which went
117unannounced. Reportedly six new members were added to
the Politburo. However there is reason to question this
118information. Nevertheless, the post of Part Secretary
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence 
Survey - South Viet-Nam, NIS 43C (April 1965), p.26 cited 
in United States - Vietnam Relations, op.cit., Book 2,
IV.A.5. Tab 3, p.6; according to this report Pham Hung, 
Nguyen Duy Trinh, Le Thanh Nghi, Hoang Van Hoan, Ha Huy 
Giap and Ton Due Thang were added while Nguyen Luong Bang 
and Hoang Quoc Viet were dropped.
118 William C. Gausmann, former editor of Viet-Nam Documents 
and Research Notes, has raised this matter in a letter to 
me dated July 3, 1974. He wrote: "What really is the
evidence? I doubt that [Nguyen Luong] Bang was ever a 
Politburo member. Hoang Quoc Viet indeed was and was 
dropped at that time. I wonder very much if [Ton Due]
Thang and Ha Huy Giap were given Politburo status from 
1956 to 1960 and then dropped. (This, oddly enough, is 
recognized in pecking order lists, with [Hoang Quoc] Viet 
appearing first after Politburo and secretariat members.
If, for example H.H. [sic] Giap had been on the Politburo 
even he'd probably rate similar treatment - but he never 
gets it.) What would have been the point of dropping 
[Ton Due] Thang just as he was being made vice president 
of the Republic?" The point to be made is that in at 
least one case, Hoang Quoc Viet, an unannounced leadership 
change took place. There may have been others.
299
General was filled by Ho Chi Minh, thus lending the full 
force of his popularity to the embattled VWP organization. 
Whatever the exact leadership realignment it seems 
reasonable to conclude that if a major report on Nam Bo 
had been presented to the 10th Plenum that action on it 
was passed to the Politburo for decision. The Politburo 
itself would have been in a considerable state of 
disorganization as a result of these leadership changes. 
Thus in addition to the suggestions made above, it appears 
probable that the document "On the Revolution in South 
Viet-Narrf'while it might have been discussed in draft form 
at the 10th Plenum was probably reviewed by the Politburo 
in the interim before being presented to the 11th Plenum in 
December.
Following the 10th Plenum a campaign for the rectif­
ication of errors was launched throughout northern Vietnam. 
Although the campaign was never officially declared 
completed it seems certain that it continued well beyond 
its projected deadline. According to J. Price Gittinger it 
was not until November 1957 that "the mistakes correction 
[campaign] had progressed to the point where it was no
120longer necessary or worthwhile to stress the program".
In the midst of this preoccupation it is surprising 
to note that the Politburo - sometime in mid to late 
October - met and discussed the situation in Nam Bo. The
Thayer, "Origin of the National Liberation Front", 
op.cit., Part II, pp.12-15.
120 Gittinger, "Communist Land Policy in North Vietnam", 
op.cit., p.122.
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evidence of this topic is somewhat circumstantial. We 
have just hypothesized that the Politburo was entrusted 
with this responsibility in advance of the 11th Plenum.
Prior to this meeting several statements on South Viet-Nam 
appeared in the Party-controlled press which revealed that 
some high-level discussions were going on. Since we now 
have authoritative confirmation that "On the Revolution in 
South Viet-Nam" was compiled at the end of 1956 it seems 
most likely that it was this policy review which was being 
discussed.
On October 31st Nhan Dan commented editorially", [o]n
reviewing the causes of these mistakes [including inter alia
the struggle for national reunification] the [10th] plenary
session of the Central Committee realized that for some
time there had been a number of ideological deviations in
121the leadership of our Party". This was the first time
that the leadership dismissals were ascribed to mistakes
committed in carrying out the Party's reunification
policies. At that same time a conference of the Viet-Nam
Fatherland Front was convened. Tran Cong Truong gave a
report on, among other things, "the struggle for national 
12 2unity". Later the conference reached agreement on
"Doan Ket Nhat Tri, Kien Quyet Chap Hanh Nghi Ouyet 
Cua Hoi Nghi Trung Uong Lan Thu 10" [Unite Unanimously 
and Resolutely Implement the Resolutions of the 10th 
Session of the Central Committee] Nhan Dan (October 30, 1956), No.900, p.1.
122 "Thong Cao Cua Hoi Nghi Uy Ban Trung Uong Mat Tran To 
Quoc Viet-Nam", [Communique of the Conference of the 
Central Committee of the Viet-Nam Fatherland Front] Nhan 
Dan (November 3, 1956), No.973, pp.l and 4.
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several points - after heated discussions according to one 
12 3account - among which was the following:
[Point 3] The conference noted that during these 
last two years...the movement for Viet-Nam's 
unification...has achieved some success.
Nevertheless, there have been many mistakes 
in the consolidation of the North and the 
maintenance of the struggle in the South 
(emphasis added) . 4
Accordingly the Fatherland Front adopted a number of "concrete
measures" to help restore North-South relations in all
fields as well as the strengthening of "the activities
of the Action Committee of the Central Committee of the
12 5Front on behalf of Vietnam's reunification".
In other words, the Politburo had now acknowledged 
that there were defects in its policy towards the South and 
had made this assessment available to its principal 
instrument for achieving national reunification, the 
Fatherland Front. Thus these public comments by Party- 
controlled organs merely foreshadowed further changes in 
leadership as well as policy towards Nam Bo. Unfortunately 
at the same time, from the point of view of VWP officials 
assigned to Nam Bo, developments in the north were to 
intrude once again claiming top priority.
12 3 Mentioned in radio reports but not in the press;
Voice of Vietnam in Vietnamese to South Vietnam, 1200 GMT, 
November 2, 1956.
12 4 "Thong Cao Cua Hoi Nghi Uy Ban Trung Uong Mat Tran 
To Quoc Viet Nam", op.cit., p.4.
125 Ibid.
CHAPTER 6
POLICY REVISION: ON THE REVOLUTION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
(October-December 1956)
I. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NORTH: REVOLT AND CRITICISM
A . The "Rectification of Errors" Campaign
During the last quarter of 1956 VWP leaders grappled 
with problems occasioned by the failure of their policy 
on reunification in the south as well as errors and 
mistakes arising from the conduct of the land reform 
campaign in the north. The former was dealt with in a 
comprehensive policy review entitled "On the Revolution 
in South Viet-Nairf'while a "rectification of errors" 
campaign was instituted to alleviate grievances arising 
from the latter.
Ever since the VWP agreed to the partitioning of 
Viet-Namit was confronted with a built in tension of 
coordinating policies designed to grapple with problems 
of reconstruction and rehabilitation in the north with 
others which addressed the difficulties of political 
struggle in the south. The VWP has always accorded priority 
to developing the North yet this was not meant to be at 
the expense of the South. Rather the problem (for the 
VWP) was to determine how much emphasis was to be placed 
on each separate yet interrelated policy at a given moment.
The policy decisions incorporated in "On the 
Revolution in South Viet-Nam" reflected this dilemma. At 
the precise time when policy decisions were being made 
on southern strategy, events in the north were crying out
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for immediate attention. In short, priority continued 
to be assigned to building up the North so that at some 
future time it could serve as a reliable and firm base 
for the struggle in the South. Since the North's "firm 
foundation" was in fact a very shaky edifice at that 
time, the new policy for the South had to take this into 
account. In other words, the new policy presaged 
nothing drastic for the immediate future.
According to an official party history of the period 
since the Geneva Conference the "greatest difficulty" 
encountered in the "liberated North" was the state of 
the economy.^ It was both backward and war ravaged. In 
fact the North was faced with severe shortage in foodstuffs 
and a possible famine. Therefore the party set two tasks 
to be fulfilled: (1) the completion of the land reform
(begun in 1953) and (2) the rehabilitation of the national 
economy. Of the two, land reform was deemed a "fundamental 
strategic task" which had to be thoroughly completed.
"Land reform" in practice combined four interrelated 
elements: (1) classification and distribution of land;
(2) the implementation of the party's so called "democratic 
principles"; (3) the reorganization of the party's 
apparatus and (4) the suppression of counter-revolutionaries. 
"By the summer of 1956", as the above mentioned party 
history observed, "the land reform had been completed in 
the lowlands and midlands and a number of villages in the
^An Outline History of the Viet Nam Workers' Party, 
op.cit., p.82.
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highlands of our north". However by that time the 
Party found itself enmeshed in a paradox. On the one 
hand, as a result of the reform campaign, paddy production 
was boosted to an all-time high (see Table 6-1), on 
the other hand, serious errors had been committed which 
vitally effected the party's organization at the local 
level.
Concerning the former point J. Price Gittinger 
observed in 1959: "all the evidence indicates that the
Communists have carried out their land tenure policy 
without seriously interfering with rice production - even 
during the open reaction to the land reform excesses of 
1956. In the period since the Geneva Agreements, in fact, 
North Vietnam has apparently been able to increase rice
3production appreciably over the prewar level".
Immediately after the 10th Plenum, VWP officials 
made forthright statements concerning the mistakes which 
had been committed. The DRVN's Council of Ministers, 
meeting under the chairmanship of Ho Chi Minh, immediately 
suspended the authority of the central and local land 
reform committees, converting them into "study organs ... 
directly subordinate to their respective levels of the
2
Ibid., p.83; Burchett, North of the 17th Parallel, 
op.cit., p.102-133.
3 Gittinger, "Communist Land Policy in North Viet Nam", 
op.cit., p.125.
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TABLE 6-1
PADDY PRODUCTION IN THE DRVN, 1939-1960
YEAR Vo Nhan Tria B.B. Fallb W. KayeC J.P. Gittinger^ E . Kux
1939 2.4 2.45 _ 2.45
1940 - - - 3.3 -
1943 - - - 2.9 -
1944 - 2.28 - - -
1945 - 3.77 - - -
1954 - 2.60 - 2.6 -
1955 3.5 3.60 3.60 3.6 3.52
1956 4.1 4.24 4.15 4.1 4.14
1957 3.9 3.89 3.95 4.0 3.95
1958 4.6 4.58 4.55 4.1 4.58
1959 5.2 5.11 5.20 - 5.19
1960 4.2 4.15 4.40 — 4.21
SOURCES:
Vo Nhan Tri, Croissance economique de la Republique 
democratique du Viet Nam (Hanoi: Editions en langues
etrangeres, 1967), pp.215 and 293.
Bernard B. Fall, The Two Viet-Nams, 2nd Revised Edition, 
p . 163 .
cWilliam Kaye, "A Bowl of Rice Divided: The Economy of
North Vietnam", in P.J. Honey, editor, North Vietnam Today,
p .116 .
J. Price Gittinger, "Communist Land Policy in North Vietnam", 
Far Eastern Survey (August 1959), p.125.
0 Ernest Kux, "Nordvietnam", in Ernst Kux and J.C. Kun,
Die Satelliten Pekings: Nordvietnam, Nordkorea (Stuttgart:
W~. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1964) , p.7 8.
No doubt these sources are highly interdependent as they have 
relied on official DRVN statistics as well as figures 
appearing in Soviet publications.
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4(local) administration". The Special Land Reform 
tribunals were suspended and the immediate release from 
jail of all those "wrongly imprisoned due to incorrect 
classification" was ordered.
These actions were then followed by a full-blown 
campaign to rectify the errors committed during the 
course of the land reform campaign. Generally these 
mistakes can be grouped under three main headings:
(1) errors in carrying out agrarian reform, (2) errors 
in the extension of "democracy" and (3) errors in the 
readjustment of organizations.
(a) Errors in the conduct of the rent reduction and 
agrarian reform campaigns
According to the Party's own admission the basic 
problem in this area was the nature and composition of 
the agrarian reform committees which relied on outside 
cadres in alliance with the local poor peasants. Together
5they failed "to apply the land reform laws and regulations". 
In practice this meant that too many landlords were 
classified as reactionaries or saboteurs and that too 
many other individuals were upgraded in classification
Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 
0500 GMT, November 2, 1956; "Nghi Quyet cua Hoi Dong 
Chinh Phu Ve May Chinh Sach Cu The De Sua Chua Sai Lam 
Ve Cai Cach Ruong Dat va Chinh Don To Chuc" [Resolution 
of the Council of Ministers Concerning Several Concrete 
Policies on the Rectification of Land Reform Errors and 
Readjustment of Organizations] Nhan Dan, (November 7, 
1956), No.977, pp.1-2.
5 Ibid. , p .1.
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into the landlord category. As a result of this bias, 
which was accomplished in some cases on the basis of 
false documentation and extortion, various individuals 
were subjected to corporal punishment, false arrest, 
imprisonment, loss of civil rights, confiscation of 
property and even execution.^
It was obvious from the compensatory measures that 
the Party's main concern was the maintenance of the rural 
alliance of all classes in the period after landlord 
control had been broken. It was not the Party's intention 
to jail or execute the entire landlord class but to 
punish those who were found guilty of certain crimes.
The remaining landlords and rich peasants not in this 
category were liable to property and goods confiscation 
and redistribution. However the systematic bias described 
above seriously threatened the position of those groups 
on whom the Party had relied in the past. For example, 
the Party was now preoccupied with restoring the rights 
and privileges of families who included among their members
Ibid.; Vo Nguyen Giap, "Bai Noi Chuyen Cua Dong Chi 
Vo Nguyen Giap Ve Nghi Quyet Cua Hoi Nghi Trung Uong Lan 
Thu 10" [Speech by Comrade Vo Nguyen Giap Concerning the 
Resolution of 10th Plenum of the Central Committee],
Nhan Dan, (October 31 , 1956) , No.960 , pp.1-3; there is 
considerable debate over the precise meaning of Giap's 
use of the words "xu tri" (to execute or to discipline) 
nevertheless even those who translate xu tri as "to 
discipline" do not deny that some executions took place.
See: D. Gareth Porter, The Myth of the Bloodbath: North
Vietnam's Land Reform Reconsidered, op.cit., pp.54-55; 
and H.C. Taussig, "Land Reform Abuses", South China Morning 
Post, November 28, 1956, p.15; Taussig visited North 
Viet-Nam where he held a long discussion with Ho Chi Minh 
in November 1956. He concluded, "The landlords received 
very harsh treatment and in several cases - nobody apparently 
has any figures relating to that question in Hanoi - were 
executed by the peasants".
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war dead, war heroes, war wounded, and disabled veterans, 
demobilized or discharged troops and men presently 
serving in the armed forces.
Demobilized and discharged troops were now treated
as "revolutionary military personnel" even if they were
7landlords or children of landlords. They therefore 
became eligible for membership in the locally powerful 
peasants associations where they exerted an influence 
on the political, social and economic affairs of the 
village.
In cases where family members had been mistakenly 
classified as landlords, the rectification campaign now 
decreed that they be given favourable treatment. This 
included immediate release from jail, the restoration 
of all political rights and adequate compensation for 
land and other property already distributed. Readjustments 
were to be made in the estimates of crop area and land 
yield on which both classification and tax computation 
were based. In cases where landlord families had been 
left with insufficient land on which to live (thus 
making them "poor and hungry") additional land was to be 
given to them.
Serious errors had also been committed in the case 
of church and pagoda owned land. Several religious 
institutions had been seized and their buildings used as
"Nghi Quyet cua Hoi Dong Chinh Phu Ve May Chinh Sach 
Cu The De Sua Sai Lam Ve Cai Cach Ruong Dat Va Chinh Don 
To Chuc", op.cit.
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gheadquarters for the local land reform committees.
These buildings were now returned. In cases where the 
amount of church and pagoda land expropriated exceeded 
the limits set by law (thus rendering it impossible for 
a church or pagoda to maintain itself) the excess was 
to be returned. Errors were also committed in the 
ethnic minority areas. According to Vo Nguyen Giap 
"We indiscriminately attacked the upper class showing 
no respect for and even encroaching upon local customs 
and mores".^
Cadres who had been mis-classified and punished 
by loss of political rights were now released and 
supposedly reassigned to suitable missions. They were 
also granted compensation.
(b) Errors in Implementing Democracy
Interwoven with these mistakes were errors which 
violated "democratic legality". By this is meant both 
procedural and physical breaches of the law. Religious 
freedom, for example, was violated. Catholics in some 
areas were systematically excluded from the peasants'
g Ibid.; see also: Vietnam News Agency in Vietnamese to
Vietnam, 0517 GMT, November 20, 1956 which reports on an 
enlarged meeting of the National Catholic Liaison Committee 
held to discuss the communique of the Council of Ministers; 
and "Sua Sai 0 Vung Tong Giao" [Correcting Errors in 
Religious Regions], Nhan Dan, (November 29, 1956), No.999, 
P-1.
9 Giap, "Bai Noi Chuyen Cua Dong Chi Vo Nguyen Giap Ve Nghi 
Quyet Cua Hoi Nghi Trung Uong Lan Thu 10", op.cit.
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association because of their religion.^ Various legal 
processes were ignored thus denying persons their 
freedom of speech and movement.
During the rectification of errors campaign a great 
deal of attention was focused on the ambiguity and ill- 
defined nature of the relationship between people's 
security organs, the judiciary and other management and/or 
administrative organizations. Apparently the muddled 
nature of these relations lent itself to abuse including 
false arrest and "erroneous disciplinary measures".
The National Assembly was now designated the "people's 
supreme organ" with the responsibility to spell out in 
laws and regulations, the precise nature of democracy 
in the DRVN.^  Elections were scheduled for 1957 to 
elect people's councils and administrative committees.
(c) Errors in the Readjustment of Organizations
According to criticism published at this time the 
Party had been seriously remiss in exercising "democracy". 
Locally the "cult of the individual" or "individual
12dictatorship" served to stifle collective leadership. 
Various cadres were accused of not exercising "close
"Nghi Quyet Cua Hoi Dong Chinh Phu Ve May Chinh Sach 
Cu The De Sua Chua Sai Lam Ve Cai Cach Ruong Dat Va Chinh 
Don To Chuc", op.cit.
11 Ibid.
12 "Doan Ket Nhat Tri, Kien Quyet Chap Hanh Nghi Quyet 
Cua Hoi Nghi Trung Uong Lan Thu 10" [United Unanimously 
and Determinedly Execute the Resolution of the 10th Plenum 
of the Central Committee] Nhan Dan, (October 10, 1956),
No . 969 , p .1.
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leadership" of the land reform campaign, thus permitting
a slack investigation during the crucial phase of
classification. These cadres were accused of subjectiveness,
complacency and authoritarianism and of not actively
seeking the people's participation. They were accused
of imposing wrong disciplinary measures on cadres,
party members and ordinary people thus seriously weakening
13the efficiency of the Party at the local level.
According to Gittinger the rectification of errors 
campaign did not really begin until January 1957, the 
period from October 30 until then (phase 1) being devoted 
to a crash survey of the damage and the release from 
jail of wrongly classified and imprisoned peasants and 
cadres.
The Vietnam News Agency, for example, stated that 
by November 20 the following three steps had been completed:^
1. The first step has been taken in the 
re-adjustment of organizations, those who 
suffered from erroneous disciplinary measures 
have been released, and the correction of crop 
area and land yield estimates has been made.
2. With regard to the second step, involving the 
release of detained working persons who 
suffered from erroneous disciplinary measures, 
this has been carried out in various places.
13 Ibid.
14 Vietnam News Agency in Vietnamese morse to Vietnam, 
0900 GMT, November 28, 1956.
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3. The third step, that is, the stage, of
releasing landowners who were classified
as reactionaries has been carried out . . .
most of the cadres and Party members who
suffered from erroneous measures in the
third inter-zone have been set free.
Gittinger's second phase was divided into two parts.
The first, the reclassification of peasants, was to be
completed by Tet, in February 1957. The second part,
the restitution of property erroneously expropriated
and/or the making of suitable compensation, was to be
completed by March 1957. Phase II was to be a
recapitulation and review of the entire campaign. A
variety of problems arose which disrupted this schedule,
some involving tension and even violence between the old
cadres (who had suffered during the land reform campaign)
and new cadres (who led the land reform campaign and
15who were expected to rectify their errors). In addition,
there was some foot-dragging on the part of some who
resisted the reclassification of those incorrectly
punished. In August Nhan Dan was moved to query why the
16rectification campaign was moving so slowly.
There can be no doubt that the rend reduction and 
land reform campaigns were successful in their objectives:
15 Gittinger, "Communist Land Policy in North Vietnam", 
op.cit., pp.120-121; for a discussion of the "old cadres" 
versus the "new cadres" see Hoang Van Chi, From Colonialism 
to Communism, op.cit., pp.226-233.
16 Nhan Dan, August 20, 1957 quoted in Gittinger, op.cit
p .122 . • f
313
boosting economic production and breaking the control
exercised by rich peasants and landlords on the rural
masses. This success, however, was accompanied by a
great deal of turmoil and disruption. This was serious
enough to cause the VWP to divert its attention for a
period of several months to rectify the errors committed
in its name. Various scholars and observers have tried
to estimate the human cost involved: did as few as 185
or 800-2,500 die or did as many as 15,000; 50,000 or
17500,000 perish? It seems that a great deal of 
emotionalism, poor scholarship and even malicious bias 
may have gone into these estimates. For our purpose we 
need only observe that at that time as a result of the 
land reform campaign the North's foundation was not yet 
firm enough to provide increased support for the revolution 
in the South.
B. The Quynh Luu District Uprising
Throughout the months of October-December, according 
to various press accounts filtering out of North Viet-Nam, 
several disturbances occurred which called into question
The sources are respectively: Faber, Rot Leuchtet
der Song Cai, op.cit., p.104 (N=185 in the early period
of the land reform); Porter, "The Myth of the Bloodbath: 
North Vietnam's Land Reform Reconsidered", op.cit., p.ll 
(N=800 - 2,500); Buttinger, A Dragon Embattled, op.cit., 
Vol.2, p.914 (N=10,000 - 15,000); Fall, The Two Viet-Nams, 
op.cit., p.156 (N=50,000); and Hoang Van Chi, "Why No
Peace in Vietnam?", in Sibnarayan Ray, editor, Vietnam Seen 
from East and West (Melbourne: Thomas Nelson Australia
Ltd. , 1966) , p .3 6 ' (N=500,000) .
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the policies and popularity of the VWP and DRVN 
18government. These incidents were localized events in
reaction to specific abuses and grievances connected
with the various facets of the land reform campaign.
They were not set in motion by a VWP instigated de-
Stalinization campaign and therefore should not be
compared with the mid-1956 Polish workers' riots and the
19November Hungarian "revolution".
The most dramatic incident was the so-called Quynh
Luu uprising which occurred in the district of the same
name in the Central Viet-Nam province of Nghe An during
the first three weeks of November. Various accounts
agree that the major issue was religious discrimination
against the local Catholic community exacerbated by the
land reform campaign which further disadvantaged this 
20group. The VWP leadership recognized this problem and 
was in the process of drawing up reforms when tensions 
reached an explosive state.
Buttinger, A Dragon Embattled, op.cit., Vol.2, 
pp.915-916; Fall/ The Two Vie t-N ams, op.cit., pp. 156-157 ; 
Gittinger, "Communist Land Policy in North Vietnam", 
pp.119-120; Hoang Van Chi, From Colonialism to Communism, 
op.cit., p. 232 ; and Journal d 1 Extreme-Orient (November 
26, 1956) , pp.l and 5 which cites both "private well- 
informed sources" and a dispatch by Vietnam Press from 
Hong Kong. The possibility of a revolt had been suggested 
earlier at a PAVN conference; see: Fall, "A'Straight
Zigzag': The Road to Socialism in North Viet-Nam", op.cit.,
p.221.
19 Bernard B. Fall, "Crisis in North Vietnam", Far Eastern 
Survey (January 1957), Vol.XXVI, No.1, pp.12-15.
20 Ibid., p .102; Voice of Vietnam in Vietnamese to 
Southeast Asia, 0400 GMT, November 16, 1956; and Turley, 
"Army, Party and Society in the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam", op.cit., pp.117-118.
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Apparently the Cau Giat region of Nghe An, which 
embraces Quynh Luu district, had witnessed several
2 'murders of agrarian reform cadres prior to November 1956.
The prime motive for these killings appears to have been
revenge against particularly abusive officials who had
singled out local Catholics as "reactionaries and
saboteurs" . Local vendettas were carried out along
religious lines: Catholics versus non-Catholics.
On November 2 and 3, according to Nhan Dan,
"reactionary gangsters" implemented their plan to exploit
errors in the land reform campaign, and in particular,
22to use Catholic grievances for their own ends. Their
plan consisted of "sow(ing) disorder and resist (ing)
the local administration ... (by) luring a number of
compatriots in some villages to indulge in illegal 
23activities". In practice this meant recruiting 
neighbouring youths for paramilitary training, errecting 
defensive barricades around Quynh Yen village, and "openly 
slandering the government and compell(ing) the local
24people to supply them with rice, buffaloes and oxen".
On November 5 a delegation of district administrative 
cadres accompanied by soldiers, arrived at Quynh Yen
Vietnam Press dispatch from Quang Tri in Journal 
d 1 Extreme-Orient, November 19 , 1956 , p.5.
2 2 "Tin Them Ve Vu Bon Phan Dong Gay Lon Xon 0 May Xa 
Thuoc Huyen Quynh-Luu (Nghe-An)" [Further Information 
About Reactionary Groups Causing Disturbances in the 
Villages of Quynh Luu district (Nghe An province)]
Nhan Dan, (November 18, 1956), No.988, p.3.
2 3 Voice of Vietnam in Vietnamese to South Vietnam, 0500 
GMT, November 20, 1956.
24 Ibid.
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village "to explain to the compatriots the position and
25policy of the Government". This mission was attacked 
and beaten; twenty-eight of its members were held 
captive and a small number of arms captured. The 
prisoners were presented with a previously drawn up 
statement which they were requested to sign, admitting 
religious discrimination and "assaulting the people".
2 6This they refused to do and were therefore not released.
On November 9 a group of villagers assembled at
Cau Giat where they attempted to present petitions to
27Canadian representatives of the Vinh Fixed Team. The 
petitions asked that certain Catholic families be permitted 
to regroup to the south. It was at this time that local 
militia members intervened with the intention of dispersing 
the crowd. A scuffle broke out and the soldiers were 
forced to withdraw. They returned later with reinforcements
25 Ibid.; it is unclear whether the soldiers were drawn 
from the regional forces or were in fact a platoon from 
PAVN's 325 Infantry Division; Fall, "Crisis in North 
Vietnam", op.cit., p.12-15, states they were regional troops 
of the 325th Division in platoon strength; later, in 
The Two Viet-Nams, p.157, Fall states the entire 325th 
Division was sent to crush the rebels. Contemporary 
accounts mention regular troops belonging to the 304th 
Division; dispatch from Ben Hai in Journal d 'Extreme 
Orient, November 20, 1956, p.5.
2 6 Voice of Vietnam in Vietnamese to South Vietnam, 0500 
GMT, November 20, 1956 states that the rebels "tried to 
compel them [the soldiers and cadres] to sign a false 
report to exonerate themselves later; but, though beaten, 
our soldiers and cadres refused to sign this report";
Fall's version states the opposite: "they [the rebels]
forced the troops and party cadres publicly to confess 
their crimes and sign a prepared statement to that effect"; 
"Crisis in North Vietnam", op.cit., p.14.
27 The Quynh Luu Uprisings (Saigon: Viet-Nam Chapter of the 
Asian People's Anti-Communist League, 1957), p.16; and 
Seventh Interim Report of the International Commission for 
Supervision and Control in Vietnam, August 1, 1956 to April 
30 , 1^57) (London: hTmTsTcTT^  December 19 57 ) , Cmnd .335. p. 11.
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thus precipitating another confrontation. Violence 
broke out and shots were fired. Immediately rumours of 
this incident swept Quynh Luu district increasing the 
tension everywhere. Between then and November 12 two 
more government delegations were dispatched to negotiate 
with the protestors and each failed. The third delegation, 
composed of high level party members and the representatives 
of the administrative authorities of Nghe An was seized 
and held captive thus setting the stage for an even more 
violent confrontation.
On November 13, a crowd of 3-4,000 persons, mainly
Catholics from the villages of Quynh Yen, Quynh Thanh,
Quynh Ba and Quynh Lam decided to march on the district
seat, Quynh Luu. En route they were confronted by
regular troops who instructed the marchers to disperse
and to return home. According to the official version
"their leaders refused to listen and rushed to the soldiers 
2 8and beat them". The crowd, it should be pointed out, 
was armed with farming tools and several weapons including 
several captured earlier .
This disturbance attracted the attention of 
neighbouring villagers who assembled on the scene. In 
the ensuing melee the regular soldiers attempted
Voice of Vietnam in Vietnamese to South Vietnam, 0500 
GMT, November 20, 1956; eyewitness accounts to these 
events stated that as many as 12,000 persons were involved 
in the confrontation with PAVN troops but that only "a 
few were killed" due to the crowd control technique of 
the army regulars, see: United Press dispatch from Saigon
in The Bangkok Post (November 29, 1956), p.4. This report 
is based on refugee accounts and a briefing by the United 
States Information Service in Tourane (Da-Nang); it 
tallies closely with the official version.
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unsuccessfully to keep the two groups apart. When
"the reactionary elements" continued to attack the
soldiers were forced to fight back. As a result several
persons were killed and many more wounded.
The end came the next day (November 14) when PAVN
overcame all resistance and occupied Quynh Yen village,
the headquarters of the rebels. Militia men and cadres
held captive since November 5 were released. Troops
arrested the leaders of the revolt and disbanded the
youth para-military group which had been formed previously.
Within a week calm had returned sufficiently so that the
Cau Giat market was reopened (November 17) and the Canh
Truong Cathedral was once again holding Sunday religious 
29services.
On November 21 it was announced that "order and
30security (had) been restored". A similar impression
was given by Pham Van Bach, the Interior Minister, in
an interview with Jenna Dumasova, a Czech correspondent,
31broadcast on December 9. According to Gittinger,
"the situation was well enough in hand that regular army
troops were withdrawn and local militia reassigned to
32the sensitive areas "by late February".“
Other accounts, supposedly based on eyewitness 
reports, paint a more severe picture. For example, Hoang
29 Voice of Vietnam in Vietnamese to South Vietnam, 0500 
GMT, November 21, 1956.
30 Ibid.
31 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 
0500 GMT, December 9, 1956.
3 2 Gittinger, "Communist Land Policy in North Vietnam", 
op.cit., p.120.
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Van Chi has written that "twenty thousand peasants armed
with sticks and other crude weapons, had fought against
3 3a whole division of regular troops". Bernard Fall
states that PAVN's 325th division was deployed to crush
the rebellion and that "close to 6,000 farmers were
34deported or executed". Joseph Buttinger cites claims
by unnamed Western observers that "about 1,000 peasants
were killed or wounded between November 10 and 20, and
35several thousand arrested and deported". Whatever 
the magnitude of this civil disturbance it appears that 
it was generated by local grievances and confined to the 
district of Quynh Luu alone and that it was relatively 
short-lived.
One facet of this uprising remains as yet fully 
unexplained: the extent to which outside forces
(i.e. agents of the RVN) were involved and whether or 
not they were in contact with a clandestine organization 
which opposed the DRVN. According to official reports 
appearing in the DRVN press and broadcast over the radio 
a "reactionary clique" had begun their planning "long in
3 6advance" to incite discontent among the Catholic community.
Hoang Van Chi, From Colonialism to Communism, op.cit., 
p . 232 .
34 Fall, The Two Viet-Nams, op.cit., p.157; according 
to the account in The Quynh Luu Uprisings, op.cit., p.14, 
other military units were involved as well: 269 Artillery
Battalion and the 176 Regiment of the 316th Division, 
the 101st Regiment and elements of the 321st Division.
3 5 Buttinger, A Dragon Embattled, op.cit., Vol.2, p.915, 
footnote 14 4.
3 6 Voice of Vietnam in Vietnamese to South Vietnam, 0500 
GMT, November 20, 1956.
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Minister of the Interior Pham Van Bach in the above
cited interview claimed that "the ring leaders arrested
in Quynh Yen village, Quynh Luu district have been
identified as agents who had previously forced people
37of the area to go to the south".
One refugee account, made by a woman who fled
Nghe An, stated that "the revolt was the work of a
secret organization which had been active for some time
3 8and had killed several cadres of the agrarian reform".
This same source described "revolutionary elements"
(i.e. anti-DRVN here) in the army who made guerilla
attacks against "the VC [read PAVN] forces". From what
we know about previous clandestine operations conducted
3 9against the DRVN it seems not unreasonable to conclude 
that "outside forces" may have participated in these 
events; they may even have instigated various confrontations. 
However it appears obvious that sufficient local grievances 
existed to account for the fact that an uprising occurred 
in the first place.
What about other disturbances? There appears to 
be no evidence to suggest that a coordinated uprising 
was attempted by "reactionary elements" elsewhere in North 
Viet-Nam. DRVN sources do admit that "(i)n a number of
Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast 
Asia, 0500 GMT, December 9, 1956.
3 8 Vietnam Press dispatch from Quang Tri in Journal 
d'Extreme Orient, November 19, 1956, p.5.
39 Cf. "Lansdale Team's Report on Covert Saigon Mission 
in '54 and '55", in Sheehan, compiler, The Pentagon Papers, 
op.cit., pp.53-66.
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other regions there have been a number of elements who
have committed sabotage and sowed [sic] confusion among 
4 0the people". Neither the location, scope, duration 
nor intensity of these incidents was described. Bernard 
Fall has written that between November 5-13 the Quynh 
Luu rebellion had spread "to neighbouring districts"
41but that PAVN units effectively sealed off the region.
Hoang Van Chi states without citation that "there were
reports from several areas (Bac Ninh, Nam Dinh for
example) of peasant uprising but according to the official
sources serious trouble was avoided by the tact of
42soldiers and cadres". From the context in which these
accounts appeared, these "uprisings" occurred prior
to November 1956. Gittinger also provides evidence of
similar - but not equally violent or extensive -
demonstrations in a number of other parts of North Viet-Nam.
In a region south of Hanoi, for example, "local officials
apparently openly supported the dissidents in their
4 3complaints against Government policy". Elsewhere, 
according to an account published in Saigon, "local militia
^  Voice of Vietnam in Vietnamese to Southeast Asia,
0400 GMT, November 16, 1956.
4 1 Fall, "Crisis in North Vietnam", op.cit.
42 Chi, From Colonialism to Communism, op.cit., p.232; 
another source states, "It is certain that the well-publicised 
uprising north of Vinh on November 13th was not the only 
disturbance to the peace, though the other incidents were 
relatively minor riots by discontented southerners bereft of 
their hopes of returning to Cochin-China [sic] as party 
or government leaders", "The Ho Chi Minh Way", The Economist 
(January 5, 1957), Vol.CLXXXII, No.5915, p.41.
43 Gittinger, "Communist Land Policy in North Vietnam", op.cit., p .119.
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troops apparently deserted to the cause of the
demonstrators, forcing the regime to bring in the better
4 4disciplined regular army units" .
Finally, there was a report of disturbances amongst
the Tho and Nung ethnic minority peoples in the provinces
of Cao Bang, Bac Kan, Lang Son, Thai Nguyen and Tuyen
Quang resulting from the alleged execution of members
4 5of the family of Vi Van Dinh, a Tho chieftan. They 
had apparently been sentenced to death by a court in Lang 
Son province. In the absence of other corroborating 
evidence it is impossible to confirm the alleged details 
of this event. We do know however, of the concern 
expressed by DRVN officials over the mistakes committed 
against sections of the ethnic minorities during the 
land reform campaign.
C. The Nhan Van - Giai Pham Affair
Throughout 1955-56 certain members of the DRVN's 
intellectual community comprising artists, journalists, 
lecturers, poets, musicians, lawyers, students and writers 
began to express their concern about the lack of freedom 
of expression in their respective fields of interest.
This concern was deepened as a result of the numerous 
errors committed in the course of agrarian reform movement, 
and gradually the criticism itself broadened to include
Land Reform Failures in Communist North Viet Nam 
(Saigon: Review Horizons, 19 57) , p.10 .
45 Associated Press, "Ethnic Minorities Rise Against Viet 
Minh", The Times of Viet Nam Weekly, Vol.I, No.46 
(December 1§ 5 6), p.4~.
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a much wider range of issues. This concern was
intensified as a result of external factors: Khrushchev's
denunciation of Stalin (February), the Polish workers'
uprising (June) and the Hundred Flowers Campaign in
China (May). During the final quarter of 1956 this
intellectual discontent found expression in a number of
publications which printed material highly critical of
PAVN, VWP and DRVN government officials. Foreign technical
advisers were also the subject of comment, mainly for
4 6their overbearing attitudes.
The seeds of discontent had began to sprout prior 
to the CPSU's Twentieth Congress and the start of China's 
Hundred Flowers Movement. They grew to maturity and 
blossomed simultaneously with the recognition that serious 
errors had been committed in the movement for agrarian 
reform. They were in flower at the same time as the 
peasants' uprising in Nghe An province; as a result the 
so-called "revolt of the intellectuals" took on an added 
significance in the eyes of the VWP leadership.
Fall, The Two Viet-Nams, op.cit., p.189 writes that 
Russian experts were accused of being "overbearing" and 
criticized for "driving around in big cars". The entire 
period of the Vietnamese "Hundred Flowers Movement" deserves 
closer study. No doubt in future some scholar with access 
to the Vietnamese-language original publications as well 
as other materials will alter our prevailing view of this 
important but little known episode. Our present understanding 
is based on the following sources: Tram Hoa Dua No Tren
Pat Bac [The Blooming of the Hundred Flowers in North 
Vietnam] (Saigon: Mat Tran Bao Ve Tu Do Van Hoa, 1959) ,
the book consists of two parts. Part I presents a history 
of the intellectual movement. Part II presents brief 
biographies of some 15 writers and excerpts from their 
writings; Hoa Mai, editor, The "Nhan Van" Affair (Saigon:
Asian Poeple's Anti-Communist League, 1958); Chi, From 
Colonialism to Communism, op.cit., pp.233-243; Nhu Phong,
"Intellectuals, Writers and Artists", in Honey, editor,
cont'd
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During the Resistance War many members of Viet-Nam's
intelligentsia threw in their lot with anti-French
forces, applying their talents to the anti-colonial
struggle. Many left their safe-havens in France to
engage in the "national salvation" effort. At the war's
end they elected to remain in the North and practise
their professions. At this time two areas of contention
developed: (1) the distinction drawn between Party-
approved (and therefore supported) intellectuals and those
without sponsorship and (2) the tension between "creative
freedom" and the attempt to direct artistic expression 
47from above. As for the first area of contention, it 
seems that many intellectuals were both disappointed and 
frustrated by the lack of concern shown for their welfare 
by the authorities. Others experienced a decline in their 
social and material standards from what they had known in 
either France or pre-war Viet-Nam. Regarding the second 
area, it seems that with the end of the war the cohesion 
built up began to erode slowly. As artists and writers 
began to explore other themes and topics besides those 
being officially stressed (anti-French struggle, national 
reconstruction, national reunification etc.) they encountered 
difficulties. Poet Hoang Cam, for example, led the 
struggle to unfetter artists and writers from continued
46 cont'd
North Vietnam Today, op.cit., pp.70-92; P.J. Honey, "The 
Revolt of the Intellectuals in North Vietnam", The World Today, 
Vol.XIII, No.6 (June 1957), pp.250-260; and Elizabeth 
Godfrey, "The Emergence of a Communist State in Vietnam",
M .A . Thesis, Cornell University, 1962, pp.72-89.
47 Chi, From Colonialism to Communism, op.cit., pp.233-237.
325
control by the military, from his post as a member of
4 8PAVN's Arts and Letters Bureau.
In 1955 Cam, in cooperation with Tran Dan and Tu
Phac succeeded in obtaining the signatures of nearly
30 other artists and writers on a petition to the Party's
49Central Committee. The petition called for the
abolishment of Party control of arts and letters in the
army. They submitted an "Outline Policy for Arts and
Letters" with this petition which set forth three 
n 50proposals:
1. Hand over the leadership of arts and letters 
to the artists and writers.
2. Establish an arts and letters association 
within the structure of the army organization.
3. Abolish the existing military regime insofar 
as it affects the artists and writers serving 
in the armed forces.
In April 1956 further tension was revealed in the
51awarding of prizes for the 1954-55 literary competitions.
A group of intellectuals were unsuccessful in their attempt 
to change the selections by which prizes were awarded 
to those writers who hewed the Party line.
Nhu Phong, "Intellectuals, Writers and Artists", 
op.cit., p.80.
49 Van Nghe, No.11 (April 1958) , p.106 cited in ibid.
50 Ibid.
Hoa Mai, ed., The "Nhan Van" Affair, op.cit., pp.38-41.
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During the months of July and August, Party-supported
officials such as To Huu, came under increased attack
52in the course of study sessions held in Hanoi. To Huu, 
it has been alleged, was forced to admit publicly that 
he was out of contact with the rank and file membership 
of the Artists' and Writers' association. A recapitulation 
conference of the board of this association met on August 
21. There the leaders admitted to a whole host of errors.
It was in these circumstances that Phan Khoi, a greatly 
respected writer, was given official permission to 
publish Nhan Van in an attempt to encourage wider 
discussion.
By this time, however, the full force of errors 
committed in the land reform campaign were well known. 
Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin had already been 
publicly admitted and the Polish workers' uprising (of 
June 28, 1956) was general knowledge. Hanoi's intellectuals 
took up these issues, shifting from their earlier criticism 
of "bureaucratic stifling of freedom in the arts and 
letters" to criticism of the lack of civil rights, the 
lack of democratic freedom, as well as the "high-handed 
and dictatorial behavior of senior (Party and government) 
officials". They also argued for a new constitution and 
civil code.
According to the available evidence, this dissent 
coalesced in early 1956 around the Minh Due publishing 
house which produced various critical tracts and pamphlets
52 Ibid. , p .7 0.
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53in addition to the influential journal Giai Pham. The
first issue was produced in March and carried the writings
of Hoang Cam, Van Cao, Le Dat, Tran Dan, Sy Ngoc, Tu
54Phac, Phung Quan, Nguyen Sang and Tu Vu. Allegedly
one of the poems by Le Dat was a veiled criticism, if
not against Ho Chi Minh himself, then against the Viet-Nam
55Workers' Party. Soon after the journal was seized
and Tran Dan, a contributor, arrested.
On August 29, it reappeared under the title Giai
Pham Mua Thu. Unlike the earlier Giai Pham, this
publication picked up support from a considerably wider
5 6group of intellectuals. It published a second issue 
in October and a third in December (under the new title 
Giai Pham Mua Dong). It would appear that VWP officials 
were prepared for the moment to tolerate such unprecedented 
written criticism. A fortnight after the issue of Giai 
Pham Mua Thu appeared, permission was given to publish 
another periodical, Nhan Van, under the editorship of 
Phan Khoi. A further five issues were produced until in 
mid-December, it too was forced to cease production.
Issue number six, apparently in the process of being printed, 
was seized before it could be distributed.
53Chi, From Colonialism to Communism, op.cit., p.236;
Giai Pham (Literary Works) was first published in March 1956; 
it was followed by a journal of the same name (except for the 
addition of the season) which numbered its issues from August 
1956: Giai Pham Mua Thu (Autumn Literary Works) No.l (August
1956); Giai Pham Mua Thu No.2 (October 1956); and Giai Pham 
Mua Dong (Winter Literary Works), No.l (December 1956).
54 Tram Hoa Dua No Tren Dat Bac, op.cit., p.102.
55 Chi, loc.cit., p.236-237 .
5 6 Nhu Phong, "Writers, Intellectuals and Artists", op.cit.,
p . 82 .
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In addition to these major publications, outlets
for satire and further criticism were found in various
other publications such as Pat Moi, a student publication,
Tram Hoa and Van the official publication of the Artists'
57and Writers' Union. Thus during the time period from
mid-September to mid-December, when new press laws were
introduced, the VWP appears to have exercised tolerance
in its dealings with dissident intellectuals. After mid-
December this tolerance gave away to slow but calculated
moves to circumscribe this brief Vietnamese "Hundred
Flowers Movement" that is, at least six months before
5 8the Chinese called a halt to their experiment. There
are several reasons for this. Firstly, the press in Viet-
Nam was seen by officials as "a tool of struggle for the
59people". According to this view the press "must serve 
the interests of the country and the people, safeguard 
the people's democratic regime and support the government 
of the Vietnam [Democratic] Republic". In this respect 
the Party judged the dissident intellectuals as failures. 
According to Xuan Troung:
57 xbid., pp.83 and 85; Godfrey, "The Emergence of a 
Communist State", op.cit., p.87.
5 8 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 
0500 GMT, December 15, 1956; the Chinese decision to end 
the "Hundred Flowers" campaign can be dated to May-June,
1957, see Hinton, Communist China in World Politics, op.cit., 
p . 33.
59 The quotation is taken from the DRVN government decree 
imposing restraints on the press; Vietnam News Agency in 
Egnlish morse to Southeast Asia, 0500 GMT, December 15,
1956; see also Associated Press dispatch from Hong Kong 
in The New York Times (December 16, 1956), p.2.
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Nhan Van talked about the "national unification", 
but does it know the enemy radio station in 
Saigon has used its slanderous and distoting 
articles to attack our regime? A number of enemy 
papers in South Vietnam have used Nhan Van1s 
articles to defame North Vietnam, split the 
people, and to create doubts among the peopleof South Vietnam.60
Secondly, VWP leaders in light of events then unfolding
in Hungary (and no doubt Nghe An province) must have
feared the long term ramifications. Another Party-
endorsed attack on the "Nhan Van-Giai Pham group" stated
they [the dissident intellectuals] took advantage 
of the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union, which condemned the worship 
of individuals and the mistake of Comrade Stalin.
They took advantage of the disturbances in 
Poland and the counter-revolutionary agitation 
in Hungary. They took advantage of our Central 
Committee's uncovering of mistakes in the land 
reform ... attempting to strike directly at 
the regime and the leadership of the Party, 
on both the political and artistic fronts. 1
II. CHOU EN-LAI'S VISIT (November 1956)
On November 16 in the midst of these events the 
DRVN Foreign Ministry issued the following communique,
Xuan Truong, "Opposing Slander and Distortion",
Nhan Dan (December 10, 1956) as broadcast by Vietnam News 
Agency in Vietnamese morse to South Vietnam, 0630 GMT, 
December 14, 1956.
^  Nam Moc, "A Few Observations on Our Literary Theory 
and Criticism during the Past Fifteen Years", Nghien Cuu 
Van Hoc (Literary Research) (October 1960) translated 
by U.S. Joint Publications Research Service, Selected 
Translations on North Vietnam (May 18, 1961), No.3,
JPRS 8304.
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at the invitation of the government of the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam Mr Chou En-lai,
Prime Minister [Premier] of the People's 
Republic of China will arrive on November 18,
1956 for a visit to Vietnam. 2^
On the following day the New China News Agency
announced that Chou En-lai's visit to Viet-Nam was also
part of seven-nation swing through Asia which would also
encompass Cambodia, India, Burma, Pakistan, Nepal and 
6 3Afghanistan. Viet-Nam was the only socialist country 
on the list. Because Chou En-lai's trip came immediately 
after the Hungarian and Quynh Luu uprisings (and during 
the start of the intellectuals' revolt) it has been 
suggested that the possibility of Chinese intervention 
was in the air. For example Brian Shaw, an Australian 
scholar, has written:
Chou En-lai made his first visit to the DRVN 
in November 1956 in the wake of admissions 
in Hanoi of "errors" in the land reform, the 
crushing of a limited armed revolt against 
the Hanoi Government, and the Soviet Army's 
intervention in Hungary. The Chinese 
Premier's pledge that China would always 
oppose "great nation chauvinism" must have 
had special meaning in Hanoi, for the 
Vietnamese evidently had misgivings that 
China might use the armed dissidence in the
Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia,
1100 GMT, November 16, 1956. The first public hint of 
Chou's visit came five hours earlier when VNA broadcasting 
in English morse to Southeast Asia at 0508 GMT stated, "It 
has been learned that Chou En-lai ... will soon visit the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam". This lead the FBIS monitors 
to comment editorially that the "timing of the forthcoming 
event [was expressed] in the vaguest terms". The implications 
seems to be that the Chinese Premier's trip was arranged 
on short notice, thus providing further slender evidence 
for those who have interpreted Chou's trip ominously. On 
the other hand, in the author's view, no special significance 
need be attributed to the timing and style of these 
announcements.
r o New China News Agency in English morse to Europe, 0800 GMT, 
November 17, 1956.
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DRVN as an excuse for direct intervention.
This fear could hardly have been alleviated 
by knowledge that Peking had urged Moscow 
to use force to crush the Hungarian uprising 
only a few days before.64
Elizabeth Godfrey, an American scholar, has also
suggested that Chou En-lai's visit was timed to provide
crucial backing for the recently ousted VWP Secretary-
65General, Truong Chinh. According to this view the 
VWP leadership had split along pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese 
lines. The dismissal of Truong Chinh from his Party 
post was a blow to the Chinese faction, which he allegedly 
headed. Chou's timely arrival, according to this view, 
prevented a further weakening of Truong Chinh's party 
standing.
It will be argued here that Chou En-lai's visit 
to the DRVN was prompted by three considerations, none 
of which encompassed the possibility of Chinese intervention
Brian Shaw, "China and North Vietnam: Two Revolutionary
Paths (Part I)", Current Scene (November 7, 1971), Vol.IX, 
No.11, p.4. This article is taken from Shaw's PhD thesis 
which was unavailable to me at the time of writing. See 
also, Honey "Revolt of the Intellectuals in North Vietnam", 
op.cit., p.251.
65 Godfrey, "The Emergence of a Communist State", op.cit., 
pp.69-72, and 85-86. According to Godfrey the VWP, as 
led by Ho Chi Minh, was under challenge by a "fanatical, 
harsh and doctrinnaire group" led by Truong Chinh and 
which also included, among others, Le Van Luong (recently 
dropped from the Politburo for his errors in the land 
reform campaign) and Nguyen Son (an allegedly pro-Chinese 
general who either died or was murdered on October 22,
1956). Chou's visit was timed to bolster the sagging 
fortunes of this group. Godfrey claims that Son's death 
was "sudden" (p.69) whereas another source claims he was 
"secretly liquidated"; "Uncle Ho's Garden: New Spring
Perennials To Be Set Out", The Times of Viet Nam Weekly 
(December 1, 1956), No.46, p .5. This issue deserves 
further investigation.
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to keep any particular faction of the VWP leadership in 
power. Chou's arrival in Hanoi came immediately after 
the CCP's 2nd plenum (8th congress) had heard a political 
report by Liu Shao-chi on the situation in Eastern 
Europe. The main reason for Chou's trip was to explain 
China's newly formulated policy on the nature of inter­
state relations within the Socialist bloc. Undoubtedly 
Chou sought VWP understanding and approval. It would 
appear from the text of the joint communique issued after 
Chou's visit that the Chinese Premier had also come to 
discuss problems related to Viet-Nam's reunification under 
the terms of the Geneva Agreements as well as the nature 
of continued PRC aid and technical assistance to the DRVN.
There are several reasons for discounting the 
possibility of Chinese intervention in Viet-Nam in late 
1956. Firstly, the Quynh Luu uprising as we have seen 
was a localized affair based on grievances arising from 
religious discrimination in the conduct of the land reform 
campaign. It was quickly suppressed, in fact before the 
arrival of the Chinese Premier. The formal announcement 
that "order and security had been restored" was made 
while Chou was still in Hanoi. In other words VWP leaders 
were in a position to demonstrate that their authority 
was in no way threatened by these or any other disturbances. 
As regards the Nhan Van-Giai Pham affair it seems unlikely 
that the Chinese would wish to council the suppression 
of these views at this time. It should be recalled that 
similar ferment, the Hundred Flowers Movement, was just 
beginning to blossom in their own country and that the
¥
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the decision to end it (the so-called rectification
6 6campaign of 1957) was still several months away.
Further, initial criticism of Nhan Van has already 
appeared in the Party controlled press on November 10
6 7over a week before the Chinese delegation paid a visit.
Secondly, it would appear that China had adopted 
a much more "liberal" view on the nature of relations 
between socialist states than the Soviet Union. As 
events in Poland and Hungary unfolded over the course 
of 1956 it was clear that serious disagreement had arisen 
between Moscow and Peking. According to Donald Zagoria, 
China had been sympathetic towards Polish leaders from 
the start. At the 8th Congress of the CCP, held in 
September 1956, for example,
Roderick MacFarquhar, The Origins of the Cultural 
Revolution, Vol.I, Contradictions Among the" People (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1974), pp.177-183.
According to MacFarquhar1s reconstruction the Chinese 
leadership decided sometime during mid-November 1956 and 
mid-January 1957 to launch a rectification campaign. In 
mid-November 1956 Mao Tse-tung was on record as favouring 
such a course while in mid-January a Chinese periodical 
Chung-kuo Ch'ing nien (Chinese Youth) revealed that the 
CCP's Central Committee had decided to launch a rectification 
campaign "as from 1958". However no firm decisions were 
taken until February when Chou En-lai returned and reported 
on his overseas tour. It was not until early March that 
these decisions were publicly announced. MacFarquhar's 
detailed examination of the Chinese side of these affairs 
lends support to the contention being developed here that 
Chou did not come to Viet-Nam to counsel VWP leaders on 
their "Hundred Flowers" affair.
6 7 Godfrey, "The Emergence of a Communist State", op.cit., 
p.84-5 argues that the suspension of Nhan Van (Humanities) 
and Chou En-lai's visit were not connected as the first 
disciplinary actions against Nhan Van were taken on November 
10th. It seems that criticism of Nhan Van began as early 
as September 1956, see Nguyen Chuong, "Important Errors 
in Nhan Van and in Giai Pham Mua Thu", Nhan Dan, September 
20, 1956, cited in Hoa Mai, The "Nhan Van" Affair, op.cit., 
pp.51-55.
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Mao, in conversation with [Edward] Ochab,
[first secretary of the Polish Party]
"showed sympathy for the Polish liberal 
faction and for Gomulka". At one point, 
when Mao and Ochab were discussing Molotov's 
ouster as Soviet Foreign Minister, Mao is 
alleged to have said: "It seems that China
and Poland have been keeping company for some 
time already without even knowing it. It is 
good company and we are glad of it". Mao's 
attitude encouraged Ochab to speak out about 
Poland's trouble with Moscow. Ochab, in the 
presence of Soviet delegate Anastas Mikoyan, 
allegedly described difficulties with the 
Russians over trade and domestic autonomy.
Mikoyan at another point reacted strongly 
to Ochab's moderate appraisal of the Poznan 
riots. Ochab remarked that the Poles knew 
more about what was going on in Poland then 
the Russians, adding "our people will no 
longer tolerate taking orders from abroad".
At this point Mikoyan exploded and Ochab 
silently shook hands with Mao and left the 
room. Mao turned and followed Ochab, 
ignoring Mikoyan. According to Miss Lewis,
Mikoyan piqued at this incident "boarded a 
plan the same day and returned to Moscow 
although the Congress had not closed ."6 8
In October, the Polish Party held its 8th Plenum. A
Soviet delegation, led by N.S. Khrushchev, attended in
an attempt to "forestall the installation of a new
'Liberal' leadership committed to freeing Poland from
69Soviet control". It failed and Gomulka was elected the 
Party's First Secretary on October 21. Two days later 
the Hungarian revolt began with massive student demonstrations 
in Budapest. In these circumstances China advised Moscow 
against armed intervention in Poland. The Chinese view
Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, op.cit., pp.55-56; 
Zagoria relies on reports by Flora Lewis who had access 
to unnamed Polish sources, see pg.409.
69 MacFarquhar, The Origins of the Cultural Revolution, 
op.cit., p.170.
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in this matter, according to Zagoria, was that Poland 
was "not attempting to secede from the Bloc but only
7 0[trying] to follow a distinctive path to socialism".
Although the Chinese eventually condoned and even 
encouraged Russian suppression of the Hungarian rebels, 
this decision came only after the Hungariansthemselves 
declared their aims as including, inter alia, secession 
from the Warsaw Pact. It would appear that China had 
initially adopted a position sympathetic towards the 
Hungarian "liberals", although much less so than its 
support for Polish leaders. However when it became clear 
that the Hungarians were advocating secession the Chinese 
changed their policy and in the interests of bloc unity 
encouraged the Russian suppression which followed.
The nature of socialist bloc unity and relations 
between socialist states was under revision in other 
quarters besides Poland and Hungary. Palmiro Togliatti, 
the head of the Italian Communist Party, produced some 
of the most persuasive arguments in favour of "polycentrism". 
Yugoslav leaders, now back in Moscow's good graces
Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, op.cit., p.56;
Zagoria's excellent book was written before the Sino-Soviet 
polemics became openly revealing. On the Chinese attitude 
see: "The Origins and Development of the Differences
Between The Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves, Comment 
on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU", 
by the editorial departments of Renmin Ribao (People's 
Daily) and Hongqi (Red Flag) in The Polemic on the General 
Line of the International Communist Movement (Peking:
Foreign Languages Press, 1965), pp.67-69 especially.
Radvanyi, Hungary and the Superpowers, op.cit., pp.13, and 
21-29, provides an insider's view.
71 Giorgio Galli, "Italian Communism", in William E. Griffith, 
editor, Communism in Europe: Continuity, and Change, and
the Sino-Soviet Dispute, Vol.1, (New York: Pergamon Press, 
1964), pp.351-364.
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(temporarily anyway) were also plugging for greater 
autonomy and independence in the relations between the 
people's democracies and Russia. Throughout 1956, in 
fact, the Soviets acquiesced to Yugoslav arguments, but 
made it clear only in the bilateral relations between 
Belgrade and Moscow. However, with the onset of violent 
rebellion in Hungary, the Soviets were forced to make a 
more generalized policy statement which they issued 
on October 30, 1956. According to an analysis by Klaus 
Mehnert:
in its search for a formula for its relationship 
to the Eastern European members of the 'camp', 
one which would satisfy these states and at the 
same time keep its own dominant position more 
or less intact, the Kremlin came up with the 
expression sodruzhestvo (literally: co-friendship,
like sosuchestvovanie = co-existence), which might 
be translated as 'friendship association' (in 
the sense of 'commonwealth'). The expression 
'sodruzhestvo of the socialist countries' had 
already made its appearance the year before, 
but it was not defined until the Declaration 
of October 30: complete equality of status,
respect for territorial immunity, national 
independence and sovereignty, mutual non­
interference in domestic affairs, and co-operation 
in the fields of economy, politics and culture.^
Liu Shao-chi was in Moscow at the time this delcaration
73was being drawn up, and he was privy to its content. Two
Klaus Mehnert, Peking and Moscow (New York: Mentor
Books, 1964), pp.371-372.
7 3 MacFarquhar, The Origins of the Cultural Revolution, 
op.cit., pp.170-171; "At that time the leaders of the CPSU 
accepted our suggestion and on October 30, 1956 issued the 
Soviet Government's "Declaration on the Foundations of the 
Development and Further Strengthening of Friendship and 
Cooperation Between the Soviet Union and Other Socialist 
Countries", in which they examined some of their own past 
mistakes in handling their relations with fraternal countries.
On November 1, the Chinese Government issued a statement 
expressing support for the Soviet Government's declaration", 
quoted in "The Origin and Development of the Differences 
Between Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves", op.cit., pp.69-70
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days later on November 1 the Chinese released a major
statement endorsing the Soviet declaration. The October
30 statement, it should be pointed out, was the first
Russian concession to the principles of equality in the
relations among all the Communist parties. The Chinese
statement took the opportunity to support Gomulka,
pointing out that one should not confuse "Gomulkaism"
(an expression of the "just demands of the broadest
mass of the people") and reaction (the conspiratorial
activities of "an extremely small number of reactionary
elements"). The PRC's November 1 statement ended with
a warning against "big power chauvinism", which "inevitably
results in serious damage to the solidarity and common
74cause of the socialist countries".
This, coupled with the violent Russian suppression
of the Hungarian Rebellion, is the backdrop to Chou En-lai's
visit to Asia. In his dealings with the DRVN officials
Chou explained the Chinese position on the nature of
relations between socialist states and he sought their
support. Elsewhere on his tour, Chou tried to soften
the impact of Russ.ian intervention in Hungary .
Chou En-lai arrived in Hanoi on November 18.
According to Elizabeth Godfrey, the manner of Chou's
reception tends to confirm the rumours of a split between
7 5pro-Russian and pro-Chinese wings of the VWP. Although 
Chou held talks with Ho, he was met at the airport by 
and accompanied throughout by Pham Van Dong. And,
Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, op.cit., p.57.
75 Godfrey, "The Emergence of a Communist State", op.cit.,
p . 86 .
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according to Godfrey, Ho remained noticeably off stage 
during Chou's tour.
The manner in which Chou En-lai was received, in 
accordance with Vietnamese protocol, provides no evidence 
of a split in the VWP. Chou En-lai was making a state 
visit in his capacity as Chinese Premier. He was met 
by his counter-part, the Vietnamese Premier, Pham Van 
Dong. It would have been quite extraordinary if Ho Chi 
Minh, the DRVN President, had gone to the airport to 
receive an official who was not also a head of state 
(Ho did not meet Mikoyan when he arrived in April, for 
example). At any rate, Chou En-lai met Ho Chi Minh on 
at least three occasions during his tour, (see Table 6-2). 
There was thus sufficient contact for high level discussion.
TABLE 6-2
CHOU EN-LAI'S SCHEDULE DURING HIS VISIT TO THE DRVN
(18-22 November 1956)
Date Event
18 November
19 November
20 November
Chou En-lai arrives in Hanoi;
Welcoming speech at the airport 
(Premier Chou and Pham Van Dong);
Chou received by Ho Chi Minh;
Rally in Ba Dinh square (N=6,000); 
Reception at Presidential Place;
Chou - Ho meet again.
Chou visits the China-Vietnam 
Friendship Association; Speeches 
by Chou - Dong;
Chou - Dong confer;
Evening reception;
Chou attends cultural performance.
Chou visits Jade mountain pagoda,
Hai Ba Trung temple, Union Match 
factory, Gia Lam railways works;
Chou delivers talk at Hanoi University; 
PRC Embassy hosts reception; speeches 
by Chou - Dong.
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Date
21 November
22 November
Event
Ho Chi Minh hosts dinner for Chou.
PRC - DRVN joint communique.
Chou departs for Phnom Penh.
The view that Chou En-lai1s visit was timed to
provide crucial support for Truong Chinh, the alleged
leader of the pro-Chinese faction, may be similarly
dismissed. It should be recalled that Truong Chinh (in
1950 a founding member of the Vietnam-Soviet Friendship
Association) was held partly responsible for failures in
the conduct of the land reform campaign because of his
role as VWP Secretary—General. He was dismissed from
his post. However Truong Chinh was not expelled from
the Party Central Committee and in fact retained his place
on the Politburo; other individuals more directly
7 6involved, received much more severe punishment. According 
to press and radio accounts Chinh made two appearances 
during Chou's visit: (1) on November 18 at Pham Van Dong's
official reception at the Presidential Palace and (2) on 
November 29 at the reception given by the Chinese Ambassador 
Lo Kuei-po. In both instances he was invited in his 
capacity as Politburo member. As both occasions were state
Ho Viet Thang was expelled from the VWP Central Committee, 
Le Van Luong was dropped from the VWP Politburo and 
Secretariat whereas Truong Chinh, although forced to 
relinquish the post of Party Secretary-General kept his 
position in the Politburo and continued as assistant 
director of the Central Land Reform Committee.
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rather than Party affairs it is not surprising to find 
that Truong Chinh (who held no state position) was 
listed according to protocol, after other individuals 
who held state positions but who were outranked by Chinh 
in Party standing. In short, the rank-order of names 
for state occasions is not an appropriate measure of 
Party standing (or lack thereof).
In the interval between his dismissal as Party
Secretary-General and Chou En-lai's arrival Chinh made
at least two public appearances as a representative of
the Politburo. On November 2 he addressed a Congress
of the National Salvation Youth League and on November 9
he addressed a gathering of Party officials on the Suez 
77situation. Thus it would appear that Truong Chinh 
was playing an active role in Party affairs in advance 
of Chou's arrival. He continued to do so after Chou's 
departure.
An analysis of the various speeches made by Pham Van 
Dong and Chou En-lai reveals that three areas dominated 
their discussions: (1) the nature of bloc unity (2) Viet-Nam's
unification and (3) Chinese aid. The Chinese formula 
for bloc unity in the post-Stalin era was alluded to 
by Chou En-lai on November 19 in a speech made on the 
premises of the Vietnam-China Association. Here Chou stated 
that the "friendship and cooperation" between China and 
Viet-Nam had been successfully based on the Five Principles
Cf. Voice of Vietnam in Vietnamese to South Vietnam, 
1200 GMT, November 5, 1956 and'Vietnam News Agency in 
English morse to Southeast Asia, 1100 GMT, November 9, 
1956 .
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of Peaceful Co-existence as well as on the basis of
7 8"socialism and internationalism". A day later, in a
speech given on the grounds of the Chinese Embassy,
Chou expanded this formula for successful bi-lateral
relations to embrace the entire Socialist bloc. According
to the Chinese Premier, "China would maintain its friendly
relations not only with Vietnam but all countries. The
Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, which were
adopted by India and China two years ago, have become
standard rules of co-existence for all countries, including
the Vietnam Democratic Republic. Socialist Countries too,
should observe the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence
79in their relations".
In this same speech Chou En-lai pledged that "China 
would determinedly and thoroughly eradicate great-nation 
chauvinism, just as Chairman Mao Tse-tung has said". Was 
this remark on "great-nation chauvinism" a signal to the 
Vietnamese, as suggested by Brian Shaw, that China was 
not about to intervene to end armed dissidence within 
the DRVN? Were the Vietnamese in fact so fearful of 
Chinese intervention that they needed public reassurance? 
Shaw has in fact suggested that Chou En-lai was deliberately 
taken to the shrine of the Trung sisters as a subtle
Vietnam News Agency in English to Southeast Asia, 
1140 GMT, November 19, 1956.
7 9 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast 
Asia, 0556 GMT, November 21, 1956. Emphasis added.
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warning that the Vietnamese would resist present day
8 0Chinese invaders as their ancestors had done in 43 A .D.
The phrase "great-nation chauvinism" which Chou
quoted Mao as using most likely refers to its appearance
in Mao's address to the 8th National Congress of the CCP
(September 15 , 1956) . It appeared in the section on
international affairs (but interestingly not in the
international section of Liu Shao-chi's important
political report). According to Mao:
We must be good at learning from our forerunner, 
the Soviet Union, (applause) from the People's 
Democracies, (applause) from the fraternal 
parties in other parts of the world (applause) 
as well as from the people the world over 
(applause). We must never adopt a conceited 
attitude of great-nation chauvinism and become 
arrogant and complacent because o£the victory 
of the revolution and some success in the 
construction of the country. Every nation, 
big or small, has its own strong and weak points. 
Even if we had achieved extremely great success, 
there is no reason whatsoever to feel conceited 
and complacent. Humility helps one to make 
progress whereas conceit makes one lag behind.
This is a truth we must always bear in mind.^l
Shaw, "China and North Vietnam", op.cit., p.4 writes,
"Chou also visited the shrine of the Trung sisters 
(leaders of an unsuccessful revolt against Chinese rule 
in 39-41 A.D.) and laid flowers in memory of their 
sacrifice to stress that 'new China' would not repeat the 
errors of former Chinese rulers". For a recent appreciation 
of the role of the Trung sisters in Viet-Nam's history 
see Uy Ban Khoa Hoc Xa Hoi Viet-Nam [Social Science 
Committee of Vietnam], Lieh Su Viet Nam [History of 
Vietnam], Vol.I (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Khoa Hoc Xa Hoi,
1971), pp.80-86.
81 Mao Tse-tung, "Opening Address at the 8th National 
Congress of the Communist Party of China", in Eighth National 
Congress of the Communist Party of China, Vol.I Documents, 
op.cit., p.10.
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In April 1956 in a statement by Mao entitled "On 
the Ten Great Relationships" he referred to chauvinism
8 2in relation to Han Chinese-ethnic minority interaction.
This term refers to relations within China. The term
"great-nation chauvinism" refers to external relations;
that is between Russia and Poland. There is some
evidence that chauvinism on the part of foreign technical
8 3advisers was an issue in Viet-Nam. If so this would 
refer to Russian, Eastern European and Chinese advisers 
and their relations with native Vietnamese. In any case 
the issue of chauvinism on the part of foreign advisers 
was not a major one in terms of the DRVN's agrarian reform 
and it is most unlikely that it would have played such 
a prominent role in Chou's remarks. Although Western 
and DRVN inspired propaganda tried to play on the alleged 
traditional enmity between China and Viet-Nam when discussing 
the Chinese assistance to the DRVN, it seems from the 
slight evidence available that the behaviour of Soviet (and
Mao Tse-tung, "On the Ten Great Relationships", in 
Stuart Schram, editor, Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed: Talks
and Letters: 1956-1971 (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books,
1974), pp.81-83.
8 3 Although the information is scanty it would appear that 
there were about 400 foreign advisers in Viet-Nam in 1954, 
the majority comprising Chinese (perhaps 300). This 
number rose to 3,500 by 1962, according to A.L. Nutt; 
William Kaye asserts that it only reached 1,500 by that 
time. Albert Parry has written that about 2,300 foreign 
technicians served in Viet-Nam during the decade 1954-64. 
Undoubtedly there is a problem of classification here as 
none of the writers defines what he/she means by "adviser" 
or "technician". Cf.: Kaye, "A Bowl of Rice Divided",
op.cit., p.112; Nutt, Troika on Trial, op.cit., Vol.l, 
pp.217 and 218; Albert Parry, "Soviet Aid to Vietnam",
The Reporter (January 12, 1967), p.32; and Turner, 
Vietnamese Communism, op.cit., p.292, writes of "thousands" 
of advisers.
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not Chinese) advisers was the major problem. In 
this case Chou En-lai's reference to "great-nation 
chauvinism" (i.e. Russian-Polish relations), coupled 
with China's support for the Gomulka regime, must have 
fallen on sympathetic Vietnamese ears that is to the 
extent that Russian (and not Chinese) advisers were 
guilty of chauvinistic behaviour while on assignment to 
the DRVN. To the extent that Chinese advisers may have 
been guilty of chauvinism, Chou's remark may be seen as 
being sympathetic to the view of the Vietnamese leadership. 
The term "great-nation chauvinism" was repeated in the 
PRC's November 1 endorsement of the Russian Declaration of 
October 30. Clearly the issue was not Chinese intervention 
in Viet-Nam but a Chinese attempt to explain and receive 
for their defence of the Polish regime against the Soviet 
Union. As one observer has pointed out, the Chinese 
chose the tactic of chiding themselves against "great-nation
84
Fall, The Two Viet-Nams, op.cit., p.189. The 
evidence is scanty nonetheless; according to Professor 
Huynh Kim Khanh, a Vietnamese student of the history of 
the VWP, Chou En-lai's visit was occasioned at least in 
part by difficulties in the relations between Chinese 
specialists serving in the DRVN and their Vietnamese 
hosts. Professor Khanh bases his remarks on confidential 
conversations he has had in recent years with high-level 
DRVN officials passing through Singapore. At any rate 
this sensitive issue has been kept from the Party-controlled 
press. Interview with Professor Huynh Kim Khanh in 
Singapore, January 15, 1976. Cf. Jumper and Normand, 
"Vietnam", op.cit., p.508.
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chauvinism" as an indirect means of criticizing the 
8 5Soviets. The wording of the final joint communique 
did not explicitly commit the DRVN to the Chinese view 
point:
The two prime ministers [sic] pledged that in 
the relations between their two countries as 
well as in relations between them and other 
countries, the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Co-existence would be strictly observed and 
mistakes due to chauvinism resolutely 
prevented.00
In brief the words "great nation" (an unmistakable reference 
to Russia) were dropped. This changed wording must have 
been more acceptable to the Vietnamese who had no 
compelling reason to openly support the Chinese criticism 
of Russia. To the extent that Chinese specialists (and/or 
Russian and Eastern Europeans) then serving in Viet-Nam 
had exhibited "chauvinistic attitudes" towards their 
Vietnamese counterparts, the wording of the joint communique 
gave the DRVN the best of both positions.
On November 21, the People's Daily, in another 
important comment on the Soviet October 30 declaration, 
raised the issue of "great-nation chauvinism" and "narrow 
nationalism". According to the editorial, "If in future 
relations between socialist countries the larger nations
Mehnert, Peking and Moscow, op.cit., p.372; "But the 
leadership of the CPSU made grave errors in both [Hungary 
and Poland]. By moving up troops in an attempt to subdue 
the Polish comrades by armed force it committed the error 
of great-power chauvinism", (emphasis added), quoted from 
"The Origin and Development of the Differences Between 
the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves", op.cit., p.69.
8 6 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 
0600 GMT, November 22, 1956.
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could make a greater effort to avoid 'big power chauvinism'
(that is the main thing) and the smaller nations could
make greater effort to avoid nationalism (that is also
important), then there is no doubt that friendship and
solidarity based on equality would be strengthened and
8 7continue to grow..."
Once again the Vietnamese staked out the middle
ground on this question. In an editorial appearing in
Nhan Dan on November 29th, in obvious reference to the
previous Chinese pronouncement, the VWP accepted the
view that chauvinism and narrow nationalism were both
problems. They once again dropped the words "great
nation" and neglected to comment on which of the two
(chauvinism or narrow nationalism) was more important.
In fact the Vietnamese stated that chauvinism could be a
8 8product of either.
Undoubtedly of greater importance to the Vietnamese
was the second item on the agenda; Chinese views on the
reunification of Viet-Nam. This issue was raised
repeatedly during Chou En-lai's stay. The fact at least
two members of the Chinese delegation (Chou En-lai,
89Ch'iao Kuan-hua and possibly Lo Kuei-po) had attended
Cited in Mehnert, Peking and Moscow, op.cit., p.372.
8 8 Quoted in Vietnam News Agency in English morse to 
Southeast Asia, 1144 GMT, November 29, 1956.
89 Donald W. Klein and Anne B. Clark, Biographic Dictionary 
of Chinese Communism 1921-1965 (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1971), Vol.I, pp.179-182, and 216 and 
Vol.II, pp.648-650; however, as the Chinese delegation at 
the 1954 Geneva Conference "numbered close to two hundred" 
it may not be significant that at least some member of the 
delegation to Hanoi had served in Geneva, see: Chester L.
Cooper, The Lost Crusade: America in Vietnam (New York:
Dodd, Mead & Company , 197 0 ) , p". 77 .
347
the 1954 Geneva Conference may be evidence that they 
expected to discuss this issue.
On November 19 at the Presidential reception for 
Chou En-lai, Premier Pham Van Dong broached the subject.
After pointing out that the unification of Viet-Nam 
had met many difficulties and that the Geneva Agreements 
were being seriously threatened by U.S. military 
intervention (weapons and personnel), he stated his belief 
that with the support of "China, the Soviet Union and 
the world peace forces, the Vietnamese people ... will 
certainly be victorious in the struggle for the just 
cause of realizing national unity in accordance with the 
Geneva Accords"
By way of reply Chou outlined his country’s policy 
views on this matter. According to the Chinese Premier,
"this disregard of international obligations [which meant 
a "delay", in his words, in the holding of general elections] 
and the wrecking of the Geneva Agreements will impel the 
nations participating in the Geneva Conference to take up 
their inescapable responsibility and adopt effective, joint
91measures for the complete implementation of the Agreements".
The question of who or what would "impel " the 
Geneva Conference participants to make joint action was 
left unstated. Did the Vietnamese want China to undertake 
new initiatives? A partial answer may be found by referring
Voice of Vietnam in Vietnamese to Southeast Asia, 
0440 GMT, November 19, 1956.
91 Ibid.
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once again to the joint DRVN-PRC communique, and more
importantly to the differing interpretations given by
the Hanoi and Peking press.
The joint communique made three points with respect
to the 1954 Geneva Agreements: (1) that their application
in Cambodia and Laos "have brought good results",
(2) that the ICC had "contributed towards restoring peace
in Vietnam" and therefore should be permitted to carry
on its work and (3) that the implementation of the Agreements
9 2was "being gravely sabotaged" in Viet-Nam. ' The only
solution suggested was "that the countries participating
in the 1954 Geneva Conference had the irrefutable
responsibility to stop the development of such a situation,
and that they should take effective joint measures to
ensure full implementation of the Geneva Agreements".
Harold Hinton has suggested that this statement was aimed
primarily at the Soviet Union but that there was also
some hope that Britain "which was then on extremely bad
terms with the United States on account of the Suez crisis,
might be persuaded to reverse its earlier stand on the
93elections in Vietnam".
The differing views on the extent of Chinese support, 
although papered over in the joint communique, were made 
quite clear in the divergent editorial comment on the 
communique. Nhan Dan raised the question of reconvening
Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 
0600 GMT, November 22, 1956.
9 3 Hinton, Communist China in World Politics, op.cit., 
pp.338-339.
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the Geneva Conference "as proposed by Premier Chou En-lai
94on January 30, 1956". As we have seen the Chinese since
then had adopted a "wait and see attitude". Nhan Dan
then went on to warn of "serious results for peace and
security" in Indochina and Southeast Asia if the Geneva
Conference participants "remain indifferent" to the
present situation (i.e. continued U.S. sabotage and
postponement of elections). Finally, Nhan Dan explicitly
stated what "effective measures" it expected conference
participants to take: that the two co-chairmen, in
accordance with the Soviet Union's proposal of 21 July
1956, "will again recommend that South Vietnam communicate
their views about the time requested for opening consultations
on [the] organization of nationwide elections as a means
of achieving the reunification of Vietnam".
The Chinese obviously did not agree to renew their
call for a new Geneva Conference, and neither did they
give verbal support to North Viet-Nam's "warning".
According to the editorial in the People1s Daily
As a party to the Geneva Conference and a 
neighbour of Indochina, China is very 
interested in the consolidation of peace 
in Indochina and the carrying out of the 
Geneva Agreements.^
94 Editorial in Nhan Dan, November 24, 1956 as broadcast 
by the Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast 
Asia, 0510 GMT, November 24, 1956.
9 5 Editorial in the People's Daily, November 23, 1956 
as broadcast by the New China News Agency in English morse 
to North America, 0114 GMT, November 23, 1956.
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On this basis China was willing to join the DRVN 
in urging the Geneva Conference participants "to take 
effective joint measures" to implement the Agreements 
but nothing more.
The third and perhaps least controversial item on
the PRC-DRVN agenda was the nature of Chinese assistance
to Viet-Nam. Although no formal trade or other agreement
was announced at this time it seems certain from remarks
made during Chou's tour that some discussions had occurred
and perhaps even an agreement had been reached. On
November 18th Chou En-lai pledged that "the Chinese
people will as heretofore, firmly support the national
96construction of the Vietnamese people". The final 
communique repeated this formulation after reference to 
the expanding nature of "economic and cultural exchanges 
and contacts" and the fact that Pham Van Dong has "clearly 
pointed out the importance of China's technical aid to 
Vietnam". The Chinese delegation did not include any 
economic or technical aid specialists and it is doubtful 
that anything more than general agreement was reached on 
the nature of future Chinese assistance.
Interestingly among the members of the Chinese 
delegation was Ho Lung. Ho (one of 10 PLA Marshals), a 
vice chairman of the National Defense Council, had been 
re-elected to the CCP's Central Committee at the 8th 
Congress in September and to the Politburo (for the first
9 6 Voice of Vietnam in Vietnamese to Southeast Asia,
0440 GMT, November 19, 1956.
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time) at the 1st plenum (8th Congress) that same month.
This trip marked his first venture into the realm of
97international diplomacy. His presence suggests that 
military affairs (including aid or other assistance) 
may well have been discussed.
In summary, Chou En-lai's visit to Hanoi was intended 
to enable the Chinese leaders to appraise the Vietnamese 
leaders of how, in the Chinese view, developments in 
Eastern Europe would effect socialist bloc unity. No 
doubt Chou sought Ho Chi Minh's own opinions. Chou's 
visit also served as a convenient forum for consultations 
on matters of mutual interest (Vietnamese unification 
and aid). The "threat" of a Chinese invasion was in fact 
non-existent.
III. ON THE REVOLUTION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
A. The 11th Plenum: Introduction
In December 1956 the VWP Central Committee held its 
11th Plenum. Two major sets of problems confronted Party 
leaders: how to consolidate economic progress in the
North in the aftermath of disruptions caused by widespread 
errors in the conduct of the land reform campaign and, 
secondly, what kind of strategy should be devised for the 
South in light of the fact that reunification under the 
terms of the Geneva Agreement now seemed unlikely.
Klein and Clark, Biographic Dictionary, op.cit., 
Vol.I, pp.297-303.
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It was at this Plenum that the Party also reviewed
decisions taken three months earlier, at the 10th Plenum,
regarding consolidation of the North. Such a review was
obviously imperative as a result of the Quynh Luu 
9 8uprising. With regard to the South, the Party faced 
equally important decisions as it was presented with a 
major policy review undertaken by senior officials in 
Nam Bo.
The 11th Plenum was followed later in the month
by the convening of the 6th Session of the DRVN's National
Assembly. This session lasted for nearly a month,
from December 29, 1956 to January 25, 1957. This in
itself was an unprecedented event. For example, throughout
the entire period 1946-1971, during which 26 sessions
of the National Assembly were held, the 6th Session stands
out as the only session to last for more than fifteen days.
In fact, over this time period the average session was
99just under eight days. Howard Penniman has rightly 
observed that "(t)he sessions themselves are much too 
brief to allow the National Assembly to play a serious 
role as policy-making body or even as a critic of policies 
made elsewhere"
A comparison of decisions taken by the 10th Plenum 
and "recently" (i.e. at the 11th Plenum) may be found in: 
"Tang Cuong Doan Ket, Nang Cao Tinh To Chuc Va Boi Duong 
Chi Khi Chien Dau Trong Toan Dang" [Reinforce Unity, Raise 
the Quality of Orgnaization and Foster the Will to Struggle 
in the Party] Hoc Tap (November-December, 1956), No.11 
reprinted in Nhan Dan (December 30, 1956), No.1030, p.2.
9 9 Howard R. Penniman, Elections in South Vietnam (Stanford: 
Hoover Institution Press, 1972), pp.217-218.
100 Ibid., p.217.
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What explains the extraordinary duration of the 
National Assembly's 6th Session? According to the official 
press reports, it would seem many areas of policy were 
extensively discussed, reported on, and eventually 
approved. While the 6th Session continued to play its
rubber stamp role, it also seems likely that the gravity 
of the issues which faced VWP decision-makers required a 
full and lengthy review by officials outside the circle 
of the Central Committee. The National Assembly provided 
a convenient forum for this review.
It would also seem a reasonable assumption that 
speeches and reports delivered before the National Assembly 
by senior Party officials acting in their legislative 
capacities (Pham Van Dong and Pham Hung, for example) 
were an indication of decisions taken by the Party at 
its 11th Plenum, which met in advance of the opening of 
the 6th legislative session.
At the 11th Plenum the Central Committee grappled 
with the complex problem of how to integrate policies 
for the North and South into one comprehensive revolutionary 
strategy. According to Pham Hung:
The issue of reunification received extensive coverage; 
in addition to the reports by Pham Van Dong and Pham Hung, 
the following delivered reports which touched upon the 
issue: Ton Quang Phiet who delivered the report of the
Standing Committee; Huynh Van Tieng who delivered the 
report for the subcommission on reunification; Xuan Thuy 
who also spoke as a member of the subcommission on 
reunification and the National Assembly itself which 
passed a resolution on reunification on January 18th and 
which also addressed a letter "to the people of the South".
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The revolutionary task which arises from 
the fact that our country is partitioned into 
two zones, demands that all policies and 
activities in the North be implemented with 
the central objective of winning over the 
South*... Acting in conformity with this line 
is advantageous to the realization of unification 
as well as to the consolidation of the North. 
Acting counter to this, either neglecting the 
consolidation of the North for the sake of 
winning over the South, or concentrating on 
the consolidation of the North without paying 
due attention to winning over the South, 
would bring about negative results for the 
revolutionary movement. The consolidation 
of the North and the winning over of the 
South are not contradictory - indeed, they
cannot be separated from each other. 102
The Party's theoretical journal Hoc Tap (Studies),
which discussed the decisions taken by the December
plenum, made it clear that given these two tasks, priority
was to be given to consolidation of the North:
The consolidation of the North is the key 
task in realizing national unification.
Therefore we must not allow the winning 
over of the South to detract from the 
requirements of consolidating the North, 
(emphasis added).
103
One other concern seems to have vexed VWP decision­
makers: were the policies then being drawn up for the
North and the South in fact "revolutionary policies"? 
Hoc Tap was led to state:
Pham Hung, "Dau Tranh Cho Thong Nhat Nuoc Nha" [The 
Struggle for National Unification], Nhan Dan (January 6, 
1957), No.1037, p.2; Hung's speech was delivered on 
January 3rd.
10 3 "Tang Cuong Doan Ket, Nang Cao Tinh To Chuc Va Boi 
Duong Chi Khi Chien Dau Trong Toan Dang", op.cit.
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Speaking from the viewpoint of the entire 
nation, it is due to the scheming of the 
American imperialists and their henchmen that 
our country is still divided into two zones.
The struggle for national reunification is 
clearly a revolutionary struggle, although long and difficult.^ -04
The very fact that VWP leaders, Pham Hung in 
105particular, had to argue that their policies were
"revolutionary" is an indication of the nature of the
problems that they faced. In the North, on the one
hand, the completion of the anti-feudal task as a result
of the land reform campaign did not lead to collectivization
but rather to rectification and consolidation. In the
South, on the other hand, reliance on the Geneva Agreements
and the policy of peaceful struggle, had clearly failed
to achieve reunification. Cadres there were rebuffed
in their attempts to get permission to resume armed
struggle. Indeed, Party officials in Nam Bo were called
upon to exercise "close control" over certain cadres who
106violated Party policy by employing violence. These
104 ibid.
105 Hung, a member of the VWP Politburo and a minister 
attached to the Premier's office (possibly with responsibilities 
for southern affairs) served as a deputy to Le Duan on the 
Nam Bo Regional Committee during the Resistance. He has 
been mentioned by one source as a possible co-author with 
Le Duan of "On the Revolution in South Viet-Nam"; see:
Nhu Phong, "List of Public Figures Presently Making Up 
the Top Leadership in North Vietnam", op.cit., p.13.
106 According to one account "(t)he situation was increasingly 
difficult. Most Party members had no confidence in 
political struggle and in the Party's policies. They 
wanted to activate armed forces and these forces had to be 
expanded. In some areas Party members automatically killed 
enemy spies and furnished the people with weapons to counter 
the enemy's terrorism. However there were only a few 
incidents due to the close control of the higher echelons",
Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, p.25.
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restrictions led certain cadres to question whether they
107were to be engaged in "revolution" or "reformism".
In addition, other cadres chose to question the efficacy
of Khrushchev's policy of so-called "peaceful transition
to socialism" as a result of the Anglo-French seizure
of the Suez Canal. Again, according to Hoc Tap:
The Anglo-French attack on Egypt posed the 
question: are the forces of peace really
growing daily? Is the capacity of these 
forces to prevent violent conflictincreasing or decreasing?-^-® ^
Because of these doubts one of the objectives of 
the 11th Plenum was to redefine the theoretical nature 
of northern and southern strategies within a comprehensive 
revolutionary framework. This difficult task was left 
to Pham Hung to argue in public. He reasoned that the 
national democratic revolution was still a nation-wide 
struggle despite the fact that the North had been liberated. 
The objective of this struggle was to free the entire 
country from both imperialism and feudalism. In Hung's 
words:
Although the present situation is more 
complicated than before, and although the 
manner of struggle is different than before, 
the basic nature of the question of national 
unification is still a matter of 
implementing revolutionary tasks, still a 
matter of continuing and completing the 
people's national democratic revolution 
throughout the entire country. Because our 
country is temporarily partitioned into two 
zones the work of completing the people's 
national democratic revolution is being carried 
out under the slogan of 'National Unification'.-^-®^
The issue was discussed in Duong Loi Cach Mang Mien Nam, 
op.cit., p.7.
10 8 "Tang Cuong Doan Ket, Nang Cao Tinh To Chuc Va Boi Duong 
Chi Khi Chien Dau Trong Toan Dang", op.cit.
Pham Hung, "Dau Tranh Cho Thong Nhat Nuoc Nha", op.cit.109
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In other words, after a close review of Party 
policies for all of Viet-Nam, the VWP leadership attempted 
to overcome the growing ideological malaise within its 
ranks by stating in forthright and unequivocal terms its 
renewed commitment to Vietnamese independence by 
revolutionary means. National independence, however, 
could not be achieved immediately and cadres were enjoined 
to recall Ho Chi Minh's remarks made on July 22, 1954 
immediately after the Geneva Conference that the struggle 
for independence was a long and arduous affair.
The new revolutionary strategy which emerged from 
the VWP's 11th Plenum had three main components:
1. consolidation of the North as the base for 
unification.
2. maintenance and development of the struggle 
movement in the South.
3. winning the sympathy and support of the world's 
peoples.
Extensive public discussion was given to points one 
and three. Point two, concerning the South, was dealt 
with in a major statement which remained confidential.
It was transmitted to the Nam Bo Regional Committee for
Ho Chi Minh, "Appeal Made After the Successful 
Conclusion of the Geneva Agreements (July 22, 1954)", 
in Bernard B. Fall, editor, Ho Chi Minh On Revolution 
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), p.271; these
remarks were cited by Pham Hung and Pham Van Dong in 
their reports to the National Assembly.
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discussion and implementation, a task which appears to 
have been accomplished prior to March 1957 . From
that moment on it served as the basis for Party policy 
in the South until late 1958.
B . The 11th Plenum: Consolidating the North
The nkey nature" of consolidating the North was
made evident at this time in numerous statements attributed
to Party and Government leaders. According to Hoc Tap
the VWP's present policy priorities were: "consolidation
of the North, leading it toward socialism step by step
while at the same time struggling to achieve national
unification on the basis of independence and democracy
112by peaceful means. Pham Hung, speaking before the
National Assembly's 6th Session, chose to underscore
these priorities in this way:
The task of consolidating the North is a 
basic one. The government's report delivered 
to the National Assembly's Fifth session [in 
Sept. 1955] clearly pointed this out: "In
order to consolidate peace and to realize 
national unification we must be strong. This 
strength is based on the unity and the struggle
In March 1957 RVN security officials in Long An province 
acquired two Communist documents. One was either a copy 
of "On the Revolution in South Viet-Nam" or a close 
paraphrase of it; the other was entitled, "Ban So Ket 
Hoc Tap ve 'DuongLoi Cach Mang Mien Nam'" (Preliminary 
Report on the Study of 'The Path of Revolution in the 
South'); both documents may be found in Race, compiler, 
Vietnamese Materials, Microfilm Reel No.I, Documents 
Nos.1002 and 1002b.
112 "Tang Cuong Doan Ket, Nang Cao Tinh To Chuc Va Boi 
Duong Chi Khi Chien Dau Trong Toan Dang", op.cit.
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of all the people from North to the South.
The basis of this strength is the Democratic 
Republic of Viet-Nam - the North. Therefore 
we must pay special attention to the 
consolidation of the North, turning it into 
a stable and powerful foundation for the 
struggle of all of the people in order to 
consolidate peace and realize national 
unification, complete independence and 
democracy throughout the entire country.
"Consolidating the North" was a short-hand expression
for a broad range of developmental activities currently
being undertaken in the DRVN. Pham Van Dong summarised
these developments under five main headings and they
provide an indication of the breadth encompassed in the
phrase "consolidating the North": (1) land reform;
(2) economy and finance (agriculture, industry, small
industry and handicrafts, communications, posts and
telegraph, commerce, finance and banking); (3) cultural
and social affairs (mass education, anti-illiteracy,
publications, movie-making, theatre, hospitals and
sport); (4) domestic affairs (public order and security,
minority policy, religious freedoms); and (5) national
defence (regularisation and modernisation of -.the Viet-Nam
People's Army).
The VWP decided to stress "economy and finance" for 
the immediate future. Priorities arising from the decision 
were clearly spelled out in the final communique of the 
11th Plenum:
The [11th plenary] session decided that the 
general line of economic and financial work 
in 1957 will be as follows: all economic
and financial work must aim at encouraging
Pham Hung, "Dau Tranh Cho Thong Nhat Nuoc Nha", op.cit.
\
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an increase in production and the practice 
of frugality. Production should be 
developed under the leadership of the State- 
owned economy and of the State itself. In 
the overall national economy agricultural 
production will be the main task. Light 
industry and handicraft production are the 
key points at present. All economic and 
financial plans and policies must aim at 
consolidating the North while at the same time winning over the South ... .
It seems quite clear that there were impelling
reasons behind this new policy emphasis. Firstly,
areas of dissatisfaction remained, despite the fact that
"good preliminary results" had been obtained in the
rectification of errors campaign. According to Hoc Tap
the "ideological situation of various social strata"
115had become "rather complex". In the countryside
"hooligans and subversive elements" were still active.
In the cities both cadres and workers were dissatisfied 
with their "standards of living" and were impatient over 
the slowness of efforts at improvement. In certain 
areas speculation and hoarding of goods were reported. 
Elsewhere, according to Hoc Tap, demands were made for 
so-called "capitalist freedoms" (defined by the Party's
"Thong Cao Cua Hoi Nghi Lan Thu 11 (mo rong) Cua Ban 
Chap Hanh Trung Uong Dang Lao Dong Viet Nam" [Communique 
of the Eleventh Enlarged Plenary Session of the Central 
Executive Committee of the Viet-Nam Workers' Party],
Nhan Dan (January 12 , 1957) , No.1043 , pp.l and 4; 
unfortunately the microfilm reproduction of this issue 
of Nhan Dan is illegible in many parts and I have had 
to rely on the English translation provided by the Vietnam 
News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 0500 GMT, 
January 12, 1957.
115 "Tang Cuong Doan Ket, Nang Cao Tinh To Chuc Va Boi 
Duong Chi Khi Chien Dau Trong Toan Dang", op.cit.
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journal as "freedom without discipline") which affected 
social life in the urban areas adversely from the Party's 
point of view.
Secondly, the Party was affected by these developments
too. Hoc Tap frankly admitted that organization building
within the Party was "slow" and that friction had arisen
between old and new cadres and that problems persisted
in coordinating the tasks of the land reform cadres with
those cadres engaged in the readjustment of organizations.
Pham Hung acknowledged that although the interrelatedness
of Party policy in the North and in the South had been
expounded since 1954 it had "not yet been fully realised
in the policies, activities and in the mass organizations" 
117in the North. He argued that further education would
be necessary before people sae the relationship between
consolidating the North and achieving national unification.
Indeed, this problem was a two edged one as both southern
118regroupees as well as northerners had to be convinced.
C . The 11th Plenum: Maintaining the Southern Movement
"Consolidating the North" was only one prong of a 
three-pronged strategy designed to bring about Viet-Nam's 
unification. The second prong, "maintaining and developing
116 Ibid.
117 Pham Hung, "Dau Tranh Thong Nhat Nuoc Nha", op.cit.
118 Ibid.; Hung states, "[t]oward the South Vietnamese 
cadres and compatriots regrouped in the North we must be 
more solicitous and we must adopt a correct policy in 
order to increase unity and to make them realize more 
clearly their duties, to make them become more confident 
and enthusiastic".
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the struggle movement in the South", was not discussed
in public in any detail. It was, however, discussed at
some length in private. The conclusions which emerged
were embodied in a document entitled, "On the Revolution
119in South Viet-Nam". We know from subsequent accounts
that this was a major policy review which settled for a
time the arguments over North-South priorities and
whether or not revolutionary violence and/or armed force
should be employed at this time.
According to Ta Xuan Linh this document was drawn
up by "the leaders in Nam Bo ... at the end of 1956" and
was based on their experiences in carrying out the Party's
line of peaceful political struggle in the period following
the 1954 Geneva Conference. Linh wrote:
The gist of this document is as follows:
The advance of the revolution in South Viet 
Nam must rely on the force of the masses.
Political struggle must be supported by 
military activities in the fight against the 
US-Diem policy of repression and terror so 
as eventually to overthrow the fascist 
dictatorship in Saigon and win back power for the people. (emphasis added) ^ -^ 0
119 This document has been translated variously into 
English as "The South Vietnam Revolutionary Path", "The 
Path of the Revolution in the South" and "On the Revolution 
in South Viet-Nam"; the latter formulation has been adopted 
because it was provided by a semi-official source who 
may have had access to the Vietnamese language original. 
Jeffrey Race, in a private conversation with the author, 
has suggested that he has had second thoughts and would 
probably translate "Duong Loi Cach Mang Mien Nam" into 
English as "The Line of Revolution in the South"; Interview 
Bangkok, July 20, 1972. Nhu Phong, who has identified 
Pham Hung as a possible co-author with Le Duan translates 
the work as "The Revolutionary Lines for South Vietnam".
12 0 Linh, "How Armed Struggle Began in South Viet Nam", 
op.cit., p.22.
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As we shall discuss below, the decision acknowledging
that "military activities" (i.e. force) could now support
political struggle activities was a major one. This
decision was not a carte blanche to resume all-out guerilla
struggle however. At the most basic level it resolved
a growing dispute within the Party brought on by the
evident failure of its policy of peaceful struggle and
reliance on the framework of the Geneva Agreements to
achieve unification. According to a captured Party history
which reviewed this period:
...after 20 July 1956, the key cadres and 
Party members in South Vietnam asked questions 
which demanded answers: "Can we still continue
to struggle to demand the implementation of 
[the Geneva] Agreement given the existing regime 
in South Vietnam? If not, then what must be 
done"? A mood of skepticism and non-confidence 
in the orientation of the struggle began to 
seep into the party apparatus and among some 
of the masses, -^l
This same history made it explicitly clear that a
crisis had arisen over southern policy and that the
decisions taken in late 1956 were momentous:
At the end of 1956 the popularization of 
the volume by Comrade [Le] Duan entitled 
"The South Vietnam Revolutionary Path" was 
of great significance because the ideological 
crisis was now solved...the volume outlined 
a new strategic orientation for the South 
Vietnam revolution, a strategic mission in 
which everyone could have some confidence:
It is necessary to continue the national 
democratic revolution in South Vietnam and 
it is necessary to use force to overthrow 
the feudalist imperialist regime in order 
to establish a revolutionary democratic 
coalition and create the conditions for the 
peaceful reunification of the Fatherland.
121 Working Paper, Appendices, Item 301, p. 3.
122 Ibid. Emphasis in original.
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The importance of the decision to sanction the
123use of force should not be under-estimated. The policy
which was spelled out in "On the Revolution in South Viet* 
Nam" was mainly a justification for not taking immediate, 
and presumably, premature action. On the one hand the 
restriction on the use of force had been removed; yet 
on the other hand no encouragement was given to its 
immediate employment. In brief, force would be used at 
some future time, when circumstances were ripe. With 
that issue resolved, cadres were enjoined to build up 
their organization in preparation for the future.
According to Jeffrey Race, a secret directive accompanied 
"On the Revolution in South Viet-'Nam" which was sent to
Jeffrey Race concludes, "[i]t [Duong Loi Cach Mang 
Mien Nam] abandoned the option of armed activity, which 
had been maintained as a potential alternative up until 
that time, and directed that the conflict was to be 
carried on by means of political activity, for reasons 
which it went on to develop"; this is somewhat 
misleading for, on the one hand, no discussion of armed 
violence can be found in the Vietnamese document which 
Race used, on the other hand, Party sources are quite 
explicit in stating that it did sanction the use of 
force. The apparent contradiction may be explained by 
observing that force was sanctioned in the struggle to 
overthrow the Diem regime but that it was not to be used 
until the revolutionary movement in Nam Bo had been 
built up. Race, War Comes to Long An, op.cit., p.77. 
Elsewhere I have written "although the Party authorised 
a modification in its policies of using force in the 
South, it did not countenance a radical shift in direction 
which would have absorbed both precious resources and 
manpower [needed in the consolidation of the North]".
I did state, however, that Duong Loi Cach Mang Mien Nam 
did not sanction the use of armed force m  its text; 
Thayer, "Origin of the National Liberation Front", 
op.cit., pp.12-13.
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all Party members in Nam Bo operating at province level 
124and above. It authorised a "limited policy of violence
known as 'extermination of traitors' (trugian)". It 
was kept secret so as not to cause confusion among lower 
level cadres who were now being instructed in 
organization-building tasks.
D. On the Revolution in South Viet-Nam
It seems worthwhile to discuss at some length 
the argumentation and conclusions embodied in "On the 
Revolution in South Viet-Nam". Although a copy of the 
original is not available we are fortunate in having a
Race, "The Origins of the Second Indochina War", 
op.cit., p.355 states, "From the viewpoint of the rank 
and file, among whom the document [i.e. Duong Loi Cach 
Mang Mien Nam] was circulated, there were not Party 
activities involving violence during this period.
However, in a separate secret directive circulated only 
down to province level, the Party authorized a limited 
violence policy known as tru gian or 'extermination of 
traitors'... " In War Comes to Long An, p.82-83,
Race writes, "Although the period after the circulation 
of 'The Path of the Revolution in the South' was supposedly 
one of purely political activity, 'extermination' 
activities were considered essential to the survival 
of the Party's apparatus. They were carried on in absolute 
secrecy, however, not even being acknowledged within the 
Party itself below province level". This latter account 
does not mention secret directives (although they are 
implied) nor does it tie the tru gian directives to Duong 
Loi Cach Mang Mien Nam as does his first account.
In a personal letter to the author answering my query 
on this matter Race wrote, "I never saw such a document 
[a secret directive authorizing the extermination of 
traitors], only was told of it by informants .... As for 
whether the directive was sent with DLCMMN [Duong Loi Cach 
Mang Mien Nam] or separately, I do not recall that this 
was specified, but my assumption is that it would have 
been separate, since one was an internal secret document 
and the other was an open document for indoctrination of 
lower-level cadres". Jeffrey Race letter to the author, 
September 14, 1976.
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lengthy summary as well as study guidelines based on 
the original document. Both manuscripts discuss
the situation in Nam Bo in detail and therefore provide
125unprecedented insights into VWP thinking at this time.
They are also important because they served as the Party's 
basic policy document until at least the last quarter of 
1958 .
Jeffrey Race has failed to make it clear in all his 
published writings that the copy of the document entitled 
Duong Loi Cach Mang Mien Nam which he uses may not be 
the Central Committee original but a close summary or 
paraphrase of it produced perhaps by the Nam Bo Regional 
Committee or even a subordinate level provincial committee. 
Race document 1002 is undoubtedly an authentic Communist 
document which was captured by RVN security officials 
and retyped for wider distribution. Unfortunately the 
process appears not to have been accomplished without 
editorialising on the part of the typist. China (Trung 
Quoc) is rendered "Trung Cong" (Communist China), for 
example. In the absence of the original it is of course 
impossible to know how many other changes were made.
According to William Gausmann, the former of editor of 
Viet-Nam Documents and Research Notes (a publication 
whose stock in trade Ts the translation and publication 
of captured Communist documents) and his senior translator, 
Pham Thuy Dung, Race document 1002 (Duong Loi Cach Mang 
Mien Nam) was probably authored in Nam Bo for reasons of 
style and spelling. They both feel that it also lacks 
the "polish" of a Central Committee directive. Interview 
with William Gausmann and Pham Thuy Dung, Saigon, May 30,
1972 .
Two years later Gausmann wrote the following: "I've
wondered a bit as to whether Race's document 1002 is the 
full text of 'The Path of the Southern Revolution'. Mr Dung 
swore it was not, tho it may be an honest enough (even the 
GVN) copy of a genuine Com[munist] summary. But stylistically 
it isn't right. This is not to say that it doesn't represent 
the main thrust of the full original - but as you know it's 
sometimes the fine print that matters". Private communication 
to the author, July 3, 1974.
I am led to believe that Duong Loi Cach Mang Mien Nam 
(Race document 1002) is an authentic document because a 
quotation from the Central Committee directive entitled "Duong 
Loi Cach Mang Mien Nam" which appears in Tinh Hinh Nam Bo 
(p.32) is almost identical to a passage in Race document 1002. 
I am not persuaded that Race's document is in fact a copy of 
the Central Committee original; nevertheless Duong Loi Cach 
Mang Mien Nam and Ban So Ket Hoc Tap Ve 'Duong Loi Cach Mang 
Mien Nam', op.cit. are extremely valuable sources for 
this period.
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The Nam Bo summary of "On the Revolution in South 
Viet-Nam" is divided into two sections. Section one 
presents the ideological and theoretical explication 
of the new strategy, whereas section two provides 
historical argumentation justifying it.
The policy document begins by stating that the 
Central Committee has set forth three main missions:
(1) consolidation of the North, (2) strengthening
of the movement in the South and (3) gaining the sympathy
12 6and support of the world's people. "On the Revolution
in South Viet-Nam" then focuses almost exclusively on 
the second mission which it states is composed of three 
aspects: (1) the revolutionary movement in the South,
(2) forms of struggle for the revolutionary movement and
(3) guidelines for the movement.
These three points are also made by Pham Hung in his 
speech before the 6th Session of the National Assembly;
Pham Hung, "Dau Tranh Cho Thong Nhat Nuoc Nha", op.cit.
Race document 1002, Duong Loi Cach Mang Mien Nam, states 
that the Central Committee put forth these three missions, 
cf. pg.l; a point accepted by Race, presumably also on 
the basis of his interviews with high-level defectors from 
the Party; Race, War Comes to Long An, op.cit., p.75.
Linh specifically states that "On the Revolution in South 
Viet-Nam" was drawn up by "the leaders in Nam Bo". Race 
also writes that the document was "given wide circulation 
among Party members in the South in the closing months 
of 1956" . Much of the foregoing suggests that a draft 
document was prepared by Le Duan and other cadres in Nam 
Bo during 1956 and that it was discussed widely before 
being transmitted to the North. It may have been discussed 
at the 10th Plenum, as I have previously suggested but for 
various reasons was not approved until the 11th Plenum in 
December. The mere fact that Race's document makes mention 
of "the recent Presidential election" in America precludes 
it from having been circulated before early November.
The final version obviously bore the Central Committee's 
stamp of approval.
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(1) The revolutionary movement in the South
The main objective of the movement in the South, 
according to the policy review, is the overthrow of the U.S.- 
Diem regime which will only be possible when the 
situation throughout all of Viet-Nam is ripe. "Why?", 
it asks. Because the revolutionary movement in the South 
is (1) part of a nation-wide movement sharing national 
objectives while (2) at the same time it is a southern 
movement with its own specific objectives.
South Viet-Nam is classified as a neo-colony of 
the United States. Therefore, according to the document, 
the targets of the revolution consist of both U.S. 
imperialism and Vietnamese feudalism. In any neocolonial 
relationship between a foreign power and a client state 
certain contradictions are inevitably bound to arise.
In Viet-Nam's case four specific contradictions are 
enumerated:
(a) the contradiction between the people's desire 
for peace versus the warlike policies of the 
U.S.-Diem regime;
(b) the contradiction between the people's desire 
for national unification versus the policy
of partition of the U.S.-Diem regime;
(c) the contradiction between the people's desire 
for democratic rights versus Diem's dictatorial 
rule ;
(d) the contradiction between the people's livelihood 
versus the selfish interests of the U.S.-Diem 
regime.
According to "On the Revolution in South Viet-Nam" the 
people's "just aspirations" arise from these contradictions 
and it is the Party's duty to educate the people so they 
truly understnad them. Three demands are marked out for
attention:
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(a) for peace, independence and reunification
(b) for democratic freedoms, protection of life 
and property and for material and spiritual 
development
(c) for full employment, pay and land rent reduction. 
In short, the workers and peasants must be shown by the 
Party how their interests are adversely affected by neo­
colonialism .
(2) Forms of struggle for the revolutionary movement
According to the policy document, in order to select 
the correct form of struggle three considerations must 
be taken into account:
(a) the world situation
(b) the situation and prospects within Viet-Nam
(c) the balance of forces between revolution and 
counter-revolution.
The situation inside Viet-Nam is affected by the 
world situation which is characterized by the document 
as one in which the forces of neutralism (India, Burma 
and Indonesia) as well as the strength of the socialist 
bloc are increasing. These developments, it is stated, 
have helped to isolate the United States in the world 
arena. Further, the recently acquired atomic capacity 
of the Soviet Union is alleged to have created an 
international situation favourable to the forces of peace. 
In such a climate, it is argued, revolutionary ends can 
be achieved by peaceful means, not only in Viet-Nam but 
elsewhere in the world.
"On the Revolution in South Viet-Nam" pointed out 
that the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU affirmed that
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(1) all international conflicts can be settled by 
peaceful means and that (2) revolutionary movements can 
also develop peacefully. The document includes the 
standard disclaimer that this strategy may be altered 
if the forces in power resort to repression. So far 
as Viet-Nam is concerned, it is concluded, violence is 
unlikely due to the overwhelming aspirations of the 
Vietnamese people for peace.
(3) Guidelines for the revolutionary movement
A revolutionary movement can develop according to
a peaceful line, it is stated, because the political
127force of the people is the key, not armed force.
In the face of Diemist repression, the document asks, is 
this possible? It answers affirmatively arguing that as 
the Party relies on the people and is intimately bound 
up in supporting their aspirations no repression can be 
successful. The Diem regime is isolated and therefore 
cannot rely on the support of any political force.
Difficulties in the present state of the revolutionary 
movement in the South are ascribed to the fact that it 
is underdeveloped. Two reasons are advanced to account
This point has been made elsewhere in almost the same 
words; according to Pham Hung, "but the factor that 
determines victory is the strength, unity and spirit of 
struggle of all the people from the North to the South". 
See: Pham Hung, "Dau Tranh Cho Thong Nhat Nuoc Nha",
op.cit. Pham Van Dong, in his report before the National 
Assembly's 6th Session stated, "[t]he factor deciding 
the victory of this struggle is the people, the strength 
of unity of the people, their degree of awareness, 
organization and spirit of struggle...." See: Pham Van
Dong's remarks as broadcast by the Vietnam News Agency in 
English morse to Southeast Asia, 1100 GMT, January 2, 1957.
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for this: (1) the objective difficulties encountered in
1954 from changing from a strategy of armed struggle 
to peaceful struggle and (2) the subjective difficulties 
caused by cadres who failed to rely on the power of the 
people and who failed to develop appropriate struggle 
techniques.
According to "On the Revolution in South Viet-Nam", 
every movement has its periods of ascendancy and decline. 
Therefore in order to be successful a revolutionary 
movement must be conducted according to various forms.
At present revolutionary cadres have been targeted by 
the Republic of Viet-Nam. The RVN has been
successful in depleting the Party's strength and lowering 
the capabilities. But, according to the Party's analysis, 
if the cadres continue to mingle with the people and defend 
their interests the Party will never be destroyed because 
the Party and the people are one. To destroy the Party 
one would have to destroy the people.
The first section of the document ends with the 
conclusion that the foregoing analysis has shown that a 
policy of peaceful struggle is the best one considering 
(1) the present situation in the world; (2) the situation 
throughout Viet-Nam; and (3) the situation in Nam Bo.
Section two of "On the Revolution in South Viet-Nam" 
reviews the past history of the Party's activities since 
1930 and lists five major lessons which can be drawn from 
that experience. The inference is that these lessons 
are directly applicable to the present era.
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1. To exploit a favourable international situation 
it is necessary to have an internal force in being. Here 
it is argued that the August Revolution of 1945 (that
is when favourable external conditions were created 
in the wake of Japan's sudden surrender) could not have 
been successful without relying on the internal 
revolutionary force which had been built up since the 
Party's founding fifteen years earlier.
It is further pointed out that at present "some 
cadres" have only relied on the development of a favourable 
international situation instead of developing the strength 
of the revolutionary movement. These cadres have become 
pessimistic when no favourable conditions developed and 
consequently when the movement failed to develop. The 
main question, according to the document, is how to develop 
a revolutionary force?
2. A revolutionary movement needs a Marxist-Leninist 
Party in the vanguard, it is alleged. The Party must 
provide the leadership of the revolutionary movement and 
it must adopt a working-class view-point and pursue a 
policy opposed to imperialism and feudalism. Toward 
this end the Party must organize a national united front 
composed of the worker-peasant alliance in coalition 
with the bourgeoisie and certain patriotic elements.
3. The worker-peasant alliance must be strong. In the 
past the Party provided decisive leadership and was able
to rally the people through the creation of a strong
front and through implementation of the "land-to-the-tiller"
program. Today, the document states, some cadres have
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raised the issue of class struggle. Although it is
necessary to protect the peasants' rights, the new
strategic mission, according to "On the Revolution in
South Viet-Nam", calls for "united all middle, poor,
landless peasants with rich peasants to counter the
feudalists and the landlords. Each landlord, however,
12 8must be treated as a separate case".
In the urban areas the workers are poverty stricken 
and unemployed. Therefore, according to the policy 
review, it is necessary (1) to be aware of the objective 
political situation in the cities and (2) to make the 
workers aware of their own interests.
If the political authority of the movement lies 
in the hands of the bourgeoisie, the document warns, or 
a representative of that class, the Party's leadership 
position will be affected adversely. And this will be 
detrimental to the revolution. Therefore the Party 
must strengthen the worker-peasant alliance, develop 
Party control over it, then create a national front in 
which other classes will be included.
4. Strengthen and develop the national front. During 
the period 1930-31, the study points out, the emphasis 
was on class struggle (during the Nghe-An soviet period).
In 1941 the Party was more "realistic" in stressing the 
national democratic character of the revolution. According 
to "On the Revolution in South Viet-Nam" the nature of 
the national front varies with the historical period as it
128 Duong Loi Cach Mang Mien Nam, op.cit., p.12.
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responds to the objective situation of that period. The 
most important mission for the Party then is to strenthen, 
develop and consolidate the national united front.
In the past, the document states, errors were committed. 
Leftist tendencies emerged in the 1930's and rightism
129was prevalent in the conduct of certain land policies.
Today, as Viet-Nam is divided, the task is very complex. 
However, the analysis concludes, the program and platform 
of the Fatherland Front are suitable for the anti-U.S.-Diem 
struggle.
The Fatherland Front should (a) strengthen the worker- 
peasant alliance and (b) promote patriotism among the 
bourgeoisie, intellectual class and among the intellectuals 
and students. Both intellectuals and students can play 
an important role in the patriotic movement according 
to "On the Revolution in South Viet-Nam". Today, it 
states, with the exception of certain progressives, most 
intellectuals have not defended their interests. The 
Party should therefore conduct propaganda among this group.
Concerning the bourgeoisie, the document notes, 
they are indignant in the face of the My-Diem domination 
of South Viet-Nam. Therefore the Party should organize 
and motivate them as well as others of a different social
The reference to "leftist tendencies" seems clear; 
however the reference to "rightism" is obscure. Race 
suggests that "rightism" refers to the fact that the VWP 
actually returned land to its original owners after it 
had been confiscated during the 1956 land reform campaign. 
"Rightism" was a Chinese term of criticism of this Vietnamese 
practice according to Race who cites an unnamed defector.
See: remarks appended to the microfilm copy of Duong Loi
Cach Mang Mien Nam, op.cit.
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strata around these issues: democratic freedoms,
establishment of a national democratic government in the 
South, the normalisation of North-South relations and 
peace, democracy, independence and reunification. The 
Party must also rally well-known personalities and other 
patriotic intellectuals to the front. The Party must 
also consolidate the Cao Dai, Hoa Hao and Catholic 
leadership with whom it has had good relations in the 
past. Finally, the Party should attempt to win the 
support of RVN personnel, especially those in "popular 
organizations" (i.e. youth and women's groups).
5. Take advantage of the contradictions in the 
enemy's ranks, isolate him and introduce our agents into 
his ranks. The nature of the relationship between the 
United States and Diem is unequal, states the document. 
There is also discontent over the regime's (Diem's) 
nepotism. Accordingly the Party should endeavour to divide 
the enemy ranks and activate sympathetic ("friendly") 
forces in his ranks. The Party should also strive to 
isolate the U.S.-Diem leadership from subordinate ranks 
and take advantage of any dissension in (a) the hamlets 
and villages, (b) in military camps and installations,
(c) in political parties, (d) in RVN organizations and 
(e) within the ranks of the U.S. imperialists. Further 
directives are promised in the policy review.
Section two ends with a four-point set of conclusions:
(1) the revolution must be led by a Marxist-Leninist 
Party based on the worker-peasant alliance-
(2) a broad worker-peasant alliance must be created.
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(3) a national united front must be developed, 
expanded and consolidated.
(4) the enemy's internal contradictions must be 
exploited, the enemy must be isolated and the 
Party's forces must be introduced into his 
ranks.
The concluding section of "On the Revolution in 
South Viet-Nam" listed five reasons why the revolutionary 
movement would overcome its difficulties and succeed.
These advantages were listed as follows:
(1) the strength of the North
(2) the patriotism of the people in the South
(3) the favourable international situation
(4) the weakness and isolation of the enemy
(5) the use of the 1954 Geneva Agreements as a 
legal base.
E . The 11th Plenum: Winning the Sympathy and
Support of the World's Peoples
The third prong of the VWP's revised strategy was 
concerned with the conduct of the DRVN's foreign relations, 
which various Party spokesmen summed up under the following 
headings: "winning the sympathy and support of the world's
peoples", "re-establish normal North-South relations", 
and "continue to rely on the Geneva Agreements". These 
phrases captured the flavour of a foreign policy 
orientation designed to obtain external backing for the 
twin domestic policies of consolidation of the North and
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the strengthening and development of the revolutionary 
movement in the South (on the basis of the Geneva 
Agreements).
Pham Van Dong, in his report to the National Assembly's 
1316th Session, advanced two major propositions in this 
regard: (1) that membership in the socialist camp was
the "key" and (2) that the Geneva Agreements provided 
a "legal basis" for the DRVN's externalisation efforts. 
According to Dong, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, 
as a member of the socialist bloc, was bound by the 
"spirit of internationalism" to cooperate closely with 
its fraternal allies "in all fields - political, economic 
and social". This relationship was mutual for "(t)he 
friendship between our country and the socialist and 
people's democracies is a sure guarantee of the independence 
and prosperity of our country and for our people's 
struggle to consolidate peace and achieve the reunification 
of our country".
The "key" to this relationship was the "further 
strengthening" of relations with all socialist countries, 
and with the Soviet Union and China in particular. Dong
An official VWP review of thirty years of diplomatic 
activity states: "During the years that followed the
conclusions of these agreements [i.e. 1954 Geneva Agreements], 
in our diplomatic activities, we persistently endeavored 
to assert the justice of these fundamental rights [independence, 
sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity], while 
asking for international support and assistance for the 
economic restoration and the start of socialist construction 
in the north"; Nguyen Duy Trinh, "Thirty Years of 
Diplomatic Struggle" Vietnam Courier (December 1975), New 
Series No.43, p.18.
131 Quotations in this and the following paragraphs are 
taken from: Vietnam News Agency broadcast in English morse
to Southeast Asia, 0529 GMT, January 2, 1957.
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left no doubt that "the fraternal assistance of the 
countries of the socialist camp" (i.e. Russia and China 
in particular) had made an important contribution to 
the consolidation of the North. In return the DRVN 
gave loyal and predictable support to those issues on 
which the bloc was united: opposition to the Anglo-French
operations in the Suez and support for Soviet intervention 
in Hungary. Otherwise Dong steered a middle course on 
other issues, endorsing Russian and Chinese policies 
almost equally:
The government of the Democratic Republic 
of Viet-Nam fully supports the proposals of the 
Soviet Union to ban the testing of weapons 
of mass destruction, for a reduction in armaments, 
for the abolition of military blocs, for the 
dismantling of bases in foreign countries and for 
the signing of a treaty of collective security in 
Europe .... The government of the Democratic 
Republic of Viet-Nam supports China's proposals 
for the elimination of all aggressive military 
blocs in Asia and the signing of treaties between 
all the countries concerned to maintain peace in 
the Pacific region.
With regard to his second proposition, Dong stressed 
the importance his government still attached to the 
1954 Geneva Agreements. "These agreements", he said, "are 
a good basis for our struggle to consolidate peace and 
achieve national unity. We must continue to maintain 
throughout the legal basis of the Geneva Agreements, mobilize 
the people firmly throughout the country and mobilize 
world public opinion to urge that the South Vietnamese 
administration respect and implement these agreements, 
and urge that the countries participating in the Geneva 
Conference fulfil their tasks. The Geneva Agreements 
represent a great victory of the Vietnamese people. We 
must thoroughly apply these agreements in the revolutionary
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struggle of our people aimed at reunifying our 
Fatherland".
It is important to note the stress given by VWP 
officials to the "legal basis" of the Geneva Agreements.
In their eyes these agreements still had a valuable 
use for they acknowledged the "independence, sovereignty, 
unity and territorial unity" of Viet-Nam. Any repudiation 
of these Agreements, in public or private, would have 
had the most serious consequences. Since the DRVN was 
in no position to prevent the United States from aiding 
the Diem regime let alone forcing the RVN's compliance 
of the political provisions with the Agreements, it had 
to be content with wringing every bit of propaganda value 
out of them (especially alleged violations by the RVN and 
U.S.). Neither could the DRVN bring much pressure to 
bear on the Soviet Union outside of calling public attention 
to the alleged responsibilities of conference participants. 
With regard to France, Pham Van Dong could merely hint 
that "economic and cultural relations" might improve if 
France "as a signatory to the Geneva Agreements" fulfilled 
its responsibility for the implementation of the Agreements.
In private, and especially when confronted by
criticism from those cadres who disagreed with post-
Geneva strategy in Nam Bo, the VWP maintained that one
of the reasons why reunification did not come about was
132excessive reliance on the Agreements as a means of 
arousing popular support. The Party still maintained that
Cf. Ban So Ket Hoc Tap Ve 'Duong Loi Cach Mang Mien Nam1, 
op.cit., p.1.
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the Agreements were useful, for in its view, many people
in the South desired the normalisation of North-South
relations. In this context, the political provisions of
the Agreements provided a useful, but by no means
exclusive, source of appeals. Pham Hung put the issue
succinctly, "The legal basis of the Geneva Agreements
is a good support enabling us to step up the political
struggle, but the factor that determines victory is the
strength of the unity and the spirit of struggle of all
133the people from the North to the South".
In terms of international relations, Hung stated
that "(o)ur basic stand is that the Geneva Agreements
must be respected and their implementation continued.
The South Vietnamese administration is bound by the Geneva
Agreements and is France's successor in implementing 
134them...." Although Hung once again raised the issue
of re-convening the Geneva conference "to discuss measures 
to implement the Geneva Agreements" neither he nor other 
Party officials could have expected anyone to take heed 
of it.
Thus by early 1957 the VWP had weathered its worst 
storms - revolt in the North, set backs in the South - 
and in the calm that followed prepared to implement a 
comprehensive two-year strategy designed to bring about 
Viet-Nam's unification. There was no doubt that the new 
policies would take time, for Party and government officials 
continually stressed the "long and arduous" nature of the
Pham Hung, "Dau Tranh Cho Thong Nhat Nuoc Nha", op.cit.
134 Ibid.
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struggle. Le Duan, the secretary of the Party's
Regional Committee for Nam Bo, was recalled to the North 
135at this time. Thus the foremost advocate of more
militant policies in the South was brought into the inner 
circle of decision-making: the Party's Politburo.
From that vantage point Le Duan began to play a decisive 
role in overseeing the consolidation of the North and 
the development of the revolutionary movement in the 
South. Duanf it seems, assumed many of the duties 
of Party Secretary-General in advance of formal (and
13 6public) confirmation to that post in September 1960.
His elevation was to have decisive impact on subsequent 
developments.
United States Central Intelligence Agency, The North 
Vietnamese Party Leadership (Langley, Virginia: typescript,
1972), p.10, states that he probably remained in the South 
until mid-1957. Thomas Latimer, a former CIA analyst 
who presumably had access to the more extensive files 
of radio monitoring reports than are included in the U.S.
FBIS Daily Reports, states that no public reference to 
Le Duan was made until September 1957. The first reference 
to Le Duan to appear in the BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts, 
Part V, The Far East, comes in issue No.707 (October 15,
1957), which quotes a Vietnam News Agency dispatch of 
October 8, 1957. The first reference to Le Duan in the 
U.S. FBIS Daily Report comes in issue No.204 (October 21, 
1957), p.EEE3, which cites Vietnam News Agency in English 
morse to Southeast Asia, 1100 GMT, October 19, 1957.
Cf. Thomas K. Latimer, "Hanoi's Leaders and their South 
Vietnam Policies, 1954-1968", Ph.D. Thesis, Georgetown 
University, 1972, pp.50-51.
136 Rostow asserts that Le Duan became de facto Secretary- 
General of the VWP; W.W. Rostow, The Diffusion of Power 
(New York: Macmillan Company, 1972) , pp.41 and 43. Honey,
"North Vietnam's Party Congress", op.cit., p.71, states 
that on at least one occasion prior to 1960 Le Duan signed 
himself as the Party's Secretary-General. I have been 
unable to find any such evidence however.
PART 2
ON THE REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH
CHAPTER 7
REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH:
MAJOR DOMESTIC POLICIES OF THE DIEM REGIME 
(January 1957-December 1958)
I. INTRODUCTION
While the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam grappled 
with a series of domestic problems in the last quarter of 
1956, its southern counterpart, the Republic of Viet-Nam, 
moved into a new period of apparent stability and economic 
development. As chapter five detailed, from mid-1956 
onwards Diem firmly consolidated his regime. Major 
opponents of his government, pro-French non-Communist 
nationalists and the sect forces, had been rendered impotent. 
The success of the first phase of the Anti-Communist 
Denunciation Campaign (ACDC) had been greatly exaggerated.
On the one hand, the Party was engaged in a reduction of 
cadres movement, designed to trim its underground 
organization for the struggle ahead. On the other hand, 
Party policy had not yet sanctioned armed self-defence or 
other acts of systematic violence against Diem. Thus the 
Party's low profile coincided with the optimistic view from 
Saigon. As this chapter will demonstrate, this view was 
an illusion. ^
"Diem's self-deluding propaganda in 1956-57 had the 
effect of lulling some Vietnamese and some Americans into 
believing that his regime, by its truly bold actions against 
the sects and the Binh Xuyen in 1955 and by his rejection 
of Ho Chi Minh's overtures in 1955-56, had won the day 
against the Communists as well. In 1956, for example, he 
boasted that he had restored peace and control even in the 
Camau peninsula - where the Communists are still entrenched 
to this day [i.e. 1965-66]. Diem failed to have - certainly 
failed to voice - a clear perception of the Communist
cont'd
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During the period from March 1957 to mid-1958 the Diem 
regime breifly relaxed its anti-Communist suppression in 
the countryside. This was not to say however that the 
Party's organization was ignored, as certain areas of 
Central Viet-Nam were still the focus of regime attention. 
During this lull the Party started reconsolidating its 
organization while at the same time resisting the 
initiatives of the Diem government and capitalizing on the 
ineptitude of the RVN administration. Tran Van Bo (Le 
Van Chan), a former deputy secretary of the Party's Western 
Nam Bo Interprovince Committee, summed up the situation in 
this way:
We can say with absolute certainty that by 1956 
the Party was weakened.... In 1957 the Party 
began to recover, because of a number of not very 
intelligent actions and policies on the part 
of the [Diem] government, which the Party 
exploited. Among these actions and policies 
the most deserving of attention were Ordinances 
2 and 57 of the land reform program, which 
automatically restored to the landlords who had 
followed the French all the lands granted to the 
peasants during the Resistance...?
There were a range of RVN "actions and policies" in 
addition to the conduct of land reform which the Party 
exploited. This chapter will consider: the role of the
military, the Anti-Communist Denunciation Campaign, rural 
resettlement, land reform, non-Communist political development 
and the increasing influence of the United States.
cont'd
danger until well into 1957. But when he did, in 1958 and 
1959, other - Americans and Vietnamese - thought he was 
crying wolf..."; in Frank N. Träger, Why Viet Nam? (New 
York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p.161.
2 Race, War Comes to Long A n , op.cit., p . 97 .
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II. THE ROLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM ARMED FORCES
3A. Military Operations
In mid-1956 two military operations were launched 
against sect and Communist forces in Nam Bo. Operation 
Truong Tan Buu concentrated on the eastern delta provinces 
while Operation Thoai Ngoc Hau covered central and western 
Nam Bo. Both operations continued until February 1957, 
although the Party would later attribute subsequent 
military activity in eastern Nam Bo to a continuation of 
the Truong Tan Buu campaign.
In October 1956 the commander of Operation Truong Tan 
Buu, Gen. Mai Huu Xuan, held a review of progress. According 
to press accounts he declared that with the defeat of the
4sect forces "the battle was over". Although Xuan did 
acknowledge that the Communists were capable of continuing 
sporadic guerrilla action he nevertheless signalled a change 
in RVN tactics to small unit security operations. In Ba 
Ria province, for example, General Xuan presided approvingly 
over a ceremony of black pyjama-clad province officials who 
were inaugurating a new civic action program designed to
"The Times of Saigon [sic] on October 3, 1959, quoted 
General Myers, deputy chief of MAAG (Military Aid and 
Advisory Group) [sic] at the time, summing up operations 
during the previous year, as follows: 'If I remember
well, out of ten divisions, six were thrown into action 
to a greater or lesser extent, over half the logistics 
services participated with the support of the entire 
river services of the Navy'", quoted in Wilfred G. 
Burchett, The Furtive War (New York: International
Publishers, 1963), p.30.
4 Journal d1Extreme-Orient (October 19, 1956), p.5.
386
counter dissident activity. Although further details 
were not provided the press hinted that combined civil- 
military units would henceforth conduct pacification in the 
countryside. In Bien Hoa province in August 1956 the 
following activities were undertaken by the RVN province 
chief in conjunction with military units assigned to 
Operation Truong Tan Buu: a population census, formation
of village councils, the establishment of inter-familyggroups, the recruitment of civil guards and the creation 
of youth groups. The population was also mobilized to 
assist the army in repairing roads, building bridges, 
constructing schools and making sports grounds. The army, 
for its part, distributed medicine as well as anti-Communist 
propaganda.^
On the military side Operation Truong Tan Buu 
stimulated the defection in October of some 45 soldiers, 
members of the Cao Dai Trinh Minh The regiment. The 
following month ARVN units conducted a sweep in Tan Uyen 
district located in the famous Zone D base area "to destroy
gthe last remnants of the Communist Viet Minh". In 
December press accounts revealed that 302 "outlaws" had
9been arrested and 63 "rebels" had rallied. Thereafter, 
until the operation was formally ended in February 1957,
5
The origins of the civic action program are reviewed 
briefly in Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars op.cit., pp.207-213. 
The originator of the idea, Kieu Cong Kim, died in 1957 and 
his organization was absorbed by Ngo Dinh Nhu.g These are described in Scigliano, South Vietnam: Nation
Under Stress op.cit., pp.169-170.
7 Journal d* Extreme-Orient (October 15, 1956), p.5.
® Ibid., October 3, 1956, p.5 and November 30, 1956, p.5.
Ibid., January 4, 1957, p.5.9
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few details of military operations were reported in the 
press.
Elsewhere Operation Thoai Ngoc Hau concentrated its 
attention on the Mekong Delta provinces in the south. 
During August-November 1956 ARVN units moved into Ha Tien 
province to conduct operations against a "Viet Minh rebel 
zone1' in the Tra Tien plain along the Giang Thanh river 
and Vinh Te canal. Several arms caches were uncovered 
in the nearby Trai and Giang Thanh hills.^
Both Operation Truong Tan Buu and Operation Thoai 
Ngoc Hau provoked complaints to the International Control 
Commission (ICC) by the PAVN High Command. According to 
these protests both operations were a violation of article 
14(c) of the Geneva Agreements which prohibited reprisals 
against former members of the Resistance. As Joseph 
Buttinger has rightly pointed out "(v)ery little reliable 
information has come out of Vietnam about the manner in 
which these and later campaigns to uproot the Vietminh 
were conducted by the army and political cadres specially 
trained for these campaigns".^ Nevertheless the claims 
by the PAVN High Command (as set out in Table 7-1) set an 
upward limit on the number of victims. There can be no
Ibid., November 24, 1956, p.4.
 ^Buttinger, A Dragon Embattled, op.cit., Vol.2, pp.975-976; 
Buttinger goes on to state, "It is of course impossible 
to accept as true the fantastic claims and accusations 
of Communist propaganda, which counts the number killed 
and imprisoned in the hundreds of thousands..." Official 
Communist figures, which may be inflated, are clearly 
distinguishable from Communist propaganda claims as will 
be readily apparent from the figures presented in Table 
9-7.
388
TABLE 7-1
RESULTS OF OPERATIONS TRUONG TAN BUU AND THOAI NGOC HAU
(July 1956-Feb. 1957)
Time Period Arrested Killed Wounded
July-September 1956 3,016 136 68
September 1956-February 1957 1,984 300 30
TOTAL 5,000 436 98
SOURCES: Vietnam News Agency, January 24, 1957 and May
25, 1958
doubt of ARVN's anti-Communist objectives. At the conclusion
of Operation Truong Tan Buu General Mai Huu Xuan stated that
one of his three main aims was the destruction of "the
12Viet-Cong organization".
From about mid-1957 onward, especially after October,
a rural insurgency was ignited (see chapter eight). By
the following year the two paramilitary forces were suffering
13casualties at the rate of 40 men per week.
By way of response the Diem government launched a new
14series of pacification operations in the countryside.
From March-October 1958 Operation Tho Lo was launched against
Journal d*Extreme-Orient (April 17, 1957), p.3; the other 
two objectives were: assuring the security of the people
and raising their living standards.
13 American objectives for the Vietnamese Army were to 
maintain limited internal security and to offer limited 
resistance to a conventional attack by PAVN regulars. 
Increasingly the latter became the most important objective; 
see "US Training of the Vietnamese National Army", United 
States - Vietnam Relations, op.cit., Book 2, IV.A.4., p.24.
14 Scigliano, South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress, op.cit.,
p.138.
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dissidents in Binh Dinh and Phu Yen provinces. In 
April Operation Nguyen Trai (I) swept through the eastern 
Nam Bo provinces of Binh Duong (Thu Dau Mot), Binh Long,
Bien Hoa and Tay Ninh. In September Operation Nguyen Trai 
(II) shifted its operations to An Giang, An Xuyen, Ba Xuyen 
Kien Giang, Phong Dinh and Vinh Long provinces in western 
Nam Bo. Meanwhile, during July-August 1958, Operation 
Hong Chau tackled the Chau Boi region along the Cambodian 
border.
B. U.S. Training and Support
During the months July-September 1957 all ten ARVN 
15divisions were withdrawn from the countryside and put
through an American-styled training program. The end
result, as could have been expected, was the creation of
a Vietnamese Army on the American model. In late 1958 ARVN
began a period of reorganization which lasted until September
1959 by which time seven so-called "improved divisions" of
10,000 men each had been created from the previously existing
166 light and 4 field formations created by the French.
After completion of the American-sponsored training 
program in September (1957) ARVN units emerged equipped to
We Open the File (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing
House, 1961), p.35; Details of Operation Nguyen Trai are 
given in "First Phase of Psy-War Operation Closing",
The Times of Viet-Nam (July 4, 1958), Vol.2, No.142,p. 1.
1 "US Training of the Vietnamese National Army, 1954-1959", 
in United States-Vietnam Relations 1945-1967, op.cit.,
Book 2, IV.A.4. Chronology pp.NN which cites the Weekly 
Intelligence Digest 30-58.
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17conduct warfare along conventional lines. Throughout the 
period of retraining both the Civil Guard and Self-Defense 
Corps (see below) took prime responsibility for the 
maintenance of rural security.
C. The Paramilitary Forces
American influence was brought to bear on the Diem
government with respect to the paramilitary Civil Guard and
Self-Defense Corps. In 1956 Diem transferred the Civil
Guard from the Ministry of the Interior to the Ministry
of National Defense. According to Pentagon analysts:
Diem envisaged the CG [Civil Guard] as a large 
and powerful military organization accountable 
to him through his appointed province chiefs - 
a counter to the army in the struggle for 
power which would also provide provincial 
security through mobility from posts outsidethe villages...
The Michigan State University (MSU) Vietnam Advisory 
19Group, on the other hand, adopted a different view. MSU
17 Ibid., p.PP which refers to a history prepared by the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff unavailable to the author; see also 
the main body of the study, section G, pp.24-30. Bernard B.
Fall has written "American military planning in Viet-Nam was 
utterly disastrous, for it created a road-bound, over­
motorized, hard-to-supply battle force totally incapable of 
besting the real enemy (i.e. the elusive guerrilla and not 
the Viet Minh divisional regular) on his own ground". Fall,
The Two Viet-Nams, op.cit., p.325.
18 "US Training of the Vietnamese National Army", loc.cit., p.22 
19 On the role of the Michigan State University Vietnam 
Advisory Group see: Michigan State University Vietnam
Advisory Group, Final Report (Saigon: mimeographed, June 1962)
held by the US Library of Congress; Robert Scigliano and Guy 
H. Fox, Technical Assistance in Vietnam: The Michigan State
University Experience (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
1965); and Robert Scheer, How the United States Got Involved 
Vietnam (Santa Barbara: Center for the Study of Democratic
Institutions, July 1965), especially pp.33-38.
had originally been contracted to the United States
Operations Mission (USOM) to provide advice to the Civil
Guard. They felt that the Civil Guard should be:
a national police [force], civilian in character 
and function, lightly but adequately 
equipped with sufficient delegated authority 
and training to enforce all laws, control 
subversion, and collect intelligence data in 
areas not covered by municipal police, as 
well as establishing close ties with the 
population of the rural areas by fixed 
basing in the villages within pacified areas. u
In July 1957 MSU opposed Diem's request for sixty
million u.S.dollars to provide the Civil Guard with heavy 
21equipment. MSU suggested a more modest grant of between 
U.S. $14-18 million for light equipment. The American 
Military Assistance Advisory Group in Viet-Nam (MAAG) 
supported MSU at least initially despite a compromise 
reached in 1958 by which U.S. $14 million would be provided 
for the purchase of equipment (including "heavy" items).
Diem refused to transform the Civil Guard along American 
lines. As a result U.S. aid was withheld for two years.
It was not until January 1959 that Diem finally agreed to 
transfer the Civil Guard to the Interior Ministry.
In the meantime the Civil Guard continued to function 
at Diem's direction operating only with non-American surplus 
handed over by ARVN. In late 1956 selected units of the 
Civil Guard were put through an ARVN training program at the 
Quang Trung military school. A year later Civil Guards
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2 0 "US Training of the Vietnamese National Army", lo.cit.,
p . 22 .
21 Such as armored vehicles, bazookas, artillery, landing 
craft and helicopters; Scigliano, South Vietnam: Nation
Under Stress, op.cit., p.201; see also Duncanson, Government 
and Revolution in Vietnam, op.cit., p.281-282.
participated in pacification operations alongside ARVN 
professionals.
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The United States provided salary subsidies to the 
Self-Defense Corps (SDC) since its formation. It too was 
equipped with non-American ARVN surplus. According to 
Pentagon analysts "the SDC was in even worse shape than 
the CG. The controversy that engulfed both these 
organizations for five years [1955-1960] produced two 
paramilitary units that, far from being adequate to free 
the army for 'combat' were confusingly organized, inadequately 
equipped, poorly trained, and badly led - even when compared 
with ARVN".22
In 1955 the strength of the Civil Guard (Bao An)
stood at 50,000 while that of the Self-Defense Corps (Dan
Ve) was estimated at 40,000 (these grew in numbers to
2 372,000 and 80,000 respectively by mid-1963). Both of
these organizations were assigned a principal role in
maintaining internal security. Their lack of training and
poor leadership was to prove unfortunate for the Diem 
24regime. According to Robert Scigliano the Civil Guard 
served "as a dumping ground for inferior army officers".
The Self-Defense Corps, locally recruited and village-based,
"US Training of the Vietnamese National Army", loc.cit., 
p.23; and Scigliano, South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress,
op.cit., p.164.
2 3 Ibid., p.47 and 164; Duncanson, Government and Revolution, 
op.cit., p.288 states that the Civil Guard totalled 68,000 
in 1955 and decreased in strength to 40,000 in 1959.
24 "the Civil Guard...is regarded by the Southern peasant 
as a symbol of insecurity and repression" in David Hotham, 
"South Vietnam - Shaky Bastion", The New Republic (November 
25, 1957), p.36-38.
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was provided with rudimentary training and, according to
the same source "(a)s a result...was hardly adequate to the
task of defending villages, roads, and other local strategic
2 5points against armed attacks by Communist guerrillas".
This view is also shared by Denis Duncanson, a British
observer, who noted "the village militia or Local Defense
Corps (at first Tu Ve, later Dan Ve) was made up of poorly
trained hamlet guards with a maximum operating strength of
a platoon, supervised by the nearest contingent of the
Civil Guards but nominally 'commanded' by the village
2 6administrative committee".
D. The Draft^
On May 2, 1957 Diem issued decree 183/qp which
announced universal conscription into the regular army for
a period of twelve months. Two years later, in January
1959, service was extended for an additional six months.
Mobilization for draft aged youths (20-21 years), which
began on August 1, 1957, aimed at a target figure of 
2 860,000 men. Due to opposition and administrative
inefficiency this deadline was postponed until November
14th. According to Communist accounts some 15%-20% of those
2 9eligible evaded their military obligations.
Scigliano, South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress, op.cit.,
p.164.
2 6 Duncancon, Government and Revolution, op.cit., p.254.
27 According to Duncanson, "Conscription remained in force 
from before the Geneva Conference, but it was to be several 
years before it became necessary to call men up for the 
ranks", ibid., p.289.
2 8 Vietnam Press, "Compulsory Military Service to be Applied 
In Viet Nam From August 1", The Times of Viet Nam Weekly 
(May 4, 1957), No.17, p.2.
2 9 Vietnam News Agency, October 20, 1958; New China News 
Agency, October 4, 1957 and April 11, 1958.
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III. THE ANTI-COMMUNIST DENUNCIATION CAMPAIGN, 1957-58
Chapter five provided details of the start of the
Anti-Communist Denunciation Campaign up to May 1956 at
which time a conference was held in Saigon to assess the 
30results. Under the impetus of this campaign ACDC
directorates were established in twenty-one provinces.
After the Saigon conference phase two of the campaign was
launched with special attention devoted to those provinces
31where past progress had been slack. In central Viet-Nam 
these included provinces where the Communists had 
traditionally exhibited strength: Binh Dinh, Quang Nam,
Quang Ngai and Quang Tri. In Nam Bo attention was focused 
on Ba Ria, Long Xuyen, Sa Dec, Tay Ninh, Vung Tau and Ca 
Mau provinces (most of which had not established ACDC 
directorates by May 1956).
The direction of the ACDC campaign was now placed in
the hands of the province chiefs. In October 1956, under
Ordinance 57a, these individuals were designated the
government's principal agents operating directly under the
32authority of President Diem. At the same time Diem affected 
a provincial reorganization which altered the names and
30 On May 20, 1956 the ACDC moved into "period II, stage I"
The Fight Against the Subversive Communist Activities in 
Vietnam op.cit., p.4.
31 See the interview with Le Quang Binh, a former Resistance 
fighter, who joined the Quang Ngai province committee of the 
NFL in Burchett, Inside Story of the Guerilla War op.cit., 
p.126. In March 1957 Saigon hosted the third congress of 
the Asian People's Anti-Communist League. In May the RVN's 
Department of Information held a National Information Congress 
to evaluate phase two of the ACDC.
32 Race, War Comes to Long An, op.cit., p.21-22.
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boundaries of many southern provinces. In March 
1957 Diem reshuffled the province chiefs giving added
34influence to the military who secured 14 of 21 posts.
This tendency to militarization was intensified in later 
3 5years. Diem also combined the positions of province chief
and sector commander into a post to be held by a single
individual with field grade military rank. Thus the
top administrative and military posts were combined giving
the new province chief control over the provincial
bureaucracy as well as the Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps.
The ACDC has been periodized by one writer as follows:
In its second phase, the campaign switched its 
priority target to the jungle areas along the 
Truong Son (the Indochinese Cordillera) and 
the Central Highlands....By the end of 1957 
and early 1958, the central target of the 
'denounce the Communists' campaign switched to 
the Mekong River delta where the enemy [i.e. Diem]
Palmerlee, "Viet Cong Political Geography", op.cit., 
p.5; Appendix A in Pike, Viet Cong, op.cit., p.386 provides a 
list with old and new provincial names.
34 "President Appoints New Chiefs for All But Three Provinces", 
The Times of Viet Nam Weekly (March 9, 1957), No.9, p.4.
35 "The regular government structure in the provinces has 
likewise been affected by the trend toward militarization.
In 1958, 13 of the then 36 province chiefs were military 
officers, and it was planned to replace most of them with 
civilians in the near future. By September, 1960, there 
were 21 military and 17 civilian province chiefs, and by 
August, 1962, the ratio had jumped to 36 military officers 
and 5 civilians in an expanded 41 provinces", Scigliano,
South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress, op.cit., p.166; in 1963
only 5 provinces were administered by the civil service, 
Duncanson, Government and Revolution, op.cit., p.236;
"Rebellion Against My-Diem", United States-Vietnam Relations, 
op.cit., Book 2, IV.A.5. Tab 2, p.44 provides percentage 
figures for the process: in 1958 36% of all province
chiefs were military, in 1960 the figure was 58%. See 
also Voice of Vietnam in Vietnamese to Southeast Asia,
March 21, 1957, 2300 GMT.
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had only obtained poor results in the previous 
campaigns. Saigon sent its most efficient, most 
experienced agents from Central Viet Nam to the 
Mekong delta where in conjunction with the 
local reactionaries, they launched a campaign 
'to wipe out the remaining Communist cadres', 
i.e. patriots and former resistance cadres.
The explicit goal of this campaign was to 
'root out the Communists'. Dinh Tuong 
province (formerly My Tho) was chosen as a pilot 
province in the campaign which was to spread to 
the surrounding areas, in particular the former 
resistance zones...^
The above analysis, written by Ta Xuan Linh seventeen
years after these events, tallies with complaints made by
the High Command of the People's Army of Viet-Nam (PAVN)
to the ICC at this time. From June 1956 to July 1957
the PAVN High Command filed complaints alleging reprisals
against Resistance veterans in the central Vietnamese
provinces of Khanh Hoa, Pleiku, Phu Yen, Binh Dinh and 
37Thua Thien. However the greatest attention was reserved
for developments in Quang Tri and Quang Nam.
With respect to Quang Tri, the PAVN Liaison Mission
to the ICC reported 685 cases of reprisals in violation of
article 14(c) in the period from July 1954 to August 1956.
PAVN officials alleged that 292 individuals had been killed,
534 wounded, 5,441 detained and 306 families placed in
3 8"concentration camps". According to the same source 
53 letters concerning Quang Tri alone had been posted to 
the ICC in the period July 1954-February 1957.
Linh, 'How Armed Struggle Began in South Viet Nam", op.cit.,
p. 22 .
37 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 1150 
GMT, March 31, 1958; ibid, in English morse to Southeast Asia, 
0540 GMT, May 25, 1958; for an early account see Journal 
d'Extreme-Orient (October 17, 1956), p.5.
3 8 Vietnam News Agency, in English morse to Southeast Asia,
1100 GMT, February 27, 1957.
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More serious accusations were laid later in the year
when it was alleged that further repression followed the
conduct of the anti-Communist denunciation classes held
during April 1957 in the village of Gio Linh. According
to the PAVN High Command the inhabitants of Gio Linh had
supported the Resistance and had numerous relatives who
regrouped to the North in 1954-55. As a result the RVN
authorities clamped a one-month curfew on the village
during which time some 200 persons were subjected to
anti-Communist propaganda in an effort to get them to
denounce their political allegiances. In late April 150
suspects were arrested, including local village officials.
The following month representatives from families of 19
separate hamlets, acting under duress, signed a commitment
39not to support the Communists.
In early 1958 anti-Communist repression was renewed in
Gio Linh district. In January after a fortnight's devotion
to denouncing Communism, some 32 Resistance veterans were
apprehended. During March-April so-called "concentration
camps" were erected in the district to house some 52
4 0families with "Viet Minh" connections. The renewal of 
anti-Communist repression in Quang Tri paralleled 
developments in neighbouring Quang Nam.
Voice of Vietnam in Vietnamese to South Vietnam, 1500 
GMT, May 8, 1957 and Vietnam News Agency in English morse 
to Southeast Asia, 0518 GMT, June 10, 1957.
4 0 Vietnam News Agency, October 9, 1958 quotes from a 
letter of October 2, 1958 from the PAVN Liaison Mission to 
the ICC; Vietnam News Agency, January 31, 1958 and New 
China News Agency, May 18, 1958 which cites Lt. Col. Mai 
Lam, PAVN'S deputy head of the Liaison Mission to the 
ICC .
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In March 1957 Chau Di village in Quang Nam province 
was subject to a similar pattern of events. A provincial 
ACDC team in the company of local security forces entered 
Chau Di and compelled 60 persons to attend a one-month 
program of anti-Communist indoctrination. Former members 
of the Resistance were forced to describe their past 
activities, to spout anti-Communist slogans and to malign 
the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. In the end only ten 
persons were taken into custody. In May four further 
arrests of Resistance veterans were reported by the PAVN 
High Command to the ICC. By March 1958 a total of 700 
individuals were reportedly incarcerated at the Phu Hoa 
"concentration camp"
One of the most publicized events occurred in Dai Loc 
district of the same province. Unlike the previous examples 
there are non-Communist sources for what allegedly occurred.
On January 17th, 1958 the Saigon daily Tu Do (Freedom) 
reported that 360 "ex-Communists" were subject to a four- 
month long indoctrination course before being turned loose 
in Dai Loc district. As a result of their efforts more than 
a thousand suspected "Communist agents" were confined to
4 2nine "re-education centres" while another 160 were imprisoned. 
The PAVN report of this case differs in only one detail, it 
asserts that between 8-9,000 persons were placed in the
41 Voice of Vietnam, dictation in Vietnamese to Southeast 
Asia, 2330 GMT, August 22, 1957; and Vietnam News Agency, 
November 26, 1957; ibid., in English morse to Southeast 
Asia, 1116 GMT, June 12, 1958.
42 Quoted in Bernard B. Fall, "South Viet-Nam's Internal 
Problems", Pacific Affairs (September 1958), Vol.XXXI, 
p.258; and Quang Loi, South of the 17th Parallel, op.cit.,
p.112.
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4 3re-education centers. Both accounts reveal that some 
suspects were maltreated. Another case, similar to this 
one, allegedly occurred in Quang Nam's Que Son district
44where 500 Resistance veterans were supposedly detained.
Prior to the shift in emphasis from central Viet-Nam
to the delta, the ACDC recorded only spotty success. In
September 1956 one-hundred and forty-seven "Viet Minh
cadres" reportedly surrendered to provincial authorities 
4 5in Ca Mau. By the end of the year Soc Trang province
4 6recorded a total of 1,889 ralliers. In April 1957 the
PAVN High Command complained to the ICC that the families
of ex-Resistance fighters were being forced into
"concentration camps" in the provinces of Chau Doc, Bac
4 7Lieu and Rach Gia. This protest coincided with reports
in the Cambodian press that military mopping-up operations
were being conducted in Tan Chau district of Chau Doc
with the aim of attacking sect forces and former Resistance 
, 48personnel.
During late 1958, as Ta Xuan Linh has suggested, the 
pace of the ACDC picked up in the Mekong Delta. Chau Doc
4 3 Voice of Vietnam in Vietnamese to Southeast Asia, 0440 GMT, 
January 28, 1958. These PAVN figures appear excessive.
44 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia,
0535 GMT, March 20, 1958.
4 5 Journal d'Extreme-Orient (October 3, 1956), p.5.
^  Ibid., (January 14, 1957), p.5.
4 7 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia,
0535 GMT, April 5, 1957.
4 8 Vietnam News Agency, May 2, 1957 cites reports appearing 
in Song Chung (Coexistence) and Trung Lap (Neutrality) both 
of which are published in Phnom Penh by Party sympathisers. 
Interview with Phan The Ngoc, Saigon, June 8, 1972.
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province appears to have been the scene of major activity
between August 1957 -March 1958. According to the DRVN’s
official newsagency more than 30,000 people in An Phu
district were forced to relocate their homes away from the
4 9Cambodian frontier. By March 1958 the PAVN Liaison Mission
to the ICC files reports of 42 specific cases of reprisal
under article 14(c) involving the killing of more than 100
persons, the wounding of another 13, the arrest of 318 and
the forced detention in "concentration camps" of an
additional 4,000 Resistance veterans (the majority of whom
50were said to be Hoa Hao).
In February - March 1958 the ACDC scored a notable
51triumph in Cai Be district of Dinh Tuong province.
As a result of a successful police operation five underground 
Party cadres were arrested with incriminating documents, 
including one paper which listed the names of persons to 
whom the underground had recently communicated. Forty-two 
persons were arrested the following month including 
three senior Party officials and one district level cadre.
In addition three covert Party agents in the Dinh Tuong 
Civil Guard and a ring of fourteen Party members operating
Vietnam News Agency, English morse to Southeast Asia, 1115 
GMT, April 7, 1958; for a related story see ibid., November 
19, 1957.
50 Ibid., in English morse to Southeast Asia, 1130 GMT, April 
7, 1958.
51 For reports on the ACDC in Dinh Tuong see: William R.
Andrews, The Village War: Vietnamese Communist Revolutionary
Activities in Dinh Tuong Province, 1960-1964 (Columbia: 
University of Missouri, 1973), p.44 which reports that all 
twenty members of a village Party committee had been arrested 
by mid-1958; the fate of a financial cadre in Dinh Tuong is 
mentioned in Zasloff, Origins of the Insurgency, op.cit.,
P-13.
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52under various covers were apprehended. Among the latter 
were Ma Thi Chu and her husband, Nguyen Van Hieu, two 
future members of the Central Committee of the National 
Front for the Liberation of South Viet-Nam.
According to a CIA biographic study:
After the Geneva Accords in 1954, [Nguyen Van] Hieu 
apparently concentrated on propaganda activities 
[o]n behalf of the Viet Minh in educational 
and literary circles. A 1955 report lists him as 
active in the training of Viet Minh cadres for 
the Saigon-Cholon area. He was arrested by 
Vietnamese authorities around July 1958 for pro- 
Communist activities but was released the following October on National Day.53
Hieu's underground status was confirmed later by Party
sources. According to an item carried by the Liberation
Press Agency:
Since 1946, he [Nguyen Van Hieu] acted covertly 
in the press circles teaching staff and artist 
circles in Saigon... Later [i.e. sometime 
during 1951-59] he was a member in the Guiding 
Committee of Artistic Activities, Propaganda 
and Education belonging to the leadership of the Nam Bo revolution.54
Ma Thi Chu's background was also described by the CIA's 
biographic study:
[A]fter the Geneva Accords she became an assistant 
professor in the School of Pharmacy in Saigon.
Together with her husband, she continued to work
against the South Vietnamese government until
she was arrested in early 1958 for her participation
52 "Communist Cell for Subversion of Free Viet-Nam Press 
Discovered", The Times of Viet-Nam (March 21, 1958), Vol.
2, No.62, p.1-2; "Communist Ring Uncovered in Cai Be District", 
Ibid. (March 22, 1958), Vol.2, No.63, p.3 and Voice of 
Vietnam in Vietnamese to South Vietnam, 0510 GMT, June 26,1958.
53 United States Central Intelligence Agency, Memorandum, 
(September 22, 1965), op.cit., Appendix, p.A-37.
54Liberation Press Agency (Saigon) in English, 0935 GMT,
April 7, 1976.
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in Communist activities. Released some five or 
six months later, she apparently left with her 
husband for an NFLSV-controlled area.^
Years later Mrs. Chu was quite candid about her past when
she visited Australia as part of a women's delegation.
According to a transcript of her interview on the ABC
radio:
We [my husband and I] worked a long time underground 
work in Saigon. And our parents helped us.
QUESTION: Could you tell us a bit about your
day-to-day life in being underground? I think 
not many people in Australia really understand this.
Yes. We can say that we have two lives. One legal. 
I am a pharmacist. I had an office in Saigon and 
so I openly, legally I worked everyday on [sic] 
my office. But behind this I have underground 
work. And that must be very secret. [We must not] 
let anybody know. Our friends, our really 
close friends cannot know. And we must be secret.
We do not reveal anything we know. Even with 
friends, with good friends, only when we are in 
the same cell of three persons we discuss our 
problems. And three persons ...ehh... one of 
the three persons forms with another two 
persons another cell, and so on, and so on 
and so on and so we have a very large movement.
But very secretly, you see? And that is why if 
one of the three persons is arrested the other 
two escape. [They] get out of police search...
We cut the file...I don't know the word for 
this...
...But for myself in 1957 [sic] I was discovered 
by the Saigon police. And I was arrested by them...
QUESTION: How long were you under arrest for?
In jail? More than one year. But they had 
nothing for me. They put in my dossier that I 
have been arrested because I get one Viet Cong 
in my house. And that Viet Cong was my husband. °
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Memorandum (September 
22, 1965), op.cit., p.A-27.
The transcript of the interview with Ma Thi Chu was prepared 
from a tape recording of her talk with a woman activist on 
the ABC Radio, April 6, 1975, Mrs. Chu was a member of a 
women's delegation which visited Australia in March-April 
1975. Cf. The Age (April 2, 1975). Mrs. Chu's expression 
"we cut the file" is almost certainly the English equivalent for the French "couper le fil" which means literally "to cut the wire" or, in this case, "to sever the connection".
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It is of course impossible to cross check all complaints
made by the PAVN High Command with independent sources.
Joseph Buttinger has warned that
Communist claims of countless massacres of 
civilians in the sweep by the South Vietnamese 
Army into Vietminh controlled areas cannot be 
taken as evidence, nor can the reports of 
Wilfred Burchett, which, though they cannot be 
dismissed altogether, are certainly also 
Communist propaganda. The ICC reports in this 
respect are inconclusive, chiefly because the 
Diem regime prevented the ICC teams from 
pursuing their investigation. / (emphasis added)
Communist accounts themselves are also often contradictory.
The following table sets out the cumulative data provided
by DRVN sources. Although they were issued with the
TABLE 7-2
RESULTS OF THE ANTI-COMMUNIST DENUNCIATION CAMPAIGN TO 1959
Time Period: Reprisals Killed Wounded Arrested Missing Detained
by February 
1956a - 1,563 4,636 40,768 732 -
by October
1956° 5,529 1,775 4,725 53,350 761 10,024
by April
1957° 5,777 2,124 5,159 57,353 778 10,000
by November
1957a 6,172 2,148 4,182 65,211 880e 10,024
by February
1959r 4,971 10,185 183,843 10,000
SOURCES: a Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia,
1100 GMT, 4 May 1956.
Letter from Brig. Gen. Phan Trong Tue, head of the PAVN High 
Command, dated 10 May 1957, to Ambassador T.N. Kaul, chairman 
of the ICC; Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast 
Asia, 1130 GMT, 14 May 1957.
Buttinger, A Dragon Embattled, Vol.2, op.cit., p.1156, fn. 
Ill; accounts by Burchett appear in The Furtive War, op.cit., 
p.36-41; Inside Story of the Guerrilla War, op.cit., p.121-128;
cont'd
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SOURCES c Nhan Dan, 3 December 1957. 
cont'd:
Vietnam News Agency, 1 November 1958.
0 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 
1100 GMT, 7 August 1958.
 ^Quang Loi, South of the 17th Parallel (Hanoi: Foreign 
Languages Publishing House, 1959), p.21; Loi cites documents 
prepared by PAVN. Wilfred G. Burchett, The Furtive War 
(New York: International Publishers, 1963), p.38 states
these figures, prepared by the PAVN liaison office to the 
ICC/ cover the period 11 April 1955 to 31 January 1959.
disclaimer that they were based on "incomplete figures" 
these estimates nevertheless serve as an upper limit in 
determining the effectiveness of the RVN's anti-Communist 
denunciation campaign.
Table 7-3 sets out the same figures arranged by time 
period. From this display one observes that the most 
intense period of the ACDC fell during November 1957 and 
February 1959. The period February 1956-November 1957 
appears less intense than the period before (July 1954- 
February 1956) or after. Thus there are grounds for the 
assertion by Party leaders that during 1957 the Party 
apparatus experienced a brief period in which it was able 
to recover.
It should be noted that the ACDC was directed 
indiscriminately at opponents of the Diem regime. These
57 cont'd
and Vietnam Will Win! (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970),
p.50-51. Independent scholars as well as former Party 
cadres (and internal Party documents captured by RVN forces) 
agree that the ACDC was widespread, indiscriminate and brutal; 
see: Joseph Zasloff, Origins of the Insurgency, op.cit., p.9-11; 
Lacouture, Vietnam: Between Two Truces, op.cit., p.28-31 and
Philippe Devillers, "The Struggle for the Unification of 
Vietnam", The China Quarterly (January-March 1962), No.9, 
p.9-15.
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TABLE 7-3
RESULTS OF THE ANTI-COMMUNIST DENUNCIATION CAMPAIGN
BY TIME PERIOD
Time Period
July 1954 - February 1956 
February - October 1956 
October 1956 - November 1957 
November 1957 - February 1959
Killed Wounded Arrested
1,563 4,636 40,768
212 89 12,582
373 457 11,861
2,871 5,185 126,490
SOURCES: Same as table 7-2 above.
5 8included both Communists and non-Communists alike. Among 
the latter were ex-Resistance veterans who were not Party 
members. These individuals were subject to the same
Scheer, How the United States Got Involved in Vietnam, 
op.cit., p.40; Zasloff, Origins of the Insurgency, op.cit., 
p.9 has written, "Not only the active Party members, but 
large numbers of the inactive, whether or not they were still 
loyal to the Vietminh, were harassed, persecuted, arrested, 
and in some cases executed [as a result of the ACDC]. In many 
areas this local oppression also included the so-called 
'Vietminh families', that is to say, those who had sons among 
the regroupees in the North or relatives who were involved in 
insurgent activities in the South...". Also: P.J. Honey, "The 
Problem of Democracy in Vietnam", The World Today (February 
1960), Vol.16, No.2, p.73, writes "There are, in the Republic 
of Vietnam, establishments euphemistically known as Political 
Re-education Camps. Each one of these camps contains some 
thousands of detainees who have never faced a court trial and 
who have never received a fixed sentence. The declared 
purpose of the camps is to teach those favourably disposed 
towards Communism the errors and shortcomings of Communist 
doctrine and practice. This writer has visited such camps 
and talked with the guards and instructurs there and, though 
not permitted to question the detainees themselves, had long 
conversations with former inmates who have now been released. 
The consensus of the opinions expressed by these people is that 
there are a number of real Communists in the camps, but that 
the majority of the detainees are neither Communists nor pro- 
Communists. It is popularly believed that persons are placed 
in the camps because they have been critical of the regime".
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abuses as Communist cadres during 1956-59 and found
themselves confined to "re-education centres". Although
estimates vary on the number of detainees at this time,
59non-Communist estimates put the total over 50,000.
IV. RURAL RESETTLEMENT
In order to cope with the influx of refugees who
regrouped from the North in 1954-55 (660,000 of whom were
6 0totally dependent on outside aid ), and to alleviate rural
The Republic of Viet-Nam's Information Ministry published 
a document in 1960 which stated that 48,200 persons had been 
arrested between 1954 and 1960, Georges Chaffard, Indochina: 
dix ans d1independance (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1964), p.168-169; 
Philippe Devillers has estimated that as many as 50,000 were 
held in RVN jails in late 1956; in Kahin and Lewis, The United 
States in Vietnam, op.cit., p.100; In May 1956 the RVN's 
Secretary of State for Information put the figure of 
detainees at between 15-20,000, Osborne, "The Tough Miracle 
Man of Vietnam", p.166; a figure of 30,000 prisoners in 1960 
was provided by Time (November 21, 1960) cited in Scheer,
How the United States Got Involved in Vietnam, op.cit., p.59 
and for 1962 by Nguyen Thai Binh, Viet-Nam: The Problem and
A Solution (Paris: Viet-Nam Dan-Chu Dang [Viet-Nam Democratic
Party], 1962), p.71. Fox Butterfield, in his summary of the. 
Pentagon Papers, places the number of detainees at between 
50-100,000. A search of the original U.S. Government edition 
by the author failed to turn up a reference to the figure 
of 100,000. Butterfield's estimate of 50,000 relies on Kahin; 
Butterfield, "Origins of the Insurgency in South Vietnam", 
in Sheehan, compiler, The Pentagon Papers op.cit., p.17. The 
relevant section in the U.S. Government's edition may be 
located in "Rebellion Against My-Diem", United States- 
Vietnam Relations, op.cit., Book 2, IV.A.5. Tab 2, p.27-29. 
Interestingly a Communist writer has cited Butterfield's 
figure of 100,000 approvingly in his estimates of the number 
of persons jailed during the course of the ACDC: Viet Hong,
"Vai Net Va Dau Tranh Vo Trang Va Luc Luong Vo Trang o Nam bo 
Truoc Cuoc Dong Khoi 1959-1960" [The Armed Struggle and the 
Armed Forces in Nam Bo Before the 1959-1960 General Uprising] 
Nghien Cuu Lieh Su [Hanoi] (March-April, 1974), No.155, p.40. 
Hong is a high-level cadre in the Liberation Armed Forces 
in Nam Bo who took part in the events of the period.
^  Foster Hailey dispatch from Cai San (20 February 1957) 
in The New York Times (March 3, 1957), p.24.
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poverty in central Viet-Nam, the Republic of Viet-Nam 
initiated a massive program of population resettlement 
into the rural areas. Security considerations went hand 
in hand with humanitarian ideals as plans were drawn up 
to create a "living wall" of new villages along the Viet- 
Nam-Cambodian frontier from Kontum province in the north 
to Ca Mau in the south.^ Various aspects of this program 
had unanticipated consequences for the RVN.
Two separate programs were inaugurated in the
Highlands. One, begun in April 1957, involved the
resettlement of indigent families from the central Viet-Nam 
6 ^coast. " The pace of the program was revealed in various 
contemporary press accounts. According to correspondent 
Bruce Russell, 31,000 peasants had been settled in 22 so- 
called land development centres (LDC's) by July 1958, 18,000 
of whom had been moved to the Highlands during the first year 
alone.^ By 1963 two-hundred and twenty-five LDC's had been
John D. Montgomery, The Politics of Foreign Aid: American
Experience in Southeast Asia (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, 1962), p.73. For a general discussion of various 
aspects of early refugee relief and settlement see Lindholm, 
editor, Viet-Nam: The First Five Years, op.cit., pp.45-105,
especially the discussion by Bui Van Luong and Joseph J.
Harnett.
6 2 Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, 
United States Congress, Land Reform in Vietnam (Washington:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), 20th Report, 90th 
Conbress, 2nd Session, p.8; Warner, The Last Confucian, op.cit., 
p.139-140? Vietnam Press, "The President of the Republic 
Visits the Highlands", The Times of Viet-Nam (January 14, 1958), 
Vol.2, No.11, p.l; Vietnam Press, "Quang Ngai People Participate 
in Land Development Program", ibid. (April 12, 1958), Vol.2,
No.83, p.1-2; and Vietnam Press, "Six New Land Development 
Centers Created in Highlands", ibid. (May 17, 1958), Vol.2,
No.102, p.l.
6 3 Bruce Russell, "New Life Surges in the Highlands", The Times 
of Viet-Nam (July 14, 1958), Vol.2, No.150, p.l. "Commentary: 
Fell on Father Harnett", in Lindholm, loc.cit., p.93.
408
created which embraced 52,182 families (274,945 individuals)
64settled on 112,443 hectares of cultivated land.
In 1958 the Diem government inaugurated the second
program, the Highland Resettlement Scheme, which planned
to build 80 centres for 88,000 people on 13,000 hectares 
6 5of land. All too often the actual resettlement was
r raccompanied by the use of force. In the face of the
resultant local opposition the scheme began to founder and
in 1960 virtually ended. Before this, however, several
uprisings on the part of Highland montagnards had been
provoked. According to one writer:
But here [in the central Highlands], Saigon ran 
into the resistance of the ethnic minorities which 
culminated in the armed uprisings of the Raglay 
tribe in the Western part of Ninh Thuan 
province, the Bahnar tribe in Vinh Thanh in the 
western part of Binh Dinh province in early 
1958, and the Cor and Hre ethnic minorities 
in Western Quang Ngai in 1959. 5
In the lowlands, where refugee resettlement had begun
as early as 1955, five agricultural exploitation zones
6 8(AEZ) were created in October 1957. These were:
Gerald C. Hickey, Some Recommendations Affecting the 
Prospective Role of Vietnamese Highlanders in Economic 
Development (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, September
1971), P-4708, p.26-27. It has not been possible to 
construct figures showing the pace of resettlement for 
individual years from 1957-60.
^  Hickey, Some Recommendations, op.cit., p.27.
Radio Hanoi, 1200 GMT, November 11, 1957; Bernard Fall has 
written, "The mountain tribesmen of the vast plateau area 
which covers almost 65 percent of South Viet Nam were the 
subject of political and economic oppression which American 
experts as early as 1957 considered tantamount to genocide". 
Fall, "Viet Nam in the Balance", Foreign Affairs (October 1966), 
Vol.45, No.1, p .6.
Linh, "How Armed Struggle Began in South Viet Nam", op.cit.,
p . 2 2 .
6 8 Vietnam Press in The Times of Viet Nam (October 1, 1957), 
Vol.l, No.1.
409
1. Dong Thap Muoi A.E.Z. (Kien Tuong and Kien 
Phong)
2. An Xuyen - Ba Xuyen A.E.Z.
3. A.E.Z. No.l (Binh Tuy, Phuoc Tuy, Long 
Khanh, Phuoc Long and Binh Long provinces)
4. A.E.Z. No.2 (Bien Hoa, Binh Duong, Tay Ninh and 
Long An provinces)
5. Cai San A.E.Z. (Kien Giang - An Giang)
The most publicized of the zones v/as the Cai San
resettlement area where between 40-43,000 persons were
relocated on 30,000 hectares of land which had been
69abandoned during the war. Press reports indicated that
5,500 persons had been placed in the Dong Thap Muoi A.E.Z.
and 19,839 persons resettled in the An Xuyen - Ba Xuyen
A.E.Z. by late February 1958. Unfortunately figures are
7 0lacking for the other A.E.Z.'s. Here too there was
resistance on the part of some communities at being required
to relocate a second time since migrating to the South. In
several areas parish priests articulated this discontent
71only to find themselves at odds with the Diem regime.
Robert M. Pearce, "Land Tenure and Political Authority: 
The Process of Change in Land Relations and Land Attitudes 
in Vietnamese Villages of the Mekong Delta Since 1954",
Ph.D. Thesis, The University of Washington, 1968, p.124-126. 
"Commentary: Alfred L. Cardinaux on Father Harnett", in
Lindholm, loc.cit., p.90.
70 Vietnam Press, "Dong Thap Muoi Land Development Zone 
Towards Full Prosperity", The Times of Viet Nam (April 9, 
1958), Vol.2, No.76, p.l and 3-4; Vietnam Press, "An Xuyen - 
Ba Xuyen Land Development Area Develops Steadily", ibid. 
(April 10, 1958), Vol.2, No.77, p.5.
71 Voice of Vietnam in Vietnamese to Southeast Asia, 1100 
GMT, March 5, 1957, ibid, in Vietnamese to Southeast Asia, 
0430 GMT, April 26, 1957; and Vietnam News Agency, December 
18, 1957.
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There are two main reasons why this resettlement effort
was significant. Firstly, the influx of lowland Vietnamese
into the Highlands immediately sparked off racial animosity
72between the new settlers and the Highland minority groups.
This explosive situation was only made worse by the heavy
handed efforts of the RVN to forcibly re-settle montagnard 
73groups. Further, included among the lowland migrants who
were "formerly under complete Vietminh control [were]...
families the new authorities considered unreliable... [a]s
a result, the settlements, though reinforced by a sprinkling
of demobilized soldiers, took on the wretched aspect of
74banishment camps..." As we shall note in the next
chapter, the Party underground was alert to this situation.
Secondly, the resettlement program did not provide
free land to the refugees even though "(t)he government
choose the settlement sites, cleared the land, transported
the settlers, allocated plots, and provided food, livestock,
75seed, and other supplies...". This policy gave rise to
One result was the emergence of a montagnard racial 
consciousness which cut across linguistic groups; see the 
discussion of the Bajaraka Movement below.
73 Gerald Hickey has written, "the Highland Resettlement 
plan, under which Highlanders were forced off their ancestral 
land and into 'reservations'". (emphasis added); Hickey,
The Highland People of South Vietnam: Social and Economic
Development (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, September
1967), Memorandum RM-5281/1, p.28.
74 Duncanson, Government and Revolution, op.cit., p.247. 
Dispatch from Phuoc Long (October 29, 1957) in The New York 
Times (October 30, 1957), p.ll states that "Many discharged 
servicemen had joined settlers adding to national guard and 
reserve militia strength.
Scigliano, South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress, op.cit.,
p.105; Warner, The Last Confucian, op.cit., p.139-140 writes: 
"Settlers from the impoverished coastal areas were resettled 
in the much more fertile and sparsely populated High Plateau 
waited in vain for titles to their new settlements. They 
were assigned garden plots and could work on communal farms:
cont'd
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to grievances between the government and the settlers.
At Cai San, for example, the new tenants were permitted to
purchase their land over a six year period. Robert
Scigliano has commented on this situation as follows:
[the] peasants have not been able to understand 
why they have to sign tenancy contracts for 
unoccpuied land which they assumed the Diem 
government was giving them. At the large 
Cai San development in southwestern Vietnam, 
for example, there was so much resistance to 
tenancy contracts by the 43,000 resettled 
refugees that the government cut off daily 
subsistence payments in order to bring the 
refugees around. °
In order to grasp the crucial importance of this 
issue it is necessary to turn to the larger issue of the 
RVN's so-called land reform program.
V. LAND REFORM77
The Mekong Delta area of South Viet-Nam, in terms of
landholdings and ownership, is characterized by great 
7 8inequality. In 1954 one quarter of one percent of the
cont'd
but the incentive of private ownership on their agricultural 
lands was still lacking".
7 6 Scigliano, South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress, op.cit., p. 123 ;
Fall, "South Viet-Nam's Internal Problems", op.cit., p.251 
has written; "in January, 1958, the provincial governor 
of Kien Giang, which includes Cai-San, appeared at the 
settlement with an escort of Civil Guards to explain to the 
farmers that the word 'distributed' used in their land 
contracts was not to be confused with 'definitely granted', 
and that they owed rent or purchase payments to the 
'rightful owners' of the land. Needless to say, the situation 
became explosive, the refugee farmers claiming that they had 
been 'duped' by the authorities".
77 This section relies on a variety of sources including: 
Government Operations Committee, Land Reform in Vietnam, 
op.cit., pp.1-12; Pearce, "Land Tenure and Political 
Authority", op.cit., chapters 4-7; Wolf Ladejinsky,
"Agrarian Reform in the Republic of Vietnam" in Wesley 
Fishel ed. Problems of Freedom: South Vietnam Since
Independence (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961),
pp.153-176; Price Gittinger, "Agrarian Reform", in Lindholm,
cont'd
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rural population owned 920,000 hectares of riceland, or 
roughly 40% of the total. Put another way, 44% of the 
arable land was in the hands of owners whose estates were 
larger than 100 hectares in size. 49% of the cultivated 
land was owned by 1% of the landowners whose holdings 
exceeded 100 hectares in area. At that time the average 
farm plot in the delta was 1.5 hectares.
There were 1,330,000 farmers in the delta at that 
time. Six thousand three-hundred of whom owned 1,035,000 
hectares (45% of the total). Another 183,000 small holders 
(representing 72% of all landowners) owned 345,000 hectares, 
or 15% of the total rice land. According to Robert Sansom 
there were an estimated one million tenants in the Mekong 
Delta area (77% of the total number of farmers) whose
79average family size, according to another writer, was 5.5.
When the number of tenant families are aided to the number
of landless (2 million) the total figure, 8 million persons,
8 0represents nearly 80% of the Delta population.
cont'd
editor, Viet-Nam: The First Five Years, op.cit., pp.200-208
and the discussion on pp.209-213; and David Wurf el, ‘'Agrarian 
Reform in the Republic of Vietnam", Far Eastern Survey 
(June 1957), Vo..XXVI, No.6, pp.81-92.
7 8 Pearce, "Land Tenure and Political Authority", op.cit., 
p.108, fn.6, states that inequality in the Mekong Delta was 
the worst in Asia. All figures in this section have been 
converted to hectares for purposes of comparability. One 
hectare is equal to 2.47 acres.
7 9 Robert L. Sansom, The Economics of Insurgency in the Mekong 
Delta of Vietnam (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1970), p.55.
Sansom found the average size of a Delta family to be 7.7 
persons; James B. Hendry, The Small World of Khanh Hau 
(Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1964), p.12 found the
average size to be 5.5 in 1958-59.
8 0 Sansom, The Economics of Insurgency, op.cit., p.55; and 
Price Gittinger, "Rent Reduction and Tenure Security in Free 
Viet Nam", Journal of Farm Economics (May 1957), Vol.XXXIX,
No.2, p.430.
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It has been estimated that the total amount of
cultivable land in SouthViet-Nam (mainly in the delta but
including the central coast line too) was around 2,300,000
hectares. Nearly 221,000 hectares of which was abandoned
81during the Resistance War. Both the Catholic Church and
the French community (433 individual owners) owned
extensive landholdings: 262,000 ha. and 229,000 ha.
8 2respectively.
Prior to the Resistance War the tenant's lot was
precarious indeed. He had little or no security of tenure
and he was forced to pay exceedingly high rental rates
amounting to as much as 50%-60% of the crop. Quite often
debt on the interest of loans borrowed to buy seed exceeded
8 3the original loan by as much as 70%. During the
Resistance large numbers of landowners retreated to the
safety of the major towns and cities. These were individuals
who possessed large rural estates. During 1946-48, according
to one writer, "(t)he gradual retreat... became a panic-
stricken exodus to escape intimidation, assassination, or
84trial and probable execution by the Viet Minh". Rent
Scigliano, South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress, op.cit.,
p.104; Wilfred Burchett, My Visit to the Liberated Zones 
of South Vietnam (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House,
1966), p.71 claims that 400,000 hectares of land were 
redistributed; Pike claims only 5,000 ha., Pike, Viet Cong, 
op.cit., p.277.
8 2 Communal land in Nam Bo (74,000 ha.) was also exempt;
Pearce, "Land Tenure and Political Authority", op.cit., p.117.
8 3 Sansom, The Economics of Insurgency, op.cit., p.56 and 
61; on the interest on loans see: Jumper and Normand, "Vietnam",
op.cit., Gittinger, "Agrarian Reform", op.cit., p.200
84 Sansom, The Economics of Insurgency, op.cit., p.55; on 
terror directed against the landlords see: Pearce, "Land
Tenure and Political Authority", op.cit., p.93-95. Cf. 
the testimony of Bui Cong Tuong, a former Party cadre in
cont'd
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reduction for rural farmers was decreed by the insurgent 
DRVN government first in 1949 and later, on a nation­
wide scale, on December 4 , 1953. As a result of DRVN
policy tenants experienced the twin benefits of land
8 6redistribution, taken from large landowners and especially
8 7absentee landlords, and rent reduction. To be sure the
peasant-farmer had tax obligations to the Resistance
government but these financial obligations were seen as being
different from traditional rent. The impact of this program
must have been considerable as the Party controlled over
fifty percent of the villages outside the sect areas in the 
8 8Delta. After Geneva, and only as a result of prodding
8 9by American and French officials, Diem reluctantly agreed 
to act on the question of land reform which, as we have 
seen, was of vital concern for four-fifths of the population
84 cont'd
Kien Hoa province, who asserted "In 1945 or 1946, if you 
came to Ben Tre Province, you could see each day the corpse 
of a landlord in the river water, with a [death] sentence 
pinned to his chest". Quoted by Robert F. Turner, "Expert 
Punctures 'No Bloodbath' Myth", Human Events (November 11, 
1972) reproduced in The Human Cost of Communism in Vietnam - 
II.The Myth of No Bloodbath, op.cit., p.39.
8 5 Pearce, "Land Tenure and Political Authority", op.cit., 
p.99-101 and Fall, The Viet-Minh Regime, op.cit., p.119-138.
8 6 According to Pearce, "Land Tenure and Political Authority", 
op.cit., p.92 the average amount of land redistributed 
amounted to 5-10 cong, or .5 to 1 ha.
Rent was reduced by as much as 80%, ibid., p.92.
8 8 Homer Bigart in The New York Herald Tribune (March 1,
1955) quoted in Hammer, The Struggle for Indochina 1940- 
1955, op.cit., p.360; there were an estimated 3 million 
persons in the liberated zones; Burchett, North of the 17th 
Parallel, op.cit., p.213.
8 9 Duncanson, Government and Revolution, op.cit., p.242; 
Scigliano, South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress, op.cit., p.121;
there had, of course, been previous attempts at land reform 
by the State of Viet-Nam but these remained on paper, see
cont'd
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of the Mekong Delta. In early 1955 President Diem issued
9 0two ordinances, number 2 (8 January) and number 7
(5 February). Ordinance 2 attempted to provide security of
tenure to tenants by placing limits on rent. Ordinance
7 provided additional guarantees for tenants who were
91farming land abandoned during the Resistance. In 1956
Diem attempted to deal with the pressing problem of land
redistribution and ownership with Ordinance 57 (22 October).
Although a Commissariat General for Land Development was
created the following year progress was remarkably slow.
It was not until 1958, and only after a change of directors,
that land redistribution made some progress.
92Under Ordinance No.2 the RVN attempted to protect
a farmer's security of tenure by requiring that all tenancy
agreements be drawn up in writing on government-approved
contract forms and that these contracts be registered in
the village concerned. There were two types of model leases.
The first (type A) ran for three years and permitted the
owner to recover his land only if he or his family intended
to work it themselves. Under the second (type B) contract,
a tenant was granted a five-year lease that was renewable
93at the end of the period by mutual agreement. This contract
89 cont'd
Gittinger,
p.433-434.
9 0  t kIbid.
"Rent Reduction and Tenure Security", op.cit.,
91 Ibid., and Pearce, "Land Tenure and Political Authority", 
op.cit., p.109-112. Ordinance 57 expired on December 31, 1955 
and was replaced by Ordinance No.28 on April 30, 1956; 
Gittinger, "Agrarian Reform", loc.cit., p.201.
Gittinger, 
p.433-434.
93
"Rent Reduction and Tenure Security", op.cit.,
cont'd on following page cont'd
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was liable to termination if the tenant's rent fell into
arrears. Under the terms of either contract, rents were
limited to between 15% and 25% of the main crop depending
94on soil fertility. Additional payment, not to exceed
12%, had to be made for any implements, animals or seeds
provided by the landlord. Loans given by the landlord to
the tenant were also subject to limitation as they were not
allowed to exceed an annual rate of interest of 12%.
Agrarian Reform Committees were supposed to be formed at
the village and district levels to oversee implementation of
Ordinance No.2 and to arbitrate any disputes which might
arise in coordination with provincial agrarian reform
committees. On the face of it the application of Ordinance
No.2 appeared successful for by mid-1959 eighty percent of
all tenanted land (774,000 contracts) had been duly 
9 5registered.
96Ordinance No.7 addressed itself to the problem of 
abandoned land. Under its provisions village councils were
"Any increase of yield resulting from a farmer's investment 
or use of improved technique belonged to the tenant without 
any increase of rent". Cf. Robert Shaplen, The Lost 
Revolution (New York: Harper Colophon Books, Revised Edition,
1966), p.144. There were in fact three types of contracts; 
Type C, "to be used when the landlord or his personal agent 
was not present to sign the lease, is the same as Type B 
except that the Communal Council 'acts on behalf' of the 
absent landlord in drawing up the contract". Würfel,
"Agrarian Reform in the Republic of Vietnam", op.cit., p.87.
94 Pearce, "Land Tenure and Political Authority", op.cit., 
p.110; Gittinger, "Rent Reduction and Tenure Security", 
op.cit., p.430 indicates that this was a drop from the 
traditional 50%.
95 Duncanson, Government and Revolution", op.cit., p.96; 
Committee on Government Operations, Land Reform, op.cit., p.9. 
Gittinger, "Agrarian Reform", op.cit., p.203.
96 Gittinger, "Agrairan Reform", op.cit.; Gittinger, "Rent 
Reduction and Tenure Security", op.cit., p.435.
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to prepare a list for the central government of all rice 
land not cultivated the previous season. All landowners 
were simultaneously required to declare their intention 
either to lease the land in question or to cultivate it 
themselves. If the landlords chose to lease the land they 
were immediately subject to the provisions of Ordinance 
No.2. All land on which the owner had failed to file a 
declaration of intent was declared abandoned land. Village 
councils, under Ordinance No. 7, were empowered to lease 
this land to suitable tenants. No rent was to be collected 
during the first year and reduced rent was collected for 
the next two years. The money in rent collected by the 
village councils was held until claimed by the absentee 
owner. Although Ordinance No.7 expired on December 31, 
1955, its provisions were reinstated by Ordinance No.28 
issued on April 30, 1956.
The defects of ordinances nos.2 and 7 were well 
summarized by Robert Shaplen, a close follower of the 
Vietnamese rural scene:
While some peasants benefitted from this part of 
the land reform program, it was hindered by bad 
administrationand lack of proper enforcement.
Peasants were frequently in arrears on their 
rents, and the system of agrarian courts 
established to settle landlord-tenant 
disputes soon came to be dominated by the 
landlords and by officials friendly to them, 
to the obvious disadvantage of the peasants. 
Furthermore, the peasants objected to paying 
rents for land that had been unoccupied because 
of the war - almost a third of the total 
riceland.9 7
Shaplen, The Lost Revolution, op.cit., p.144; the duties 
of the agrarian courts are outlined in Pearce, "Land Tenure 
and Political Authority", op.cit., p.119-121 where he 
indicates that of 18,882 cases presented to the courts, 
16,329 were settled; a report on Decree No.498/DT/CC
cont'd
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The last point was a crucial factor influencing 
98peasant discontent. During the war years, as we have 
already noted, most of the large landlords fled, leaving 
their holdings in the countryside. According to Dennis
99Dundanson so too did the tenant labor who worked for them. 
Thus during the Resistance much of the fallow land was worked 
by new peasants, squatters in fact,^^ under the Party's 
"Land-to-the-Tiller" program.^1- As a result of the new 
RVN ordinances these people were subject to regressive 
measures. The absentee landlords who remained for the 
most part in the towns, were quite happy to collect some
97 cont'd
establishing the courts may be found in Vietnam Press, 
"Agrarian Tribunals to be Created", The Times of Viet Nam 
(December 10, 1957), Vol.l, No.59, p.2. Gittinger, "Rent 
Reduction and Tenure Security", op.cit., p.438 has observed 
"the high costs of legal action and the slow judicial process 
have combined to make recourse to the courts all but 
inaccessible to tenants. Only about half the villages 
have agrarian reform committees, and these meet infrequently 
and have often been irregularly appointed".
"This reversal of traditional roles was caused in part 
by the peasants' continued recognition of earlier 
'expropriation' by the Viet Minh of the land of absettees 
and 'traitors'. Entering into lease agreements would have 
validated the claim of ownership by landlords who had been 
thus 'expropriated'. Farmers would then have been forced 
to pay rent on land they felt was largely their own. Tenant 
reluctance was also a tribute to the continuing influence 
of Communist organization and propaganda. Viet Minh agents 
repeated incessantly in the villages that after the projected 
July 1956 elections, the South would come under the 
jurisdiction of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam which 
would confirm earlier Communist expropriation of land", in 
Würfel, "Agrarian Reform in the Republic of Vietnam", op.cit. 
p. 85.
99 Duncanson, Government and Revolution, op.cit., p.243; 
Pearce, "Land Tenure and Political Authority", op.cit., p.104
Ibid., p.170; Committee on Government Operations, Land 
Reform, op.cit., p.8.
Burchett, My Visit, op.cit., p.71 and Inside Story of 
the Guerilla War, op.cit., p.178-179.
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rent where no rent had been collected before. In many 
cases rent was now collected not by the landlord but by
102local officials or agents acting on behalf of the landlord.
In some areas the landlord returned with RVN military 
103forces. Despite the intentions of Ordinance No.2,
landlords sought to collect rent in excess of 25% regardless 
of soil fertility. One study conducted in 1958 puts the
104average rent at 25%; another study put this figure at 30%.
In fact, even as these rents were being collected, certain
landlords demanded payment in full for rent unpaid during 
105the war years. And finally, although a National Credit
Office was established in 1957 to aid the peasant farmer
with temporary loans (for farm tools, livestock, and
extension work) less than one-third of those eligible
106availed themselves of the credit service.
The plight of the rural tenant assumes even greater
proportions when set against the failure of the RVN to
effect any meaningful land redistribution. According to
Ordinance No.57 all individual landholdings in excess of
107100 hectares were liable to expropriation. The effect of
Buttinger, A Dragon Embattled, op.cit., p.932; Sansom, 
The Economics of Insurgency, op.cit., p.56.
103 John Mecklin, Mission in Torment (New York: Doubleday &
Co., 1965), p.86.
Warner, The Last Confucian, op.cit., p.140; Hendry, The 
Small World of Khanh Hau, op.cit., p.36-41; Sansom, The 
Economics of Insurgency, op.cit., p.56 places the rent as 
high as 40%. For the figure of 30% see: Gittinger, "Rent
Reduction and Tenure Security", op.cit., p.438.
105
106
Duncanson, Government and Revolution, op.cit., p.245. 
Warner, The Last Confucian, op.cit., p.139.
Landlords had the first choice of land to retain and 
almost invariably the worst land was left for redistribution. 
Gittinger, "Agrarian Reform", op.cit., p.201.
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this law was less sweeping than imagined however. Firstly,
individual landowners were allowed to keep an additional
45 hectares, 30 hectares if the owners worked the land and
another 15 hectares to be reserved for family graves (huong
10 8hoa) and temples. Secondly, land owned by the French,
Catholic Church, communal land and land belonging to
absentee landlords was not subject to expropriation as was
all land not devoted to rice cultivation, that is, coffee,
109tea and rubber plantations. Thus of the 2.45 million
hectares of cultivable land in the delta, only 650,000 
ha. owned by 2,600 landlords was subject to expropriation 
and redistribution.110
There was one significant catch to the redistribution 
program: all prospective new owners^1 had to purchase the
Land turned over for livestock grazing was also exempted. 
Registration of the land was done on an "honors system", 
Committee on Government Operations, Land Reform, op.cit., p.6
109 Ibid., p.6. A description of the types and origins of 
communal land (cong dien) may be found in John Adams and 
Nancy Hancock, "Land and Economy in Traditional Vietnam", 
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies (September 1970), Vol.l, 
No.2, pp.93-94. As a result of French colonialism and the 
Resistance War as well as administrative changes brought 
about in the village councils by the State of Viet-Nam the 
control of village-owned (communal) land seems to have 
passed into the hands of the wealthy.
Pearce, "Land Tenure and Political Authority", op.cit., 
p.114; Other estimates place the amount of land subject to 
expropriation at between 685,000 and 740,000 ha; see:
Ladejinsky, "Agrarian Reform in the Republic of Vietnam", 
op.cit., p. 170 (685,000 ha.); Fall, The Two Viet-Nams, 
op.cit., p.311 (700,000 ha.); and Gittinger, "Agrarian 
Reform", op.cit., p.205 (740,000 ha.).
New owners were listed in the following order of priority 
tenants, laborers on expropriated land, wounded veterans or 
relatives of war dead, refugees, unemployed, small landowners 
with more than five children and less than 3 ha. of land 
and others without land.
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land from the government (for the same purchase price the
government had paid) after it was expropriated from its
112original owners. The old owners were offered relatively
good terms even though the RVN paid for the surplus land at
113prices roughly one-half of the market value. Ten percent
was paid in cash and the remainder in government bonds
bearing an interest rate of 3% which matured in twelve
years. The new owners, on the other hand, had six years in
which to purchase a permanent title at rates calculated to
equal 25% of the annual gross yield. Further, the new
owners were prohibited from mortgaging the land for ten
114years after the date of purchase. Some observers pointed
out that the purchase time was too restrictive, they suggested
115a time frame of from 15 to 20 years.
Both land redistribution and transfer of title deeds
116were undertaken at a snail's pace. Part of the problem
with the transfer of land titles arose from the fact that 
little progress in land registration had been made since 
1940. Although there had been a cadastral survey it focused
According to Burchett, Inside Story, op.cit., p.180, 
only 90,000 ha. of land had been purchased by 41,000 peasant 
families by July 1960.
113 Details of the Price Commission may be found in, Vietnam 
Press, "Agrarian Reform Scored Great Success in 1957",
The Times of Viet Nam (February 27, 1958), Vol.2, No.43, 
p.2. Ordinance 75 (April 4, 1957) provided the legal basis.
114 Träger, Why Vietnam?, op.cit., p.153. "Commentary: David
Würfel on Gittinger", in Lindholm, editor, Viet-Nam: The
First Five Years, op.cit., p.209.
115 Shaplen, The Lost Revolution, op.cit., p.144.
Pearce, "Land Tenure and Political Authority", op.cit., 
p.132 writes that the first formal transfer under Ordinance 
57 was held in December 1958, a year later only 55,439 h.a. of 
411,723 ha. available for transfer was actually given to 
former tenants. Gittinger, "Agrarian Reform", op.cit., p.208 
says the first title was given on May 9, 1958.
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TABLE 7-4
LAND REFORM UNDERTAKEN BY THE RVN (1957-1967)
Date
Amount of Land 
Expropriated 
(in hectares)
Redistributed 
(in hectares) New Owners
July 1957a - 35,700 18,800
January 1958^ - 104,370 49,968
May 1958° - 148,445 64,877
September 1958 - 258,969 97,229
July 1961e 415,843 - 109,438
1965f 440,668 247,760 115,912
October 1967^ - 270,000 128,000
SOURCES: a Viet-Nam Presse, July 15, 1957, p.v.
i. Vietnam Press, "Agrarian Reform Scored Great Successes 
in 1957", The Times of Viet-Nam (February 27, 1958),
Vol.2, No.43, p .2.
C La Depeche du Cambodge (July 9, 1958).
^ Robert L. Sansom, The Economics of Insurgency in the 
Mekong Delta of Vietnam, p.57, fn.8.
0 Republic of Viet-Nam, State Secretariat for Information, 
Bilan des realisations gouvernementales (Saigon, 1961), 
p.370.
 ^ Sansom, op.cit., p.57.
9 United States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee 
on Government Operations, Land Reform in Vietnam, House 
Report No.1142, 90th Congress, 2d Session (Washington:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), p.7.
its main attention on domain lands, concessions and the
towns, not rural property. Under Diem the Land Registry117
117 Duncanson, Government and Revolution, op.cit., p.243.
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Office was severely understaffed (and therefore fell behind
1 isin its work) and even non-existent in some provinces."
In addition the land registers on which the Registry
Office based its work were in many cases either inaccurate,
wrong (due to interference by interested parties) or non-
119existent (destroyed during the war). Land titles were
temporary until the new owners had completed purchase. To
obtain land a prospective buyer had to have his farm plot
surveyed and a new title issued. This process was protracted
to put it mildly. By December 1960, for example, of
607,300 ha. acquired by the RVN only 376,600 ha. had been
surveyed (three-fourths of which was being cultivated by
12 0100,000 new owners). Table 7-4 sets out the figures on
the progress of land reform.
The crucial point about land redistribution undertaken
121under Ordinance 57 was that it was too narrowly conceived. 
Only 30% of the total cultivated rice land was liable to 
expropriation and of the number of tenants in 1955 only
118 Ibid., p .245-246.
119 Ibid., p.243.
Pearce, "Land Tenure and Political Authority", op.cit.,
p.118.
121 Race, War Comes to Long An, op.cit., p.60 writes about the 
impact of the program in Long An: "What conclusions can be
drawn about the government land reform program in Long An?
The first and most striking is that the maximum impact of the 
program was limited, even on paper. Of some 78,000 hectares 
of rented riceland at the time the program began, only 7,370, 
or less than 10 percent, came under the expropriation 
provisions of Ordinance 57... Moreover, by 1960 when the 
government was already in serious trouble in Long An, only 
973 temporary titles had been distributed, that is, less than 
3 percent of an estimated 35,000 tenant families profited 
from the program in time for it to benefit the government". 
According to Sansom, The Economics of Insurgency, op.cit., p.58, 
"At most, 10 percent of the tenants [in the Mekong Delta as a 
whole] were affected".
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12 210% ever benefited. ““ As late as 1965 according to Sansom,
some 817,000 tenants (87.5% of the total) had yet to benefit
12 3from the provisions of Ordinance 57. In brief the
vast majority of tenants in the Mekong Delta labored under 
the abusive tenancy conditions described earlier.
Two further points should be made. Firstly, French- 
owned land (229,150 ha.) was never redistributed. Under
124a scheme agreed to by the French government and the RVN,
the former paid French owners a form of compensation and
turned the land over to the RVN. The RVN in turn sold the
12 5land to the highest bidders. Among the beneficiaries
were members of the President's family, in-laws and close
12 6friends (such as Tran Van Chuong and Nguyen Ngoc Tho).
Committee on Government Operations, Land Reform, op.cit., 
p.5 states "Of the 4.48 million acres [1.8 million ha.] of 
land acquired for land reform and available to the GVN 
since 1954, less than 15 percent was distributed to 
individuals and less than 10 percent was distributed for 
communal and public use between 1954 and 1962". Pearce,
"Land Tenure and Political Authority", op.cit., p.118 writes 
that 225,000 former tenants stood to benefit and another 
750,000 would remain without land. Gittinger, "Agrarian 
Reform", op.cit., p.207 states that only 312,000 stood to 
benefit.
123 Sansom, The Economics of Insurgency, op.cit., p .57.
Pearce, "Land Tenure and Political Authority", op.cit., 
p.117. Gittinger, "Agrarian Reform", op.cit., pp.207-208.
12 5 Stanley Andrews, "Red Tape and Broken Promises", The 
Reporter (May 5, 1966) quoted in Bernard B. Fall, The Two 
Viet-Nams, op.cit., p.312.
Shaplen, The Lost Rebellion, op.cit., p.145, "Perhaps the 
most disturbing aspect of the land redistribution program 
was the manner in which influential politicians and members 
of Diem's family obtained huge amounts of land that had been 
taken over by the government from French or Vietnamese land­
lords but had not been distributed to the peasants". Among 
the beneficiaries: Nguyen Ngoc Tho, RVN Vice President,
and Tran Van Chuong, Tran Thi Le Xuan's (Mme. Nhu's) father, 
described by Shaplen as "another of the successful 'land 
grabbers'". See also Montgomery, The Politics of Foreign 
Aid, op.cit., p.126.
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Secondly, communal land was not subject to Ordinance 57.
In Central Viet-Nam communal land was especially important
127where 99% of the landowners were small holders. One
hundred thousand farmers operated farms less than 1 ha. in
size. Theoretically the institution of communal land served
to benefit the poor but in practice, as land was let to the
12 8highest bidder, only the well-to-do benefited.
This system has been described by Denis Warner:
In practice, the system usually works as yet 
another means for squeeze and graft by 
appointed village chiefs and one of the 
worst forms of land exploitation. No security 
of tenure is given beyond the crop year, and 
there is no incentive for crop or land 
improvement when the poor peasants are allowed 
on the land. More often than not they do not 
get a chance at all, and the land goes to the 
richest and most prominent landlord.
There were many other defects involved with the
running of the RVN's land reform program. Private
agreements were often struck between landlord and tenant
which disregarded provisions of the various land reform 
130ordinances. Wealthy landowners escaped expropriation by
placing legal ownership of excess land in the hands of close 
family members. Both the Land Registry Office and the Land
Gittinger, "Rent Reduction and Tenure Security", op.cit., 
p.430-431; and Warner, The Last Confucian, op.cit., p.139.
12 8 Ibid.; Duncanson, Government and Revolution, op.cit., 
p.244, writes, "in Annam such big landlords as there were 
constituted the communal property either of whole villages 
or of the chretientes. In the former, periodical 
reallocation was by auction, for rents bid up often to half 
the crop..."
Warner, The Last Confucian, op.cit., p.139.
13 0 Duncanson, Government and Revolution, op.cit., p.244-245 
and Race, War Comes to Long An, op.cit., p.56-57. "Commentary: 
David Würfel on Gittinger", op.cit., p.209; and Gittinger, 
"Agrarian Reform", op.cit., p.203.
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Reform Office were run as separate departments, operating 
with inadequate facilities. Thus Diem's reorganization 
of provincial boundaries created the incredible situation 
where branches of one office existed in some provinces but
The RVN’s land reform of 1957-58 also struck at the
heart of reforms implemented by the Party during the
Resistance. According to Le Van Chan:
This land-reform program had a great impact 
in the countryside, making the majority of the 
peasantry angry at the government. The 
peasants felt that they had spilled their 
blood to drive the French from the country, 
while the landlords sided with the French and 
fought against the peasants. Thus at the very 
least the peasants' rights to the land should 
have been confirmed. Instead, they were 
forced to buy the land, and thus they felt 
they were being victimized by the Government.
At the same time the Party apparatus took 
advantage of this situation to propagandize on how 
bad the Government was, how it was the government
stealing the land from the
Duncanson, Government and Revolution, op.cit., p.245,
"A special agency was set up to administer the reform, 
outside the Land Registry - an administrative error made 
worse by the fact that hasty creation of new provinces 
coupled with poor facilities in some of the older ones, 
meant that there might be a land registry but no land 
reform office in some provinces, or a land reform office but 
no land registry, or neither".
132 Race, War Comes to Long An, op.cit., p.97-98; Race also 
quotes a former province chief of Long An as stating, "It 
appears that this policy was not well received by the 
peasants, because under it they had to pay for the land 
as well as pay agricultural taxes to both the government 
and the Vietcong. But the communists had already confiscated 
most of this land and distributed it free, one-half to one 
hectare to each family", (p.17); Träger, Why Vietnam? op.cit., 
p.153-154, writes, "Particularly unhappy were the peasants 
who had squatted on the lands of absentee landlords during 
the war years, 1940-1954, when the owners were not in a 
position, because of the security situation, to collect 
rents; now, as the peasants obtained title to land which 
they had long been cultivating free of rent, land they 
already regarded as their own, they were being forced for 
the first time to make substantial annual payments". Shaplen,
not in others. 131
131
cont'd
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POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM 
(1957-58)
A. Organizations Created by the Diem Regime
The main organizational strength of the Diem regime
lay in a web or organizations - political and security -
kept in tight control by an inner circle of the President's
family and their close associates. At the center of all
activity was the Can Lao Nhan Vi Cach Mang Dang (Revolutionary
Personalist Workers' Party) run by Ngo Dih Nhu, one of
Diem's three brothers. The Can Lao Party was a covert
organization which copied. Communist organizational patterns,
13 3including a cell structure at the base. Like the
Communist Party it too operated through a variety of front 
groups: Phong Trap Cach Mang Quoc Gia (National Revolutionary
Movement) and the Lien Doan Cong Chuc Cach Mang Quoc Gia 
(Revolutionary Civil Servants' League). Nhu's wife, Tran 
Thi Le Xuan, took charge of the Phong Trap Lien Doi Phu Nhu 
(Women's Solidarity Movement). Ngo Dinh Nhu also operated
134a variety of private intelligence and security organizations,
132 cont'd
The Lost Revolution, op.cit., p.145, "Probably the biggest 
fault of the land redistribution program was its failure to 
recognize the fact that the Vietcong [sic] had turned over 
land to the peasants for nothing in the areas they 
controlled; in view of this, the price the peasants had to 
pay to buy land from the government was undoubtedly too high".
13 3 Interview with Tran Kim Tuyen, Saigon, 13 July 1972; 
Duncanson, Government and Revolution, op.cit., p.401-402 
states that it was more similar to the French Surete.
134 The Surete was reorganized into a Viet-Nam Bureau of 
Investigation which employed 2,500 agents (of a total 
number of 6,500 employees) in December 1958; Weekly 
Intelligence Digest 52-58 quoted in "US Training of the 
Vietnamese National Army", op.cit., Chronology, p.OO. There 
were in addition municipal police forces and the Cong Dan 
Vu. Estimates of the number of services vary: Duncanson,
Government and Revolution, op.cit., p.255 says 10 in 1962;
cont'd
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the most prominent of which, the Service des Etudes 
Politiques, Economiques et Sociales (SEPES), was headed by 
Tran Kim Tuyen.
135The origins of the Can Lao Party are obscure, but
it seems certain that by 1954 Nhu had divided up the task
of Party-building with his brother Ngo Dinh Can and their
close associate Tran Quoc Buu. Their initial organizing plan
called for Can to work among the Catholic community, for
Buu to build up influence in trade union circles and for
Nhu to proselytize among the intellectuals. However after
Diem's appointment as Premier by Bao Dai, Viet-Nam was
effectively carved up between the two brothers. Can took
firm control in the central provinces while Nhu and his
13 6wife exercised influence further south.
134 cont'd
David Halberstam, The Making of a Quagmire (New York:
Random House, 1965), p.57 writes, "At one time there were 
thirteen different secret police organizations, controlled 
by different members of the Government". Voice of the Dai 
Viet National Liberation Troops in Vietnamese to Vietnam,
2300 GMT, September 10, 1955 provides a commentary on six 
of the major services.
135 Scigliano, South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress, op.cit.,
p.75 states that it was formed in the pre-1954 period; its 
charter may be found in John C. Donnell, "Politics in South 
Vietnam: Doctrines of Authority in Conflict", Ph.D. Thesis,
The University of California at Berkeley, 1964, pp.555-577; 
most interesting is Lansdale's claim: "Ambassador Durbrow
seemed genuinely surprised when I told him that the Can Lao 
Party in Vietnam was originally promoted by the U.S. State 
Department and was largely the brain-child of a highly 
respected, senior U.S. Foreign Service professional". See: 
"Memorandum for Secretary of Defense" (undated circa 1961) by 
Brig. Gen. Lansdale in "US Perceptions of the Insurgency, 
1954-1960", in United States-Vietnam Relations, Book 2, IV.A.5. 
Tab 4, p.74. Geoffrey Warner, "Interview with Major-Gen. 
Edward G. Lansdale, Alexandria, Va., 25 June 1973", typescript, 
p.l states "I asked Lansdale who the State Department man 
who created the Can Lao was, and he replied that it was 
Ambassador Reinhardt".
136 Donnell, "Politics in South Vietnam", op.cit., p.224-237.
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The size of the Can Lao Party, like its origins, is
also a matter of some dispute. In August 1959 Nhu stated
137that Party rolls contained 20,000 names. In May 1960
he released another estimate: 70,000 members on the Party's
138rolls of whom no more than 25,000 were active. Nhu's
estimates are undoubtedly exaggerated and although
independent estimates have ranged from 5,000 to 50,000,
139Can Lao Party size probably never exceeded 16,000.
According to Robert Scigliano, however,
(i)n actuality the Personalist Labor Party consists 
of a small number of trusted persons, nearly all 
of whom are in the government. There they occupy 
key, though not necessarily the highest, 
positions in the Saigon bureaucracy, the army, and 
some provincial administrations.
The NRM was founded in October 1954 as a mass-based
political organization. Its membership may have grown
141from 10,000 in 1955 to over 1 million by August 1959.
During the 1954-60 period, although three separate persons 
have headed the NRM (Bui Kien Tin, Tran Chanh Thanh and 
Pham Van Nhu),^^ "real power within this organization",
137 Scigliano, South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress, op.cit.,
p. 76.
138 The New York Times (May 22, 1960), p.4.
Shaplen, The Lost Revolution, op.cit., p.130-131; the 
estimate of 16,000 may be found in: U.S. Department of State,
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Intelligence Report:
The Outlook for North and South Vietnam, No.8008 (May 5, 1959), 
p.8. Pearce, "Land Tenure and Political Authority", op.cit., 
p.158 indicates that the Can Lao Party was not intended 
to be a mass based group.
Scigliano, South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress, op.cit., p .76 . 
Donnell, "Politics in South Vietnam", op.cit., p.238-250.
Tran Chanh Thanh resigned and was replaced by Pham Van 
Nhu in 1957; "Movement for National Revolution End Congress, 
Begins Third Year", The Times of Viet Nam (June 8, 1957), 
Vol.2, No.22, p.l and 15.
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writes one observer, "is divided between Ngo Dinh Can, 
who runs the party in the central delta area of the 
country, and Ngo Dinh Nhu, who directs it, less strictly, 
in the South, with the central highlands area divided 
between them".^^
The same writer has also commented:
the backbone of the Movement is the government 
administration. Its national leaders are 
deputies and administrative officials; 
province chiefs have presided over its 
public meetings, district information 
chiefs, at least in some areas, have 
acted as district NRM chairmen, and the 
village political commissionerj^sually 
act as local chapter chairmen.
The Revolutionary Civil Servants' League traces its 
origins to 1954-55 when a segment of the civil service,
operating through the so-called Democratic Revolutionary 
Force (DRF), became politicized and threw its support behind 
Diem in his confrontation with the Binh Xuyen. Later in
the year Nhu succeeded in winning over the DRF's leader, 
Nguyen Huu Khai. After a series of preparatory conferences,
the Revolutionary Civil Servants' League was founded on
Double Seven Day (July 7, 1955), the first anniversary of
145the Diem regime.
Mme. Nhu's Women's Solidarity Movement was created in
May 1958 as an outgrowth of the League of Women Civil
Scigliano, South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress, op.cit.,
p . 77 .
144 Ibid. Its activities in Central Viet-Nam are 
described by a broadcast of the Free Voice of the Vietnamese 
People in Vietnamese to Vietnam, 1200 GMT, April 8, 1955.
14 5 Charles A. Joiner and Roy Jumper, "Organizing 
Bureaucrats: South Viet Nam's National Revolutionary Civil
Servants' League", Asian Survey (April 1963), Vol.III, No.4, 
p .205-206.
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Servants. It claimed an exaggerated membership of 
969,850 in I960.146
In addition to the above-mentioned regime-sponsored
organizations, there also existed a number of intelligence
services which in theory came under the direction of 
14 7SEPES. According to Dennis Duncanson, "in practice
each [service] communicated direct with the President or 
his brother, in whose hands SEPES became the tool of the 
Can Lao rather than the other way round...All these 
services competed to show off their 'kills' to the
Palace... M 148
These organizations and movements represented the
scaffolding surrounding the inner core of the Diem 
14 9government. At the centre stood the President, Ngo
Dinh Nhu, Tran Thi Le Xuan and Ngo Dinh Can. Central Viet- 
Nam was run as a separate fief by Can (although he held no 
formal government position), where the full resources of 
the NRM and Can Lao Party were used to keep watch over all
146 Donnell, "Politics in South Vietnam", op.cit., p.276-285
Described by military officers who led the abortive 
November 1960 coup in their memorandum, excerpts of which 
are published in Burchett, The Furtive War, op.cit., p.93; 
See also the discussion in Nguyen Thai, Is South Vietnam 
Viable? (Manila: Carmelo and Bauermann, Inc., 1962),
p.202-209.
14 8 Duncanson, Government and Revolution, op.cit., p.255; 
Scigliano, South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress, op.cit.,
p.186-187.
14 9 Halberstam, The Making of a Quagmire, op.cit., p.43-59; 
Duncanson, Government and Revolution in Vietnam, op.cit., 
p.218, Burchett, The Furtive War, op.cit., p.77-94.
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opponents of the Republic, communist and non-Communist
alike.150
In Nam Bo, Nhu and a coterie of four-five close 
associates directed the maze of organizations through the 
instrumentality of the Can Lao Party. The personal 
relationship each adviser maintained with the Ngo family 
determined the amount of power and influence they could 
wield at any given moment. The family, however, was the 
real centre of power. As Scigliano has perceptively 
pointed out:
It seems impossible, moreover, that Diem could 
dispense with the services of his family, for, 
given the way in which he governs Vietnam, his 
family is indispensable to him. Together the 
Ngos constitute a balanced system, no important 
part of which may be removed without wrecking 
its operation. And thus is Vietnam governed, 
by paternalism and nepotism, and with a 
growing gulf between the very few rulers and 
the very many ruled.
It is significant that the political "activities" 
undertaken by Diem, Nhu and Can in this period would lead
In March-April 1958 Can and Nhu reached an agreement by 
which Can's agents in the centre could operate in Saigon 
(the number rose from 25 to over 200), Working Paper, 
Appendices, Item 28, p.6; Can and Nhu differed on the role 
of the Viet-Nam Socialist Party, it was permitted to operate 
in Nam Bo but not in central Viet-Nam; see Donnell,
"Politics in South Viet Nam", op.cit., p.440. Perhaps more 
revealing is the account by Bernard Fall, The Two Viet-Nam's, 
op.cit., p.272, "In 1958, four translators of French nation­
ality disappeared one night from Saigon; although working 
for the French Embassy, they were not covered by diplomatic 
immunity. Inquiries to police authorities proved fruitless; 
the latter, genuinely puzzled, explained that they were not 
involved in the case. It turned out that the translators 
had been arrested by a Central Vietnamese strong-arm 
group run by Ngo Dinh Can that had specially 'raided' Saigon 
for that purpose".
151 Scigliano, South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress, op.cit.,
p.61-62; Scigliano mentions Diem's reaction to an attempt 
by an American Ambassador to criticize Nhu.
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the U.S. Ambassador in September 1960 to recommend, inter 
alia, that Tran Kim Tuyen ("Nhu's henchman") should be 
posted abroad "because of his growing identification in 
public mind with alleged secret police methods of repression
Durbrow suggested the following:
Make public announcement of disbandment of 
Can Lao party or at least its surfacing, 
with names and positions of all members 
made known publicly. Purpose this step 
would be to eliminate atmosphere of fear 
and suspicion and reduce public belief in 
favoritism and corruption, all of which
s semi-covert status has given rise
B . Non-Communist Opposition
During 1954-55 the Diem regime had done its best to
suppress non-Communist opposition to which it attached
the pejerative labels "colonialist" (pro-French) or
"feudalist" (pro-Bao Dai). Central Viet-Nam had long
been the home for a variety of anti-Communist and anti-
154Diemist groupings. Chapter two provided details of their
early challenges to the Diem regime. As late as 1956 one 
faction of the Viet-Nam Quoc Dan Dang (VNQDD) was still able 
to continue its dissidence in Quang Nam and Quang Ngai
Telegram from Ambassador E. Durbrow in Saigon to the 
U.S. Secretary of State in Washington (Saigon 624) (September 
16, 1960) reproduced in United States-Vietnam Relations, op.cit., 
Book 10, p.1313.
153 Ibid., p.1314.
154 See the discussion in R.J. O'Neill, "Regional Influences 
on Vietnamese Political Parties", Politics (May 1969),
Vol.IV, No.l, p.1-19. Robert G. Scigliano, "Political 
Parties in South Vietnam under the Republic", Pacific Affairs, 
(December 1960), Vol.XXXIII, No.4, pp.327-346; and 
Scigliano, "The Electoral Process in South Vietnam: Politics
in an Underdeveloped State", Midwest Journal of Political 
Science (May 1960), Vol.IV, No.2, pp.138-161.
and control".152 Concerning the Can Lao Party, Ambassador
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15 5provinces. That same year, according to Joseph Buttinger,
the RVN succeeded in suppressing at least three other
groups: Dang Dai Viet Quoc Xa, Dang Dai Viet Duy Dan and
] 56the Dai Viet Quoc Dan Dang.
One expedient employed by the Can Lao Party and the
NRM was the wholesale dismissal from the civil service or
armed forces of anyone suspected of being an opponent of 
157the regime. One writer has even gone so far as to
suggest that Ngo Dinh Can paid more attention to rounding
up anti-Diemist nationalists than members of the Communist 
158underground. Elsewhere the RVN preferred to take over
and control trade union and other political groups which it
had not originally formed. Some, like Nguyen Thanh Trac's
159wing of the Viet-Nam Phuc Quoc Hoi, were disbanded.
Donnell, "Politics in South Vietnam", op.cit., p.436-438.
15 6 Buttinger, A Dragon Embattled, Vol.2, op.cit., p.1246; 
trials of members of the Dai Viet Quoc Dan Dang in April 
1957 were reported by Vietnam News Agency, in English, 1118 
GMT, April 11, 1957. A member of the Dai Viet carrying 
weapons into Saigon was arrested in October 1958, "Skipper 
Arrested for Hiding Weapons", The Times of Viet-Nam 
(October 20, 1958), Vol.2, No.232, p.l and 2; "Skipper 
Accused of Taking Orders from the Dai Viet", ibid. (October 
22, 1958), Vol.2, No.234, p.l.
These incidents were reported in Quang Ngai and Binh 
Dinh provinces by Vietnam News Agency, in English morse to 
Southeast Asia, 1100 GMT, December 12, 1956. Dismissals 
reportedly continued during 1958, Nhan Dan (October 10, 1958) 
as carried by Vietnam News Agency (October 10, 1958).
Duncanson, Government and Revolution, op.cit., p.256, "it 
was whispered that Can excluded Nhu's agents from his territory 
and even turned the tables by infiltrating his own spies 
into high places in Saigon. For all the intelligence 
services it is a valid criticism that the Vietcong were 
generally a secondary target, priority being given to 
surveillance of other enemies of the regime or of one another..."
159 Donnell, "Politics in South Vietnam", op.cit., p.422-423; 
see also Voice of Vietnam in Vietnamese to South Vietnam, 1200 
GMT, December 6, 1956. Another faction led by Nguyen Thanh 
Dang existed in Ninh Thuan province as late as March 1956.
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Others were used as front's for Nhu's influence and
compliant officials were often rewarded with seats in
16 0the rump National Assembly.
The case of Phan Quang Dan, one of the most prominent
161opponents of the Diem regime, is illustrative. In May
1957 Dan united various personalities representing the 
Viet Nam Phuc Quoc Hoi, the Socialist Party and the Republican 
Party into an opposition Democratic Bloc. Through the 
bloc's organ, Thoi Luan, they began to press for the 
abolishment of "concentration camps" (as political re-education 
centres were termed by the RVN) and for a variety of 
democratic liberties (freedom of the press, association, 
etc.). In September a government sponsored mob ransacked 
the editorial offices of the paper, pouring acid on the 
presses. The following month Thoi Luan1s editor, Nghiem 
Xuan Thien, was taken to court on charges of violating Decree 
No.13 (20 February 1956) which made it illegal to publish 
news detrimental to the national interest. In March 1958
16Thoi Luan apparently went too far and was permanently closed.
16 0 Scigliano, South Vietnam; Nation Under Stress, op.cit., 
p.60-61 and 76. The Nhu-Can rivalry even extended to the 
National Assembly where both brothers sponsored deputies in 
opposition to each other.
161 The details of Phan Quang Dan are taken from: ibid.,
p.85-87 and 175-176; Warner, The Last Confucian, op.cit., 
chapter six, "The Case of Dr Dan", p.107-124, especially 
p.112-114.
162 The closure of Thoi Luan was typical of press censorship 
at that time. In March 1957 the newspaper Dan Chu was first 
seized and then suspended for reporting details of an 
assassination attempt against President Diem. The weekly 
Duong Song suffered the same fate for reporting Dan Chu's 
account (March 5, 1957). In September of that year mobs 
attacked the press offices not only of Thoi Luan but of 
other papers which irritated the government: Tan Dan, Tu Do
and Doc Lap. In June 1958 Cong Nhan was forced to close 
for reporting landlord evasions of the land reform 
ordinances.
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The object of the government's ire was an anonymously
written column entitled "Letter to My Deputy" which,
according to Robert Scigliano, "was a long blistering
attack on the constitutional foundations, policies and
leadership of the regime, said to be distinguished from
Communist and Fascist rule only by the absence of ideology
16 3and organization". According to a story in The Times of
Viet-Nam, Thoi Luan1s references to rural insecurity and
the alleged formation of a "Committee to Liberate the
South" headquartered in Saigon-Cholon, were additional
reasons why the government chose to cancel the paper's
164permit to publish. The Democratic Bloc finally collapsed
the following year when Phan Quang Dan withdrew his 
membership.
In June 1957 several anti-Communist and anti-Diem 
nationalist factions came together in Paris and former a 
group which called itself the National Salvation Movement 
(NSM). Within three months, no doubt operating through 
Cambodia, the NSM managed to install a radio transmitter
inside South Viet-Nam which broadcast anti-regime
, 165propaganda.
16 3 Scigliano, South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress, op.cit.,
p.176.
164 "Editor Nghiem Xuan Thien sentenced to 10 Months' 
Imprisonment With Reprieve and 100 Thousand piastres of 
Fines", The Times of Viet-Nam (March 14, 1958), Vol.2,
No.56, p.1.
Kahin and Lewis, The United States in Vietnam, op.cit., 
p.110; see Voice of the National Salvation Movement, in 
English 0500 GMT, in French 0530 GMT, October 18, 1957 in 
British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts, 
Part 5, (October 24, 1957), No.710, p.40, which also 
contains editorial comment on the station by BBC monitors.
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The content of these broadcasts is interesting for 
they provide an alternate insight into political develop­
ments at this time. This transmitter, the Voice of the 
National Salvation Movement, was alive to the growth of 
Communist influence in the rural areas and also to Diem's 
policies against the sects which left them with little 
choice but to remain in opposition. According to a 
broadcast made in October 1957:
It is precisely this political dictatorship and 
the corrupt and unjust regime which have driven 
the people of South Viet-Nam into the arms of 
the Communists and which could facilitate their 
forcible seizure of South Viet Nam. In the 
light of the policy followed by Diem and his 
brothers since 1954...one can assert without 
fear of being contradicted, that Diem's 
anti-communism is only a political plan 
aimed at obtaining foreign aid. Inside the 
country he has busied himself only with 
exterminating nationalist elements, and to 
this end he has even agreed to collaborate 
with notorious former Viet Minh cadres. °°
Although information on the National Salvation
Movement is scanty (transcripts of its radio broadcasts
exist for the months of October and November 1957 only)
it seems that elements of the Dai Viet Party were behind 
167it. The Dai Viets were an extremely anti-Communist
group who maintained that Diem's suppression of the sects 
and other nationalist groups (like the VNQDD) only served 
to strengthen the hand of the Communists. Apparently 
the NSM hoped to win U.S. support (or at least to deny 
it to the Diem regime) on the issue of anti-Communism.
16 Voice of the National Salvation Movement, 0001 GMT, 
October 25, 1957.
167 BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts Part 5, (November 5, 
1957), No.713, p.54 which concludes editorially, "The content 
and format of the programmes appear to be identical with 
those of the Dai Viet Radio which broadcast on the same 
frequency up to August 1956".
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Thus the NSM tried to play on the fact that ex-Viet Minh
cadres (supposedly Communist) were embraced by the Diem 
168regime.
Propaganda broadcasts of the Voice of the National 
Salvation Movement attempted to present two themes: (1)
Diem's anti-Communism was a sham and (2) that U.S. support 
for Diem, predicated on the principles of anti-Communism, 
was misguided and would eventually prove counter-productive. 
On November 11th the NSM transmitter broadcast the 
following:
Diem has launched a noisy anti-Communist 
movement in order to fool the Americans and 
collect more aid from the USA. Everywhere 
Diem has organized ceremonies for the 
submission of the Communist elements, in 
order to make the Americans believe that 
he had succeeded in reforming Communists.
True, in some places some backsliding 
Communist members had surrendered to the 
national authorities. But most of the 
people who shouted slogans against the 
Communists and who praised Diem, were Diem's 
own men who were disguised as Communist 
elements to fool American guests. If someone 
added up the number of people who Diem 
called surrendered communists, it would be 
found that the total figure exceeded the 
number of members of the Communist Party of 
Ho Chi Minh. Moreover, the Communists had 
realised that Diem needed surrendered 
Communists to fool the Americans, and had 
sent their own men to pretend to surrender to 
the national authorities in order to infiltrate 
into the various organizations of Diem's, 
especially in the villages. °
Tran Chanh Thanh and Tran Kim Tuyen, for example, were 
both ex-members of the Viet Minh Front; so were several 
other members of the Diem regime.
169 Voice of the National Salvation Movement, 2330 GMT, 
November 8, 1957. Both points were true. Many of the 
"mass conversions" of Communist cadres were indeed stage 
managed. On the other hand the Party attempted to infiltrate 
Diemist organizations. According to Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, p.25, 
"One of our greatest errors was to try to have a number of 
Party members in certain provinces of Central Viet Nam feign 
surrender to the enemy".
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Concerning U.S. support for Diem, the Voice of the 
National Salvation Movement stated the following on 
October 18th:
Continued US support of Diem's policy would 
result in the alienation of the entire 
population of South Vietnam. As for US aid, 
the granting of these funds to one individual, 
who diverted them to the advancement of his 
own family, meant that this aid could not 
reach the people. If the US policy was not 
modified, it would raise the Vietnamese 
people against the anti-nationalist policies 
of Diem, and by extension, against the USA.
Such an event could not help but play into 
the hands of the Communists. The anti­
communist fight in South Vietnam would be 
lost...170
Meanwhile RVN policy in the Highlands sparked off
resistance of its own. As a result of Diem's attempts to
resettle ethnic Vietnamese on land in the Highland
provinces, the local inhabitants were dispossessed from
their traditional property. Presidential decrees in 1958
had the effect of denying recognition to montagnard 
171landholdings. These acts, coupled with Vietnamese
ignorance of Highland customs, caused racial tension to
rise. Sometime in early 1958 various Highland leaders
came together and formed the Bajaraka Movement, an acronym
formed from the names of the four tribes involved: Bahnar,
172Jarai, Rhade and Koho. In May a provisional committee
drew up a "Special Charter" outlining Highland grievances 
and demands for political autonomy. This document was
Voice of the National Salvation Movement in English, 
0500 GMT, October 18, 1957.
171 Committee on Government Operations, Land Reform, op.cit 
p.91 and Gerald C. Hickey, The Highland People of South 
Vietnam, op.cit., p.33 and 81.
172 Ibid., p.29 .
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forwarded to Diem in September at which time the Bajaraka
leaders called a general strike to draw attention to their
claims. They succeeded for within six days of their
strike RVN security police arrested all seven of the
173movement's leaders. The significance of this is that
the montagnards involved were generally assumed to be anti­
communist . ^  ^
VII. INCREASING AMERICAN MILITARY AND ECONOMIC INFLUENCE
In the 1955-61 period the United States lavished
nearly two billion dollars in economic aid upon the
175Republic of Viet-Nam. By May 1958 Saigon housed the
largest U.S. economic aid mission in the world and within
three years (1961) was the third ranking non-NATO recipient
17 6of American aid (after Korea and Taiwan). Table 7-5
sets out the figures on American military and economic aid 
to South Viet-Nam in the 1955-60 period.
The major mechanism used in the disbursement of aid
(except for direct military grants which comprised 25% of
177the total program) was the commercial import program 
(CIP). Under the CIP the United States subsidized the 
running costs of the RVN in this way:
173 Ibid.
174 At least four of the seven became senior RVN officials 
after the overthrow of Diem in November 1963.
17 5 Actually $1,701 billion for the period July 1954 - 
June 1962, Scigliano, South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress,
op.cit., p.111-112.
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177
U.S. Perceptions of the Insurgency", op.cit., p.37. 
Montgomery, The Politics of Foreign Aid, op.cit., p.85-93.
TABLE 7-5
U.S . AID TO THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM (1955-60)
(in millions of U.S. dollars by fiscal year)
Obligations* FY1955 FY1956 FY1957 FY1958 FY1959 FY1960
Economic** 322.4 210.0 282.2 189.1 207.4 182.0
Military - 167.3 110.5 53.2 41.9 70.9
TOTAL 322.4 377.3 392.7 242.3 249.3 252.9
* Not expenditures 
** Grants and Loans
SOURCE: John D. Montgomery, The Politics of Foreign Aid: American
Experience in Southeast Asia (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, 1963), p.284.
The two Governments agreed first on the size 
of the allocation of dollars [of U.S. aid for 
a given fiscal year]. Vietnamese importers - 
preferably industrial investors - applied 
for licenses to import from the U.S., or, 
in a variety of circumstances arising out of 
Washington's own balance-of-payments 
position, from a list of third countries 
that might change from year to year, the 
commodities they required, depositing at the 
National Bank in Saigon at thirty-five piastres 
for every dollar on the pro forma invoice.
The US Treasury reimbursed the supplier in 
dollars, while the RVN government encashed the 
deposited piastres, crediting them to what 
was known as the Counterpart Fund, and 
incurred on the other side of the account such 
expenditures as had been agreed with the US - 
in the main, the pay and food of the armed 
forces.178
Duncanson, Government and Revolution, op.cit., p.284; 
Scigliano, South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress, op.cit.,
p.112 and Fall, ' Wi 11 South Vietnam Be Next?", The Nation
(May 31, 1958), Vol.186, pp.489-493. An example of a 
third country is given in Fall, "South Viet-Nam's Internal 
Problems", op.cit., p.245, fn.10, "France received 
agricultural products from the United States and repaid 
by allowing South Viet-Nam to purchase goods in France to 
the amount owed the United States by France".
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Without the CIP or some other aid mechanism, the
Diem regime would not have been able to survive as it had
no other source of revenues sufficient to cover the
179expenses of running the country. The solution to this
problem, as we shall note below, was thought to rest on
18 0encouraging Viet-Nam's economic self-sufficiency.
Neither the CIP nor the RVN's efforts at economic
n 81development were ultimately successful.
There were several problems associated with the
running of the CIP. Initially the program encouraged the
importation mainly of consumer goods (air conditioners,
18 2water skis, hi-fis, automobiles). ' These made little
179 Scigliano, South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress, op.cit.,
p.lll. The United States provided $93 million worth of 
assistance which was absolutely vital in the transport and 
resettlement of regroupees to the South in 1954-55. American 
aid also filled the breach left by the departure of the 
French Expeditionary Corps whose expenditure had a greater 
impact on the local economy than American spending; ibid., 
p.103 and Fall, "South Viet-Nam's Internal Problems", op.cit., 
p.244.
18 0 Scigliano, South Vietnam:
p.106.
Nation Under Stress, op.cit.,
181 Duncanson, Government and Revolution, op.cit., p.277-282
Edward R.
The United
provides an extended discussion. See also:
Wright, Barriers to Progress in South Vietnam: 
States Experience (Seoul: Pomso Publishers, 1973).
Scigliano, South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress, op.cit.,
p.103; Duncanson, Government and Revolution, op.cit., p.286, 
writes "American planners had anticipated that 40 percent 
of the CIP money would be devoted to capital equipment, 
while 60 percent bought raw materials and consumer goods 
to generate piastres for the armed forces. In the event, 
aid administrators had to be content when even 16 percent 
was reserved for capital equipment...". Robert Scheer,
How the United States Got Involved in Vietnam, op.cit., p.52 
has written, "On the basis of available evidence, provided 
by the Michigan State economists and other experts, it is 
apparent that at least three-fourths of American aid was 
used for the importation of either consumer goods or raw 
materials for the production of consumer goods". Fall, 
"South Viet-Nam's Internal Problems ", op . cit. , p.246, "Or 
should the flow of merchandise continue - as it does -
cont'd
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contribution to economic development projects and tended
18 3to benefit mainly the urban middle and upper classes.
Secondly, the piastre-dollar exchange rate was artificially 
184low and licensed importers, after paying customs duties, 
could often sell goods at a lower price than their overseas
value.185 One result was a massive stockpiling of goods
in Saigon which could not be sold. 186 The RVN-imposed
duties on the in-flow of goods under the CIP, in fact, soon
187became the government's prime source of revenue.
182 cont'd
without stop, then the goods would simply pile up, unsold, 
in the shops and warehouses. This is precisely what has 
happened in South Viet-Nam since the spring 1957, bringing 
about not only a crisis in the very concept of counterpart 
financing, but an even graver crisis in the Vietnamese 
economy itself". See also: Milton C. Taylor, "South
Viet-Nam: Lavish Aid, Limited Progress", Pacific Affairs
(1961), Vol.XXXIV, No.3, p.242-256.
Nation Under Stress, op.cit.,18 3 Scigliano, South Vietnam:_____________________
p.126: "the greatest beneficiaries have been the urban
dwellers, especially the small middle and upper classes.
Thus, American aid has functioned to accentuate the 
distinction between the well-off and the masses. It has 
also led the Vietnamese government to depend on a foreign 
power instead of its people for its own support".
184 Duncanson, Government and Revolution, op.cit., p.284 
states that the free rate of exchange 67$ to one U.S. dollar, 
the unofficial rate was 100$ to one U.S. dollar.
Nation Under Stress, op.cit.,18 5 Scigliano, South Vietnam: 
p.103 and 116.
Fall, "Will South Viet Nam Be Next?" op.cit., p.490:
"The market is saturated with consumer goods of all kinds 
which the Vietnamese are no longer able to buy. Merchandise 
is left to rot on the docks by importers who haven't the 
money to pay for it...On January 30, 1958, Viet-Nam had a 
stock of typewriters sufficient to cover its needs for 
five years and a stock of calculating machines (including 
450 electric calculators) sufficient to cover its needs 
for eight years...In the field of textiles...(s)tocks on 
hand are sufficient to give about two suits of clothes to 
every Vietnamese man, woman and child, not counting an 
additional 23 million yards of cloth which were due to arrive 
by the end of March, 1958".
18 7 Scigliano, South Vietnam: p.116.
Nation Under Stress, op.cit.,
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According to one observer, "American aid has paid for
most of Vietnam's imports since 1954. It has provided
most of the revenues for the Vietnamese budget - about
60 percent of all government revenues since 1954 have
18 8come directly or indirectly from American aid"."“
The U.S. used the CIP as the device through which it
18 9channelled over 80% of its economic aid. In operation
the money generated through the CIP did little to 
encourage RVN self-sufficiency. As table 7-6 sets out,
82% of the counterpart funds were used by the RVN to meet 
defence needs.
U.S. COUNTERPART
TABLE
FUNDING
7-6
FOR THE RVN (1955-,60)
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 Total
Local currency
deposits: 167.1 239.4 256.0 203.4 170.2 181.8 1218.4
Withdrawals in
support of RVN
defence budget: 97.1 202.5 2 04.5 152.9 176.0 166.6 999.6
Percentage of Total: 58% 85% 80% 75% 103% 92% 82%
SOURCE: U.S. Perceptions of the Insurgency, 1954-1960", United States-
Vietnam Relations 1945-1967, Book 2, IV.A.5. Tab 4, p.39.
All figures in millions of piastres.
Robert Scigliano has summarized the relevant figures 
as follows:
188 Ibid. p.111.
189 Ibid., p .112 and 125 .
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Between 1956 and 1960, 43 per cent of all Vietnamese 
public expenditures were allocated directly to the 
military for the support of the army and Self-Defense 
Corps. The United States provided practically all 
of the money through the counterpart [fund] 
generated by the commercial import program. As a 
matter of fact, 78 per cent of all American aid 
given to Vietnam between these two years went 
into the military budget. In short, from 1956 
to 1960 the Vietnamese government spent two-fifths 
of its total revenues, including over three- 
quarters of the money it obtained from the 
United States, in order to maintain its military establishment.190
Table 7-7 sets out the disbursement for the remaining
20% of the total U.S. aid to Viet-Nam. A closer look at
these expenditures reveals additional amounts spent on
security and defence needs. The heading "transportation",
for example, includes funds spent on the repair or
191construction of roads. Although certain economic benefits
accrued from this, military needs determined the priorities.
Ngo Dinh Diem's request for funds to construct a Saigon to
Hue coastal highway was rejected. Instead the American
government only agreed to build a highway as far as Bien
192Hoa, 20 miles on the outskirts of Saigon. This highway
19 0 Ibid., p.113; and Kahin and Lewis, The United States in 
Vietnam, op.cit., p.77 write, "the massive U.S. program 
of economic aid that in effect paid almost all government 
salaries as well as Diem's other operating expenses - a 
total of $320 million allocated for fiscal year 1955 alone 
and almost $2 billion during the fiscal years 1955 to 1960".
191 Scigliano, South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress, op.cit.,
p.105.
i 92 The PAVN High Command alleged that the highway was in 
fact a "modern jet air field" (!) and, alternately, part 
of a strategic highway system; see:. Vietnam News Agency in 
English morse to Southeast Asia, 0510 GMT, April 26, 1958 
which cites a letter by Col. Ha Van Lau of April 21, 1958 
to the ICC and dispatch from Hong Kong, quoting DRVN 
sources, in The New York Times (April 26, 1958), p.10. 
American efforts to repair and construct roads were 
continually condemned by Communist sources for their 
obvious military uses.
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cost more money than the total American contribution to
labor, community development, social welfare, housing,
health and education projects for the entire 1954-61 
193period. Priority was also given to the construction
TABLE 7-7
U.S. ECONOMIC PROJECT AID TO THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM
(1955-1961)
Area of Expenditure Amount* % of t(
Transportation 75,921 40.7
Public Administration and Safety 26,437 14.2
Food and Agriculture 16,662 8.9
Health and Sanitation 16,086 8.6
Industry and Mining 15,520 8. 3
Technical Support 12,260 6.6
Education 9,296 5.0
Community Development, Social 
Welfare and Housing 8,641 4.6
General and Miscellaneous 6,045 3.2
* In thousands of dollars
SOURCE: Compiled from John D. Montgomery, The Politics of Foreign Aid,
op.cit., p.289, Table 4.
of a road into Pleiku province as a result of representations 
made by General Williams, the head of the U.S. Military 
Assistance Advisory Group. The heading "public administration" 
similarly contained expenditures related to the police and 
security services, equipment mainly.
The above figures do not reveal, however, the total 
sum. We have already mentioned that 25% of the total 
American aid package comprised direct military grants 
(Table 7-6 above) . These averaged US$85 million per year
Scigliano, South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress, op.cit.,
p.115.
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during 1955-61. Not included in RVN expenditure are
accounts related to the technically "civilian" Civil Guard,
police and security services. And further, as Robert
Scigliano has written, "(n)or do the figures on military
and civilian expenditures indicate the extent to which
provincial and other local authorities are likewise
194preoccupied with security matters".
The RVN's progress in economic development must be
related to the security and defence priorities just
outlined. In 1957 under American pressure the RVN moved
195slowly to implement a program of economic development.
A five year development program was drawn up but it was
inexplicably kept secret. Efforts inaugurated in March
of that year to attract foreign investment were
19 7disappointingly unsuccessful.
In order to attain self-sufficiency the new development
plan placed emphasis on the export of rice and rubber which
19 8accounted for 70% of export earnings. Rice production
quickly reached pre-war levels (3.4 million tons in 1938)
194 Ibid p.114.
Ibid., p.103 and Fall, The Two Viet-Nam's, op.cit., 
p.289-315.
196 Vu Quoc Thuc, "National Planning in Vietnam", Asian 
Survey (September 1961), Vol.I, No.7, p.4.
19 7 Scigliano, South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress, op.cit.,
p.178; Fall, "South Viet-Nam's Internal Problems", op.cit., 
p.248-249; Scheer, How The United States Got Involved in 
Vietnam, op.cit., p.53 observes, "The rate of investment 
was far below that required to keep up with the 3 per cent 
annual growth in population".
19 8 _ . .Scigliano,
p.108.
South Vietnam:__Nation Under Stress, op.cit.,
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and a high point of 5 million tons was attained in 1959.
Exports rose from 70,000 tons to 340,000 in the same
period. In 1961, however, due to rural insecurity the
199Republic of Viet-Nam stopped exporting surplus rice.
Rubber production similarly increased from a pre-war level
of 60,000 tons in 1938 (51,000 tons in 1954) to 79,000
tons in 1960. Yet these developments were more than off-set
by imports. While exports increased during the 1954-60
period, and while the total value of imports was reduced
slightly at the same time (by $26.7 million), the ratio
between exports to imports stood at 1:3 in the best year.^^
Other problems beset economic planners. Because of
the proclivities of Diem and Nhu, the massive amounts of
foreign exchange accumulated by the CIP were not reinvested
2 01in productive enterprises until after 1961. Secondly,
because of the comfortable arrangement provided by the CIP
the RVN took no steps to raise the domestic revenues,
2 02preferring dependence on overseas aid. Taxation
203revenues fell drastically perhaps by as much as 50%.
Ibid., p.108 and 117 and Fall, "Will South Viet-Nam 
Be Next?" op.cit.
200 _ . ,.Scigliano, South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress, op.cit.,
p.116 and 125; Fall, The Two Viet-Namsi, op.cit., p .294-296.
201 _ . ,.Scigliano, South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress, op.cit.,
p.120; Duncanson, Government and Revolution , op.cit . , p . 2 8 6 ;
and Scheer, How the United States Got Involved in Vietnam,
op.cit., p.51.
202 _ . ..Scigliano, South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress, op.cit.,
p.116; and Duncanson , Government and Revolution, op .cit.,
p . 28 5 .
203 _ . ,.Scigliano, South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress, op.cit.,
p.117.
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Thirdly, the RVN was extremely slow to encourage the 
development of domestic industry whose growth would lessen 
dependence on foreign imported goods. Although an 
Industrial Development Center was established in 1957 
to aid new enterprises, by 1959 it had approved only 27 
of 125 projects submitted to it.2^4
The increase in American military and economic aid 
to the RVN did not go unnoticed in Hanoi. Throughout this 
period Party leaders kept a close watch on the growing 
American presence and the comings and goings of high-level 
American delegations (see Table 7-8 ). Of particular 
concern was the growth in the strength of American military 
advisers and the uncontrolled shipment into Viet-Nam of 
military supplies and equipment. Although both developments 
formed the subject of numerous complaints to the ICC, no 
definitive action was undertaken due to the refusal of the 
RVN to let ICC teams intrude where their presence might 
prove embarrassing.
During 1956 various pressures built up on the United
States to increase the numbers of its military advisers in
Viet-Nam in excess of the ceiling set by the 1954 Geneva
Agreements. The solution was the creation of TERM -
2 05Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission - a subterfuge which
Frank C. Child, Essays on Economic Growth, Capital 
Formation, and Public Policy in Vietnam (Saigon: Michigan
State University Vietnam Advisory Group, May 1961), p.133-134.
2 05 On early pressures see the letter from Robert D.
Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of State of May 1, 1956 to 
the Secretary of Defense, Charles E. Wilson reproduced in 
United States-Vietnam Relations, op.cit., Book 10, V.B.3., 
p.1057-1059; in responding to a request by Senator Mike 
Mansfield for information on MAAG, Lt. Gen. Williams, chief 
of MAAG in Viet-Nam, cabled the Office of the Secretary of
cont'd
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TABLE 7-8
HIGH-LEVEL AMERICAN DELEGATIONS TO VIET-NAM (1957-58)
Date:
18-22 Jan*1957
10 Feb, 1957
29-31 Mar. 1957 
14-15 May 1957 
22 Jul. 1957
Name: Position:
Gen. L. Lemnitzer Commander in Chief U.S.
Forces in the Far East and 
of UN Forces in Korea
Lt. Gen. Hudnell
Gen. M.D. Taylor 
C.C. Finucane 
Vice Adm. Anderson
USAF Chief of Materials 
(Pacific)
US Army Chief of Staff 
US Army Undersecretary 
USN Chief of Staff (Pacific)
16 Sept.1957
29-31 Oct.1957
17-18 Nov. 1957
15 Jan. 1958
4 Jan. 1958
Adm. F.B. Stump Commander, US Forces
(Pacific)
M.D. Sprague
F.S. Bryant
G. Norton
Assistant Secretary of 
Defense, International 
Security Affairs 
Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Properties and 
Installations
Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy for Air
Rep. Porter Harvey Member, US House Government 
and a party of Operations Subcommittee
five
I.D. White Commander, US Army (Pacific)
R.L. Wittrup Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans
and Operations
Cardinal Richard Archbishop of New York 
Spellman
cont'd
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Defense/International Security Affairs on May 20, 1960 a 
copy of his reply. Within the text of the cable the 
following appears: "Following sentence classified
CONFIDENTIAL: Change over of TERM excess to MAAG ends
subterfuge as actually TERM has had undercover mission as 
logistical advisors since activation". A copy of this 
cable is reproduced in ibid., Book 10, V.B.3., p.1279-1980.
451
TABLE 7-8 cont'd
HIGH-LEVEL AMERICAN DELEGATIONS TO VIET-NAM (1957-58)
Date: Name: Position:
23-25 May 1958 John Friryn US Assistant Secretary for 
Defense
5-7 May 1958 Gen. E.H.J. Cams Assistant Commander, US 
Forces (Pacific)
15 May 1958 J.H. Douglas 
L. Thompson
Gen. L.S. Kutor
USAF Secretary 
Director, Military Aid 
Program (Aviation)
19 May - 17 Jun 1958 Gen. M. O'Daniel 
(ret.)
Chairman, American Friends of 
Viet-Nam
15 Jul. 1958 F. Higgins US Assistant Secretary of the 
Army
4 Sept.1958 W.M. Bruckner US Secretary of the Army
16 Sept. 1958 O.E. Passman Chairman, Subcommittee, Foreign 
Operations Committee, US 
House of Representatives
19 Sept.1958 Adm. H.D. Felt Commander US Forces (Pacific)
21 Oct. 1958 Neil McElroy US Secretary of Defense
23-27 Oct. 1958 G.P. Miller Member, Armed Forces Committee, 
US House of Representatives
29 Oct.1958 Gen. M.D. Taylor US Army Chief of Staff
14 Nov. 1958 C.H. Shuff
H.J. Kuss, Jr.
Brig. Gen. W.H. 
Wright
Maj. Gen. D .R. 
Hutchinson
Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense, Military Assistance 
Program
Chief, Overseas Resources 
Division, Office of Programming 
and Control
Chief of Mutual Security 
Division
enabled MAAG to surmount the Geneva limitations. It was 
now claimed by American officials that TERM was a temporary 
mission which would operate in Viet-Nam for the sole
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purpose of recovering U.S. equipment originally given to
France. TERM was activated in June and reached maximum
strength (350 men) three months later. It soon attracted
2 06the attention of the ICC. After months of
procrastination and evasion the RVN agreed to provide 
monthly reports to the International Commission. In 
its ninth interim report (March 10, 1959) the Commission 
was moved to state:
The Commission considered all relevant reports
and documents connected with TERM and
informed the Government of the Republic
that the Commission was of the view
that TERM should be able to complete its
remaining work by the end of June 1959,
and that, the status of TERM being temporary,
TERM should cease to exist thereafter and 
its personnel should leave the Republic of 
Vietnam.207
Nearly a year later the issue had not been settled
as the RVN informed the ICC that the discovery of further
U.S. equipment made it impossible to determine when TERM
would complete its activities. Under ICC prodding the
RVN eventually replied that TERM would be able to complete
its work by the end of 1960. When the deadline was
reached the RVN informed the Commission that it "had
ceased its activities and was disbanded on 31st December,
2 01960". PAVN protested that TERM had not disbanded but
Sixth Interim Report of the International Commission 
for Supervision and Control in Vietnam, December 11, 1955 
to July 31, 1956 Vietnam No. 2 (1957), Command Paper (mncfl 
31, (London: H.M.S.O., January 1957), paragraph 63, p.23-24.
Ninth Interim Report of the International Commission for 
Supervision and Control in Vietnam, May 1, 1958 to January 31-, 
1959 Vietnam No. 1, (19 59) Cmnd. 72 6, (London: H .M .S .0.,
May 1959), paragraph 31, p.13.
2 0 8 Eleventh Interim Report of the International Commission 
for Supervision and Control, February 1, 1960 to February 28, 
1961 Vietnam No.l, (1961) Command Paper Cmnd. 1551 , (London: 
H.M.S.O., November 1961, paragraph 49, p.17.
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had remained in Viet-Nam under the cover of MAAG's 
Logistics Section. There may have been some truth in 
this as 89 ex-TERM personnel transferred to MAAG's 
roster at that time.^^
PAVN High Command made further protests to the ICC
concerning the nature of MAAG, the role of CATO (Combat
Arms Training Organization) and TRIM (Training Relations
and Instruction Mission), and the participation of RVN
210observers in various SEATO meetings. In May 1957, for
example, the DRVN Ministry of Foreign Affairs charged that
the U.S. had over 2,000 military personnel in South 
211Viet-Nam. American denials put the total at 692 and
further stated that one-half of them were on "temporary 
assignment".
209 Ibid.
The PAVN High Command protested the participation by 
military units from countries which were also members of 
SEATO in the October 26, 1956 RVN Independence Day cele­
brations in Saigon; Seventh Interim Report, Cmnd. 335, op.cit., 
p.15; the PAVN High Command also protested at the parti­
cipation in SEATO conferences by RVN observers (such as the 
March 1958 meeting in Manila). The RVN denied such 
participation. See: Eighth Interim Report of the
International Commission for Supervision and Control in 
Vietnam, May 1, 1957 to April 30, 1958, Vietnam No.l (1958) 
Command Paper Cmnd. 509, (London: H .M.S.0.,August 1958), p.ll.
For further complaints see: Tenth Interim Report of the
International Commission for Supervision and Control in 
Vietnam, February 1, 1959 to January 31, 1960, Vietnam No.l, 
(1960), Command Paper Cmnd. 1040, (London: H.M.S.O., June
1960), p.18-19; Sixth Interim Report, op.cit., p.23-28;
Ninth Interim Report, op.cit., p.11-16 and Eleventh Interim 
Report, op.cit., p.14-24. President Diem went on public 
record stating that the RVN could not join SEATO because 
this would be a violation of the 1954 Geneva Agreements and 
because it would be playing into the hands of the Communists; 
see: United Press of March 15, 1957 as quoted in Voice of
Vietnam in Vietnamese to Southeast Asia, 1200 GMT, March 20, 
1957; and Reuters dispatch from Manila in The New York Times 
(March 23, 1958), p.41.
211 Dispatch from Washington in The New York Times (May 16, 
1957), p.ll; Associated Press dispatch from Hong Kong quoting 
Radio Hanoi in The New York Times (May 16, 1957), p.ll.
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TABLE 7-9
U.S. PERSONNEL IN VIET-NAM (1958-1961)*
United States Embassy3 90 
United States Information Service (USIS)a 35 
United States Operations Mission (USOM)^ 555 
Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) 1,000 
Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission (TERM)^ 350 
Michigan State University Group (MSU)/CIAe 52
TOTAL 2,082
* These figures have been gathered from various sources and reflect 
different time periods. Figures for the U.S. Embassy and USIS may 
be maximum numbers for the period. USOM figures include contract- 
employees. Not included are various private US citizens engaged in 
business or missionary work, American dependents and temporary 
visitors.
SOURCES: a Robert Scigliano, South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress,
p.192-3; he places USOM at less than 200, MAAG at less 
than 700 and American dependents at 800.
k John D. Montgomery, The Politics of Foreign Aid, p.177; 
these include ICA contract and career employees as of 
May 31, 1958.
C Bernard B. Fall, "Will South Vietnam Be Next?", The 
Nation (May 31, 1958); Fall writes, "And a vast U.S.
Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) - its exact size 
is classified but including well over a thousand 
officers and men..."The official figures placed the 
number at 342; "U.S. Denies Build-Up", The New York Times 
CL6 May 1957), p.ll.
^ "US Training of the Vietnamese National Army, 1954-1959", 
United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 2,
IV.A.4. Chronology, p.MM.
0 Robert Scigliano and Guy H. Fox, Technical Assistance in 
Vietnam, p.8; prior to 1957 the figure stood at 34 in the 
1957-62 period it never exceeded 52. Dennis Duncanson, 
Government and Revolution in Vietnam, p.276 states that 
prior to 1961 the total number of employees assigned to 
USOM, USIS, MSU and the CIA was less than 300. This 
estimate obviously excludes the 372 USOM contract-employees.
Hanoi may well have included civilian officials in their
count (see Table 7-9above). 212
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The PAVN High Command continued to note the arrival
v 213of American planes and ships bearing "war material".
In 1957 the High Command addressed 69 letters to the ICC
concerning alleged illegal arrivals of planes (70 cases)
214and shipment of "illegal war material" (105 cases).
A review of Commission reports covering the period August 
1956-February 1961 is shown in Table 7-10. The figures for 
violations are minimum figures as the ICC was prevented 
from controlling the arrival of numerous ships and air 
craft at various RVN installations. There are numerous
references to this situation in the ICC reports of this
■  ^ 215 period.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This chapter has attempted to provide a detailed account 
of the major policies pursued by the Diem regime which had 
an impact on the underground Party apparatus during 1957-58. 
The next chapter will view this same period from the point 
of view of the Party. This introduction to the 1957-58
See the protests by Ha Van Lau, Vietnam News Agency in 
English morse to Southeast Asia, 1128 GMT, June 21, 1958; Vo 
Nguyen Giap, ibid., English morse to Southeast Asia, 1135 
GMT, June 21, 1958; and Pham Van Dong (to the Geneva 
Conference Co-chairmen) in ibid., in English morse to 
Southeast Asia, 1100 GMT, June 28, 1958. See also ibid., in 
English morse to Southeast Asia, 1129 GMT, June 28, 1957.
214 Vietnam News Agency, in English morse to Southeast Asia, 
1115 GMT, April 7, 1958; for other complaints see: ibid.,
in English morse to Southeast Asia, 1110 GMT, March 27, 1958.
Seventh Interim Report, op.cit., p.13-20; Eighth Interim 
Report, op.cit., p.9-15; Ninth Interim Report, op.cit., 
p.11-18; Tenth Interim Report, op.cit., p.15-25; and 
Eleventh Interim Report, op.cit., p.14-23 and 25-27.
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TABLE 7-10
PAVN COMPLAINTS TO THE ICC CONCERNING U.S. MILITARY 
PERSONNEL & EQUIPMENT
Article 161 Article 172
DATES
PAVN
Complaints
Violations
Recorded
PAVN
Complaints
Violations
Recorded
1 Aug 
30 Apr
'56 - 
'57 96 5 114 3
1 May 
30 Apr
' 57 -
' 58 31 13 45 6
1 May 
31 Jan
'58 -
' 59 16 27a 26 6
1 Feb 
31 Jan
'59 - 
'60 147 12 132 20
1 Feb 
2 8 Feb
'60 -
*61 122 3 132 34
Article 16 (a-g) bans the introduction of additional military 
personnel 
2 Article 17 (a-f) bans the reinforcement of all types of arms, 
munitions, and other war material, such as combat aircraft, naval 
craft, pieces of ordance, jet engines and jet weapons, and armored 
vehicles.
CompLaints filed in one time period are usually determined in a 
later report. It is therefore possible for the number of violations 
recorded in one period to exceed the number of PAVN complaints at 
the same time.
period has been necessary for three reasons. Firstly, it 
serves to indicate the continuing competition for rural 
legitimacy between the Diem regime and the various opponents 
of th.it regime. All too often this element of continuity 
has been overlooked. In other words the RVN had to devote 
a large amount of its resources to establish and maintain 
its authority over dissident areas. Both the large-scale 
military sweeps and the conduct of the anti-Communist
{*
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denunciation campaign were part of this overwhelming
concern to establish security in the countryside.
Secondly, a review of the 1957-59 period sheds light
on the nature of the political problems confronting the
Diem regime. Diem's failure to successfully cope with
problems of rural indebtedness and tenancy, for example,
left festering grievances which the Party attempted to
solve. The resettlement program, designed to secure Viet-
Nam's borders against "Communist infiltration" had the
reverse impact in the Highlands. There the Party found
a sympathetic audience for its anti-government propaganda.
In the lowlands, meanwhile, the resettlement program was
216much more successful as landless refugees were given a
stake in the future. Nevertheless discontent arose between
the newcovers and the locals as the latter felt Diem was
217giving the former special treatment.
Thirdly, a study of the growth the Ngo family's 
political machine (in combination with its repression of 
most opposition groups) and the increasing American 
military and economic influence (which caused anxiety in 
Hanoi) both provide insights into future anti-government 
themes. The corruption and nepotism of the Diem regime, 
whether real or partly imagined, sparked domestic 
disaffection. Indeed in September-October 1958 there 
appears to have been an attempt on the part of some civilians
216 Nevertheless there were some problems, See: David
Würfel, "Agrarian Reform in the Republic of Vietnam", 
op.cit., p.88.
217 Scheer, How the United States Got Involved in Vietnam, 
op.cit., p.44 and 46; Montgomery, The Politics of Foreign 
Aid, op.cit., p.70-71.
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in alliance with disgruntled army officers to promote a 
218coup, thus foreshadowing the more publicized events of 
November 1960.
Increasing American influence coupled with the 
acceptance of the RVN on the world stage (see chapter nine) 
only served to convince Party leaders that they must redouble 
their efforts to reunify Viet-Nam lest the southern 
Republic became too strong. There are two sides to the coin 
of rural discontent which emerged in Viet-Nam from 1957 
onward. The actions and policies of the Diem regime which 
in themselves contributed to rural discontent represent 
one side. On the other side of the coin are the policies 
and actions of the Party's underground organization which 
was engaged in the study of a new strategy outlined in 
"On the Revolution in South Viet-Nam". This situation 
has been aptly described by George Carver, an American 
CIA official who served under civilian cover in Viet-Nam 
in 1959-60:
The 1956-58 period was unusually complex, even 
for Viet-Nam. Diem, in effect, reached his 
political high-water mark sometime around mid- 
1957. After that, his methods of operation,
U.S. Department of State, Intelligence Report: The
Outlook for North and South Vietnam, op.cit., p.9; in 
February 1957 an assassin unsuccessfully tried to kill 
Diem at an agricultural fair in Ban Me Thuot, "Last News: 
President Diem Undisturbed By Fanatic's Shooting", The 
Times of Viet Nam (February 23, 1957), Vol.2, No.7, p.16; 
Jacques Lefebvre, "After the Ban Me Thuot Attempt", ibid. 
(February 25, 1957), Vol.2, No.2, p.2. Dispatch from Ban 
Me Thuot by Foster Hailey in The New York Times (February 
23, 1957), p.l and 8. There is some evidence that another 
attempt may have been made on President Diem by soldiers 
stationed at the Saigon airport in January 1958, see Voice 
of Vietnam dictation in Vietnamese to Southeast Asia, 0030 
GMT, January 30, 1958 which cites a United Press dispatch 
of January 27, 1958 and Moscow Radio, which in turn is 
quoted as referring to New York news sources.
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traits of character and dependence on his 
family became set with ever increasing 
rigidity along lines which ultimately led to his 
downfall. Despite undeniable progress in its 
early years, his government was never successful 
in giving the bulk of the South Vietnamese 
peasantry positive reasons for identifying 
their personal fortunes with its political 
course. The administrators Diem posted to the 
countryside were often corrupt and seldom native 
to the areas to which they were assigned, a fact 
which caused them to be considered as "foreigners" 
by the intensely clannish and provincial 
peasantry. Land policies, often admirable in 
phraseology, were notably weak in execution 
and freguently operated to the benefit of 
absentee landlords rather than those who 
actually tilled the soil.
Such factors as these, coupled with the still 
manifest consequences of a decade of war, 
generated genuine grievances among the peasantry 
which the Communists were quick to exploit 
and exacerbated^
219 Carver, "The Faceless Viet Cong", op.cit., p . 358-359 .
CHAPTER 8
MAINTAINING AND DEVELOPING THE STRUGGLE MOVEMENT IN THE SOUTH 
I. THE SECOND CONFERENCE OF THE NAM BO REGIONAL COMMITTEE
Sometime in early 1958, probably before March, the 
Nam Bo Regional Committee^ convened its second conference 
to discuss the practical application of the Central 
Committee's new policy line embodied in "Duong Loi Cach
Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, p.32; Republic of Viet-Nam, Ministry 
of National Defence, Study of the Activation and Activities 
of R , op.cit., p.17, remarks that from late 1956 "this 
was the first step in the 'attention to the south phase'". 
According to a former Party cadre the location of the 
Regional Committee was just north of Katum village in 
Tay Ninh province, see: Working Paper Appendices, Item 63.
According to Republic of Viet-Nam, Ministry of the interior, 
Ban Tran Liet Viet Cong [Viet Cong Order of Battle] (Saigon: 
1957), p.22 in Jeffrey Race, compiler, Vietnamese Materials, 
Microfilm Reel III, document A, p.2, the composition of 
the Nam Bo Regional Committee in 1957 was as follows:
Pham Huu Lau 
Nguyen Van Cue
Le Toan Thu
Mai Chi Tho
Phan Van Dang
Nguyen Huu The 
Nguyen Van Kiet 
Vo Van Khanh 
Pham Thai Buong 
Cao Dang Chiem
Nguyen Van Mui 
Tran Bach Dang
- secretary
- deputy secretary with responsibility 
for finance and communications 
(kinh-tai va giao-lien)
- Committee member with special 
responsibility for internal party 
organization
- Committee member with responsibility 
for propaganda against the enemy in 
the provinces
- Committee member with responsibility 
for enemy proselyting among the 
enemy (binh van)
- Committee member with responsibility 
for cultural affairs
- Committee member with responsibility 
for the Saigon-Cholon zone committee
- Committee member with responsibility 
for the Eastern Nam Bo Zone Committee
- Committee member with responsibility 
for the Western Nam Bo Zone Committee
- Committee member with responsibility 
for "guiding steering committees" 
(dac-phai chi-dao chuyen-mon)
- Committee member with responsibility 
for Central Nam Bo Zone Committee
- Committee member with responsibility 
for propaganda and training (tuyen-huan)
461
Mang Mien Nam". As we have noted earlier, this key 
document served to dispel disquiet among Party cadres 
in the south who had become increasingly concerned at 
the remote chances for national unification caused by the 
growing disparity of forces to the advantage of the Diem 
regime. According to one of the rare accounts of this 
meeting:
the resolution of the [2nd] Regional conference 
considered the question of armed forces [luc 
luong vo trang]. According to this assessment, 
armed forces should be developed to cope 
with the renewal of fighting. The reason the 
conference mentioned this subject was because at 
that time the reality [of the situation] in Nam 
Bo was that all the armed forces opposing Diem 
belonged to the religious sects. The Regional 
Committee did not clearly understand the 
fundamental importance of armed force in the 
revolutionary struggle in Nam Bo.
Among the long-range preparations set in train by
the conference was the reorganization of existing military
4units "and unifying the command of these forces". 
Preparations were also made to plant agents into various
5RVN departments, including the military.
Apparently sometime in late 1956, the Regional 
Committee began to discuss the means by which armed 
force would be used to overthrow the Diem regime. The 
most-favoured scenario was based on the model provided by
2
Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, p.32.
 ^ Ibid.
 ^ Republic of Viet-Nam, Ministry of National Defence,
Study of the Activation and Activities of R, op.cit., p.17.
5 Ibid.
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the 1945 August Revolution. However by early 1957 the 
Nam Bo Committee "did not outline the methods for carrying 
out this plan". In part this was due to the Committee's 
reluctance not to cause confusion among the lower ranks 
who were about to be launched on a new round of political
7struggle. The discussion would also have been premature 
given the state of the Party's organization.
In 1954, after signing the Geneva Agreements, the 
Party embarked on a "reduction of cadres" movement 
designed to streamline the Party apparatus (see Chapter 2, 
section I). By 1957 Party members had been reduced from 
60,000 to 15,000.^ It was upon these "inner core" of 
cadres that the Party was going to rely in the new phase 
of consolidation and rebuilding.
As we have noted in a previous chapter, the initial 
political struggle movement had been orientated around 
the various provisions of the Geneva Agreements. After
9July 1956 the Party decided to emphasize other issues.
Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, p.31.
7 Race, "The Origins of the Second Indochina War", op.cit., 
pp.368-369; see also the transcript of Race's interview 
with Vo Van An in Race's Vietnamese Materials, Reel II,
pp.20-22.g Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, p.25; this amounted to a reduction 
of one in every four Party members. This figure varied 
as for example there were 1,000 cadres in Go Vap and Tan 
Binh district committees in 1954, in 1957 this number 
was reduced to 385, ibid., p.26 (25% = 250). Pearce,
"Land Tenure and Political Authority", op.cit., pp.138-139 
reports on the classification of cadres into two groups.
9 Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, p.31; among them were the election 
of a new NationalAssembly and the formation of a coalition 
government.
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Acc )rding to one account, "from 1957 the people's
str iggle shifted to demanding social welfare and
democracy. The political slogans used in 1955 and 1956
wer*- seldom seen" This reorientation of the struggle
movement was considered by the second conference which
decided to inaugurate a "second phase in the struggle
movement in Nam Bo".^ This change in emphasis, noticeable
in late 1956, was now reaffirmed. "Duong Loi Cach Mang
Mien Nam" set forth three major themes that would be
stressed in the renewed political struggle movement in
Nam Bo: (1) peace and unification, (2) democracy and
12(3) social welfare (popular livelihood).
II. POLITICAL STRUGGLE (1957-58)
The second phase of the struggle movement lasted
until mid-1959 when, according to Party accounts, it
13"came to a deadlock". By mid-1958 a loss of momentum 
was already noticeable. During this period "[t]he 
Party Regional Committee advocated that the main goals 
of the revolutionary movement were the struggle for 
democratic rights and the struggle for social welfare".
Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, p.17.
Ibid., p .23.
12 Ibid., p.17, 23 and 33; and Republic of Viet-Nam, 
Ministry of National Defence, Study of the Activation and 
Activities of R , op.cit., p.37.
Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, p.23.
14 Ibid., p .33.
However the Regional Committee stressed that the
struggle movement "should not be conducted simultaneously
and everywhere but should be concentrated in specific
15local areas and at an appropriate time".
Under the catchcry "democracy" the Party focused 
its attention on abuses in the day-to-day operations 
of the Diem regime at all levels, especially in the hamlets 
and villages. In practice Diemist officials provided 
many opportunities on which the Party could act. Although 
detailed and verifiable non-Communist accounts are often 
lacking, the following examples illustrate the Party's 
view of what was going on at that time.
In late 1956 Party cadres living amongst the refugee 
communities in Saigon-Cholon began to stir up protests 
against the RVN's resettlement program as well as to 
the shifting of people due to the construction of roads 
or new military installations. At issue was the reluctance 
of some refugees to move to another location after having 
been settled for a year or more. Party cadres were not 
alone in perceiving these grievances as several parish 
priests also led public protests. No doubt many refugee 
families were glad to obtain land and moved willingly.
But elsewhere it seems that over-efficient bureaucrats 
used coercion to get the people moving. Saigon press 
accounts cited by the Vietnam News Agency provide a 
glimpse into these events:
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15 Ibid.
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Early this month, when a delegation from the 
municipal council came to districts where 
houses had to be dismantled, tens of thousands 
of inhabitants of all strata handed over to it 
hundreds of petitions demanding that people 
be allowed to remain in their present places.
In Ba Co, as elsewhere, banners were carried 
by demonstrators stretched across the roads 
or stuck on walls. These bore slogans:
"no more evacuations I", "house-shifting costs 
much blood and tears I "  In the third district 
of Saigon-Cholon, people have posted immediately 
beneath the government dismantling order, the 
following: "This is what Tran Van Lam has
brought to the people of Ban Co after being elected".
Abuses, documented in the Saigon press,
resulted from the conduct of military operations and the
conduct of the anti-Communist denunciation campaign in
the rural areas: extortion, beatings, lootings, etc.
Covert Party cadres noted the details and widely circulated
17embellished accounts of what occurred.-"
Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 
0544 GMT, December 14, 1956; in 1956 Tran Van Lam was 
elected to the RVN's National Assembly.
17 Hoa Binh Thong Nhut [Peace and Unification] (Long An 
province committee) Nos.39/40 (December 22, 1958) carries 
stories describing torture, attempted rape, and the struggle 
movement opposing "illegal searches" by RVN authorities, 
in Race, compiler, Vietnamese Materials, Microfilm Reel I, 
Document 1014. Hanoi Radio in Vietnamese, 0115 GMT,
April 23, 1957 cited Cach Mang Quoc Gia (April 15, 1957) 
for a description of a case of extortion. A case of 
bribery (to free an alleged Viet Cong suspect) is reported 
in "District Chief Ngo Van Chuyen Arrested for Receiving 
Bribe", The Times of Viet Nam (November 22, 1958), Vol.2,
No.259, p.l; a story of beatings by the security police 
may be found in "'Security Police Not to Beat People', 
Declared Sec'y of State for Interior", ibid. (November 24, 
1958), Vol.2, No.260, p.l and 2; cases of murder and 
robbery at the hands of the militia is reported in "Militia 
Men Sued for Killing, Arresting and Robbing", ibid.
(November 25, 1958), Vol.2, No.261, p.l and 2. The case 
of militia torturing to death an alleged Communist suspect 
in September 1957 is reported in "Sentenced 2 Years With 
Reprieve for Torturing People to Death", ibid. (November 28, 
1958), Vol.2, No.264, p.2; another case, which occurred 
in July 1958 is reported in the same article. Further cases
cont'd
Under the banner of "democracy" Party cadres also
encouraged the already strong protest against the renewal
of conscription. In Quang Tri province, for example,
scores of letters were sent to the provincial authorities
demanding that youths eligible for the draft "be allowed
18to stay home to look after their old parents". Face-to- 
face confrontations were arranged between the local people
19and the officials at which "pointed questions" were raised.
As we shall discuss below, armed propaganda teams 
encouraged draft-eligible young men to flee to safe- 
havens .
Party cadres also directed their efforts at the 
sizeable Khmer Krom community in the Delta provinces.
One of the main grievances was the discriminatory policies 
of government officials who closed Khmer-language schools 
and restricted teaching in the Khmer language. Various 
Various delegations were organized to protest these 
activities. Tra Vinh province appears to have been the
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17 cont'd
of looting, stealing and murder are reported in "Civil 
Guard Sergeant Gets Death Sentence", ibid. (December 11,
1958), Vol.2, No.275, p.2. See also the comments by 
Denis Duncanson, Government and Revolution, op.cit., p.297; 
"Everywhere peasant grievances against authority, or 
feuds with other groups often identified with authority 
in the uniform of the militia or the Civil Guard, as well 
as credence for Vietcong offer of land, added their quota, 
if not a large one, of malcontents vulnerable to a sympathetic 
ear and helping hand".
18 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia,
0546 GMT, September 10, 1957.
19 Hanoi Radio in Vietnamese, 1200 GMT, November 28, 1958.
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centre of these disturbances. There one protest march
20clashed with the local Civil Guard. Party cadres also 
focused on a wide variety of issues, the most important 
of which concerned land.
Prior to July 1956 Party officials pressed for
reunification elections, arguing that the new national
government would confirm titles to land distributed during
21the Resistance War. After the commencement of Diem's 
land reform program Party cadres put forward the argument 
that the present occupants of redistributed land should 
not cooperate with the RVN's schemes lest they provide 
absentee landlords with a basis for asserting legal 
ownership.
In early 1957, probably as a result of the second 
conference of the Nam Bo Regional Committee, the Party 
issued new guidelines on the land issue. The new policy 
sought to reap a dual harvest of landlord and peasant 
discontent over the implementation of RVN Ordinances 
Nos.2 and 57. The Party's land policy took into account 
the transparent defects and shortcomings of the RVN's 
efforts. According to a later review, "[o]ne of the 
reactionary forces in the rural areas is the landlords.
Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 
0553 GMT, November 22, 1957; see also Burchett, Inside 
Story of the Guerilla War, op.cit., pp.178-179.
21 Shigeto Kawano, "Socio-Economic Significance of Land 
Reform in Southeast Asian Countries", The Developing 
Economies, Issue No.l, p.42; Pearce, "Land Tenure and 
Political Authority", op.cit., pp.106 and 140-141.
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The enemy helps them collect taxes. His decrees, no.57,
2 etc. ... are aimed at restoring to the landlords and
Vietnamese traitors (Viet gian) the right of ownership
22of land previously confiscated during the Resistance.
However the Party also perceived differences between 
landlords (who objected to land reform) and the Diem 
regime:
Diem thought that his government was supported 
by all the landlords in Nam Bo but the fact 
is that his government received the support of 
only a small number, especially refugees from 
the North. A large number of landlords in 23 
Nam Bo were either neutral or disliked Diem.
The new land policy took three factors into account:
(1) the landlord's opposition to the RVN's land reform,
(2) peasant opposition to a change in the status quo 
and (3) the RVN's capacity to maintain security in the 
countryside. Therefore the Party set out to sabotage the 
RVN's plans and to play upon the grievances of all concerned. 
It did so in the full knowledge that the vast majority
of peasants would not benefit from the RVN's land reform.
The Party's policy towards the landlords was conditioned
in part on the basis of experience gained during the
Resistance. At that time land was confiscated from
landlords only if they were considered pro-French, "traitors",
24cruel or corrupt. Landlords who remained in the liberated 
areas were permitted to collect rent, albeit on a reduced
Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, p.9.
2 3 Ibid., p.13; and Würfel, "Agrarian Reform in the 
Republic of Vietnam", op.cit., pp.85-88.
24 Pearce, "Land Tenure and Political Authority", op.cit., 
pp.88 , 91 and 106 .
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scale. In 1957 the Party attempted to play on discontent 
among landlords aroused by the RVN' s land reform 
ordinances by suggesting that alternate arrangements be 
worked out with the tenants including, if necessary, 
the direct purchase of land.
Concerning the peasants, the Party adopted the view 
that its main aim should be to keep them on the land 
they were presently tilling and to organize various forms 
of protests to delay the implementation of Ordinances 
Nos.2 and 57. However the Party recognized that the 
peasant's strong desire to own his own land presented 
a complication. On the one hand, some peasants would 
resist all attempts to restore the status quo ante because 
they believed that land abandoned during the Resistance 
which the Party had redistributed, was theirs. On the 
other hand, other peasants would be stampeded by the 
provisions of Ordinances Nos.2 and 57 into signing new 
model contracts or into purchasing a clear land title.
Given these circumstances the Party formulated the following 
policy:
Temporarily set aside the slogan that the 
peasantry has achieved ownership of the land.
Instead, pay attention to the principle of 
maintaining the current tiller on his land.
This is the general policy for the entire South.
Take care not to abandon the old policy [of 
the Resistance] all at once but rather rely on 
the local balance of forces to determine whether 
to continue emphasizing ownership or to abandonit temporarily.25
Xu Uy Nam Bo, Chanh Sach Dien Dia [Policy on Land] 
(October 1957), pp.1-4 in Race, compiler, Vietnamese 
Materials, Microfilm Reel No.I, document 1005.
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In other words, the Party had assessed the "balance 
of forces" between itself and the Diem regime and had 
decided "to move one step back". Diem would incur the 
opprobrium of the landlords - for restricting rents and 
expropriating land - and peasants - for upsetting the 
gains they had made during the Resistance. Due to the 
RVN's administrative weakness Party cadres in the villages 
could turn Diem's land reform to their own advantage.
This important point has been aptly summarised by Samuel 
Popkin:
Viet Cong success has always been at least 
partially attributable to its ability to 
enforce and carry out GVN proclamations.
Ironically, often only an "illegal" 
group had this capability. The execution 
of Diem's land reform provides an example.
The Viet Cong no doubt profited from the 
land problem, but not simply because Diem was 
a reactionary or an oppressive ruler. It 
was able to use land reform by transforming 
into a political issue a seemingly arbitrary 
set of decisions which peasants did not feel 
morally obligated to accept.
The Vietnamese system of land tenure could be 
exploited in many ways even without large-scale 
redistribution of land: rent levels, market
prices, interest rates, and fertilizer prices.
All could be manipulated to improve the welfare 
of the individual farmer. Diem's policies for 
dealing with these vagaries were often sound: 
set rent ceilings, provide for displaced persons, 
institute loan programs. But because he lacked 
effective organization for reaching into the 
village, Diem was unable to implement his 
programs. Only the Viet Cong had the necessary 
links with the peasantry. Thus, for many 
peasants the Viet Cong easily emerged as the 
champion of the just cause simply by carrying out the government's promises. 6
Samuel Popkin, "South Vietnam: Villages Under Diem",
in Steven Spiegel and Kenneth Waltz, eds., Conflict in 
World Politics (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Winthrop Pub.
Inc., 1971), pp.267-268; see also Samuel Popkin, "The 
Myth of the Village: Revolution and Reaction in Vietnam",
PhD Thesis, M.I.T., 1969, pp.39-98.
cont'd
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In addition to the issue of land, the "social welfare"
component of the political struggle movement embraced a
variety of other issues: conditions in the refugee
27camps, American economic aid and cultural presence
and petty restrictions on trade imposed by the Diem
government. Party cadres encouraged refugees to demand
improvements in their supply of electricity and water,
especially in camps around Saigon where the demands
for these services was already overburdened. Demands
for the construction of new schools and anti-illiteracy
2 8classes were also voiced.
Two aspects of the American presence in particular 
came under attack. Firstly, "depraved American culture" 
in the form of "obscene films" and pornography was condemned
26 cont'd
Popkin is of course discussing a paradox in Party policy.
On the one hand, especially in areas where the Party had 
significant influence, Party cadres would carry out the 
Party's land policies. Because they did so efficiently 
they won support for their efforts. On the other hand, 
where Party influence was weak, Party cadres would take 
advantage of the contradictions in the RVN's land policy, 
specifically the intent of the law versus its implementation 
In this case the cadres would earn credit for protecting 
a tenant against common abuses (rent over the legal maximum, 
additional charges, etc.)
27 Ton Vy, "The Workers' Struggle", Vietnamese Studies 
(1966), No.8, p.80. "The import of 'U.S. aid' goods 
smothered several industrial and handicraft branches and 
further increased unemployment. In 1958, five to six 
metres of cloth remained unsold as a result of the dumping 
of 'U.S. aid' fabrics. Weaving mills were forced to close 
down, throwing 80 per cent of their employees out of work". 
See also Bernard B. Fall, "Will South Vietnam Be Next?", 
op.cit., and Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, p.ll which discusses economic 
conditions between 1955-57.
2 8 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 
0544 GMT, December 14, 1956; and ibid, in English morse 
to Southeast Asia, 1100 GMT, December 17, 1956.
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According to the Voice of Vietnam "the southern compatriots
have repeatedly demanded that the Southern authorities
reform their educational system and limit the importation
2 9of these obscene American films". Secondly, the 
commodity surplus under the CIP (discussed in chapter
3 0seven) came under attack for threatening local industry.
In response Party cadres launched a "movement for support
31of locally made goods".' Other cadres placed "Yankee
Go Home" leaflets in the mailboxes belonging to Americans
32serving in Saigon.
Various demonstrations were organized throughout 
Viet-Nam in response to local grievances. In March 1957, 
for example, "small shopkeepers" were urged "to fight
29 Voice of Vietnam in Vietnamese to Southeast Asia,
1200 GMT, February 20, 1957; and "Saigon: Bastion of
the Anti-US Struggle", op.cit., p.25 mentions a movement 
in 1957 "against US aid and the enslaving culture".
^  "Local industry is in a. fix. Warehouses are bulging 
with imports, traders are suffering great losses. Most 
of them face bankruptcy because, being refused free trade 
with foreign countries, and being confined within [the] 
vicious circle of US aid, they find themselves obliged to 
import goods which not only are unnecessary to people's 
life, but also strangle the country's own new-fledged 
industry. Due to spreading unemployment, the purchasing 
power continues to fall and people's living standards are 
lowered while taxes are constantly rising. Many kinds 
of taxes bear down upon the masses, such as the 6% production 
tax, the license tax, and hundreds of other direct taxes", 
in Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 
1122 GMT, June 18, 1958.
31 Voice of Vietnam in Vietnamese to South Vietnam, 1200 
GMT, July 21, 1957.
32 Fall, The Two Viet-Nam's, op.cit., p.331.
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33back against those who have stolen your sweat and tears".
The following month Radio Hanoi reported on the protests
launched by small traders at the Cau Muoi market against
shortened market hours and additional restrictions placed
34on the sale of pre-cooked food. Various taxes, fees
and duties which affected the small businessman were also
35subject to public protest.
Party militants (underground cadres) in the cities
encouraged various workers' organizations to engage in
protests and other public demonstrations, including
strikes. These actions were classified as "legal
activities" by the Party becasue they were specifically
related to worker grievances and they were conducted in
a peaceful manner. In other words they were designed
to conform to the range of public activity permitted by
the Diem regime while at the same time acting as a test
of these limits. The government authorities were placed
in the position of having to decide whether or not to
3 6break up an ostensibly "legitimate" protest.
Bo Chi Huy Khu Vuc Tan An - Cholon, "Loi Keu Goi" 
[Headquarters, Tan An - Cholon Special Zone, "Appeal"]
(March 4, 1957), pp.1-5 in Jeffrey Race, compiler,
Vietnamese Materials, Microfilm Reel I, document No.1003.
34 The incident, which occurred on April 20th, was reported 
by Hanoi Radio in Vietnamese, 0115 GMT, May 8, 1957.
35 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia 
1122 GMT, June 18, 1958; see also the discussion in Jeffrey 
Race, "How They Won", Asian Survey (August 1970), Vol.X,
No.8, pp.640-641.
3 6 Ibid., p.643, "It was Party policy to provoke the 
government into repressive and violent actions, such that 
government repressive acts and demands and government violence 
would themselves become a major conflict issue, super­
imposed on existing distributive conflicts within Vietnamese 
society".
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Vu Can has described the aims of the workers' urban
struggle movement as follows:
Each social group struggled firstly for its 
particular objectives: the workers and
employees struggled against unemployment, for 
decent wages and better working conditions, for 
trade union freedoms ..., the students for more 
educational establishments, for teaching in 
the national language, against systematic 
rejections in examinations and forced 
conscription; the intellectuals for freedom 
of opinion, of speech, freedom of the press, 
for the safeguarding of national culture and 
traditions threatened by the introduction of 
the "American way of life"; the small merchants 
for a less harsh fiscal system; the industrialists 
and craftsmen for the protection of national 
industry and handicrafts stifled by "US aid".
Even big businessmen and certain groups of the 
comprador bourgeoisie manifested their opposition 
to the ruling clique, demanding free enterprise 
and monopoly held by Diem's family.^
The extent of the Party's influence on urban protests
is difficult to measure, given its clandestine nature.
Party-inspired accounts of workers' struggles are self-
3 8serving and exaggerated. Thus it is impossible to
Vu Can, "The People's Struggles Against the US-Diem 
Regime", op.cit., p.91. For an account of the student 
struggle at this time consult, To Minh Trung, "The Students' 
and Pupils' Struggle", ibid. (1966), No.8, p.112-180.
3 8 Communist sources have given estimates from 200,000 
in Saigon, to 300,000 and even 500,000, see respectively:
Ton Vy, "The Workers' Struggle", op.cit., p.91 states 
200,000 demonstrated in Saigon and another 280,000 in the 
provinces; "Saigon: Bastion of the Anti-US Struggle",
op.cit., p.25 states that a parade in Saigon consisted 
of 300,000 "workers, students, intellectuals, traders and 
industrialists", and "Following the Bright Road", Viet Nam 
Pictorial [Hanoi] (February 1974), No.185, p.18, gives 
a figure of half a million. These figures are obviously 
gross overestimates as Ton Vy, citing Saigon figures, 
states that there are 316,230 workers in the South (255,230 
factory workers and 61,000 plantation workers) and that 
of the 2 million residents in Saigon, only 123,800 are workers; 
"The Workers' Struggle", op.cit., p.79. For a contemporary 
account, which provides no figures see: Vietnam News
Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 0527 GMT,
May 10, 1957. cont'd
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determine how many strikes were instigated by covert 
39Party cadres and how many strikes occurred independently
of this activity. According to accounts published by
Hanoi 292 collective actions were undertaken in 1955,
4 0504 in 1956 and 804 in 1957-58. Nevertheless it does
seem certain that the Party encouraged and supported
whatever actions workers decided to take against their
employers and that Party influence was strongest among
41the workers on the rubber plantations.
38 cont'd
Party sources claim that 500,000 persons marched through 
the streets in May 1958, these figures may be contrasted 
to Saigon press reports which claim that May Day festivities 
drew three separate crowds totalling 100,000 and that anti­
communist slogans were in evidence; see respectively:
Ton Vy, "The Workers' Struggle", op.cit., p.86 and "Trade 
Unions Make Huge May Day Celebrations", The Times of Viet 
Nam (May 2, 1958), Vol.II, No.89, pp.1 and 2. Cf. James 
B. Hendry, "The Social and Economic Characteristics of 
the Work Force in Saigon", in Fishel, editor, Problems of 
Freedom, op.cit., pp.191-218.
39 A photograph of the May 1, 1957 demonstration reproduced 
in "Following the Bright Road", op.cit., p.18 contains a 
picture of Thanh Loan. According to her official biography, 
"Struggling in Saigon during the Resistance War, she took 
part in founding the Artists' Mutual Assistance. After 
the signing of the Geneva Agreements she carried out 
underground anti-US activities. Elected member of the 
Executive Committee of the Trade Union of Saigon Actors 
and Stage Setters in 1955, she went to the liberated areas 
in 1963 ..." Commission for Foreign Relations of the 
South Vietnam National Front for Liberation, Personalities 
of the South Vietnam Liberation Movement (n.p., circa 1963), 
p.40. "Following the Bright Road", reports that she went 
to the liberated areas in late 1961.
40 Ton Vy, "The Workers' Struggle", op.cit., p.94 and 
"Saigon: Bastion of the Anti-US Struggle", op.cit., p.25.
The Vietnam News Agency on January 16, 1958 reported that 
over 200 struggles took place between January and November 
in 1957 and that this was an increase over 1956.
41 Ton Vy, "The Workers' Struggle", op.cit., p.86.
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Table 8-1 sets out the various forms of labour unrest
reported during this period. Although the main emphasis
was on economic grievances, the Party tried to link these
demands with those of "democracy" and "peace-independence-
reunification". According to Ton Vy:
Political slogans demanding freedom, democracy, 
reunification of the country through peaceful 
means, restoration of normal relations between 
the two zones, were used together with slogans ^  
demanding the improvement of living conditions.
The Party was not always successful, however, as
Ton Vy observed: "[t]he South Vietnamese working class ...
clearly realized that the economic struggle should be
combined with political and ideological struggle" in
practice but "[a]t some times and in some places, this
triple aspect of the workers' struggle cannot be [could
not be?] maintained ..."
TABLE 8-1
LABOUR UNREST IN SOUTH VIET-NAM (NOVEMBER 1956-DECEMBER 1958)
Date: Location:
November 1956 Saigon
Nha Be
Saigon
Description:
Strikes by B.G.I. distillery 
workers and employees of 
a brick and tile factory
Standard Vacuum Oil Co. 
employees strike; Caltex 
and Shell workers 
demonstrate solidarity
Strike by Delignon Society 
workers in protest against 
earlier dismissals
Ibid., p.96. These slogans appeared in Saigon on May 
Day 1958. The following quotation is from p.90.
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TABLE 8-1 continued
Date: Location: Description:
January 1957 Saigon Dockers strike for wage 
increase,holiday pay
April 1957 Ba Ria Gallia rubber plantation 
workers strike for new 
contracts, reinstatement 
of dismissed employees, 
half wages for strikers, 
protest arbitrary 
dismissals, against 
reprisals, demand repair 
of workers' housing
April 1957 Saigon Gai Ty sawmill employees 
strike in protest of 
firing of workers
Quang Sanh Trung sawmill 
workers demand wage 
increase
May 1957 Saigon May Day demonstration in 
streets
Power plant workers strike 
when salary claim is 
rejected
Loc Ninh and 
Thu Dau Mot
6,000 rubber plantation 
workers protest extended 
working hours
Saigon Maccadi Mettalurgical 
workers make wage demands
Da-Lat Cau Dat tea plantation 
workers present wage 
demands
Saigon Bus Company employees 
demand minimum wages, 
accident benefits, sickness 
allowances
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TABLE 8-1 continued
Date: Location: Description:
July 1957 Saigon Standard Vacuum Oil Co. 
workers demand higher 
wages
Bien Hoa Tran Lam pottery workers 
present list of 19 
demands
September 1957 Thu Dau Mot Xa Cat, Xa Trach and Dau 
Tieng rubber plantation 
workers demand improved 
living conditions 
and a wage rise
Saigon Employees of Commercial 
Bank of Southeast Asia 
strike for salary 
readjustments, and 
family allowances
October 1957 Saigon and
Cholon
Chinese workers protest 
RVN decree banning them 
from 11 occupations
December 1957 Saigon Waterside workers protest 
illegal sackings
Bien Hoa Rubber plantation workers 
protest repression of 
labour movement, demand 
improved living conditions
January 1958 Saigon Federation of Dockers on 
strike in protest over 
collusion between their 
leaders and government
Air Transport Co. - 800 
employees strike for 
better pay, improved 
living conditions
February-March Saigon
1958
Caltex workers protest 
maltreatment, go on 
strike
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TABLE 8-1 continued
Date :
May 1958 
July 1958
October 1958
November 1958
December 1958
Location: 
Saigon 
Da Nang
Ban Me Thuot, 
Ninh Hoa and 
Nha Trang
Saigon-Nha Be 
Binh Thuan
Binh Long
Saigon-Cholon 
Mekong Delta
Chuong Duong, 
and Van Don
Vinh Long
Saigon
Description:
May Day demonstration
Power station employees 
strike for better 
working and living 
conditions
Road workers on Route 21 
strike to protest recent 
dismissals, for special 
Highland allowances; 
steam roller drivers on 
strike
Oil workers on strike
Fish cannery workers 
strike for family 
allowances
14,000 rubber plantation 
workers strike to demand 
collective agreement 
between management and 
workers
Small traders protest tax 
increase
Bus line employees strike 
for improved living 
conditions, rehiring of 
two fired colleagues
Port workers on strike
Brick layers strike at 
salary drop
Cau Kho plant of B.G.I., 
workers strike to protest 
five recent sackings
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TABLE 8-1 continued
Date: Location: Description:
December 1958 Binh Duong Sugar mill employees
protest salary decrease, 
foreign sugar imports, 
and demand subsidy to 
maintain their living 
standards
SOURCES: Cach Mang Quoc Gia, May 10, 1957; New China News
Agency, November 3, 15 and 24, 1958; The Times of Viet Nam, 
January 8, 1957, November 25 and 29, December 4 and 18,
1958; Vietnam, No.186, February 1974, p.18; Vietnam 
Courier, June 1975, No.37, p.25; Vietnam News Agency,
26 May 1957 - 26 December 1958; Vietnamese Studies, No.8, 
pp.78-111, and Nos.18/19, pp.55-129; Working Paper,
Item 209, p.19; and Radio Hanoi, October 2, 1957.
As we have noted earlier, the Party muted the themes
associated with reunification in favour of more pragmatic
concerns. Nevertheless a low-keyed effort was conducted
4 3to keep these issues alive. On the occasion of the RVN's
National Day (October 26, 1958), for example, slogans
demanding "peace and reunification" were daubed on walls
in Saigon while posters printed by the RVN were defaced
and torn down. Elsewhere (in Quang Nam, Quang Ngai and
Vinh Long provinces) RVN soldiers and civil servants were
44subjected to slogans shouted over loud hailers. During
Joseph Zasloff, Origins of the Insurgency, op.cit., 
p.20 cites a case of a man who was recruited in 1957. These 
themes were used in recruitment.
4 4 Dispatch from Hanoi by New China News Agency on 
November 12, 1958.
481
the year various leaflets were circulated throughout
Viet-Nam. One reproduced the DRVN's March 8, 1958 call
45for the normalisation of North-South relations.
Another, distributed in Ba Xuyen province, called upon
RVN government employees to:
Support the just struggle of the people to 
overthrow the government of the Americans 
and Diem [My-Diem], to establish a democratic 
regime in the South, and to work for general 
elections which will reunify the country by 
peaceful means. °
During the eighteen month period from early 1957 to
mid-1958 the Party was relatively successful in its
efforts to launch phase two of the political struggle
movement. But as time went on the capacity of the RVN
to meet and overcome this challenge increased. According
to one Party cadre, "the [Diem] government began to
establish its village and hamlet apparatus in the remote
rural areas where the French never dared to set foot.
When the government local apparatus was established this
47naturally limited the Party's activities".
"Cong Ham Cua Thu Tuong Chanh Phu Nuoc Viet Nam Dan Chu 
Cong Hoa Goi Tong Thong Cong Hoa Viet Nam" [A Diplomatic 
Note from the Premier of the Democratic Republic of Viet- 
Nam to the President of the Republic of Viet-Nam] (December 
22, 1958) as reprinted by the Long An province committee; 
in Race, compiler, Vietnamese Materials, Microfilm Reel I, 
document 1013.
46 Robert Scigliano, South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress, 
op.cit., p.138.
47 Race, "The Origins of the Second Indochina War", op.cit., 
p.371. Pearce, "Land Tenure and Political Authority", 
op.cit., p.159 states that the National Revolutionary 
Movement had as many as 100 members in each village in the 
Delta and that one of their duties was to inform on the 
activities of "ex-Viet Minh cadres". Pearce also describes 
the extension of the inter-family group (lien gia tuong tro),
cont'd
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A Party history of this period confirms these views
concerning the timing and effectiveness of the RVN's
pacification efforts: "[t]he enemy started this
[pacification] program at the beginning of 1956, but
the enemy did not succeed in oppressing the rural areas
48until the middle of 1958". Yet the Party too was held
to blame: "as for the form of struggle the [Nam Bo
Regional] Committee sometimes put too much emphasis on
maintaining the struggle's legal position and for this
reason in some areas the [political struggle] activities
4 9of the movement lost their revolutionary meaning".
After mid-1958 the political movement "gradually
shifted from a strong to a weak position". Cadres had
great difficulty in initiating action and "[t]he movement
demanding social welfare and democratic rights became
50sporadic and uncoordinated". According to Ton Vy,
47 cont'd
a population control device which grouped together members 
of a family and made them collectively responsible for all 
the other members. According to Scigliano, "Another of 
the government's political efforts to contain Communism 
has been its attempt to organize the Vietnamese people 
into neighbourhood-control groups. This program, called 
the Mutual Aid Family Group (Lien Gia Tuong Tro), is another 
device borrowed from the Viet Minh, though it appears to 
have roots in traditional Vietnamese administration".
Scigliano, South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress, op.cit.,
pp.169-170. Instructions concerning the inter-family group,
dated March 13, 1956, may be found in appendix A of John D.
Donoghue and Vo Hong Phuc, My Thuan:^ The Study of a Delta
Village in South Vietnam (Saigon: Michigan State University
Vietnam Advisory Group, May 1961). A copy of this report
may be located in the Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University.
Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, p.9.
Ibid., p.33.
., p.23 and 19 respectively.
48
49
50 Ibid
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"[wjhile the popular movement in the countryside,
subjected to repeated attacks by the puppet regime,
suffered setbacks in some places [during the months
January-July 1958], the workers and other labouring people
in the cities availed themselves of the enemy's demagogy
51to extend and better organize their legal struggle".
The "legal" political struggle movement in the cities
survived for another three months until "a particularly
harsh repression ... caused some temporary setback to
52the worker movement".
III. VIOLENCE IN THE COUNTRYSIDE 
A. Non-Party Activity
With the destruction and scattering of the various 
sect forces in 1956 by the ARVN, rural Viet-Nam in 1957-58 
witnessed the continuation of low-level armed violence 
which had no apparent political direction. This activity 
continued simultaneously with acts of political violence 
directed against the RVN and its local administration by 
Party and sect forces who had definite political goals 
in mind. Non-political violence was carried out by a 
variety of groups who were in fact remnants of larger 
sect formations who turned to banditry to survive. In 
these conditions of unrest criminal gangs also emerged to 
take advantage of insecure conditions. Therefore in 
order to understand the events of this period and the role
Ton Vy, "The Workers' Struggle", op.cit., p.95. 
Ibid., p.98.
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played by the Party's armed forces it is important
not to neglect various groupings which acted independently
of Party control.
American military advisers serving in Viet-Nam 
estimated that a total of 7,000 sect forces rallied to
5 3the RVN during 1956 as a result of ARVN military operations.
American estimates of the total number of armed sect
dissidents still active in Viet-Nam varied considerably:
850 in January 1957; 15,000 in April 1958 and "a few
54hundred" in May 1959. Although the figures may be
inaccurate due to the confused and complex situation in
the countryside they are evidence that a distinction was
being made between Communist guerrillas and other armed
opponents of the Diem regime.
At the same time as these estimates were being
prepared, a continual stream of sect soldiers rallied
to the RVN as their situation deteriorated. During the
first six months of 1958, for example, 2,000 individuals
55surrendered to the RVN. Most of these "ralliers" came
5 3 Military Assistance Advisory Group - Viet-Nam, Statement 
on MDAP, Non-NATO Countries (January 1957) quoted in "U.S. 
Perceptions of the Insurgency, 1954-1960", in United States - 
Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, op.cit., Book 2, IV.A.5. Tab 4, 
p . 14 .
54 Ibid.; U.S. Department of State, Nature and Extent of 
the Communist Subversive Threat to the Protocol States of 
Vietnam, Cambodia and Lao's“ (April 3 , 195 8) and U.S . Central 
Intelligence Agency, Prospects for North and South Vietnam, 
National Intelligence Estimate 63-59 (May 26, 1959) 
respectively, cited in United States - Vietnam Relations, 
op.cit., Book 2, IV.A.57 Tab 4, pp.14, 18 and 20.
55 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and 
Research, Intelligence Report: The Outlook for North and
South Vietnam (May 5, 1959), No.8008, p .10. A copy of 
this document was obtained by the author under the U.S. 
Freedom of Information Act.
over in small groups, although there were some notable
exceptions. In June 1958 Nguyen Long Chau's notorious
Binh Dan Cach Mang (Revolutionary People's Army) gave
56up its resistance to the Diem government. In July and 
in September elements of four Hoa Hao battalions defected 
from their commander General Truong Kim Cu, and crossed 
over to the RVN.57
Nevertheless armed formations continued to be active.
General Cu, despite the defections of one-half of
his force, managed to continue independent operations along
5 8the Cambodian border until 1962. Various Hoa Hao
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Vietnam Press, "More Hoa Hao Surrender", The Times of 
Viet Nam (July 18, 1958), Vol.2, No.154, p.l; according 
to Nhan Dan (August 23, 1957), people in five villages in 
Chau Phu district of Chau Doc province were forced to 
sign a petition stating that the Nguyen Long Chau group 
was a "disguised Communist organization". See also 
the acount in Hanoi Radio's broadcast in Vietnamese,
1200 GMT, of September 30, 1958. According to Ngo Trong 
Hieu, a close intimate of the Diem family and the RVN's 
Ambassador to Cambodia at this time, the Nguyen Long 
Chau sect was comprised of the most fanatic anti-imperialist 
and anti-communist and anti-Diemist elements of the Hoa 
Hao who changed political alignments with shifting 
circumstances; Interview with Ngo Trong Hieu in Saigon,
July 5 and 18, 1972. Hieu also served as Secretary of 
State for Civic Action under Diem; after the November 
1960 coup attempt Hieu took charge of unspecified duties 
with the police.
57 Vietnam Press, "More Hoa Hao Surrender", The Times of 
Viet Nam (July 18, 1958), Vol.2, No.154, p.l; reports 
that 2 battalions rallied in Tan Chau district in An Giang. 
"Rebel Battalions Surrender", ibid., (September 9, 1958), 
Vol.2, No.198, p.l; reports that two battalions surrendered 
at the Kinh Xuang military post in Tan An. See also:
Hanoi Radio in Vietnamese, 1100 GMT, September 9, 1958.
5 8 Bernard B. Fall, "Vietcong: Unseen Enemy in Vietnam",
New Society (April 22, 1965) reprinted in Viet-Nam Witness, 
op.cit., p.235; Falls identifies the unit as Truong Kirn 
Cu's 104th Battalion.
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units were similarly active such as the Phan Thanh Gian,
59Le Van Duyet and Le Loi battalions.
Quite distinct from these sect groups, which
maintained the pretension of opposition to Diem, were
the various armed gangs such as the Rung Xanh (Green
Jungle) which operated in Binh Duong^ and Bung Thay^
which was captured in December 1958. These gangs
survived by carrying out robbery, extortion and murder.
An examination of Saigon press accounts reveals
that there was an awareness that "bandits" and "pirates"
were responsible for some of the rural violence. For
example, in October 1957 "outlaw bandits" were blamed
for an attack on a Caltex barge in the Mekong Delta, and
"pirates" were reported to have plundered the My Hoi Dong
6 2market in Long Xuyen. In July 1958 "armed bandits"
were involved in a shoot-out with a navy patrol on the 
6 3Cat Lai river. Other press accounts intimated that
"Full Translation of the Government Communique",
The Times of Viet Nam (June 27 , 1958) , Vol.2, No.136, pp.l 
and 2. Fall, 11 Vietnam: Unseen Enemy in Vietnam", op.cit.,
p.235.
^  "Vendetta Helps Clean Binh Duong Province of Feared 
Pirates", The Times of Viet Nam (March 5, 1958), Vol.2,
No.48, p .1.
61 "Three Brigands Arrested After Seven Day's Man Hunting 
in Jungle", The Times of Viet Nam (December 18, 1958) , 
Vol.2, No.281, p .2.
6 2 "Bandits Attacking Caltex Barge Arrested", The Times 
of Viet Nam (October 18, 1957), Vol.I, No.6, p.l;
Vietnam News Agency, October 31, 1957 quotes reports from 
AFP.
6 3 "Armed Gang Arrested On River", The Times of Viet Nam 
(July 8, 1958), Vol.2, No.146, p.l.
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criminals were responsible. In December 1957 an attempt
was made to steal the payroll at the Phuoc Hao rubber
plantation and in July 1958 ten armed men attacked a
64rice plant in Can Tho. In both cases the authorities 
were unable to provide the press with suggestions as to 
who was responsible.
It would seem reasonable to assume that many of these 
acts of violence were undertaken by criminal gangs and 
sect remnants for purposes of profit and survival. In 
these cases, where sources of cash, food and arms were 
attacked, and in the absence of other motives, a distinction 
between the two groups - sects - criminals - seems irrelevant.
B. The Sects and the Party
One must place the various sect groups who chose
to remain in confrontation with the Diem regime for
political reasons in an entirely different category.
These groups opposed their absorption into ARVN and the
dismantling of their fiefs; they resorted to armed force
against the Diem government and lost.
As early as 1955, when military forces loyal to Diem
expelled the Binh Xuyen from Saigon, a force of men
under Vo Van Mon sought refuge in War Zone D and in the
6 5Plain of Reeds (Dong Thap Muoi). In neighbouring Tay Ninh,
"A Large Group of Pirates Attack and Destroy French 
Rubber Plantation North of Saigon", ibid. (January 7, 
1958), Vol.II, NO.5, p.2; "Armed Attack on Rice Plant", 
ibid. (July 14, 1958), Vol.2, No.150, p.l.
Ta Xuan Linh, "How Armed Struggle Began in South Viet 
Nam", op.cit., p.21.
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two understrength Cao Dai battalions under the command
of Lt. Col. Manh and Major Le Hoang ensconsed themselves
6 6in the Duong Minh Chau base area. The following year
a Hoa Hao unit of 300 men, led by the son of Huynh Phu So,
6 7settled down near Can Tho. All three sect groups were 
soon contacted by underground Party cadres who overcame 
past enmity by offering to help these units in their fight 
for survival. Throughout 1956 Party cadres contacted 
other opponents of the Diem regime and attempted to win 
them over, especially now demobilised and unemployed 
members of sect units which had initially rallied to the 
RVN.
The Party's objectives seem clear: either gain control
of aimed sect units and use them to support Party
progiams or form a working relationship with independent
sect units and support their efforts against Diem. In
October 1956, for example, combined Binh Xuyen and Cao Dai
units were successfully employed in attacks at Dau Tieng
6 8in Thu Dau. Mot and Ben Cui in Bien Hoa.
In December 1956 the Party moved to unite the opposition
groups. A mass revolt of prisoners inside Bien Hoa
jail was instigated. They seized a quantity of arms,
escaped and arrived safely in Zone D and in the Plain of
69Reeds after eluding their pursuers. Later that month
66 Ibid.
6 7 Ibid. According to Donnell, only some 5% - 10% of all 
Cao Dai officers initially integrated into the ARVN 
were retained as commissioned officers; "Politics in South 
Viet-Nam", op.cit., p.425.
^  Ta Xuan Linh, "How Armed Struggle Began", op.cit., p.22.
6 9 Vietnam News Agency in English, 0600 GMT, December 15, 1956.
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various dissident leaders gathered in the Plain of Reeds
to announce the unification of their armed forces under
a joint general staff. This new alliance took the name
Cao Thien Hoa Binh, an acronymn formed from its constituent
members: Cao Dai, Thien Chua [Catholics], Hoa Hao and
Binh Xuyen.^  On operations, whether separately or in
combination, each sect unit continued to bear its own
71designation as well as that of the new alliance.
The Cao Thien Hoa Binh soon made contact with
Vietnamese exiles in Cambodia and France and tapped their
72financial resources. It is tempting to speculate that
the renewal of opposition to Diem may have sparked other
exile groups into action, such as the Dai Viet National
Salvation Movement which formed six months later. In
early 1957, for example, approaches were made to individuals
serving in sect units which had been integrated into the
ARVN to enlist their support in a coup attempt against
Diem. The plot failed when the would-be assassin missed
his mark. A purge of elements within the ARVN suspected
7 3of disloyalty followed.
Viet Hong, "Vai Net Ve Dau Tranh Vo Trang Va Luc Luong 
Vo Trang o Nam Bo Truoc Cuoc Dong Khoi 1959-1960", op.cit., 
p. 4 3 .
71 Hiliare du Berrier, "Report from Saigon", American Mercury 
(September 1958), Vol.87, No.416, pp.43-51, especially p.50.
72 Viet Hong, "Vai Net Ve Dau Tranh Vo Trang va Luc Luong 
Vo Trang o Nam Bo Truoc Cuoc Dong Khoi 1959-1960", op.cit., 
p. 43.
7 3 du Berrier, "Report from Saigon", op.cit., p.47; and 
Voice of Vietnam in Vietnamese, 0440 GMT, February 27,
1957 and ibid, in Vietnamese to Southeast Asia, 1100 GMT, 
February 27, 1957.
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A similar link-up between the Party and sect dissidents
occurred in mid-1957 in Ca Mau province. There two sect
soldiers organized a military fofce to resist local
Diemist officials. According to Nguyen Tu Quang, a
party cadre in Ca Mau at that time:
These men [Dinh Thien Hoang and Ngo Van So] had 
no particular political or ideological outlook ... 
but since their local leaders had sold out 
to Diem and they could not stand what was going 
on, Hoang and So organized some of the rank-and- 
file members of the sects and together with some 
other militants who had fled their villages 
because of repression, they form 
battalions ... (emphasis added).
In the various Party-controlled base areas, which
75dated back to the anti-French Resistance, Party cadres 
organized the sect units and provided them with military 
and political training as well as instruction in the 
etiquette of people's war. American intelligence sources 
were well aware of what was going on, according to one 
State Department analysis:
ed two resistance 74
Burchett, Vietnam Will Win! op.cit., p.120.
75 Zasloff, Origins of the Insurgency, op.cit., pp.17-18.
A cadre active in Saigon mentions a base in the mountains 
called 100-K to which he went in 1956. According to Pike: 
"Six former major Viet Minh bases remained areas of 
extreme insecurity over which Diem was never able to exert 
firm civilian control; these formed the nuclei for what 
were to become the NLF's "liberated areas" ... that is, 
the Mao-Giap safe base from which the NLF could operate. 
These were Do Xa, Mang Kim in Quang Ngai province; To 
Hap in the mountains behind Nha Trang city; Duong Minh 
Chau in northern Tay Ninh province along the Cambodian 
border; Zone D chiefly in Phuoc Thanh and Binh Duong 
provinces just north of Saigon; Ban O Qua in Kien Phong 
province in the Mekong delta; and Kien Lam in An Xuyen 
province in the far south". Pike, Viet Cong, op.cit., p.80. 
See R.J. O'Neill, Vietnam Task (Melbourne: Cassell
Australia, 1968), p.7 for a map of War Zones C and D as 
well as the Iron Triangle.
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MAP 8-1
COMMUNIST BASE AREAS IN EASTERN NAM BO
SOURCE: Robert J. O'Neill, Vietnam Task: The 5th
Battalion, The Royal Australian Regimant, 1966/67 
"(Melbourne: Cassell Australia, 1968), p.7.
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The Communists are now believed to be actively 
cultivating the remnants of the Hoa Hao, Cao 
Dai, and Binh Xuyen dissident bands, dispersed 
by GVN [RVN] security forces in 1955. As many 
as 1500 armed non-Communist dissidents are 
believed still hiding in bands of various size 
in the delta region south of Saigon, the Plaine 
des Jones, along the Cambodian border and 
northwest of Saigon. Through the years, the 
weapons of these outlaw bands have deteriorated, 
and ammunition has run low. The Communists 
are believed providing many of these bands 
with both assistance and guidance, in return ^  
for support or at least lip service to DRV aims.
The Party's attempts to win over various sect groups
was a continuous affair. As late as September 1957
the Tan An province committee, located adjacent to the
Cambodian frontier and the Plain of Reeds, instructed
subordinates, "to win over the progressive armed forces
of the sects along the border to establish a situation
7 7which is favorable to ourselves". The process of
"winning over" the sects involved introducing Party members
directly into the sect ranks as well as activating Party-
controlled units to cooperate with the sect forces.
According to one Party account:
Because of the conflict between religious 
sects and My-Diem, the Party planted a 
number of cadres among the dissident forces 
and activated armed units equipped with weapons we had hidden.^7 8
U.S. Department of State, Nature and Extent of the 
Communist Subversive Threat to the Protocol States of Vietnam, 
Cambodia and Laos (April 3 , 1958) , op.cit., p .18.
7 7 Long An province committee, "So 1/HT" (No.1/Flash) in 
Jeffrey Race, compiler, Vietnamese Materials, Microfilm 
Reel I, document 1008, pp.1-3. "HT" is probably an 
abbreviation for the Vietnamese "hoa toe" meaning an 
urgent message. It could also stand for "huan thi" meaning 
an instruction.
78 Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, p.22.
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The reactivated Party units, styled themselves the
"Vietnamese Liberation Army" (Quan Doi Giai Phong Viet
Nam) or "Vietnamese People's Liberation Movement" (Phong
7 9Trap Giai Phong Nhan Dan Viet Nam). The newly formed 
sect alliance appears to have maintained a low-profile 
until the final quarter of 1957 at which time a marked 
rise in rural violence was noticeable. Prior to then 
only sporadic clashes were reported and it is unclear 
which sect units took the initiative. In February 1957 
the ARVN's ammunition dump and barracks at Go Vap was
Cf. Bo Tu Lenh Giai Phong Quan Viet Nam [High Command 
of the Vietnamese Army of Liberation], "Tai Lieu Quan Nhu 
Tai Chanh Nam 1957" (A Document on Military Supplies and 
Finance for the Year 1957) (May 19 , 1957) , pp.1-4 in 
Race, Vietnamese Materials, Microfilm Reel I, document 1006 ; 
and Hanh chanh Giai PhongKhu Vuc [Administration - 
Special Liberated Zone]. "Chi Thi So 17/CTKV" (Directive 
N0.17/CTKV) in ibid., Microfilm Reel I, document 1007.
"CTKV" is probably an abbreviation of the Vietnamese "chi 
thi khu vuc" meaning "area/zone directive". The latter 
document makes reference to the "Phong Trao Giai Phong 
Nhan Dan Viet Nam". Republic of Vietnam, Violations of 
the Geneva Agreements by the Viet-Minh Communists (July 
19 59) , op.cit., p.2 0 states, "But after the rebellious 
sects had been successively reduced to a harmless state, 
these elements [Communist stay-behinds] were compelled, 
in spite of themselves, to remove their mask. They have 
united under a single command; in order to impress the 
people and to lead astray the opinion [sic], they have 
named themselves the 'Army of National Liberation'". 
MAAG-Vietnam in its Country Statement of July 15, 1957 
commented: "... the Communists have been forming 'front'
organizations to influence at least portions of all anti­
government minorities. Some of these organizations are 
militant, some political. An example of the former is 
the 'Vietnamese People's Liberation Movement Forces', 
a military unit composed of ex-Cao Dai, ex-Hoa Hao, ex- 
Binh Xuyen, escaped political prisoners, and Viet Cong 
cadres", reprinted in "U.S. Perceptions of the Insurgency", 
op.cit., p .16.
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8 0twice attacked, for example. In April two French grubber plantations experienced brief hit-and-run raids.
During that same month a car was ambushed on the Saigon- 
8 2Da-Lat road. This relative lull coincided with the
withdrawal of ARVN units for American-styled re-training
described in chapter seven.
Although the identity of the perpetrators of the
earlier incidents remained unknown, such was not the
case with subsequent armed attacks. Party historians
of this period specifically mention the successes of
"resistance forces" [presumably Party cadres, ex-Viet-
Minh Front veterans and sect units] in attacking Trai
8 3Be in September 1957 and Lo Than in December. In 
October eighty members of the so-called "nationalist 
resistance forces" attacked a unit of the RVN's Self-
8 0 Vietnam News Agency in Vietnamese morse to Vietnam, 
0900 GMT, March 9, 1957; and ibid, in English morse 
to Vietnam, 0900 GMT, March 9, 1957.
81 Ibid., English morse to Southeast Asia, 0516 GMT, 
April 13, 1957.
8 2 Ibid., in English morse to Southeast Asia, 0516 GMT, 
April 13, 1957.
8 3 Ta Xuan Linh, "How Armed Struggle Began in South Viet 
Nam", op.cit., p.23; Viet Hong, "Vai Net Ve Dau Tranh 
Vo Trang va Luc Luong Vo Trang o Nam Bo Truoc Cuoc Dong 
Khoi 1959-1960", op.cit., pp.47-48. As we shall note 
later both authors erroneously date an attack on Minh 
Thanh in Thu Dau Mot in 1957 (August 10th) rather than 
in 1958.
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Defense Corps stationed at a military post in Phu Long
8 4district of Binh Duong province.
One of the most spectacular incidents of this period
occurred on October 22, 1957 when two hotels serving
as billets for MAAG personnel and the USIS Library were
8 5the subject of bomb attacks. Thirteen Americans and 
five Vietnamese were wounded as a result. RVN spokesmen 
placed the blame for the attacks on a "Communist terrorist" 
group and stated that the objective was to embarrass 
the RVN before the Columbo Plan delegates then meeting 
in Saigon.^
Voice of the National Salvation Movement, 0001 GMT,
October 25, 1957; the attack took place on 16 October. It 
is unclear whether the Party was involved in this attack.
The Voice of the NSM eschewed violence and had previously 
condemned the October bombing of MAAG billets. With respect 
to this attack the radio merely stated that it was a 
continuation of the civil war begun earlier by Diem. Both 
Linh and Hong (see footnote 83 above) state that an attack 
took place in Dau Tieng district of Thu Dau Mot (Binh Duong) 
province on October 10, 1957.
8 5 Vietnam Press, "Two Explosions in Saigon Causing 15 
Casualties", The Times of Viet Nam (October 23, 1957),
Vol.l, No.20, p .2; dispatch by Greg MacGregor from Saigon 
in The New York Times (October 23, 1957), pp.1 and 6; 
and dispatch by Russell Baker from Washington in ibid. 
(October 23, 1957), p.6. For Hanoi's first reaction see: 
Voice of Vietnam in Vietnamese to Southeast Asia, 0440 GMT, 
October 24, 1957.
8 6 Vietnam Press, "President Ngo Dinh Diem Blames the 
Communists for Recent Bombings", The Times of Viet Nam 
(October 25 , 1957), Vol.l, No.22"| p. 1; Diem's view was 
shared by U.S. State Department, see the remarks of press 
spokesman Lincoln White quoted by Russell Baker in 
The New York Times (October 23, 1957), p.6. Two later 
accounts by semi-official Hanoi sources place the incident 
in 1958 and claim that 13 Americans were killed rather than 
wounded; Viet Hong in fact cites The Pentagon Papers 
as compiled by Neil Sheehan as his source. Fox Butterfield's 
summary, "Origins of the Insurgency in South Vietnam", 
states, in fact, the bombings took place on October 22,
1957 and that thirteen Americans were wounded not killed;
cont'd
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None of the attacks launched by "resistance forces" 
in 1957 can compare to two major attacks undertaken in 
1958. The first occurred on January 4th when a battalion­
sized unit (estimates range from 300-500 men) seized
the Minh Thanh rubber plantation in Thu Dau Mot after a
8 7mortar barrage.
Members of the attacking force, described later as
8 8"a cocktail of sect remnants and Communist officers", 
seized 1.5 million piastres from the manager's office, 
subjected the plantation work force to a political lecture 
and set fire to the office buildings before making off 
in five vehicles which they stole from the plantation. 
Among the topics stressed in the political lecture were:
86 cont'd
Sheehan, compiler, The Pentagon Papers, op.cit., p.75. Viet 
Hong writes that the High Command of the Revolutionary 
Forces (Bo Chi Huy Luc Luong Cach Mang) carried out the 
attack to overcome the fear and admiration held by certain 
Vietnamese for the American advisers, see: "Vai Net Ve
Dau Tranh Vo Trang va Luc Luong Vo Trang o Nam Bo Truoc 
Cuoc Dong Khoi 1959-1960", op.cit., p.48. Ta Xuan Linh,
"How Armed Struggle Began in South Viet Nam", op.cit., p.23 
also places the date of the incident in 1958. He ascribes 
responsibility for the raid to "the people's armed forces".
8 7 "Rebellion Against My-Diem", United States-Vietnam 
Relations, 1945-1967, op.cit., IV.A.5. Tab 2, pp.20-21, 
footnote 56, which cites a variety of CIA and National 
Security Council sources, gives an estimate of 300-400 
for the attacking force; Vietnam News Agency in English, 
0552 GMT, January 9, 1958, which cites AFP, gives a figure 
of 500; this agrees with estimates provided in the South, 
see: "A Large Group of Pirates Attack and Destroy French
Rubber Plantation North of Saigon", The Times of Viet Nam 
(January 7, 1958), Vol.II, NO.5, p.2.
8 8 "While Viet Nam Battalions Track Down Minh Thuan [sic] 
Intruders In Dense Jungle, Work Resumes on Raided Rubber 
Plantation", ibid. (January 9, 1958), Vol.II, NO.7, pp.l and 
6. Various reports suggested that the attackers might 
have bejen Lien Minh Cao Dai or remnants of the Binh Xuyen.
It is known that one BinhXuyen battalion was active with 
Party forces during this time.
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American responsibility for Viet-Nam's continued partition,
developments in the North, a condemnation of life in
the South and a request that taxes be redirected from the
89RVN to the guerrillas.
Seven months later "resistance units" totalling
perhaps as many as 500 attacked another rubber plantation
in Thu Dau Mot province, leading RVN and American observers
to conclude that one purpose of the attacks was to disrupt
90the Republic of Viet-Nam's economy. In a rerun of the 
earlier raid, the attackers seized a million piastres in 
cash and then set about systematically destroying the 
power plant, offices, storage sheds and processing 
facilities. On this occasion the attackers failed to 
make a perfect escape and thirty of their number were 
killed by ARVN forces. As a result of this encounter 
and the later capture of two raiders it was established
"A Large Group of Pirates Attack and Destroy French 
Rubber Plantation North of Saigon", op.cit., p.2; and 
"While Vie:t Nam Battalions Track Down Minh Thuan Intruders 
in Dense Jungle, Work Resumes on Raided Rubber Plantation", 
op.cit., pp.l and 6.
90 "38 Killed, As Pirates Attack Rubber Plantation", 
ibid. (August 12, 1958), Vol.II, No.175, p.l; and 
Associated Press dispatch from Saigon in The New York Times 
(August 12, 1958), p.ll; and UPI dispatch from Dau 
Tieng in The New York Times (August 18 , 1958) , p.5. 
Inexplicitly both Ta Xuan Linh and Viet Hong (see footnote 
83 above) date this well-documented attack in 1957; 
see: Vietnam Courier (March 1974), No.22, p.23 and
Nghien Cuu Lieh Su ^March-April 1974), No.155, p.47. 
Montgomery, The Politics of Foreign Aid, op.cit., pp.38-40 
provides an example of Communist propaganda directed at 
undermining a tilapia fish programme.
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that the attacking unit was a Binh Xuyen force under
91the command of Bay Mon, an alias used by Vo Van Mon.
These two attacks were unique when compared with
other forms of rural violence then in progress, a fact
not unnoticed in U.S. intelligence assessments. For
example, a national intelligence estimate of May 1959
stated: "[t]he guerrillas are able to marshall a force
of several hundred men for major hit-and-run raids, as
92they demonstrated twice during 1958". The estimate
went on to describe other forms of violence which we 
shall treat in the following section. It is important 
to note that in the Party's view
"Plantation Attackers Fleeing Westwards", The Times 
of Viet Nam (August 13, 1958), Vol.II, No.176, pp.1 and 
2l and uJeeps Recovered As Pursuit Continues", ibid. 
(August 14, 1958), Vol.2, No.177, pp.1 and 4. Vo Van 
Mon (also known as: Bay Mon, Vo Thanh Mon and Vo Dang
Liem) has been identified as the commander of the Cao 
Thien Hoa Binh by du Berrier, Background to Betrayal, 
op.cit., p.150. His official NFL biography states:
"After the signing of the 1954 Geneva Agreements, he 
became Commander-in-Chief [of] the Binh Xuyen troops and 
carried on energetic resistance against the U.S.-Diem 
scheme to annihilate the opponents of their regime.
Thanks to the people's support he was able to defend 
himself, break through encirclement of the enemy forces 
and inflict serious losses on them in Phuoc Tho, Long 
Thanh, Minh Thanh, Ben Cui, Dau Tieng, Tower Number 2,
Phuoc Thanh and other places". (emphasis added). 
Personalities of the South Vietnam Liberation Movement, 
op.cit. , p~. 29. Ben Cui was attacked as a diversion to 
the main attack on Minh Thanh, see: "Jeeps Recovered As
Pursuit Continues", op.cit., pp.1 and 4. According to 
the CIA, "By at least 1958 Bay Mon's forces were thought 
to be completely under Viet Cong control"; U.S. Central 
Intelligence Agency, Memorandum, (September 22, 1965), op.cit., Appendix, p.A-5*3. Mon later became a member 
of the NFL's Central Committee.
92 United States, Central Intelligence Agency, Prospects 
for North and South Vietnam, National Intelligence Estimate 
63-59 (May 26, 1359) In United States - Vietnam Relations, 
1945-1967, op.cit., Book 10, p.1193. Cf. Hanoi Radio 
in Vietnamese, 0100 GMT, September 18, 1958.
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[t]he anti-dictatorship armed forces in the 
years 1956-1957 actually became the prop of the 
people's struggle. In return, they enjoyed 
effective help from the people who provided 
them with food and manpower, enabling them to 
survive and develop. The armed forces of the 
religious sects, to enhance their reputation 
among the population and to break the 
encirclement by the Saigon army, launched 
a number of operations against military 
positions and political and economic centres 
of the Saigon regime around the resistance 
bases.93
Starting in late 1957 and in early 1958, as ARVN
forces returned to the tasks of rural pacification, and
as the ACDC intensified, the momentum built up in 1957
began to slow down. Eventually the weight of Diem's
political and military efforts achieved success and "the
resistance army of the religious sects dwindled into a
94mere token force".
C . The Party and Its Armed Forces
Throughout the period 1954-60 American intelligence
estimates placed the strength of Communist armed forces
at between 5-8,000 of whom no more than 2,000 were ever
considered active. Table 8-2 sets out in chronological
order the various estimates produced at this time.
According to Pentagon analysts:
What U.S. intelligence focused on in the 
immediate aftermath of Geneva were the 
remnants of the Viet Minh military forces 
following regroupment. These, whatever their 
strength, probably represented only a fraction 
of the numbers of former Viet Minh in active
Ta Xuan Linh, "How Armed Struggle Began in South Viet 
Nam", op.cit., p.21.
94 Ibid.
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opposition to the GVN after 1956, and 
apparently did not reflect the total numbers 
of armed dissidents from 1957 onward, nor 
the locally recruited political and logistic 
apparatus which supported the Viet Cong 
"armed propaganda teams", or guerrilla bands.
TABLE 8-2
AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES OF ARMED COMMUNIST 
STRENGTH IN SOUTH VIET-NAM, 1955-59
Date of Estimates: Source: Estimate:
11 October 1955 National Intelligence Estimate 10,000
18 May 1956 Weekly Intelligence Digest 6-8,000
17 July 1956 Weekly Intelligence Digest 5,000
10 August 1956 Weekly Intelligence Digest 5-7,000
January 1957 MAAG Country Statement 1,370
15 July 1957 MAAG Country Statement 1,5000
3 April 1958 Department of State 1,100
Intelligence Estimate 1,400
18 July 1958 Weekly Intelligence Digest 1-2,000
19 December 1958 Weekly Intelligence Digest 2,000
26 May 1959 National Intelligence Estimate 2,000
SOURCE: United States - Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967,
Book 2, "U.S. Perceptions of the Insurgency, 1954-1960", 
pp.9, 11, 13, 16 and 25. Estimates for this period, states 
a Pentagon analyst, are subject to great uncertainty.
The numbers in the above table should be treated as order 
of magnitude. The American estimates provide no explanation 
for the large drop between August 1956 and January 1957. 
Paramilitary groups may have been included in the former 
estimates. Later estimates focused on active Communists. 
Otherwise the estimates reflect the success of the Diem 
government's anti-Communist suppression.
"U.S. Perceptions of the Insurgency, 1954-1960", op.cit., 
p.26, these are the words of the anonymous analyst.
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This oversight by American observers was a serious 
error. Although the same analysts argued that the 
phenomenal growth of the "Viet Cong" in 1960 could be 
explained by previously low estimates, this is only partly 
correct. Insofar as American intelligence specialists 
focused on main force or regular troop strength they 
were probably accurate in the impression that force 
levels remained static. Their error lay in not focusing 
on all three levels of Communist military organization 
(main force, local force and guerrilla force) and noting 
the expansion in size of the latter.
With respect to military forces during this period, 
the Party carried out two distinct programmes, in addition 
to their cooperation with the sects. One programme aimed 
at laying the foundations for a future expansion in armed 
strength. This involved the creation of village self-defence 
forces to ward off ARVN attacks. The other programme 
aimed at maintaining and developing armed propaganda 
units at provincial level who were to carry out the 
"extermination of traitors campaign" (tru gian). All types 
of armed forces were developed to create an environment 
in which the political struggle movement could grow in 
accordance with the broad guidelines contained in "Duong 
Loi Cach Mang Mien Nam".
By 1959 the Party found itself, after a brief period 
of respite, in another period of decline. In a post 
mortem on the policies pursued during this period (1957-58) 
the Nam Bo Committee was criticised for not understanding 
the proper role of armed force in carrying out a national 
democratic revolution. According to this later review:
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In parts of 1957, '58 and '59 our armed forces
did not obtain any good results for our 
movement. On the contrary, when our armed 
forces appeared the enemy tightly controlled 
the people and hunted down our forces. At 
that time [1957-58] our policy was to avoid 
fighting in order to protect [read 
preserve] our armed forces. This situation 
made the people anxious. We did not launch 
any attacks because we operated under the 
name of the religious sects and therefore 
our influence [with the people] was not 
widespread....
Moreover, it was the policy of the Regional 
Committee to restrict armed activity ....
Because of this our armed forces were unable 
to support the [political struggle] movement.
Nor could our armed forces develop as they 
had no operational guidelines [phuong cham 
hoat dong]. For that reason their very 
survival was threatened. The Regional Committee's 
operational guidelines at that time were as 
follows: "cause [the enemy's] lower echelon
(administrators, spies ...) to shrink [from 
their assignments] so as to make [the enemy's] 
high echelons lack vigilance", "politics is 
no more important than military affairs",
"propaganda is more important than making war", 
etc.... and even "the main thing is the present 
and the past" for examining the re-strengthening 
of the armed forces. These operational guidelines 
greatly limited our armed forces. Therefore 
some of our people and cadres were of the 
opinion that "not having armed forces was better 
than having armed forces".^
Other captured documents make it clear that though
the expansion in size of the armed forces began in 1957,
it was not until two years later that the mission became
97one of national liberation. Prior to 1959 the Party
developed armed forces for self-defence purposes and for
the conduct of the tru gian campaign (see below). During
Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, p.22.
97 Republic of Vietnam, Ministry of National Defence,
Study of the Activation and Activities of R, op.cit., p.47.
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1957 in what appears to have been a policy embracing 
all of South Viet-Nam, squads and platoons were created
in Party-controlled base areas in Trung Bo (the Highlands,
Binh Dinh and Quang Ngai), in eastern Nam Bo (War Zone D),
in central Nam Bo (Dinh Tuong and Long An) and in western
Nam Bo (Ca Mau). These basic organizations were expanded
in numbers to company and then battalion strength, the
first of which appears to have been organized in mid-
9 81958 in War Zone D. Table 8-3 sets out a rough "order 
of battle" for this period based mainly on Party sources.
TABLE 8-3
COMMUNIST ARMED FORCES IN SOUTH VIET-NAM: ORDER OF BATTLE,
1957-58
Area:
Eastern Nam Boa
Central Nam Bob
Western Nam
Description:
1957: two companies, C40 and C45,
formed including Binh Xuyen troops;
1958: three companies
Mid-1958: a battalion formed in Zone D
End 1958: elements of two battalions
August 1957: 4th Battalion located in
Dinh Tuong province (element thereof); 
November 1957: 12th Company, 506th
Battalion located in Long An 
Party sources claim 16 squads in Long An
1957: two resistance battalions formed
in Ca Mau
1958: 3 companies identified in U Minh
area, other sources give 6 companies 
in U Minh
98 Ta 
Nam" ,
Xuan Linh, 
op.cit. , p
"How Armed Struggle Began in South Viet
2 2 .
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TABLE 8-3 continued
Area: Description:
Interzone V^ 2 battalions
0Highlands 3 companies
A company, daidoi, varied in size from 100-200 men; 
a battalion tieu doi, varied in size between 300-350 men. 
Both designations were rough classifications as the battle 
of order varied widely.
SOURCES:
Australian Army Training Information Letter, "Background 
Paper to the Vietcong in Military Region 7", 14/1970 
(November 1970), p.4.14; Robert J. O'Neill, Vietnam Task, 
p.8; Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, p.22; Ta Xuan Linh, "How Armed 
Struggle Began in South Viet-Nam", pp.22-23 reports "about 
two battalions" of the Cao Thien Hoa Binh.
^Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, p.22; "Interrogation in 1958 of a 
prisoner who had been active in the 'Resistance' since 
1945 until his capture by GVN forces in 1956", Working Paper 
Item 12, p.14 which includes comments by "headquarters"
(i.e. the CIA station in Viet-Nam); Government of the 
Republic of Vietnam, Violations of the Geneva Agreements 
by the Viet-Minh Communists (19 5 9 ) ", p .10 8; Republic of 
Viet-Nam, Ministry of National Defence, Joint General Staff, 
J2, Study of the Activation and Activities of R , p .23; 
and Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An, p.87.
c Wilfred Burchett, Viet-Nam Will Win!, p.120; Republic 
of Vietnam, Ministry of National Defence, Study of the 
Activation and Activities of R , p.23; Republic of Vietnam, 
Violations of the Geneva Agreements, p.20; and Ta Xuan 
Linh, "How Armed Struggle Began in South Viet-Nam", p.22.
J
Republic of Vietnam, Violations of the Geneva Agreements,
p . 20.
e Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, p.37.
There were various problems associated with these
developments. Despite the fact that the Party controlled
certain base areas which were kept out of RVN control,
these do not appear to have been capable of supporting
99battalion-sized units at that time. In order to
cope with this, the Party dispersed its forces when not
in operation. Although it has often been asserted
that the Party left equipment, weapons and ammunition
cached throughout South Viet-Nam at the time of regroupment/^
and indeed ARVN forces appear to have been successful in
102locating many of them, the lack of weapons and ammunition 
at this time proved an inhibiting factor in the growth 
of the Party's armed forces. The Party did rely on "weapons
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Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, p.37; Bo Tu Lenh Giai Phong Quan 
Viet Nam, "Tai Lieu Quan Nhu Tai Chnah Nam 1957", op.cit., 
outlines the financial burdens of maintaining these forces.
^ ^ Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, p.37.
^^See for example, U.S. Department of State, A Threat to 
the Peace, op.cit., Part One, p.3; and Rodger Swearingen 
and Hammond Rolph, Communism in Vietnam, (Chicago:
American Bar Association, 196 7) , pp. 3 6-38 .
102 In the period from November 1956-October 1957 the RVN 
claimed to have captured the following equipment; "735 
rifles, 176 light machine guns, 19 submachine guns, 59 
machine guns, 52 mortars and 281 revolvers"; "President 
Ngo Dinh Diem Address At the Opening of the National 
Assembly: Achievements in all Fields", The Times of Viet Nam
(October 8, 1957), Vol.I, No.7, p.l; Vietnam Press, 
"Important Stock of Ammunition Discovered in Tay Ninh", 
ibid. (December 13, 1957), Vol.I, No.63, p.l; According 
to the Republic of Vietnam's Violations of the Geneva 
Agreements by the Viet-Minh Communists (July 1959), pp.20-21, 
"As far as the Viet-Mmh arms and munitions are concerned, 
the national authorities, from September 1954 to June 1959, 
discovered 3,561 dumps of arms and munitions of which 303 
of the most important, found scattered in the following 
provinces, have been brought to the attention of the 
International Commission for Supervision and Control".
we had hidden" to build up some of its forces; but it
also had to assault ARVN posts to secure a sufficient
supply. Ta Xuan Linh has written, for example:
After those resounding exploits [described in 
section two above], the revolutionary armed units 
were supplied with more and better arms and 
equipment. With their assistance in cadres and 
armaments, Bien Hoa, Thu Dau Mot and Tay Ninh 
provinces founded their own armed units [after 
August 1958].103
By late 1958 the Party had made sufficient progress 
in developing bases to support armed units that a "Command 
of the People's Armed Forces" was set up in western Nam 
Bo to coordinate operations throughout southern Viet-Nam 
with the Cao Thien Hoa Binh General S t a f f . A l t h o u g h  
the sects had "dwindled into a mere token force" by that 
time, they still managed "to muster their remaining force 
of about two battalions composed of the most determined
105persons ... in a resistance base in Eastern Nam Bo ..." 
There Zones C and D had been built up "in all fields" 
and "(t)he Eastern part of Nam Bo became the centre of 
the armed struggle".
D . Tru Gian: Extermination of Traitors
As we have noted previously one former Party member 
has stated that a secret directive accompanied "Duong 
Loi Cach Mang Mien Nam" authorizing Party officials at the
506
Ta Xuan Linh, "How Armed Struggle Began in South Viet 
Nam", op.cit., p.23.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid.
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province level to organize armed propaganda groups to
carry out a programme of "extermination of traitors" or
107tru gian. This programme, which probably began in mid-
1957, was initially indistinguishable from other forms 
of rural violence, at least to RVN officials. By October
of that year its broad outlines were apparent to outside
108observers as underground Party cadres, organized in
small, selected armed groups were systematically kidnapping
and/or executing local RVN officials. The prime targets
included village officials (headmen, registrars, chairman
of liaison committees, notables, former notables), police
and security personnel (notables in charge of security
and village guards), RVN administrators (district and in
some cases provincial level officials) and civilians
working in semi-official positions (teachers, social
workers, NRM and Can Lao cadres, members of malaria
109eradication teams). Other forms of rural violence
included small guerrilla raids on land development centres, 
(where dredges, tractors and other equipment were destroyed) 
rubber plantations, land reform and agricultural credit 
offices and local militia posts as well as hit-and-run
107 Race, War Comes to Long A n , op.cit.,pp.82-83.
Fall, "South Vietnam's Internal Problems", op.cit., 
pp.241-260.
109 Turner, Vietnamese Communism, op.cit. pp.174-176; 
Montgomery, The Politics of Foreign Aid, op.cit., p.40. 
The focus of the campaign is not hard to understand given 
the change in the functions of the village council and 
the absolute brutality accorded Communist suspects; for 
documentation on these points consult: Pearce, "Land
Tenure and Political Authority", op.cit., pp.119-121 and 
Zasloff, Origins of the Insurgency, op.cit., p.10.
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bombing attacks (such as occurred in October 1957 when 
a bomb wounded two plainclothes security men sitting 
in a Cholon cafe).'*'1^
According to a Party cadre:
The principal purpose of the "extermination 
of traitors" movement at that time [beginning 
in 1957, 1958 and 1959] was to protect the 
existence of the Party, Without exterminating 
the [government] hardcore elements, the Party 
apparatus could not have survived. A second 
purpose was to aid in the developing of the 
Party by creating fear in the enemy ranks and 
by creating faith among the masses in the skilled 
leadership of the revolution. m
A Party history stated that since 1957 "armed
propaganda forces [cac luc luong vo trang tuyen truyen]
were activated to carry out propaganda tasks and to kill 
112tyrants" under the following guidelines (phuong cham):
1. politics is more important than military affairs
2. propaganda is more important than fighting
3. no one should observe our going, when we return 
no one should know
4. avoid making the situation worse
5. disperse our organization, be systematic, 
maintain secrecy.
It is impossible to determine with great precision 
the figures of the magnitude of the tru gian campaign, 
especially for 1957. In part this is due to the nature of
110 Fall, "Will South Vietnam Be Next?", op.cit.
Race, "The Origins of the Second Indochina War", op.cit., 
p.369; and Zasloff, Origins of the Insurgency, op.cit., 
p.21 describes the effect of the ACDC on a cadre who worked 
in Saigon. A third reason might be advanced for the tru 
gian campaign: to win popular support for the Party.
112 Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, p.37; I have translated "tru gian" 
in this passage as "to kill tyrants".
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RVN "bookkeeping", in part this is also due to the very 
real problem of determining who instigated a particular 
act and for what purpose. As we have mentioned above, 
various types of rural violence were occurring 
simultaneously. Nevertheless, even when these difficulties 
are taken into account, it is possible to discern a 
systematic programme of violence directed against RVN 
government and administrative personnel. Both outside 
observers and semi-official Party sources are in agreement 
on this point. In 1958 Bernard Fall was one of the first 
Western observers to bring the tru gian campaign to public 
attention:
Guerrilla activities in South Viet-Nam during 
1957 and 1958 no longer represent a last-ditch 
fight of dispersed sect or Communist rebel 
remnants. On the contrary they have taken on 
a pattern of their own which is quite different 
from that followed by the Viet Minh during the 
struggle against the French. While the wartime 
Viet-Minh forces generally limited themselves to 
the intimidation of the local administrators 
(village chiefs, notables) into a state of 
"positive neutrality", the new terrorists seek 
out the local police chiefs, security guards, 
village treasurers, and youth leaders and kill 
them in as spectacular a manner as possible. It 
would be pointless to describe here the hundreds 
of cases reported in detail in the Saigon press, 
but in general they document the fact that the 
objective of the rebels - gradual "insulation" of 
the central authorities from direct contact with 
the grass roots - was achieved. ^ 3
By way of confirmation Ta Xuan Linh has painted a 
picture of the Party underground reacting to the success 
of the various RVN security programmes by striking back. 
According to Linh:
Naturally, the more the people's self-defence 
organizations shrank, the more aggressive the 
cruel agents in the localities became and the
113 Fall 
p.257.
r " South Viet-Nam's Internal Problems", op.cit.,
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MAP 8-2
A COMPARISON OF PAVN COMPLAINTS TO THE ICC WITH 
THE LOCATION OF REBEL ACTIVITIES 
(July 1954-April 1958)
SOURCE: Bernard B. Fall, Viet-Nam Witness 1953-66
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p.172.
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bloodier the crimes they perpetrated. More and 
more cadres were arrested and many more 
revolutionary organizations in the villages and 
hamlets were broken up. The South Vietnamese 
people call this 'the darkest period'. Though 
this was a major setback of the revolution, the 
revolutionaries and the people had learnt the 
hard way that to survive and wage an efficacious 
political struggle they could no longer limit 
themselves to purely defensive methods. The most 
urgent thing was to punish the cruel agents 
and tyrants the most reactionary forces in the 
countryside. Step by step the self-defense 
organizations were restored in the form of 'armed 
youth organizations' or militia and guerrilla groups. 
By 1958, the punishment of local tyrants and the 
destruction of the grassroots administration of 
the Diem regime has become a widely-extending mass 
movement. Some of the tyrannical agents at the 
top of the administration at district and even 
provincial levels were executed one after another. 
This encouraged the population and had a sobering 
effect on the enemies of the revolution.!!4
Estimates of the number of persons killed under
this programme vary. Figures for 1957, ranging from 75
115to 700, are least reliable, ~ while estimates for 1958 
(193 killed and 236 kidnapped) and 1959 (233 killed and 
343 kidnapped) are probably closer to the mark despite 
the inaccuracies in gathering data of this kind.“^  The
Ta Xuyen Linh, "How Armed Struggle Began in South Viet 
Nam", op.cit., p.22. On September 14, 1957 Nguyen Trung 
Long, My Tho chief town administrative delegate (district 
chief of My Tho) was assassinated by a squad of ten men; 
"Nguyen Trung Long Murderers Arrested", The Times of Viet 
Nam (October 30, 1957), Vol.l, No.26, p.l; and Vietnam 
News Agency, September 29, 1957 in BBC, Summary of World 
Broadcasts, Part 5 (October 3, 1957), No.704, p.41.
115 Sheehan, compiler, The Pentagon Papers, op.cit., p.75 
cites a figure of 75 killed and kidnapped; Buttinger,
A Dragon Embattled, op.cit., Vol.2, p.982, cites RVN 
sources for the figure of 700.
"Special Report on Current Internal Security Situation" 
dispatch from the American Embassy in Saigon to the 
Department of State (March 7 , 1960) , No.278 in United States - 
Vietnam Relations, op.cit., Book 10, p.1273.
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upper figure for 1957 apparently represents the total
number of persons killed, whatever the cause, by groups
labelled "Communist" by the RVN. The 1957 figures include
both civilian (government officials and private citizens)
and military (regular army, civil guard and self-defence
corps) casualties. Victims of the Party's tru gian
campaign were often found with a notice listing the
117reasons for execution attached to their corpses. This
trademark should have enabled RVN authorities to make a 
distinction between deliberate political assassinations 
and deaths caused, perhaps inadvertently, as a result 
of guerrilla raids. However not all the victims of the 
Party's armed youth squads had death sentences attached 
to their bodies.
According to Douglas Pike the tru gian campaign
began in mid-1957 with the execution of 470 persons "most
of them during that year's October 'assassination in 
118cadence'". This figure seems unduly large when compared
Republic of Vietnam, Violations of the Geneva Agreements 
by the Viet-Minh Communists, op.cit., p.108; Burchett, 
Inside Story of the Guerrilla War, op.cit., p.147, describes 
conditions around 1959. In an interview with Sao Nam, a 
Party cadre, Burchett quotes Nam as stating, "At first, 
the agents took little notice, actually stepped up their 
terror. Our group would pay another visit, usually with 
two variants of hand-written leaflets. On one was written 
the biography and crimes of the local agents and the 
death sentence by the local organ of the People's Self- 
Defense Force; the other was similar except it contained 
a pardon with a warning not to commit any more crimes.
If we found the chief agent at home, we executed him, 
leaving the execution slip with the body and posting up 
a few copies. For the others, and for the chief agent in 
case he happened to be away, we posted up the pardon and 
warnings" .
118 Douglas Pike, Viet Cong Use of Terror - A Study (Saigon: 
United States Mission in Vietnam, December 1967), p.3.
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119with subsequent years (see Table 8-4). According to
RVN sources, only 174 murders were reported to the ICC
12 0for the period 1957-July 1959. Figures gathered by
the author from the public record equal 35 for the months
For example, if the number of persons killed during 
January-March 1958 (N = 72) in the American Embassy's 
telegram of March 7, 1960 (see footnote 116 above) are 
subtracted from an estimate provided by Bernard Fall of 
400 village officials killed by March 1958, the figure 
of persons killed during 1957 (or earlier) equals 400-72 = 
328; see Fall, "Viet Nam in the Balance", op.cit., p.12. 
Fall, "South Viet-Nam's Internal Problems", op.cit., p.256 
presents a map showing the locations of assassinations 
during the period April 1957-April 1958, a tabulation 
from this source made by this author reveals no more than 
117 persons killed. President Diem put the total number of 
assassinations for the period November 1956-October 8, 1957 
at 412 (45 troops, 23 Civil Guards, 40 militiamen, 8 social
workers, 68 village notables and 228 private persons); 
"President Ngo Dinh Diem's Address At the Opening of the 
National Assembly", The Times of Viet Nam (October 8, 1957), 
Vol.I, No.7, p.l. Interestingly Buttinger's figure of 
700 may almost be derived by adding Diem's figures for 
November 1956-October 1957 with Pike's figures for 1957, 
the majority of which he claimed occurred from October 
onwards (412 + 470 = 892); the excess may be due to overlap 
or to assassinations which took place during October- 
December 1956. In 1957 the U.S. Assistant Secretary of 
State, Walter S. Ribertson was quoted as saying that 
assassinations had averaged 25/month for the last six 
months, or 150 deaths during the period April 1957-October 
1957. Several explanations come to mind: (1) the variation
in the figures may be due to differing systems of 
classifications which included civil and military victims 
of all types (2) that the Party opened its tru gian campaign 
with an intense burst of activity not equalled in 1958-59 
or (3) that the figures for 1957, for a variety of reasons, 
are totally inaccurate. Cf. Roy Jumper, "Sects and Communism 
in South Vietnam", op.cit., p.93; Jumper and Normand, 
"Vietnam", op.cit., p.444.
12 0 Republic of Vietnam, Violations of the Geneva Agreements 
by the Viet-Minh Communists, op.cit., p.107, although a 
total of 174 is claimed the specific cases (10 servicemen,
28 civil guards, 65 village officials and 59 civilians) 
add up to only 162. Denis Warner, The Last Confucian, 
p.154 claims that the RVN reported 154 assassinations to 
the ICC for the period 1957-July 1959: 10 servicemen,
28 civil guards, 65 village officials and 51 civilians.
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July-December 1957. When these are reconciled with a 
figure of 75 (killed and kidnapped) for the last quarter 
of 1957, the total number of killings does not exceed 
106. Despite these discrepancies, most sources agree 
that a systematic campaign of political assassination 
was begun in 1957 and that it was intensified from 
October 1957 onwards.
During the following years RVN agencies improved their 
data collection and analysis techniques thus enabling 
American officials to form a clearer picture of Party- 
directed rural violence. Table 8-4 sets out the figures 
for the numbers of RVN officials killed or kidnapped during 
1958 and 1959. The trend appears to be a slow steady 
rise (with monthly variations) in both categories.
Killings averaged 16 a month in 1958 and 19 a month in 
1959; kidnappings rose from an average of 19 per month 
in 1958 to 28 per month in 1959. The final months of 1959 
(September-December 1959) show a marked increase above the 
average for both killings and abductions. The fate of those 
who were kidnapped is unknown. In 1973, for example, the 
RVN released a list of 220 officials (civil servants, 
village officials, police, self-defence personnel and 
government cadres) who were abducted by the Communists during
121the period 1954-60 and on whom the RVN still sought information.
Viet Nam Cong Hoa (Republic of Viet Nam), Bang Ke Khai 
Tong So Can Bo va Thuong Dan Viet Nam Cong Hoa Bi Cong San 
Bat Giu Ke Tu 1954 (List of Civil Servants, Cadres and 
Civilians of the Republic of Viet Nam Abducted by the Communists 
Since 1954) (Saigon: Co So An Luat Trung Uong Phu Tong Uy
Dan Van, March 23, 1973); these figures were tabulated from 
a list which included details on cases from 1954-1973.
The yearly breakdown is as follows: 1954 (72); 1955 (157 ;
cont'd
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Even more unreliable, except as gross indicators,
have been U.S. attempts to record the number of "armed
terrorist incidents". These would include skirmishes
between guerrilla bands and RVN forces, and guerrilla
initiated attacks and ambushes. According to this method
less than 500 "Viet Cong incidents" occurred in 1957,
around 500 took place in 1958 and the figure for 1959
122jumped to 1,500. The tempo of conflict definitely
picked up from 1958 as one estimate places the number of
military casualties suffered by both sides at 1,000 in
] 2 31957 and 11,000 in 1959. During 1958, according to
another source, the RVN alone was suffering casulties at
the rate of 40 government and 40 military personnel per
124month - or 960 for that year.
121 cont'd
1956 (11); 1957 (9); 1958 (19); 1959 (25) and 1960 (69).
The absence of data for certain provinces indicates that 
the figures may be incomplete.
122 United States Mission in Vietnam, A Study - Viet Cong 
Use of Terror (Saigon: May 1966), pp.7-8; five categories
of "Viet Cong incidents" are listed: (1) terror acts
which are part of military or paramilitary assaults either 
offensive or defensive; (2) terror acts which are part 
of an ambush; (3) harassing villagers for coercive or 
intimidation purposes; (4) sabotage and subversive acts ... 
which involve use of violence and (5) acts directed 
against specific individuals, such as kidnappings, 
assassinations and executions.
12 3 Agence France Presse dispatch from Saigon carried 
by Agence Khmere de Presse on July 31, 1962, cited in 
Modelski, "The Viet Minh Complex", op.cit., p.198, 
footnote 36 .
124 . .Scigliano,
p.138.
South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress, op.cit.,
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j TABLE 8-4
AMERICAN ESTIMATES OF COMMUNIST-DIRECTED ASSASSINATIONS
AND ABDUCTIONS (1958-1959)
Assassinations Kidnappings
Month: 1958 1959 1958 1959
J anuary 10 10 25 17
February 36 11 5 6
March 26 31 43 21
April 17 13 12 16
May 13 16 5 22
June 21 5 15 15
July 11 16 24 22
August 7 12 18 11
September 8 22 24 34
October 15 29 26 42
November 8 35 19 89
December 21 33 20 48
First six months 123 86 105 97
Last six months 70 147 131 246
TOTAL 193 233 236 343
Average/month 16.0 19.4 19.7 28.
SOURCE: "Special Report on Current Internal Security
Situation" prepared by the U.S. Viet-Nam Country Team, 
dispatch No.278 (March 7, 1960) from the American Embassy 
in Saigon to the U.S. State Department in Washington, D.C. 
in United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 10,
V .B.3., pp.1254-1275, especially p.1273. The report relied 
on monthly figures gathered from three sources: MAAG
intelligence summary based on ARVN figures; MAAG summary 
report of Self-Defense Corps Avtivities based on figures 
supplied by the Self-Defense Corps; and "Statistics of 
Communist and Rebel Activity in South Viet-Nam" gathered 
by the CIA Station (CAS) based on figures provided by 
the "NPSS" an abbreviation not otherwise identified.
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E. The Voice of the South Viet-Nam Liberation Front
On May 26, 1958, in the midst of the developments 
described in the above sections, a radio transmitter, 
billing itself as the "Voice of the South Viet Nam 
Liberation Front" took to the air. Broadcasts of this 
station were monitored throughout the year and during 
the first quarter of 1959. Thereafter, apparently, the 
station ceased operating."*"^5
The existence of the Voice of the South Viet Nam 
Liberation Front complicates our account of this period 
insofar as it suggests the possibility of a dissident 
Party faction in Nam Bo. The significance of this 
lies in the dispute over whether or not the Central 
Committee of the VWP was in control over the Party apparatus 
in Nam Bo and whether or not independent action by 
disgruntled cadres may have forced the Central Committee 
to endorse armed struggle earlier than planned.
Broadcasts from this station were monitored for the 
period 26 May 1958 - 5 April 1959 by the U.S. Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service and by the BBC. The FBIS 
Daily Reports contain six reports: July 8, 18 and 31;
August 4 and 25; and September 2. The BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts, Part 3, The Far East, recorded only 
three: May 26, 27 and 28. The RVN has made public reference
to only one broadcast whose transcript is available: August
25 (its account bears no similarity to the FBIS version); 
all other broadcasts cited by the RVN and Carver cannot 
be located publicly; see: Republic of Vietnam, Violations
of the Geneva Agreements by the Viet-Minh Communists, 
op.cit., pp.105 and 121-122; Carver, "The Faceless Viet 
Cong", op.cit., p.360. See also: Träger, Why Vietnam?
op.cit., p.201.
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Party documents acknowledge that certain cadres 
acted in violation of the Party's line but these same 
documents give the impression that such action was limited 
and soon brought under control. They make no reference 
to the Voice of the South Viet Nam Liberation Front.
For example:
The situation [in 1957-58] grew increasingly 
more difficult each day. The thoughts of 
Party members became very complex [i.e. confused; 
phuc tap]. Nearly all lacked confidence in the 
efficacy of political struggle and in the Party's 
line [duong loi]. For psychological reasons 
they wanted a rapid development of armed forces.
A few Party members automatically killed 
[enemy] spies [do them], and armed the masses to 
resist [the enemyTs] terror. But these 
incidents were not numerous because higher 
echelons strongly criticized [kiem thao; 
to review critically] them.126
The reaction of Party officials in the North was
both prompt and unequivocal. According to a braodcast
by the Voice of Vietnam:
a profound study of the contents of this 
station's programs [i.e. the Voice of South 
Viet Nam Liberation Front] proves that its 
broadcasts are badly biased and that it 
clumsily and audibly slanders people. It 
falsifies Marxism-Leninism, manufactures 
statements which it ascribes to theoreticians of 
the communist and socialist bloc, fabricates 
non-existent news from the North, and distorts 
the policies of our party and government.
By such doings, its identity has been revealed, 
and it is our duty to point out that the 
station represents a case of dishonest 
impersonation, and is a broadcasting station 
set up by the lackeys serving the Americans
in the south.1^7
Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, p.25.
12 7 Voice of Vietnam in Vietnamese to South Viet-Nam,
0030 GMT, June 29, 1958; a similar quotation may be found 
in Kahin and Lewis, The United States in Vietnam, op.cit., 
p.lll which attributes the source to an editorial appearing 
in Nhan Dan on June 28, 1958. Kahin and Lewis relied on 
an RVN monitoring service which reproduced radio broadcasts
cont'd
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Later broadcasts by the Voice of Vietnam revealed 
Hanoi's sensitivities:
In conclusion, the 'Voice of the South Vietnam 
Liberation Front' gives its listeners the 
impression that the revolutionaries of South 
Vietnam are trying to wipe out the peasant 
class, the petit bourgeois, and the national 
bourgeois, as well as the other forces of 
individual production which form the classes 
that the enemies are to beat, and not the 
American imperialists and the Ngo Dinh Diem 
clique. These words seem to be revolutionary, 
but in reality they are not aimed at the 
principal enemies of the revolution. That is 
why this radio causes a listener who is not 
vigilant to be frightened, terrified about the 
revolution, about socialism.
Thus, in analyzing the content of these broadcasts, 
one immediately perceives that the 'Voice of the 
South Vietnam Liberation Front' is not the voice 
of the people nor the Vietnamese revolutionary 
movement in the south. It is not the voice of those 
who aspire to peace, unity, independence, and democracy in the country ...128
Other Voice of Vietnam transmissions consistently 
denounced the "Voice of the South Viet Nam Liberation 
Front" as a psywar operation designed to push the 
revolutionary forces "prematurely into action". In April 
1959, for example, the Voice of Vietnam called the "Voice 
of the Liberation Front, a traitorous spy station .... 
Everybody knows that it is one of the US-Diemists' 
propaganda organs. It is the voice of Vietnamese traitors, 
because their propaganda aims at sabotaging the North and
127 cont'd
in Vietnam Presse Bulletin d 'Information Confidentielles. 
Later Kahin has written that the broadcasts of the Voice 
of the South Viet Nam Liberation Front were "presumed 
to have been 'black propaganda' operations conducted by 
the CIA and Diem"; George McT. Kahin, 1 The Pentagon Papers:
A Critical Evaluation", The American Political Science Review 
(June 1975), Vol.LXIX, No.2, p.678.
12 8 Voice of Vietnam in French to Southeast Asia, 0530 GMT, 
July 10, 1958.
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the struggle for reunification and undermining the
fatherland and nation. It is actually a spy station using
the propaganda of spies and hiding under the cover of
support for the Party, Government, and the North so that
it will be able to sabotage the North and the Vietnamese
129people's revolutionary work".
A thorough reading of the transcripts^“^  of monitored 
broadcasts by the Voice of the South Viet Nam Liberation 
Front and the replies by the Voice of Vietnam clearly 
indicate that the policies advocated by the former were 
not official Party statements. Was the Voice of the 
South Viet Nam Liberation Front a legitimate transmitter 
used by a break-away radical Party faction or was it 
an RVN-US "black station"? According to John Lewis it may 
have been both:
I was alerted to the fact that some of the 
broadcasts were probably not authentic on one 
of my several fact-finding excursions to 
Washington,from Ithaca, but no one was able 
to give me the full story. The general 
understanding by those who seemed to know the 
most was that a real Voice of South Vietnam 
Liberation Front was started by disgruntled 
Communists groups in the South, that they were 
probably exposed by Hanoi's agents, and that 
in any case the radio was captured by Diem's 
forces and turned into a black operation.
Voice of Vietnam, 1200 GMT, April 5, 1959.
The author has not consulted the Vietnam Presse 
Bulletin d 'Information Confidentielles held by the Cornell 
University Library. However, all thebraodcasts cited 
by Kahin and Lewis in The United States in Vietnam, pp.110- 
112 and 123-125 have been located in either the FBIS'
Daily Report or the BBC's Summary of World Broadcasts.
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Since there was more than one radio going this 
did not happen all at once and thus the 
picture is confused for a time.131
Although the possibility that some of the broadcasts
13 2may have originated from discontented Party cadres 
cannot be discounted entirely, it seems more likely that 
the "Voice of the South Viet Nam Liberation Front" was 
a "black" RVN operation from its inception. The format 
of the station's broadcasts consisted mainly of apparently 
"straight" news items on life in the North and in the South. 
But on closer inspection these news items appear to be 
clever distortions of genuine items designed to convey 
an ironic meaning or to ridicule various events by the 
tone of the reporting. Table 8-5 provides examples of 
news items carried by the Voice of the South Viet Nam 
Liberation Front to illustrate this point.
Personal communication to the author by John W. Lewis 
dated July 17, 1974; in a letter to the author dated 
January 13, 1972 Professor Kahin has written, "I think 
it highly likely, if not certain, that these broadcasts, 
or at least some of them, were 'black propaganda' mounted 
by the US and the GVN. Whatever the case, the response 
from Radio Hanoi is, I think, of very real importance 
to an appreciation of Hanoi's point of view at that time".
132 Vo Van An, a senior Party cadre who served on the 
Tay Ninh Party committee, stated in an interview with 
Jeffrey Race that he had never heard of the Voice of the 
South Viet Nam Liberation Front. When asked to speculate 
he mentioned two possibilities: (1) that it was an attempt
by Hanoi to portray an indigenous Communist movement 
in the South that was acting independently or (2) that 
one of the sects might have been responsible. See "Vo 
Van An Interview", in Jeffrey Race, compiler, Vietnamese 
Materials, Microfilm Reel II, pp.67-68.
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TABLE 8-5
SELECTED NEWS ITEMS FROM THE 'VOICE OF THE SOUTH VIET NAM
LIBERATION FRONT'
News Item:
Phrase designed to convey an 
ironic meaning:_____________
1. "intelligence units 
have been created by the 
Executive Committee of 
the Dong Thap People's 
Liberation Front"
- May 26, 1958
2. "the intelligence 
units are resolutely 
carrying out their 
activities"
- May 26, 1958
3. "a small group of 
intellectuals has taken 
advantage of the mistakes 
correction policy"
- May 27, 1958
4. "it is necessary to 
deal severely with the 
'Nhan Van-Giai Pham'
Group and to knock down 
the political prestige 
of the bourgeois and 
petty bourgeois 
intellectuals"
- May 27, 1958
5. "Southerners
[ were] resettled in ... 
[a] camp ..."
- July 18, 1958
1. "their existence has been 
revealed by local people faithful 
to the Americans and Diem"
2. "Nguyen Minh Tam has surrendered 
...This act...has caused some 
trouble in our ranks"
3. "They have demanded ... to write 
as they please, freedom of thought..."
4. "This question can be easily 
resolved thanks to a great deal 
of valuable literary work by 
Soviet and Chinese writers and 
artists... [we will] translate 
these ... literary works to replace 
the decadent work of the bourgeois 
class"
5. "[they] must work day in and 
day out to sell distillation waste 
and must live in narrow, wet and 
badsmelling rooms"
"and everyone [was] made aware 
that by selling distillation waste 
from the Hanoi distillery, the 
camp would enrich the government 
with a sum of no mean importance".
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TABLE 8-5 continued
6. "there still are a 
number of dissatisfied 
elements [in a re­
settlement camp]
- July 18, 1958
6. "There was a comrade who said 
he was an old man in order to avoid 
participation in labor, though he 
was only 60 years old..." "One 
woman comrade refused to work on 
the (pretext?) [sic] that she was 
pregnant. One comrade wanted to 
have a salary commensurate with 
his labor".
7. "In the 20-day 
contest in 119 cantons 
belonging to 12 
districts in Thanh 
Hoa province, peasants 
have produced about one 
million baskets full 
of manure..."
- July 18, 1958
7. "[a certain] canton got ahead
in the contest by sowing 20 baskets 
full of manure to one sao [360 sq. 
metres] of rice field".
8. "Our commentary 
tonight is 'The 
present duty of disabled 
veterans and fallen 
heroes' families"
8. "Despite their infirmities they 
have so far taken a positive part 
in the production emulation without 
complaints".
"However it has been 
noticed that a number 
of disabled veterans 
and fallen heroes' 
families still have 
erroneous thoughts".
- July 31, 1958.
"They request enormous assistance 
from the government and do not 
want to participate in production". 
"Other disabled veterans participate 
in production according to their 
qualifications and do not rely 
completely on the government".
9. "An interprovince 
emulation campaign 
between Hai Duong and 
Hung Yen was launched 
to obtain results to 
celebrate the 
anniversary of the 
August revolution 
and independence day". 
- July 31, 1958
9. "Efforts have been made in 
Hai Duong to advance the production 
of manure".
524
TABLE 8-5 continued
10. "To celebrate the 
13th national day on 
Aug. 19 in various 
localities, despite 
many difficulties, the 
liberation front 
succeeded in organizing 
many meetings to talk 
about the anniversary 
of our national 
revolution".
- August 25, 1958
10. "Due to the inefficiency of a 
certain number of our cadres and 
combatants, the organization did 
not produce the results expected. 
Our preparatory work had not been 
kept secret, and because of the 
carelessless of our investigations, 
some spies had succeeded in 
infiltrating our ranks and in 
carrying out their subversive 
activities".
SOURCE: Voice of the South Viet Nam Liberation Front
as monitored by United States Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service and the British Broadcasting Corporation.
In addition to the tone of the broadcast commentaries, 
which does not appear to have changed over time, there 
are other reasons for doubting the authenticity of the 
Voice of the South Viet Nam Liberation Front. Firstly,
133senior Party defectors had no knowledge of this station.
Secondly, the former head of the RVN's Psychological
Warfare Directorate (1956-62) has stated in an interview
that his government ran a clandestine radio service which
134pretended to be "Liberation Radio". Thirdly, a senior
133 Ibid.
See the account of the interview between Nguyen Van 
Chau and Diane Johnstone, a correspondent with Dispatch 
New Service International, in Orleans, France as printed in 
The St. Louis-Post Dispatch (September 24, 1972), p.4. 
According to Johnstone, "Chau said that the Saigon regime 
used to, and probably still does, run a clandestine radio 
which pretended to be 'Liberation Radio' in order to 
diffuse 'black propaganda'. The broadcasts were patterned
cont'd
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official in the Central Intelligence Agency, who 
originally used transcripts of the Voice of the South 
Viet Nam Liberation Front prepared by the RVN, has now
135admitted the likelihood that they were "black propaganda".
Fourthly, it appears that in 1961 a correspondent with
United Press International stumbled on the fact that "the
'Voice of the Southern Liberation Front' had been set
up by the South Vietnamese government and that its
broadcasts praising the achievements of the Communists in
the North were interided to be used as grounds for denouncing
the Government of the VDR (Vietnam Democratic Republic)
136to the ISCC". American involvement in "black propaganda"
134 cont'd
on authentic Liberation Radio broadcasts, with just a few 
slight changes in detail..." From the context it would 
appear that Chau is referring to 1961-62 when the authentic 
Liberation Radio began broadcasting. It is possible that 
Chau is confused on this point and that the model for 
the fake 'Liberation Radio' was the 'Voice of Vietnam' 
which was broadcasting in 1958 and not the real 'Liberation 
Radio' which did not begin transmitting until 1961.
135 During an interview with George Carver at CIA headquarters 
in Langley, Virginia his assistant, Joseph Weiss, indicated 
without contradiction from Mr Carver who was present, 
that if Mr Carver were to re-write his article in the April 
1966 issue of Foreign Affairs that he would drop reference 
to these broadcasts as information at hand indicated 
that they were not authentic (according to my interview 
notes Weiss termed them "spurious"). I took this statement 
as a polite way of answering my question concerning the 
authenticity of the broadcasts without at the same time 
confirming a "black" CIA operation. Interview with George 
Carver and Joseph Weiss, Langley, Virginia, 23 October 
1972 .
Hanoi Radio to South Vietnam, 0415 GMT, March 21,
1961 in BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts (March 29, 1961) ,
Part 3, 2nd Series, No.6 02 , p.FE/602/A3/1. I have been 
unable to locate the original UPI dispatch.
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activities directed against the DRVN can be dated to this 
period. In April 1958 the U.S. National Security Council 
listed as among the American objectives towards Viet-Nam 
the following:
"54. Assist Free Viet Nam to develop a 
strong stable and constitutional government 
to enable Free Viet Nam to assert an 
increasingly attractive contrast to 
conditions in the present Communist zone.
55. Work toward the weakening of the 
Communists in the North and South Viet 
Nam in order to bring about the eventual 
peaceful reunification of a free and 
independent Viet Nam under anti-Communist 
leadership.137
At the suggestion of the Central Intelligence
Agency the following paragraph was added to item 54:
In this regard encourage and assist public 
relations and public information programs 
of the Government of Viet Nam directed both 
internally to the free Vietnamese and 
externally to north Vietnam. In this effort 
priority should be given to areas of 
greatest dissidence, particularly in the 
extreme South.138
A special supplementary statement on North Viet-Nam 
was attached which contained two items of interest in 
this regard:
78. Assist the Government of Viet Nam to 
undertake programs of political, economic 
and psychological warfare against Viet 
Minh Communists.
76. Probe weaknesses of the Viet Minh
and exploit them internally and internationally
whenever possible.
"Note by the Executive Secretary to the National 
Security Council on U.S. Policy in Mainland Southeast Asia", 
(April 2, 1958), NSC 5809, in United States - Vietnam 
Relations, Book 10, p.1131.
138 Ibid., p.1132.
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The National Security Council policy statement
would appear to encourage a joint venture between the
U.S. and RVN governments such as the "Voice of South
Viet Nam Liberation Front". Within the year, another
clandestine transmitter (undeniably a "black propaganda"
operation) entitled the "Voice of the Khmer Freedom
Movement" was braodcasting anti-Sihanouk propaganda into 
139Cambodia. No doubt these two ventures were related.
If the Voice of the South Viet Nam Liberation Front 
was originally an authentic station that was later 
captured and used by the RVN and/or U.S. for "black 
propaganda" purposes, the timing of this switch would be 
of interest. If we knew the date, for example, it would 
be possible to isolate the views of disgruntled cadres 
from later anti-Communist propaganda. Unfortunately 
this crucial piece of information, if it exists, cannot 
be located. Nevertheless the ironic tone of the commentary - 
noted above - was part of the station's stock-in-trade 
from the moment monitors picked up transmissions thus 
supporting the view that the station was "black" from the 
start. The overwhelming preoccupations with developments - 
initially at least - is another (i.e. the aim was to misinform
Ibid., p.1124, paragraph 30 states, "Implement as 
appropriate covert operations designed to assist in the 
achievement of U.S. objectives in Southeast Asia". Operations 
Coordinating Board, "Report on Southeast Asia (NSC 5809)", 
(January 7, 1959) in ibid., p.1162, states, "U.S. influence 
continues to be discreetly applied in the hope that the 
Cambodian Government will be more receptive of U.S. views".
On April 10, 1959 a station calling itself the "Voice of 
the Khmer Freedom Movement" began anti-Sihanouk braodcasts, 
see BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts (April 15, 1959), No.862, 
Part 5, p.24. For allegations of U.S. involvement see:
Norodom Sihanouk and Wilfred Burchett, My War With the C.I.A., 
op.cit., pp.122-26.
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listeners about conditions in the North rather than in
the South). As a result of telling criticism from Hanoi,
which charged the new station with avoiding key issues,
the Voice of the South Viet Nam Liberation Front appears
to have made a few tactical adjustments in order to maintain
a semblance of credibility. Criticism of the American
presence and the U.S. economic aid programme featured
prominently - themes which Ngo Dinh Nhu himself encouraged
14 0in the controlled Saigon press.
Although the complete facts surrounding the Voice 
of the South Viet Nam Liberation Front may never be known, 
Hanoi's public reaction is on the record. If there was 
any doubt over Party policy the Voice of Vietnam could 
not be blamed for trying to set the record straight. Even 
if one assumes that early transmissions of the Voice of 
the South Viet Nam Liberation Front represented authentic 
views of disgruntled Party cadres in Nam Bo it seems 
certain that they were uninfluential in altering the course 
of Party policy. As we shall note below despite grumblings 
of discontent within the southern Party organization, 
the Nam Bo Regional Committee had little trouble in 
maintaining its authority.
F. Violence in the Central Highlands
Cadres belonging to the Indochinese Communist Party 
(ICP) began their political activities in the Highlands
140For examples of Ngo Dinh Nhu's criticisms see: Montgomery,
The Politics of Foreign Aid, op.cit., pp.89-90. For Nhu's 
views in 1961 see Robert Scigliano, South Vietnam: Nation
Under Stress, op.cit., pp.212-213.
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141of Trung Bo as early as the mid-1930s. At that time
it was the policy of the French colonial administration
to send political detainees to mountain camps. From
that time, and especially during the Resistance War,
these cadres made remarkable progress in winning over
selected ethnic minority groups and their leaders.
Together they created revolutionary base areas from
which they attacked French forces. One scholar has
14 2estimated that as many as 6,000 tribesmen (mainly 
Rhade) regrouped to the DRVN in 1954-55. At the same time 
a Party Committee for Trung Bo (Xu Uy Trung Bo) was 
created to oversee the remaining cadres who stayed behind'*' 
and who were expected to conduct the next phase of the 
movement: political struggle.
The new Diem government in Saigon quickly moved to 
incorporate the Crown Domain land in central Viet-Nam 
into the administrative structure of the State of Viet- 
Nam. In 1957, as we have noted in chapter seven, a 
resettlement programme was begun which resulted in the 
migration of thousands of lowland ethnic Vietnamese into
Ta Xuan Linh, "Armed Uprisings by Ethnic Minorities 
Along the Truong Son", Part I, Vietnam Courier (September 
1974), New Series No.28, p.15.
142 Gerald C. Hickey, Preliminary Research Report on the 
PMS, op.cit., p.26; and Fall, The Two Viet-Nams, op.cit.,
p . 2 81.
143 Working Paper, Appendices, Items Nos.19 and 204; 
Palmerlee, "The Central Office of South Viet-Nam", op.cit., 
p.4. Denis Warner, The Last Confucian, op.cit., p.142 has 
written, "Everywhere there were some [stay-behind cadres], 
however. In Kontum Province in the High Plateau sixty 
cadres worked among the montagnards. In Pleiku there were 
about a hundred, and in Darlac, forty".
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14 4the Highlands. This was followed by another programme
designed to shift highlanders into camps which the RVN
could more easily control. An attempt was made through
the anti-Communist denunciation campaign to identify
Party cadres and their sympathisers. All three programmes
led to the disaffection of sections of the highland
population who chose to respond in the traditional way
by withdrawing further upland away from Vietnamese control.
14 5When force or coercion was employed to resist these 
efforts, the highlanders fought back, even with only 
primitive weapons.
During 1955-56, as a result of the ACDC in the lowland
provinces of Trung Bo, Party cadres began to seek refuge
14 6in the highland base areas. According to one account
as many as 1,000 cadres may have made the trek into western 
Quang Nam province alone. As there were more than one
144Montgomery, The Politics of Foreign Aid, op.cit., p.78, 
"Certain Land Development centers were used as political 
reeducation camps and barracks for political prisoners 
under the supervision of army forces .... Camps at Pleiku 
and Banmethuot had been designated as resettlement centers, 
to be supported by U.S. funds, without any suggestion that 
they would be detention camps"; Committee on Government 
Operations, Land Reform in Vietnam, pp.8-9, "The lands 
occupied by the Montagnards were declared by the GVN to be 
public lands and the Montagnards were denied the legal rights 
to occupy and cultivate the land unless they purchased it 
and paid taxes".
145 According to Y Bay, a Sedang and a cadre with the NFL's 
Autonomous Minority Movement, "We had greater losses between
1957 and 1959 than during the nine years of the anti-French 
war". Quoted in Burchett, Vietnam Will Win!, op.cit.,
pp.144-145; Hanoi Radio in French, 0500 GMT, November 14,
1958 reported the forcible resettlement of 2,000 minority 
people from Binh Dinh at a camp named Van Thanh, and the 
resettlement of 4,000 Montagnards in Binh Tuy.
146 Ta Xuan Linh, "Armed Uprising by Ethnic Minorities 
Along the Truong Son", op.cit., p.18; Zasloff, Origins of 
the Insurgency, op.cit., pp.12 and 21. Vu Can, "The People's 
Struggles Against the US-Diem Regime", op.cit., pp.111-126 
provides a general view of developments in the Highlands.
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hundred secure villages in the central highlands, the 
Party's underground there was able to absorb these 
political refugees. These villages "later became 
revolutionary bases, inviolable bastions of the 
revolution" .
The balance of forces began to shift in favour of 
the revolutionaries throughout 1957 and especially during 
1958. Several reasons account for this. Firstly, 
the difficult programme of consolidation and expanding 
bases made rapid progress. In Tra Bong district of Quang 
Ngai, for example, cadres withdrew to the wooded hills 
and began preparing secret camps. There they armed 
themselves with weapons left in the south after regroupment.' 
In 1958 resistance zones were "extended to the mountains, 
the three border area, and further north to areas bordering 
on the Central Highlands, parts untrodden by the resistance 
forces" previously. Secondly, these cadres embarked on 
a programme to make themselves economically self-sufficient, 
especially in food production. Thirdly, the cadres 
conducted a programme of "cultural and political studies" 
for themselves and for ethnic minority youths who had joined 
them. Thus the foundation for an organized political 
movement was laid. Finally, as the various RVN programmes 
picked up pace, more and more highlanders became alienated, 
creating an even better operational environment for Party 
cadres.
Ta Xuan Linh, "Armed Uprising by Ethnic Minorities Along 
the Truong Son", op.cit., p.19.
14 8 Republic of Vietnam, Ministry of National Defense,
Study of the Activation and Activities of R, op.cit., p.22.
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These developments, however positive from the Party's
own viewpoint, contained elements of a dilemma as the
"revolutionary potential" in certain highland localities
threatened to outpace other areas. On the one hand,
Party cadres were apparently quite successful in organizing
various tribal groupings (Kor, Hre, Katu, Bahnar, Raglay).
By the end of 1957, according to one writer, "most leading
bodies [i.e. Party-controlled organizations] at district
level were staffed by cadres chosen from amongst the
ethnic minorities. Most tribal chiefs and village
15 0patriarchs sided with the revolutionaries..." As a
result it was possible to launch a political struggle
movement by relating the three themes spelled out in
151"Duong Loi Cach Mang Mien Nam" to local conditions.
Resistance to forced resettlement and poor camp conditions
once resettlement had taken place, were major issues
15 2exploited by Party cadres, as well as corvee labour, 
taxes, loss of land rights and the application of Vietnamese 
laws (which took no account of highland customs which 
varied among tribal groups anyway).
On the other hand, Party cadres faced the problem of 
how to respond to growing armed violence which threatened 
to lead to premature local uprisings which could be easily
Ta Xuan Linh, "Armed Uprising by Ethnic Minorities 
Along the Truong Son", op.cit., p.19; for "most" read 
"some".
Ibid.; Burchett, Vietnam Will Win! op.cit., p.116;
Cao Van Luong, "The Struggle of the National Minorities of 
Tay Nguyen", Vietnamese Studies (1966), No.8, p.189.
152 Ta Xuan Linh, "Armed Uprisings by Ethnic Minorities 
Along the Truong Son", Part 2, Vietnam Courier (October 
1974), New Series No.29, p.18.
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crushed. ' If cadres attempted to restrict the tempo
of highland retaliation might they not lose their hard
won positions of trust? It appears that sporadic killing
of RVN officials was soon accompanied by a better-organized
campaign influenced by the Party underground. According
to Ta Xuan Linh, "armed agitation groups were formed
to eliminate cruel officials and traitors. They included
national defense groups and former resistance members'
154armed groups". There was another purpose for in 1958
it had been decided to wage "all possible forms of
resistance to the Ngo Dinh regime". Linh has written:
To facilitate these preparations, the 
revolutionary forces disrupted and later 
completely destroyed village and hamlet 
administrations, especially in remote 
areas. In the highlands, the Diem ruling 
machine became practically ineffective ....
A few remaining cruel officials had to flee 
and hide in military posts and district capitals. 155
It would seem from the accounts available that the
rise in highland violence preceded the Party's ability
to control, let alone direct, it. Throughout 1957 and
1958 most of the targets were RVN officials involved in
highland resettlement. In early 1957 members of the Katu
were responsible for murdering several RVN officials in
western Quang Nam, as part of a system of seasonal inter-
156tribal vendettas. In another district of the same
154 Ibid., p
155 Ibid.
.19
156 "According to an old custom, every spring and autumn 
people along the Truong Son used to organize inter-tribal 
'vendetta' battles", quoted in ibid., p.18.
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province tribal youths attacked the Thanh My resettlement
15 7camp "with poisoned and incendiary arrows". They later
ambushed and killed three RVN officials. These and 
other highland attacks brought on increased government 
repression as both police and soldiers attempted to locate 
and punish those responsible, thus escalating the level 
of violence. Party cadres quickly made contact with 
minority dissidents and attempted to channel their energies 
for Party ends.
Broadcasts by the Voice of Vietnam in various tribal
dialects extolled the progress made in the DRVN in setting
158up autonomous regions for ethnic minorities. Sometime
in 1958 (perhaps as a counter to the independent Bajaraka
Movement described in chapter seven) a highland autonomy
159movement was launched. Training programmes for ethnic
minority cadres were instituted and a network of local
cadres was soon established. Secret agents were also
assigned to penetrate RVN military and administrative 
160posts.
157 Ibid.
Hickey, Preliminary Research Report on the PMS, op.cit., 
pp. 26-27 ; Republic of Vietnam, Violations of the Geneva 
Agreements by the Viet-Minh Communists^ op.cit., p .105;
Hanoi Radio in Rhade, 0430 GMT, November 27, 1958 and 
Hanoi Radio in Vietnamese, 1200 GMT, November 30, 1958.
See also the comments by George K. Tanham, Communist 
Revolutionary Warfare: The Vietminh in Indochina (New
York: Frederick A. Praeger, 19 61) , p .152'.
159 Cao Van Luong, "The Struggle of the National Minorities 
of Tay Nguyen Against U.S. Imperialism", op.cit., p.190.
"The government has been able to restrict but not 
eliminate the subversive and espionage activities of 
clandestine Communist agents. It is probable that Communists 
have penetrated some local army and security units, village 
councils, and local branches of the government .... There
cont'd
Throughout the remainder of the year developments
picked up. In February, after a period of quiet planning
between Party cadres and Raglay tribesmen, the escape
of inmates at Camp Brawn (a resettlement centre) was
effected. Shortly thereafter, Raglay living at Tam Ngan 
161did likewise. Once out of the RVN's grip they set
about preparing "combat villages" (defended in the 
traditional manner with bamboo spikes, booby-traps, etc.) 
and organizing self-defence groups. The following month 
members of the To Lo tribe escaped RVN attempts to 
resettle them along Phu Yen's National Route One. They 
too took to the interior where they set up a defensive 
system to resist their pursuers.^2
The combination of all these happenings forced Party 
leaders in Trung Bo (and indeed elsewhere) to consider 
once again the question of armed struggle. Although the 
following section will deal with developments throughout
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160 cont'd
is probably a widespread Communist underground in the urban 
areas, especially Saigon, and Communist intelligence of 
GVN plans and activities is probably good. Communist 
agents are also stimulating unrest among the tribal 
minorities in the central highlands ..." U.S. Central 
Intelligence Agency, Prospects for North and South Vietnam. 
National Intelligence Estimate 63-59 (May 26, 1959), op.cit 
p.1193.
161 Ta Xuan Linh, "Armed Uprisings by Ethnic Minorities 
Along the Truong Son", Part 2, op.cit., p.18.
16 2 Ibid.; Montgomery, The Politics of Foreign Aid, op.cit 
p.78, wrote, "The whole question [of resettlement] broke 
out into the open with an incident in June 1958: the
village of Cu Ty rose against its guards during a heavy 
rain, attacking them as they huddled under ponchos, seized 
weapons and vehicles, and fled to Cambodia".
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South Viet-Nam, it is important to note the pressures
building up in the Highlands. There Party officials
noted sporadic and ever-increasing independent attacks
by tribal minorities against the RVN. Coinciding with
these attacks were the Party's successful efforts to
create secure base areas and active self-defence groups.
Minority leaders, some of whose ties to the Party dated
back to the anti-French Resistance, wanted assistance in
their endeavours. The Party responded by providing training
and equipment and various sorts of material. Nevertheless
the question remained: what was the Party's policy on
armed struggle? Part of this dilemma was summarised by
Sao Nam, a cadre who operated in Quang Nam and Quang
Ngai provinces at that time:
Before 1959, when we started to organize our 
real strength to try to find out where we stood, 
we asked people to wage a political struggle 
only - around economic questions, living 
standards, democratic rights; against unpaid 
labor, conscription and savage beatings ... 
although we sometime had arms hidden away, we 
remained disciplined. We had to put up with 
it [RVN repression] and do nothing. But when 
people saw that this passive attitude only 
encouraged the enemy, and when some of the 
tribes-people in the mountains decided to 
resist with armed struggle, using their 
rudimentary weapons, we agreed with them. This 
was not yet a real armed struggle but a legal 
struggle using rudimentary weapons in self- 
defense, such as spiked traps to limit the enemy's attempts to enter their villages.163
Apparently the Party's line on armed violence -
extermination of traitors but not armed struggle - was
163 Burchett, Vietnam Will Win! op.cit., p.116.
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the subject of intense discussion among cadres in Trung 
Bo in late 1957. At that time, according to one writer, 
they
received materials sent from Nam Bo containing 
the view-points of the leaders of the struggle 
in South Viet-Nam as a whole. These documents 
indicated clearly that, because of the brutal 
fascist policies of the Saigon regime, there 
was no other way out than to use people's 
revolutionary violence. They also pointed out 
the necessity to prepare for an armed uprising 
to wrest back power for the people. They 
listed some experiences of the Nam Bo people 
and stated that timely armed activities in self- 
defense had been carried out and that the people's 
armed forces had been formed shortly after 
Ngo Dinh Diem's had started his atrocious 
campaign of terror, (emphasis added) -*-64
As a result of the documents dispatched from Nam Bo,
and in light of the discussions held between Party cadres
and minority leaders, and "pending the decision about a 
165new line" Party officials in Trung Bo "took the initiative
of gradually changing the local movement into a combined
16 6political and military struggle".
These same officials decided to test this new strategy 
by limiting it to the western districts of Ninh Thuan 
and Quang Ngai provinces. Accordingly sometime around 
March-April 1958, Tran Nam Trung, the Party's most senior 
official in Trung Bo, gave the order to prepare for the 
first armed uprising in Tra Bong district of Quang Ngai
164 Ta Xuan Linh, "Armed Uprisings by Ethnic Minorities 
Along the Truong Son", Part 2, p.19.
1 6 5  T U ' dIbid.
166 Ibid.
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16 7where the provincial party committee was located.
In July 1958 a congress of Vietnamese Party cadres and
representatives of the Kor, Hre and Ca Dong met in Tra
Bong "to discuss the waging of all possible forms of
168resistance to the Ngo Dinh Diem regime. It was from
this time onwards that determined efforts were made to 
weaken the RVN by eliminating its officials on the one 
hand, and building up the revolutionary forces on the 
other. The tempo of the times have been aptly captured 
by Ta Xuan Linh:
The building of revolutionary forces was 
speeded up. Leading bodies of villages 
and districts were strengthened 
and mass organizations were re-organized.
Special attention was paid to the building 
of people's armed forces, the young people 
in secret camps were organized into militia 
units. Villages and hamlets were gradually 
organized into 'fighting' villages and hamlets 
were guarded by sharp bamboo spikes, booby 
traps, an alert system, and other measures.
While these preparations were being set in train
the RVN continued to launch forays into the uplands as
well as instigating an "economic blockade" of dissident
170areas (denying the tribesmen salt, for example).
In October and again in December Tra Bong district witnessed
apparently spontaneous local rebellions in Tra Khe and
171Tra Linh villages respectively. Needless to say the
16 7 Ibid.; "Tran Nam Trung" 
"Loyal to the South".
is a nom d'guerre meaning
168
169
Ibid. 
Ibid.
Ibid.; Hanoi Radio, 0830 GMT, October 26, 1958; and 
Burchett, The Furtive War, op.cit., p.125.
171 Ta Xuan Linh, "Armed Uprisings by Ethnic Minorities Along 
the Truong Son", Part 2, p.19.
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RVN held the Voice of Vietnam responsible for inciting 
the disturbances. Party officials, on the other hand, 
were preoccupied with a different question: were the
172other areas of the South similarly ripe for rebellion?
IV. THE THIRD CONFERENCE OF THE NAM BO REGIONAL COMMITTEE 
(August 1958)
Almost eighteen months separated the second and third
conferences (hoi nghi) of the Nam Bo Regional Committee.
In the intervening period Party officials witnessed
17 3definite progress on all fronts. The Party's organization
174had been consolidated and maintained during the year.
New recruits were attracted and old contacts reactivated.
The existing resistance bases absorbed a variety of
political refugees and served as ideal locations for
175indoctrination and training programmes. New bases
were established, most successfully in the mountain areas
to the north of Resistance Zones C and D and in the extreme
172 Ibid.; for example Quang Ngai was considered more 
advanced than Ninh Thuan.
Chan (Tran Van Bo), a former Party cadre has stated, 
"Then there was a second period from 1957 to 1958, during 
which the Party recovered and was comparatively well off"; 
quoted in Race, "The Origins of the Second Indochina War", 
op.cit., p.372. Elsewhere Chan has commented, "During 
1957 and 1958 the Party was able to recover its apparatus 
and its mass organizations, and it counted on contradictions 
within the government to produce a coup"; ibid., p.376.
174 Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, pp.8 and 26; nevertheless there 
were problems, see "To Chuc Moi" (New Organization), an 
internal Party document dating to early 1957 in Race, 
compiler, Vietnamese Materials, Microfilm Reel I, document 
1004, pp.1-2.
175 Fall, The Two Viet-Nams, op.cit., p.367.
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southwest. The Party's clandestine apparatus extended
its penetration of legal organizations, such as schools,
professional associations, religious groups, and trucking
companies as well as various RVN civil and military 
176groups. Although the sect forces had been reduced,
the Party itself had been successful in developing village
self-defence groups in addition to regional force units.
As the military base was strengthened, squads and platoons
were gradually expanded into company size and by mid-
1771958 a battalion was created. Similar progress was
made in reorientating the form and content of the political
struggle movement. The errors of the Diem regime offered
17 8fertile ground for exploitation. By the time the
third conference convened in August 1958 the tru gian
campaign had already begun to have an impact of raising
the morale of the Party's supporters in addition to its
179intended effect on the RVN administration.
Warner, The Last Confucian, op.cit., p.143; for 
contemporary reports consult: U.S. Central Intelligence
Agency, Probable Developments in North and South Vietnam 
Through mid-1957, National Intelligence Estimate, No.63-56 
(July 17, 19 5>6) , op.cit., p.1077 ; and MAAG-Vietnam, 
Country Statement on MDAP, Non-NATO Countries (January 
1957) in United States - Vietnam Relations, Book 2, IV.A.5 
Tab 4, p.16.
177 
Nam"
178
Ta Xuan Linh, "How Armed Struggle Began in South Viet 
, op.cit., p.22.
Warner, The Last Confucian, op.cit., p.154.
179 Rostow, The Diffusion of Power, op.cit., p.41.
Nevertheless, despite these positive developments,
the Party was far from able to take on the Diem regime in
a full-blown campaign of armed struggle. The leaders
in Nam Bo, despite whatever provocations they faced at
the hands of the Diemists, still remained cautious.
Although they held that a resumption of armed struggle
was necessary (at some point in the future) they held
18 0back from encouraging premature action. By the third
conference it was evident that the tides of revolutionary
progress were once again beginning to ebb.
The Party and its various organizations did not
operate in a vacuum, as they faced intense competition
by the RVN authorities. By late 1957 and early 1958
the Diem regime took up the slack and renewed its efforts
to extend control in the countryside. By the Party's
own admission, RVN police and security officials, as well
as hamlet and village officials, began to operate in
181areas where they had been absent for months. Thus
the Party's newly rejuvenated political struggle began
to wind downwards. In the words of a later Party review:
From the middle of 1958 to the end of 1959 
the revolutionary movement in Nam Bo remained 
at a standstill. The political movement 
could not be initiated. The movement demanding 
social welfare and democratic rights was 
sporadic and uncoordinated. 2
Wherever the RVN managed to re-install its administration,
the Party encountered difficulties in conducting normal
operations. According to a former Party cadre:
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18 0 Race, "The Origins of the Second Indochina War”, op.cit., 
pp.368-369.
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182
Ibid., p.371.
Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, p.19; Burchett, Vietnam Will Win! 
op.cit., pp.51-52.
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... the Government began to establish its 
village and hamlet apparatus in the remote 
rural areas where the French never dared 
to set foot. When the [Diem] government 
local apparatus was established this naturally limited the Party's activities.183
The Party's nascent armed forces likewise encountered
problems. Although the tru gian campaign was seen as
successful, other operations were less so:
In some places where our armed forces appeared 
the enemy patrolled, controlled and terrorized 
the people. Sometimes our armed forces could 
neither counter enemy sweep operations nor could 
they protect the people because they were weak or 
had to act in accordance with the policy lines 
of the Party. They could not create favorable 
conditions for the political movement and they 
met many difficulties. The scattered killings 
of tyrants did not entirely affect the enemy's 
morale except to some small extent. As a 
consequence when the enemy terrorized the people, 
our armed forces were inadequate to protect 
the people. The people were afraid when our 
armed forces operated in their areas. The 
enemy always tried to locate the camp sites of 
our armed forces in order to attack them, 
separate them from the masses, and inflict 
casualties on them. At that time [from 1957 
onwards] there were no military bases, our armed 
forces had to disperse and hide in thick jungles 
or in the middle of ricefields. They were thus 
driven into an isolated position. In places where 
the terrain features were disadvantageous to operate, 
our armed forces had to disperse widely among the 
people. They were quite weak. To maintain a 
lawful position for the people, we restricted 
armed activities and tried to prevent armed forces 
from interfering in the matters concerning the 
people's struggle movement.184
As was indicated earlier (Table 7-3) this was one of
18 5the most intense periods of anti-Communist suppression.
183 Race, "The Origins of the Second Indochina War", op.cit., 
p.371; Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, p.8.
184 Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, p.37.
For examples of reporting on the arrests of Communist 
Party members, in chronical order, see: "Chinese Communist
Cadres Arrested in Ba Xuyen Province", The Times of Viet Nam 
(October 11, 1957), Vol.I, No.10, p.l; Working Paper,
cont'd
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18 6According to Communist figures 57% of all persons killed
during the July 1954 - February 1959 period, were killed
during the months November 1957 - February 1959. The
percentages of those missing and arrested during the
same time period represent 50% and 66% respectively.
Various Party cadres have indicated that this was "the
187darkest period". In late 1957 the RVN took steps
18 8to control Party-influenced trade unions. Early in
the next year attempts to organize a student struggle
18 9movement around issues of educational reform foundered.
Several of the self-defence organizations "were broken 
19 0up". The sect forces had "dwindled into a mere token
191force" while the armed forces had to be kept dispersed. 
These were the trends which the Nam Bo Regional Committee 
had to consider when it met in August for its third 
conference.
According to the only available account of this 
meeting:
185 cont'd
Appendices, Item 28, pp.l and 6; Andrews, The Village War, 
op.cit., p .44; U.S. Department of State, A Threat to Peace, 
op.cit., pp.26-27; "Police Killed Michelin Rubber Plantation 
Attackers", The Times of Viet Nam, (November 12, 1958),
Vol.2, No.250, pp.1-2.
18 6 These percentages were calculated from the data 
appearing in Table 7-3.
Sheehan, The Pentagon Papers, op.cit., p.74; Zasloff, 
Origins of the Insurgency, op.cit., p.15; and Ta Xuan Linh, 
"How Armed Struggle Began in South Viet Nam", op.cit., p.22.
18 8 Ton Vy, "The Workers' Struggle", op.cit., p.86.
To Minh Trung, "The Students' and Pupils' Struggle", 
op.cit., p .117.
190 Ta Xuan Linh, "How Armed Struggle Began in South Viet 
Nam", op.cit. p.22.
191 Ibid.
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The resolutions of this conference were based 
on the content and spirit of the document 
'Duong Loi Cach Mang Mien Nam'. Although the 
entire Regional Committee realized that they no 
longer had the ability to peacefully change 
[the] political power [structure] in the South, 
they nevertheless affirmed that the Revolution in 
the South could only develop according to the 
line "peaceful means must be employed flexibly 
with other means". The subject of arms [i.e. 
violence] was stated more positively [i.e. 
affirmatively] than before but the approved line 
of struggle was not yet spelled out clearly.
In fact the leadership of the Regional Committee 
more and more came to favor limiting the use of 
armed force. It criticized those who favored 
[an increase in armed violence] arguing that 
these persons' ideas were in opposition to the Party's line.192
The point of the debate appeared to be, not whether
to use armed force, but when, with what units (sects,
companies, battalions) and for what purpose (self-defence,
extermination of traitors, or a general uprising). In
late 1957 the Nam Bo leadership sent a review of armed
activities in the south to the Trung Bo Committee. This
review stated that "there was no other way out than to
use people's revolutionary violence", and that it was
193necessary "to prepare for an armed uprising". By
the time of the third conference in August, Tran Nam Trung 
had already taken the initiative when he issued orders 
to prepare for an armed uprising in a carefully selected 
test area. It is doubtful the Nam Bo Committee was 
unaware of these developments. Nevertheless the debate 
continued. According to a CIA study of this period:
Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, p.32.
19 3 Ta Xuan Linh, "Armed Uprisings by Ethnic Minorities 
Along the Truong Son", Part 2, op.cit., p.19.
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[The] debate over strategy continued through 
1958. Reports captured while being forwarded 
via Lao Dong [i.e. VWP] channels from South 
Vietnam to Hanoi indicate that some 
subordinates there clung to the belief 
that the Diem regime could be toppled without 
recourse to guerrilla warfare, and that 
others despaired of success without substantial 
military aid from the North. There is also 
evidence throughout 1958 that Viet Cong [sic] 
tactics were being subjected to careful study in Hanoi.194
Although the Regional Committee continued to place
restrictions on the widespread use of armed force they
nevertheless permitted certain specific actions. In
August, the very month the third conference was held,
Party-led units successfully attacked RVN posts in Dau
Tieng and Bien Hoa, distributing the captured armouries
to neighbouring Thu Dau Mot and Tay Ninh provinces so that
195cadres there could develop their own military forces.
The consolidation and development of military units continued.
By the end of the year an army command was set up in
western Nam Bo to coordinate operations with the Cao Thien
Hoa Binh forces in the east. An estimated 300 selected
cadres joined the Party's Nam Bo organization after completing
19 6the long overland march from the North via Laos.
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Memorandum (September 
22, 1965) op.cit., p.2; "Hanoi and the Insurgency in 
South Vietnam", in United States - Vietnam Relations, op.cit., 
Book 2, IV.A.5. Tab 3, p.55.
Ta Xuan Linh, "How Armed Struggle Began in South Viet 
Nam", op.cit., p.23.
196 Republic of Vietnam, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Infiltration of Communist Armed Elements and Clandestine 
Introduction of Arms From North to South Vietnam 
(Saigon: June 1967), pp.8 and 34.
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The RVN was quick to react to these developments.
In September Operation Nguyen Trai swept through the
western provinces of An Giang, An Xuyen (Ca Mau), Ba
Xuyen, Kien Giang (Ha Tien-Rach Gia) and Phong Dinh
19 7(Can Tho) continuing until February 1959. Meanwhile
developments in the DRVN had reached the point where
the Central Committee was once again prepared to conduct
a comprehensive review of developments throughout Viet-
Nam and to examine once more the interrelatedness of
policies in the North and South. After two years of
implementation of the policies outlined in "Duong Loi
Cach Mang Mien Nam" was the South now ready to enter
a new stage? In order to find out Le Duan himself made
19 8an unpublicised inspection tour of the south. As the
former secretary of the Nam Bo Regional Committee Le Duan 
was the right man to conduct a thorough assessment. He 
made the journey in late 1958 and probably returned to 
Hanoi sometime in December. Duan's report was considered
We Open the File/ op.cit., p.71; and Vietnam News 
Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 0526 GMT,
March 19, 1959.
198 Carver, "The Faceless Viet Cong", op.cit., p.359, writes: 
"Hanoi was far more satisfied with the pace of Viet Cong 
progress and was particularly chagrined at the movement's 
failure to win a really significant political following. 
Several Viet Cong cadre members who were subsequently 
captured have reported that in late 1958 Le Duan himself 
was sent on an extensive inspection trip in the South ..."; 
P.J. Honey, Genesis of a Tragedy: The Historical Background
to the Vietnam War (London: Ernest Benn Ltd., 1968), pp.73-74 
dates the trip to late 1957 with Le Duan returning to the 
North in 1958; according to Phan The Ngoc, a member of the 
My Tho province committee specialising in "arts and letters" 
(uy vien ban van nghe) he (Ngoc) accompanied Le Duan as an 
escort officer during part of this trip in late 1958.
Interview with Phan The Ngoc, Saigon, Ministry of Open Arms, 
June 8, 1972.
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by the VWP's 15th Plenum which met in January 1959. In 
order to understand fully the background of this historic 
plenum it will be necessary to review the events of 
1957-58 period, focusing this time on the North. There 
the VWP had been charged with implementing the two other 
main missions set out in "Duong Loi Cach Mang Mien Nam" 
and by the Party's 11th Plenum: consolidate the north
and win the sympathy and support of the world's people.
CHAPTER 9
CONSOLIDATING THE NORTH AND WINNING THE SYMPATHY
AND SUPPORT OF THE WORLD'S PEOPLE (1957-58)
I. INTRODUCTION
During the last quarter of 1956 the Democratic 
Republic of Viet-Nam passed through a period of domestic 
crisis occasioned by mistakes committed during the 
agrarian reform campaign. In November peasant discontent 
flared into open revolt in several villages of Nghe An 
province. These problems alone were sufficient to post­
pone any plans some leaders might have had for giving 
greater attention to developments in the South. There, 
as previous chapters have indicated, Diem surmounted 
domestic opposition and began to consolidate his regime 
with generous assistance from the United States. Party 
officials in Nam Bo faced a crisis too as cadres became 
disillusioned with their situation. They wondered aloud 
how reunification could be achieved if Diem was permitted 
to strengthen his rule while the Party pursued an 
ineffectual policy of peaceful protest. In the face of the 
anti-Communist denunciation campaign and military sweeps 
some cadres clamoured for a return to armed struggle.
These points of view were woven into discussions at 
the VWP's 10th and 11th Plenums held in October and 
December 1956, respectively. Once again the view that 
consolidation of the North was the main priority was 
reaffirmed. This was so for two reasons: to protect the
building of socialism in the North and to serve as the base 
for the struggle in the South. In other words, because
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Party leaders had erred in expecting a speedy reunification 
of the country, they were now faced with the incredibly 
complex problem of how to integrate resources and planning 
in both halves of the country given the fact that the North 
was liberated and the South was under "enemy" control.
One result was that a long-range strategy for the South 
was mapped out in a major policy document entitled "Duong 
Loi Cach Mang Mien Nam" described earlier. In the North, 
meanwhile, the Party launched a "rectification of errors 
campaign" to redress many of the injustices committed in 
the course of land reform. Nevertheless the North still 
faced underlying problems of economic recovery and Party 
reorganization. At the 6th Session of the DRVN1s National 
Assembly (December 1956 - January 1957) great attention 
was given to economic and financial matters related to 
increasing agricultural production (the main task) and 
developing light industry and handicrafts (key tasks).
The new review of these policies was slated for
July 1957, when the National Assembly was expected to
\
convene its 7th Session. However due to typhoon damage
which weakened the dikes and caused intensive flooding the
1National Assembly postponed its meeting until September.
This session was originally scheduled to follow the VWP's 
12th Plenum which met in March. On the eve of the Central 
Committee's meeting the VWP celebrated its sixth anniversary 
(3 March 1957). In a speech given in honour of that
Voice of Vietnam dictation in Vietnamese to Southeast 
Asia, 2330 GMT, September 5, 1957 carries an announcement 
by Ton Quang Phiet, vice chairman of the National Assembly's Standing Committee.
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occasion General Vo Nguyen Giap summed up the dilemmas
2facing the Party throughout Viet-Nam at that time.
According to the General:
The revolutionary struggle of the people will 
still meet many difficulties, but by examining 
the prevailing situation in the world and in the 
country, and by making a comparison between 
the situation of the previous days and the 
present time, we can say that we have 
favorable conditions - and this is a fundamental 
point - and although we still have many 
difficulties, these difficulties can certainly 
be overcome. One of the objectives is the 
strengthening of the North in its advance 
toward Socialism, and there is still another:
The North will be transformed into a base for 
the struggle for the unification of the country.
General Giap then went on to detail what "Duong Loi 
Cach Mang Mien Nam" termed the "three main missions" for 
the future:
1. It is necessary to enlarge the anti-American- 
Diem front in the South, and rally and 
unite all people's forces which can be 
rallied and united, to patiently struggle 
against the fascist dictatorial policy,
to demand democratic freedoms, to 
struggle against the policy of reducing 
[the people] to poverty, to demand the 
improvement of the living conditions of 
the people, and to demand rights of our 
people to a livelihood, basing ourselves 
on the ever-strengthened North.
2. We should hold fast and develop the people's 
movement and struggle in the South for the 
realization of the resumption of normal 
economic and cultural relations between the 
two zones...We must... struggle for the 
reestablishment of normal relations between 
the North and South to create favorable 
conditions so that the North and South may
2 Giap's speech was broadcast in two parts: Voice of
Vietnam in Vietnamese to Southeast Asia, 0440 GMT, March 4, 
1957 in U.S. FBIS Daily Report (March 5, 1957) , No.43, 
pp.EEE1-EEE5; and Voice of Vietnam in Vietnamese to 
Southeast Asia, 1100 GMT, March 4, 1957 in U.S. FBIS Daily 
Report (March 7, 1957), No.45, pp.EEE1-EEE8. Unattributed 
quotations in the following paragraphs are taken from 
this source.
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draw closer to each other and advance toward 
reunification of the country as provided 
by the Geneva Accords:
3. Our practical missions [in the North] during 
1957 are clearly very important and heavy 
(serious). It is necessary to accomplish 
the mistakes - correction work in order to 
complete the agrarian reforms. It is 
necessary to concentrate all our forces to 
basically achieve economic recovery [to 
pre-war levels], and all other activities 
should be coordinated with these two 
fundamental tasks. On the other hand, 
we should study thoroughly the line of 
conduct and policy, the ideology and 
organization of our party in order to push 
forward the strengthening of the North 
through this transitory period. We must at 
the same time struggle for the reunification 
of the country.
In short General Giap was foreshadowing the policy 
that would be pursued by Party leaders throughout the 
year. Earlier in his speech Giap drew parallels with the 
past to argue that the Party's "line of conduct" must be 
followed by all VWP members. Given the context it appears 
that General Giap was directing his remarks at those cadres 
who had misgivings about the Party's priorities, and 
especially about policy toward the South. To quote Giap 
directly:
Through twenty-seven years of struggle [i.e. 1930- 
1957], our people's liberation work has scored 
brilliant success, but the revolutionary struggle 
has not always gone from one victory to another.
During the time of secret activities [i.e. when 
the Party was illegal], our people met many 
difficulties and obstacles. Our movement had its 
ups and downs. In some places, it temporarily 
met with insuperable obstacles, and the 
revolutionary organizations were dissolved and 
the Party's leadership interrupted. However 
difficulties and dangers could never check the 
advance of the movement.
Temporary failures could never effect the fighting 
spirit of the people and the Party. On the 
contrary, each difficulty and failure only 
encouraged our people to go bravely forward, and 
forged our Party's leadership, which became more 
experienced and clearsighted....
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In each phase, the Party based itself on a 
comparison between the enemy forces and ours 
to set up a strategy, to assemble all the 
forces which could be united, and to decide 
on the form of struggle which was sometimes 
secret and sometimes public, which sometimes 
appeared as a peaceful and sometimes as an 
armed struggle - thanks to all of which we 
succeeded in organizing and strengthening the 
revolutionary force and leading it to victory.
In other words Giap was instructing Party cadres in
the North and South, who had become disillusioned, to put
their faith in the VWP. No doubt the "reduction of cadres"
movement in the South was designed to weed out those
individuals who were incapable of the discipline expected
of them. Meanwhile in the North, the Party would take
similar steps to improve political control over its members.
II. THE 12th PLENUM (MARCH 1957)
There were four major topics which attracted the 
attention of the VWP Central Committee at its 12th Plenum:
(1) the rectification of errors campaign, (2) the maintenance 
of public order and security, (3) the 1957 State Plan and 
(4) the modernization and regularization of the People's 
Army of Viet-Nam. All four topics were domestic issues 
a clear indication that agreement on southern policy had 
been reached for the time being. In addition to these 
major areas the Plenum also resolved to hold celebrations
in honour of the 40th anniversary of the Soviet October
3Revolution.
Although the 11th Plenum laid the "base" for the 1957
4State Plan, the 12th Plenum had to consider the finer
3 Voice of Vietnam dictation in Vietnamese to Southeast 
Asia, 2330 GMT, April 22, 1957.
4 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia,
0558 GMT, January 12, 1957.
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details of carrying out economic rehabilitation. According
5to the Plenum's communique there were three main features 
of this plan: (1) restore output to 1939 (i.e. pre-war)
levels, (2) strengthen and develop the people's democratic 
economy and (3) stabilize the economic situation. The aim 
of developing "the people's democratic economy" was to 
broaden the socialist sector while "readjusting and 
transforming" the private sector. It was hoped that 
progress in this area coupled with the stabilization of 
the market would eventually permit "planned construction".
In specific terms the 12th Plenum reviewed the main 
targets of the 1957 State Plan in the following areas: 
agriculture, industry, communication and postal services, 
capital construction, commerce, finance, cadre training, 
culture, education and public health. The exact targets 
were later enumerated by the Council of Ministers.^ In 
order to achieve them four tasks were marked out for 
"particular attention":
1. heighten labour discipline, carry out 
responsibility in production;
2. materialize, step-by-step, the regime of 
financial autonomy in state-owned factories;
3. launch a movement for "increasing production 
and practicing economy";
4. work out plans to practice economy, to combat 
waste and corruption.
cVietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 
1100 GMT, April 23, 1957; see also the three main 
responsibilities listed in the communique of the Council 
of Ministers as broadcast by Voice of Vietnam in Vietnamese 
to Southeast Asia, 0430 GMT, April 30, 1957.
6 Ibid.
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In addition, the following seven areas were
7designated as "important and urgent problems":
1. strict control of money on hand, financial 
discipline and the correct implementation of 
the State Plan for revenues and expenditures;
2. control market prices, combat speculation and 
hoarding;
3. study the question of the rational use of public 
servants, work out a plan to gradually
4. provide jobs for demobilized soldiers and the 
unemployed;
5. carry out "piecework salary" and increase 
production bonuses in the factories, at 
construction sites and on state-farms; 
subsidize "high-ranking intellectual and 
technical workers", work out a new wage system;
6. increase ideological, political and organizational 
leadership in economic and financial areas;
7. strengthen the financial and economic apparatus, 
promote able cadres to economic and financial 
organs.
The 12th Plenum also reviewed the role of the army 
in consolidating national defence in the period since the 
end of the Resistance War.
According to the communique of the Council of Ministers:
"it is necessary to drastically settle the following 
present, important and urgent problems: To control closely
markets and prices by using all economic, administrative, 
and cultural measures, to combat speculation and hoarding 
drastically [sic], study carefully the problem of "pien-chih" 
(Chinese term meaning "table of organization" - Ed.) [sic] 
and draw up plans for gradual reorganization, to gradually 
find jobs for demobilized soldiers, regrouped Southern 
compatriots and jobless people by placing them in the various 
production enterprises according to a general plan which 
must be carried out steadfastly, to gradually apply the 
system of piecework and allowances for increase in production 
in factories, construction sites and collective farms, to 
carry on the reasonable readjustment of salaries for cadres 
and civil servants on the basis of the present salaries 
regime, to apply a regime of appropriate allowances for 
intellectual cadres and high-ranking specialists and to 
continue the building of a new salaries regime". Ibid., in 
U.S. FBIS Daily Report (May 3, 1957), No.86, p.EEE4.
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At present, according to a resolution issued by the
Plenum, the main task of the army in the "new stage" is:
To safeguard the cause of consolidating and 
building up the North in its progressive advance 
to socialism, to defend the sovereignty, the 
territory and the security of the Democratic 
Republic of Viet-Nam, to serve as a prop to the 
struggle for the consolidation of peace, the 
reunification of the country, and the completion 
of independence and democracy all over the 
country, to be prepared to smash the aggressive 
plots of imperialism, especially the U.S. 
imperialists and their lackeys.
In order for the army to carry out these tasks it
would be necessary to strengthen the role of the Party in
the army and regularize the military forces for garrison
duty. In the words of the Plenum's final communique the
following tasks needed to be carried out:
The strengthening of political education and 
ideological leadership in the army, and the active 
preparation of plans to carry out, step by step, 
the major objectives affecting compulsory 
military service, military grades, the military 
wage system, and commendations and awards.
Increase leadership in the carrying out of 
policies toward armymen, demobilized armymen 
disabled servicemen, war martyrs and families 
of armymen and war martyrs.
Increase the leadership of the Party and the 
Government in the consolidation of national 
defence.y
In the wake of the 12th Plenum Party leaders convened 
a series of conferences in April and May at which high-level
gVo Nguyen Giap, "Strengthening National Defence and Building 
Up The People's Armed Forces", in Third National Congress of 
the Viet Nam Workers' Party, Documents (Hanoi: Foreign
Languages Publishing House, 1961), Vol.3, p.53; and Voice 
of Vietnam in Vietnamese to Southeast Asia, 1330 GMT,
August 8, 1957.
9 See the six points listed in the communique of the Council 
of Ministers, Voice of Vietnam in Vietnamese to Southeast 
Asia, 0430 GMT, April 30, 1957.
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Party cadres in the military discussed the modernization
of PAVN.^ Not only were specialized branches to be created
but a thoroughgoing system of political and ideological
controls was to be instituted. In May Generals Nguyen 
11 12Chanh and Nguyen Van Vinh were appointed, respectively,
director and assistant director on a new General Directorate
of Cadres in the Ministry of National Defense. This
directorate was to oversee the political retraining (chinh
huan chinh tri) of middle and low level cadres in the 
13army. Its aim was to ensure the ideological commitment of
"Dai Hoi Dai Bieu Dang Cao Cap Trong Quan Doi La Mot Su 
Kien Lon Trong Doi Song Chinh Tri Cua Quan Doi Tai Nam Nay", 
[The Conference of Party Delegates of Various Army Echelons 
is an Important Event in the Political Life of the Army 
This Year] Quan Doi Nhan Dan (April 16, 1957), No.335, p.l. 
"Hoi Nghi Chinh Tri Toan Quan, Da Thao Luan Phuong Cham Va 
Nhiem Vu Cong Tac Giao Due Chinh Tri Bao DamHuan Luyen 
Quan Su Nam 1957", [The All-Army Political Conference 
Discussed the Aims and Missions of Political Education Work, 
Ideological Leadership, Party-Building Tasks and Political 
Work to Promote Military Training in 1957] Quan Doi Nhan Dan 
(April 19, 1957), No.336, p.l. Voice of Vietnam in Vietnamese 
to South Vietnam, 1200 GMT, May 14, 1957 in U.S. FBIS Daily 
Report (May 16, 1957), No.95, pp.EEE6-EEE8.
^  "During the Resistance War against the French colonialists 
he fought in the Nam Bo theatre. He was Chief of Staff of 
the Nam Bo Command". Who's Who of the Republic of South 
Viet Nam, op.cit., p.25. According to Working Paper, 
Appendices, Item 19, p.l., Chanh served in the South as late 
as 1956.
"Throughout the Indochina War (1946-55), Vinh was active 
in South Vietnam, where he held senior appointments in the 
Viet Minh movement. In 1955, he was assigned to Saigon as 
Head of the North Vietnamese [DRVN] liaison mission attached 
to the International Control Commission.... In 1956, he 
was promoted to Brigadier-General and in the same year 
returned to North Vietnam". U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 
Who's Who in North Vietnam, op.cit., p.331.
13 "Thanh Lap Tong Cue Can Bo Thuoc Bo Quoc Phong Tong Tu 
Lenh", [Establishment of a General Directorate of Cadres 
Under the Ministry of National Defence and General Staff]
Quan Doi Nhan Dan (May 10, 1957), No.342, p.l.
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military personnel in the new stage where the main 
objectives were "building socialism" rather than "opposing 
the French".
In June the Party reorganized the army's General
Inspectorate, by placing Generals Tran Tu Binh and Phan 
14Trong Tue in command. Binh and Tue were charged with
overseeing the implementation of the Party's programs and
policies for PAVN as well as the army's "working methods
15and leadership styles". Both the General Inspectorate
for Cadres and the General Inspectorate for the army were 
responsible for creating an army that was simultaneously 
"red and expert". In the words on an editorial in the 
army's newspaper:
The difficulties we presently confront are brought 
forth by two great contradictions in the building 
of our army today: the contradictions between
the revolutionary situation and tasks of the 
new period on the one hand and the level of 
consciousness and thought(s) of cadres and 
soldiers on the other; and the contradiction 
between the demands of military modernization 
on the one hand and the underdeveloped technological 
level of our army and country on the other.
These difficulties have an enduring character
14 "He [Phan Trong Tue] took part in the Indochina War, and 
in 1955 emerged as a Brigadier-General and head of the North 
Vietnamese Army's [i.e. PAVN's] delegation to the Joint 
Armistice Commission. Subsequently he seems to have been 
mainly concerned with North Vietnamese [DRVN] policy vis-a-vis 
the International Control Commission....After his return to 
North Vietnam, he was named in 1957 as deputy to Brigadier- 
General Tran Tu Binh, party political commissar at the 
Infantry Training School, in what was then the newTly formed 
Army Inspection Department". U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 
Who's Who in North Vietnam, op.cit., p.309.
15 "Bo Quoc Phong Tong Tu Lenh Re Nghi Dinh Quy Dinh to Chuc 
Nhiem Vu Va Quyen Han Cua Quan Tong Thanh Tra Quan Doi", 
[Ministry of National Defence and General Staff Issue 
Directives Concerning the Organization and Duties of the 
General Inspectorate of the Army] Quan Doi Nhan Dan (June 21, 
1957), No.354, p.1.
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and we .must be firm and energetic in overcoming 
them.
The political retraining program continued throughout 
1957, ending around October. This cleared the decks for an 
increased concentration on PAVN's "modernization and 
regularization" a process which accelerated in the following 
year.
After the 12th Plenum the Party also sought to complete 
the rectification of errors campaign. Although originally 
stated to conclude by March 1957, (when the Central Committee 
met) it continued until November when a series of 
provincial recapitulation conferences signalled its end.
The March plenum had also indicated its concern over public 
order and security by listing that item as one of the four 
major tasks to be accomplished in the near-future. The main 
concern in this area appears to have been with "economic 
offences" committed by speculators and hoarders. On May 19th 
it was announced that after an unsuccessful attempt to use 
"ideological education" that the DRVN government had issued 
a formal decree making speculation and hoarding a crime 
punishable by a range of penalties including confiscation, 
fines, or imprisonment.^
The decisions of the 12th Plenum were discussed and 
given approval by the 5th enlarged congress of the Central 
Committee of the Fatherland Front and the Council of 
Ministers of the DRVN both of which convened meetings in
"Hay Coi Trong Muc Phan Hoc Tap Nhiem Vu Cong Tac 1957", 
[Give Attention to Studying the Mission and Tasks for 1957] 
Quan Doi Nhan Dan (June 18, 1957), No.353, p.l.
Hanoi Radio, 2330 GMT, May 26, 1957 in BBC, Summary of 
World Broadcasts, Part V (May 30, 1957), No.668, p.46-47.
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April. With these plans set in train VWP leaders began 
to look ahead to the future when economic restoration would 
be complete and the DRVN could embark on planned economic 
growth. Of vital importance in drawing up these plans was 
a knowledge of what outside assistance the DRVN could 
expect to receive from its socialist allies.
III. PRESIDENTIAL TRAVELS (MAY 1957): DIEM IN WASHINGTON
AND VOROSHILOV IN HANOI
On May 12 it was announced that "at the invitation
of President Ho Chi Minh, Marshal K.Y. Voroshilov, President
of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, will visit
19the DRVN in the near future". Voroshilov, in fact, had 
just completed a visit to China and was then touring 
Indonesia. He arrived in Hanoi on May 20 and departed four 
days later.
Although Voroshilov's visit was billed as "an
2 0important historical event" and was accorded much publicity
within the DRVN, it would be an error to suggest, as does
P.J. Honey, that it marked the beginning of a shift in the
DRVN's international orientation away from China and towards 
21the USSR. Rather Voroshilov's visit brought in its wake 
an improvement in relations between the USSR and the DRVN
18
Voice of Vietnam in Vietnamese to South Vietnam, 0500 
GMT, April 15, 1957; and ibid, in Vietnamese to Southeast 
Asia, 0430 GMT, April 30, 1957.
19 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia 
1500 GMT, May 12, 1957. Voroshilov's visit was a state not 
party visit.
2 0 Ton Due Thang writing in Nhan Dan (May 12, 1957) quoted in 
Honey, Communism in North Vietnam, op.cit., p.50, footnote 4.
21 . .Ibid., pp.48-50. Honey and others treat Viet-Nam's
relations with China and the Soviet Union as if they were a
zero-sum game, an assumption which is implicitly challenged
in the following analysis.
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but not necessarily at the expense of China.
In early 1957 the DRVN shared diplomatic relations
22mainly with members of the socialist camp. The RVN, on
the other hand, was making rapid strides in gaining
23international acceptance. In 1956 Diem had drawn-up a
constitution and elected a National Assembly while at the
24same time achieving domestic stability. Because Diem 
successfully refused to be bound by the terms of the 1954 
Geneva Agreements, he had staked out a position from which
he could argue that the Republic of Viet-Nam was a sovereign
25state, independent from North Viet-Nam. This was
The DRVN had diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial 
level with only 12 countries: China, the Soviet Union, North
Korea, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Rumania, Poland, 
Bulgaria, Albania, Mongolia, and Yugoslavia. In addition 
"relations" were maintained with India, Canada, Indonesia,
Great Britain (whose Consulate was accredited to the port of 
Hai Phong), Burma and France. Between 1958 and 1960 the 
DRVN established diplomatic relations with Morocco, Algeria 
(provisional government), Mali, and Guinea; see: The
Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (Hanoi: Foreign Languages
Publishing House, 1975), pp.184-185; and Fifield, The Diplomacy 
of Southeast Asia, op.cit., p.343.
The RVN had diplomatic relations (at various levels) with 
the following countries: the United States, France, Great
Britain, West Germany, Italy, Spain, Netherlands, Belgium, 
Denmark, Greece, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the Vatican, 
Australia, New Zealand, Laos, Cambodia, Indonesia, Singapore, 
Republic of China, Thailand, Japan, Philippines, South Korea, 
Malaya, India, Tunisia, Morocco, Turkey, Lebanon, Brazil and 
Argentina. See: George L. Harris, et al., U.S. Army Area
Handbook for Vietnam, Department of the Army Pamphlet No.550-40 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, September
1962), pp.296-304; and Fifield, The Diplomacy of Southeast 
Asia, op.cit., p.328.
24 For a general overview of these developments see: J.A.C.
Grant, "The Vietnam Constitution of 1956", The American 
Political Science Review (June 1958), Vol.LII, No.2, pp.437-463. 
According to Moscow Radio, in Indonesian to Southeast Asia,
1330 GMT, May 18, 1957, "in March last year an election was 
held in South Vietnam. This divided Vietnam. As you know, 
following this election a South Vietnamese National Congress 
[sic] was established, which more permanently divided Vietnam".
25 This was the view that India adopted; see: SarDesai,
Indian Foreign Policy, op.cit., p.106.
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dramatically indicated on January 23, 1957 when the United 
States led thirteen other members of the United Nations in 
sponsoring a resolution calling on the Security Council to 
recommend the Republics of Viet-Nam and Korea for U.N. 
membership.^
The Soviet Union, apparently without prior consultation
with the DRVN, countered on the following day with a
package proposal calling for the admission of North and
South Korea as well as North and South Viet-Nam. While the
Soviet proposal may have been a deliberate tactical ploy
designed to embarrass the U.S., it also implied the
2 7existence of two sovereign Vietnamese states. From Hanoi's 
point of view this was totally unacceptable. If the Soviet 
proposal had been agreed to, for example, all hopes for 
re-unifying Viet-Nam under the terms of the 1954 Geneva 
Agreements would have vanished. It is not surprising 
therefore, that on January 25th Pham Van Dong addressed a
2 8letter of protest to members of the U.N. Security Council.
Ibid., p.110. In 1956 the U.N. Security Council recommended 
for membership in the General Assembly some 20 countries 
including South Viet-Nam. A Soviet veto barred South 
Viet-Nam. On January 23, 1957 the question of South Viet-Nam's 
membership was raised once again as a result of a 13- 
member resolution in the Special Political Committee of 
the General Assembly. The question was debated on Cold 
War lines. The USSR objected to the resolution because it 
suggested that the Republic of Viet-Nam represented the 
whole of Viet-Nam.
27 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia,
0500 GMT, July 12, 1956 carries an interview with Ho Chi 
Minh and the United Press news editor in Tokyo, Leroy Hansen. 
Asked if he would accept simultaneous membership in the U.N. 
for the DRVN and the RVN, Ho replied, "Vietnam is a whole 
from the North to the South. It must be reunified. It 
cannot be cut in two separate nations any more than the 
United States can be cut into two separate nations".
2 8 Pham Van Dong's letter was printed in Nhan Dan (January 
27, 1957), No.1058, pp. 1 and 4.
Undoubtedly Dong was in an awkward position as he was
unable to criticise the USSR directly.
Five days later the General Assembly's Special
Political Committee endorsed the U.S.-backed resolution
while at the same time declining to consider the Soviet
package deal. On February 28th the U.N. General Assembly
carried the matter further when it voted 40 to 8 (18
abstentions) to recommend to the Security Council that
the Republic of Viet-Nam be admitted into membership.
Once again Dong protested. This time he addressed a letter
to the Soviet Union and Great Britain in their roles as
2 9co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference. This issue was 
still under consideration at the time of Voroshilov's 
visit to Viet-Nam.
Fifteen days prior to Voroshilov's arrival in Hanoi,
Ngo Dinh Diem embarked on a triumphal state visit to the 
30United States. The RVN President was accorded unusual 
honours for a visiting head of state. President Eisenhower 
despatched his personal plane, the "Columbine III" to fly 
Diem and his party from Hawaii to Washington. Also, 
Eisenhower personally met Diem on arrival in the American
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29 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 
1130 GMT, Match 1, 1957; Pham Van Dong also wrote a letter 
of protest to the French Foreign Minister, see: Vietnam
News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 1123 GMT, 
February 28, 1957. The Vietnamese were also critical of 
Britain's Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd when he stated 
that Britain's policy continued to be based on the 1954 
Geneva Agreements including the Final Declaration "insofar 
as they remain applicable to existing conditions". Vietnam 
News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 0537 GMT, 
April 27, 1957.
30 Diem was on an official visit for only three days, May 
8-10; he spent an additional 16 days touring the United 
States. AP dispatches from Saigon and Honolulu in The New 
York Times (May 6, 1957), p.16.
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capital, the second time in four years that Eisenhower
31had greeted a visiting dignitary in this fashion. While 
in Washington, Diem met with the highest U.S. officials and 
was accorded the honour of addressing a joint sitting of 
the U.S. Congress. Table 9-1 sets out the highlights of 
Diem's tour.
From the numerous press reports and public statements
made by Diem and U.S. officials, it was obvious that this
State visit was arranged to demonstrate the depth of
American commitment to the RVN and to President Diem in
particular. As one press account noted, U.S. economic aid
during the current fiscal year amounted to $250,000,000 -
a sum only exceeded by U.S. contributions (exclusive of
32military assistance) to South Korea. Both Diem and
American officials were reportedly eager to increase this
4- 3 3amount.
In their final communique both Presidents avoided
reference to the 1954 Geneva Conference and instead stressed
the U.N. Charter and the SEATO Treaty as instruments
guaranteeing the future of South Viet-Nam. According to the
final communique, for example, Eisenhower and Diem
looked forward to an end of the unhappy division of 
the Vietnamese people and confirmed the determination 
of the two governments to work together to seek
Dispatch by Russell Baker from Washington in The New 
York Times (May 9, 1957), pp.l and 16.
32 Ibid.
Ibid.; Dispatch by Russell Baker from Washington in 
ibid. (May 10, 1957), pp.l and 12; and AP dispatch from Los 
Angeles in ibid. (May 20, 1957), p.2. Refer to Table 7-5, 
the amount of U.S. aid did not increase during 1958-1960.
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TABLE 9-1
NGO DINH DIEM'S TOUR OF THE UNITED STATES 
(5-19 MAY 1957)
Date Event
5 May Diem and party of ten arrive in Honolulu;
7 May Diem in San Francisco, meets with officials of 
Asia Foundation;
8 May Diem in Washington, met on arrival by 
President Eisenhower, attends State Department 
banquet;
9 May Diem addresses joint meeting of U.S. Congress, 
lunches with Vice President R.M. Nixon, holds 
talks with Eisenhower and Secretary of State 
J.F. Dulles, visits Supreme Court, J.F. Dulles 
hosts State dinner;
10 May Diem addresses National Press Club, confers 
with Pentagon officials, talks with Dulles, 
Diem hosts banquet at R.V.N. Embassy which 
is attended by President Eisenhower;
12 May Diem begins 3-day visit to New York City, 
lunches with J.D. Rockefeller, 3rd., 
awarded honorary degree at Seton Hall 
University by Archbishop of Newark;
13 May Ticker-tape parade through New York City, 
press conference, luncheon with Mayor Wagner 
of New York, reception held by Council on 
Foreign Relations, dinner hosted by American 
Friends of Viet-Nam and International Rescue 
Committee;
14 May Attends Mass with Cardinal Spellman, attends 
luncheon hosted by Far Eastern Council of 
Commerce and Industry;
15-16 Ma y Diem visits Detroit, addresses industrial 
leaders, receives honorary degree from Michigan 
State University;
17-18 May Diem visits Los Angeles, addresses Council 
on World Affairs;
19 May Diem flies to Honolulu, departs from U.S.
SOURCE: The New York Times (5-20 May 1957).
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suitable means to bring about the peaceful 
reunification of Viet-Nam in freedom in 
accordance with the purposes and principles of 
the United Nations Charter (emphasis added) . -^4
After referring to an alleged build-up of military forces
in North Viet-Nam and an increase of "Communist subversive
capabilities in this area [i.e. Southeast Asia]" the
communique alluded to article four of the SEATO Treaty to
affirm
that aggression or subversion threatening the 
political independence of the Republic of Viet-Nam 
would be considered as endangering peace and 
stability. The just settlement of problems of 
the area by peaceful and legitimate means within 
the framework of the United Nations Charter will 
continue to be the mutual concern of both 
governments (emphasis added). 5^
Remarkably the coincidence of Voroshilov's State 
visit to Hanoi and Diem's visit to Washington has been 
overlooked by the few sources covering this period. In
'Text of Eisenhower-Diem Statement", The New York Times 
(May 12, 1957), p.25.
3 5 Ibid.; Article 4 paragraph one states: "Each Party
recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the 
treaty area against any of the Parties or against any 
State or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement 
may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and 
safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet 
the common danger in accordance with its constititional 
processes. Measures taken under this paragraph shall be 
immediately reported to the Security Council of the 
United Nations". Point two declares: "If, in the
opinion of any of the Parties, the inviolability or the 
integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political 
independence of any Party in the treaty area or of any 
other State or territory to which the provisions of 
paragraph one of this Article from time to time apply is 
threatened in any way other than by armed attack or is 
affected or threatened by any fact or situation which might 
endanger the peace of the area, the Parties shall consult 
immediately in order to agree on the measures which should 
be taken for the common defense". The DRVN's reaction 
to the Eisenhower-Diem communique may be found in Vietnam 
News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 0505 GMT, 
May 15, 1957.
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other words, one explanation for Voroshilov’s sojourn
to Hanoi may well have been to counterbalance the effects
of Diem's tour of the United States by shoring up the
3 6DRVN's international prestige.
Voroshilov was accompanied on his tour by three
Soviet officials: S.R. Rashikov, Vice President of the
presidium of the USSR's Supreme Soviet and President of the
Uzbek Republic's Supreme Soviet; V.P. Yelyutin, Minister for
Higher Education; and N.T. Fedorenko, the Russian Deputy
Foreign Minister. Rashikov had accompanied Mikoyan on his
visit to Hanoi in April 1956. The delegation's schedule
(see Table 9-2) and the public speeches made by the two
Presidents indicated that there were at least three main
reasons for the visit: (1) to discuss increased Soviet
aid; (2) to discuss the prospects for Viet-Nam's
reunification and (3) to discuss problems of bloc unity.
Throughout Voroshilov's visit Ho Chi Minh continually
expressed Vietnamese gratitude for Soviet economic and 
37cultural aid. No doubt Ho and other DRVN leaders
impressed upon their Soviet guests the need for trained
38Vietnamese specialists. If so this possibly accounts for 
the inclusion of the Russian Minister for Higher Education
Cf. comments by Izvestia as quoted by a special dispatch 
from Moscow in The New York Times (May 26, 1957), p.20.
37 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 
1100 GMT, May 20, 1957 contains the text of Ho's welcoming 
speech. For agreements signed earlier in the year refer to 
Table 9-5.
3 8 In May of 1955 there were only 23 engineers in all of 
North Viet-Nam; Fall, "A 'Straight Zigzag': The Road to
Socialism in North Viet-Nam", op.cit., p.211.
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TABLE 9-2
DETAILS OF PRESIDENT VOROSHILOV'S VISIT TO THE DRVN
(20 - 24 MAY 1957)
Date - Time Event
2 0 May 9:45 am Voroshilov and party of three arrive in 
Hanoi, met at airport by Ho Chi Minh, 
exchange welcoming speeches;
4:00 pm Voroshilov calls on Ho Chi Minh at 
President's House;
8:00 pm Ho Chi Minh hosts banquet for Voroshilov, 
both presidents give public speech;
21 May 6:30 am Voroshilov and Ho Chi Minh address mass 
rally of 100,000 in Hanoi,
8:00 am Soviet-Vietnamese Friendship meeting, 
Voroshilov receives delegation 
representing the Vietnamese people, 
gives public speech,
6:30 pm 
pm
Ho Chi Minh calls on Voroshilov 
Vice Premier Phan Ke Toai hosts 
reception for Voroshilov, Premier Pham 
Van Dong reported ill;
22 May am Voroshilov visits engineering works 
under construction in Hanoi,
pm Voroshilov takes sightseeing tour of 
Vietnamese capital, visits Jade mountain 
and Lake of Restored Sword,
pm Rashikov, U.S.S.R. Vice President, and 
Yelyutin, U.S.S.R. Minister of Higher 
Education, visit the port of Hai-Phong;
2 3 May am Voroshilov and Ho Chi Minh address 
gathering at Hanoi Central University, 
Voroshilov hosts meeting with Russian 
specialists serving in Viet-Nam,
pm Voroshilov hosts reception for Ho Chi 
Minh at Soviet Embassy in Hanoi;
2 4 May Voroshilov and delegation seen off at 
airport by Ho Chi Minh.
SOURCES: TASS (20-23 May 1957), The Times of Vietnam
(1 June 1957), The New York Times (21 May 
1957) and Vietnam News Agency (20-24 May 
1957).
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and the visit to Hanoi Central University by the two 
Presidents. Although no public statements were made at 
this time it is also possible that Ho Chi Minh appraised 
Voroshilov of Viet-Nam's developmental prospects, including 
a forthcoming three-year plan which would lay the 
foundation for building socialism in the DRVN.
According to Donald Zagoria,
As prospects of early reunification faded, Hanoi 
had to come to grips with its acute economic 
problems. No longer able to count on incorporating 
the rice-rich South into its economy, it began 
to look for alternative sources of foodstuffs 
for the North and to lay the groundwork for a 
self-sustaining economy. It now came to believe 
that its best hope for eventual reunification 
lay in building up its own strength....
In this situation, it was both necessary and 
logical for the DRV to turn to the Soviet Union.
DRV requests were met with surprising alacrity 
by Moscow, despite the fact that the Soviet Union 
was already cutting down on its aid to China.
Thus, then Soviet chief of state Klement 
Voroshilov went to Hanoi in May, 1957, and 
generously proffered offers of Soviet assistance 
to the Northern economy....A month later Ho Chi 
Minh toured Eastern Europe for the purpose of 
soliciting aid. Within a year the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe had replaced China as the principle 
source of economic aid to the DRV.40
It was not until later in the year however that
significant amounts of Soviet began to reach Viet-Nam.^ In
39 Voroshilov also held a meeting with Soviet specialists 
serving in the DRVN. Paradoxically Dan tiguyen [Saigon]
(April 30, 1957) reported the closure of the USSR's Consulate 
in Hai-Phong at this time. According to this report the 
decline in the number of Russian ships arriving was the 
reason. Dan Nguyen also claimed that Czech technicians 
were replacing Soviet technicians who were in the process 
of leaving. Quoted in "Soviets Close Consulate in Haiphong",
The Times of Viet Nam Weekly (May 4, 1957), Vol.2, No.17, p.5.
40 Zagoria, Vietnam Triangle, op.cit., p.102. See also: Fifield,
The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia, op.cit., pp.337-338; Honey, 
Communism in North Vietnam, op.cit., pp.50-56; and Turner, 
Vietnamese Communism  ^ op.cit. , p.292.
41 Turley, "Army, Party and Society in the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam", op.cit., p.125, footnote 83.
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brief, during 1957 the Soviet Union approved of Viet-Nam's
three-year plan of socialist construction and decided to
support it with much needed assistance funds.
The issue of Viet-Nam's unification was a continual
theme in public remarks by Voroshilov and Ho Chi Minh.
Although no public reference was made to Soviet diplomatic
moves at the United Nations it would be remarkable if the
issue was not touched upon in private. The speed of
reunification was no longer as pressing a matter between the
two parties as in the past, mainly because the Vietnamese
had reconciled themselves to a prolonged resolution of this 
42matter. It appears clear from Voroshilov's remarks that 
the USSR was anxious to keep developments in Viet-Nam 
peaceful. For example at a reception in his honour on May 
20th he stated:
The Soviet people, like the fraternal people of 
China and all the peoples of the socialist 
countries, from the bottom of their hearts wish 
to see the successful realization of the 
legitimate aspirations of your people [i.e. peaceful 
reunification].
Acting on instructions of their foreign masters, 
the South Vietnamese authorities are inimical to 
the Geneva Agreements. But it is to be hoped 
that the popular masses in South Viet-Nam, 
all the progressive forces, including sober 
minded politicians, who are not blinded by 
hatred for Communism, will unite on the basis 
of the nationwide urge for a peaceful and 
democratic reunification of Vietnam.
The Soviet Union has insisted and continued to 
insist on the unconditional implementation of
On the occasion of May Day 1957 Ho Chi Minh reiterated 
once again, "[o]ur people's struggle for the reestablishment 
of normal relations between the North and the South, for 
the implementation of the Geneva Agreements, and the 
reunification of the country is a revolutionary, long and 
hard struggle". Vietnam News Agency in Vietnamese morse 
to Vietnam, 0937 GMT, April 30, 1957.
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4 3the Geneva Agreements.
In an address before representatives of the Vietnamese
people on May 21st and perhaps as a result of talks with
Ho Chi Minh and the VWP officials, Voroshilov appeared to
acknowledge the potential dangers if the issue of
reunification were not resolved. Nevertheless he failed
to modify his Government's past position. In his words:
This policy ["pursued by the reactionary circles of 
South Vietnam...of undermining the Geneva Agreements 
and implementing the aggressive design of U.S. 
imperialist quarters"] runs fundamentally counter 
to the interests of the popular masses of South 
Vietnam. There is no doubt that the policy of 
trampling underfoot the Geneva Agreements and 
obeying foreign orders now pursued by the South 
Vietnamese authorities is a threat to peace not 
only in Vietnam but throughout Southeast Asia.
We note with a feeling of profound satisfaction 
that the DRV Government, expressing the will of 
all the Vietnamese people, is unflinchingly 
conducting a policy of strict adherence to the 
Geneva Agreements, a policy directed toward the 
peaceful reunification of the country in a 
democratic way....
Although you are still faced with not a few 
difficulties, it is beyond doubt that the 
Vietnamese people will succeed in making their 
beautiful motherland into a highly developed and 
rich country. We understand your difficulties, 
because the Soviet Union has itself overcome 
tremendous difficulties in the struggle for 
freedom and the construction of socialism (emphasis added).44
The Soviet Union's views on Viet-Nam were part of a 
larger global policy which stressed peaceful coexistence 
with the West. According to Voroshilov:
TASS (Moscow) in English hellschreiber to Europe, 2045 
GMT, May 20, 1957; this passage was singled out by the 
Vietnam News Agency for special emphasis, Vietnam News 
Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 0500 GMT, May 21, 
1957. Voroshilov, it should be noted, spoke of "Soviet 
people" not "Soviet government".
4 4 TASS (Moscow) in Russian hellschreiber to Europe, 1220 
GMT, May 21, 1957.
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The foreign policy of our country aims at easing 
world tensions and preventing a new war. We are 
together struggling for collective security and 
peaceful coexistence among all nations... The 
people of our two countries are struggling 
to urge reduction of armament and armed forces, 
and a strict ban on hydrogen and atomic weapons 
and on the testing of these weapons.^
We we have noted previously in our discussions of the 
CPSU's 20th Congress, Khrushchev had formulated the so-called 
peaceful or parliamentary path to socialism in 1956.
Other events at this time no doubt encouraged the Soviets 
in this view. Prior to arriving in Viet-Nam, for example, 
Voroshilov visited Indonesia where the Communist Party
4 6(PKI) had made a strong electoral showing in late 1956.
Although excluded from the government PKI officials were
appointed to the 45-member advisory National Council
on March 6th, 1957 following the resignation of the Ali
Sastroamidjojo cabinet. In May Voroshilov and Sukarno
both toured Java and although the Russian President
refrained from endorsing the PKI publicly, his presence had
a favourable effect on PKI support in the ensuing local
47elections held betwen June-August.
In April 1957 the Soviet parliamentary path to 
socialism seem vindicated by the electoral victory of the
Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia,
1144 GMT, May 20, 1957.
4 6 Herbert Feith, "Indonesia", in Kahin, editor, Governments 
and Politics of Southeast Asia, op.cit., pp.205-209.
4 7 Leslie Palmer, Communists in Indonesia: Power Pursued in
Vain (Garden City, New York: Anchor Press-Doubleday, 1973),
pp.180-181; Fifield, The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia, op.cit., 
p.146; and Hinton, Communist China in World Politics, op.cit., 
pp.81-82. In September 1956 Sukarno visited the USSR and 
the Soviet Union awarded Indonesia US$100 million in aid.
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Communist Party in the Indian State of Kerala. Meanwhile
in Laos progress was being made in the negotiations between
the Royal Lao Government and the Pathet Lao. The general
agreements of August 1956 (which called for the inclusion
of Pathet Lao representatives in a National Union
Government) were followed by joint discussions of the
4 8details in January of the following year.
Apparently Voroshilov was quite emphatic in 
recommending a policy of peaceful coexistence to the 
Chinese during his visit in April 1957. According to Harold 
Hinton:
When Soviet Chairman Voroshilov visited the CPR 
[Chinese People's Republic] in April, 1957, CPR 
leaders made several references to the possibility 
of friendly relations with the Nationalists [on 
Taiwan], to one of which Voroshilov replied,
'Cooperate permanently'.49
The problem from the Vietnamese point of view was not 
entirely one of accepting this Russian assessment as their 
own, but rather one of insuring that the 1954 Geneva 
Agreements were not forgotten altogether. The reason for this 
had been spelled out countless times by DRVN officials and
Martin E. Goldstein, American Policy Toward Laos 
(Teaneck, New Jersey: Fairleigh Dickinson University
Press, 1973), pp.110-112 and 114.
49 Hinton, Communist China in World Politics, op.cit., p.32; 
this was at a time when the Chinese Communists were offering 
the olive branch to Taiwan. Hinton writes, " [i]ndividual 
Nationalist personnel were offered amnesty, jobs on the 
mainland, the right to revisit their original homes, and 
even the right to return to Taiwan". He also points out 
that "[t]he original version of Mao Tse-Tung's speech on 
'Contradictions' of February 27, 1957 (but not the edited 
version published on June 18, 1957), is believed to have 
said that relations with the Nationalists might be brought 
within the 'nonantagonistic' category". The Chinese swing 
to the left in foreign policy was still in a period of 
gestation.
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was once again reiterated prior to Voroshilov's visit.
On the occasion of May Day 1957 for example, Premier Pham 
Van Dong stated:
The Geneva Agreements are being seriously 
undermined. The U.S. imperialists and their 
henchmen have been striving to turn South 
Vietnam into a U.S. colony and military base.
The entire Vietnamese people, Northern and Southern 
alike, must heighten their vigilance, broadly 
and closely unite within the Vietnam Fatherland 
Front so as to continue to carry out the 
Geneva Agreements and steadily maintain the legal 
basis of the revolutionary struggle for national 
reunification (emphasis added).
The Vietnamese were evidently successful in
obtaining Soviet agreement to publicly endorse the "strict
implementation" of the 1954 Geneva Agreements as the
above-cited remarks by Voroshilov attest. Even further,
the Soviets continued to exercise their Security Council
veto to block U.N. membership for the RVN while at the same
51time dropping their four-nation package deal. No doubt
Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia,
0533 GMT, May 1, 1957. This viewpoint was restated by 
Pham Van Dong on the eve of Voroshilov's arrival; see 
Dong's interview with J.M. Hermann, president of the 
International Organization of Journalists in Nhan Dan (May 
16, 1957) as carried by Vietnam News Agency in English 
morse to Southeast Asia, 0532 GMT, May 16, 1957.
51 "In early May, Diem paid a state visit to the U.S., where 
he received assurances of continued strong U.S. support. 
Whatever its reasons, the Soviet [sic] thereupon took a 
position against the admission to the UN of South Vietnam..." 
from "Hanoi and the Insurgency in South Vietnam", in United 
States-Vietnam Relations, op.cit., Book 2, IV.A.5. Tab.3, 
p.50; In September 1957 To Quoc [Fatherland] was reported 
as hailing the "recent" Soviet veto of South Viet-Nam's 
application for UN membership, Vietnam News Agency in 
English morse to Southeast Asia, 0500 GMT, September 18, 1957; 
at the same time Pham Van Dong sent a letter of protest to 
the United Nations, Vietnam News Agency in English morse to 
Southeast Asia, 1100 GMT, September 7, 1957; on October 25, 
1957 the UN General Assembly voted 49-9 (with 23 abstentions) 
to affirm the RVN's eligibility for membership. The USSR 
once again cast its veto; see: AP dispatch in The Times of
Viet Nam (December 11, 1958), Vol.2, No.275, pp.l and 4.
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the Soviet delegation detected Hanoi's disappointment 
that the USSR was unwilling to pursue the question of 
Vietnamese reunification with vigour. On the other hand 
it seems unlikely that the Soviet Union would have been 
upset to learn of the VWP's new long-range strategy embodied 
in "Duong Loi Cach Mang Mien Nam". Over the course of the 
next year both the DRVN and USSR were in general agreement 
that reunification was not an immediate prospect and that 
the consolidation of the North deserved priority over armed 
liberation of the South.
The other area of discussion between Ho Chi Minh and
Voroshilov touched on issues relating to the socialist bloc
arising in part from the events in Hungary and Poland in 
5 21956. For obvious reasons the content of these discussions
remained undisclosed. Voroshilov's public reference to
China as a world power ("without whose participation not
a single major international problem, especially in the
5 3Far East and Asia can be solved today") indicates that the
two presidents may have discussed the PRC's new leadership
role within the socialist camp. Chou En-Lai, it will be
recalled, had undertaken a ten-day tour through Russia,
54Poland, and Hungary in January 1957. As a result of 
subsequent announcements it seems probable that Voroshilov
52 This was alluded to by Ton Due Thang who wrote in Nhan 
Dan that Voroshilov's visit would also contribute to the 
further strengthening of the socialist system; Vietnam 
News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 0512 GMT,
May 12, 1957.
5 3 TASS (Moscow) in Russian hellschreiber to Europe, 1220 
GMT, May 21, 1957.
54 Mehnert, Peking and Moscow, op.cit., pp.362-373; and 
Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, op.cit., pp.61-62.
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and Ho Chi Minh discussed the latter's projected tour of
Eastern Europe scheduled for July and Vietnamese
participation in Moscow's celebrations marking the 40th
5 5anniversary of the October Revolution.
In summary, Voroshilov's visit to the Democratic
Republic of Viet-Nam was significant because it marked a
continuation of a trend which witnessed increased Russian
awareness of Viet-Nam's importance both in its own right and
as a member of the socialist bloc. It was only in 1958,
after embarking on a three-year plan of socialist construction
and after receiving large amounts of Soviet and Eastern
European aid, that the DRVN was officially designated as
5 6"building socialism". In the wake of the Russian 
President's visit, the DRVN was to enlarge its international 
contacts. In July 1955 Ho Chi Minh visited Russia and 
China. The following year witnessed visits to Hanoi by 
Mikoyan (April 1956) and Chou En-Lai (November 1956).
In 1957 not only did K. Voroshilov, President of the 
presidium of the USSR's Supreme Soviet, visit Hanoi but 
a whole parade of East European delegations visited the 
Vietnamese capital. In return Ho Chi Minh made an extended 
tour of Eastern Europe as well as attending the highly 
important Moscow Conference in November 1957. These and 
other contacts enabled the VWP leadership to pursue their 
goal of "winning the sympathy and support of the world's
A thirty-six man committee was set up at this time to 
plan for the celebrations of the 40th anniversary of the 
Socialist October Revolution; Vietnam News Agency in English 
morse to Southeast Asia, 1127 GMT, June 6, 1957.
56 Cameron, "The Soviet Union and Vietnam", op.cit., p.199.
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people" outlined in "Duong Loi Cach Mang Mien Nam".
IV. WINNING SYMPATHY AND SUPPORT: THE DRVN'S FOREIGN
RELATIONS DURING 1957-58
A. INTRODUCTION
As we noted in chapter six the VWP leadership, faced 
with de facto division of their country devised a new three­
pronged strategy to replace their earlier policy of
reliance on the 1954 Geneva Agreements and the 1955 program
57of the Fatherland Front. The three prongs consisted of 
(1) maintaining and developing the revolutionary movement 
in the South (2) consolidating the North and (3) winning 
international support for the cause of Vietnamese unity.
The last two prongs were obviously interrelated, especially 
in the area of foreign affairs, as VWP officials insisted 
that membership in the socialist camp was fundamental to 
achieving their objectives.
In 1957 the DRVN initiated a wide-ranging series of 
international contacts, mainly with fellow-members of the 
socialist camp but also with friendly Asian States. There 
were three major aspects of this: (1) major delegations were
invited to Hanoi; (2) the DRVN President, Ho Chi Minh, made 
three important trips overseas and, (3) the DRVN widened
DRVN officials nevertheless continued to emphasize the 
importance of both documents in public announcements; see 
Ta Quang Buu, DRVN Vice Minister of National Defence,
on the legal aspects of the Geneva Agreements, Vietnam News 
Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 0525 GMT, July 
24, 1957. For a restatement of the importance of the 
Fatherland Front see the editorial in Nhan Dan entitled "Our 
People Will Triumph" carried by Voice of Vietnam in 
Vietnamese to South Vietnam, 0500 GMT, August 28, 1957.
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its state ties with a number of countries by negotiating 
a series of economic and cultural agreements.
B. MAJOR DELEGATIONS TO HANOI
Beginning in March 1957 Hanoi hosted the first of 
fifteen important overseas delegations which visited the 
Vietnamese capital between then and the end of 1958.
As Table 9-3 indicates DRVN officials received major 
delegations from the following members of the socialist
camp: Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Soviet Union,
\
Yugoslavia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania and North Korea.
Delegations from non-Communist Indonesia,Burma^ and
India^ were also received. Among the important non-govern-
61mental visitors were: a Burmese peace committee, a
6 2delegation from the French trade union movement and
6 3representatives of the provisional government of Algeria.
"Nhiet Liet Chao Mung Vi Su Gia' Cua Nhan Dan Nam-Duong 
Anh Hung", [Warm Welcome to the Messenger of the Heroic 
Indonesian People] Nhan Dan (August 5, 1957), No.1245, 
pp.l and 4. The Indonesian delegation (see Table 9-3) came 
at the invitation of Ton Due Thang, chairman of the DRVN's 
National Assembly; Vietnam News Agency in English morse to 
Southeast Asia, 0532 GMT, 0605 GMT, August 5, 1957; 0500 
GMT, August 6, 1956; and 0651 GMT, August 11, 1957.
5 9 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 
0555 GMT, August 15, 1957.
^  Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 
0620 GMT, 1238 GMT, September 12, 1957.
61 The Burmese Peace Committee stopped in Hanoi enroute 
home after attending a conference in Stockholm; Vietnam 
News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 1133 GMT, 
September 2, 1958.
6 2 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 
0541 GMT, December 25, 1957.
6 3 Vietnam News Agency, December 16, 1958.
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TABLE 9-3
MAJOR DELEGATIONS RECEIVED BY THE DRVN (1957-58)
Date Delegation
17-20 March '57 V. Siroky,
Premier of Czechoslovakia
3-6 April '57 J. Cyrankiewicz
Chairman of Polish Council of Ministers
20-24 May '57 K. Voroshilov
President of Supreme Soviet Presidium
5-11 August '57 D. Sartono
Speaker of the Indonesian Parliament
15 August '57 Thakin Tin Maung
deputy speaker of the Chambers of Nationalities, Burma
1-4 September '57 S . Vukmanovic-Tempo
Vice-President Yogoslav Federal Executive Council
12-14 September '57 Dr. S. Radhakrishnan 
Indian Vice President
6-9 October '57 A. Yugov
Chairman of Council of Ministers, Bulgaria
18-26 October '57 USSR Parliamentary delegation led by,
A.B. Aristov, Secretary of the CPSU Central 
Committee and member of the Legislative Commission
24 December '57 B . Frachon
Secretary of C.G.T.; a French trade union
7-24 January '58 French Communist Party delegation led by 
J. Vermeersch
23-27 March '58 C. Stoica
Chairman, Rumanian Council of Ministers
1 September '58 U. MyoMying
Secretary General of the Burmese Peace Committee
9-14 October '58 V. Chervenkov
Vice Chairman of Bulgarian Council of Ministers
22 October '58 Balluku, Albanian Minister of National Defense
28 November '58 - 
2 December '58
Kim Il-sung
President of the Democratic Peoples Republic of 
Korea
*(4-6 November '58) *(Syngman Rhee, President of the Republic of Korea 
visits South Viet-Nam)
13-15 December '58 Delegation of Provisional Government of the 
Republic of Algeria
An analysis of the composition of the various 
socialist delegations and the public announcements, 
including joint declarations and final communiques, 
indicates the following reasons for their visits: (1) an
improvement in state-to-state relations, (2) increased
aid, trade and cultural ties (3) and liaison between 
officials of their respective ruling parties. The 
Czechoslovak, Polish, Russian, Yugoslav, Bulgarian, Rumanian 
and North Korean delegations were led by either the chairman 
or vice-chairman of their respective governmental 
institutions (Council of Ministers, Federal Executive 
Council; see Table 9-3). Their trips to Hanoi were part of 
a mutual exchange of visits with Ho Chi Minh and without 
exception marked a first in state-to-state relations.
With the exception of the USSR Parliamentary group,
all other state delegations included the Minister of
Foreign Affairs or a senior representative from that 
64department. These officials held discussions with their 
Vietnamese counterparts on the world situation as well as 
specific items of mutual interest. In this way the DRVN 
traded endorsements with the Eastern European countries; 
these usually took the form of accepting the USSR's foreign 
policy themes on peaceful coexistence and disarmament as 
well as acknowledging the importance of the 1954 Geneva
579
Only Yugoslavia failed to include its minister; Foreign 
Affairs was represented by V. Velebit, the foreign affairs 
under-secretary. Viet-Nam News Agency in English morse 
to Southeast Asia, 0632 GMT, September 1, 1957.
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Agreements.^ No doubt the Czech and Polish officials 
discussed Ho Chi Minh's forthcoming visit to their 
countries. The Yugoslovs, now back in the Soviet Union's 
"good graces" probably arranged for accreditation of an 
ambassador.^  ^
The Czech, Polish and Bulgarian delegations, by their 
size and composition, were obviously concerned with trade 
and mutual assistance. All three delegations included their 
respective Minister for Foreign Trade. The Czech and Polish 
delegations, the largest to visit Viet-Nam also included 
a variety of senior ministers concerned with such areas 
as art and culture, finance, construction, public health, 
industry and economic planning (the details may be found 
in Table 9-4). As a result of joint negotiations between 
the visiting delegations and their Vietnamese counterparts 
three major agreements were reached. On March 20, 1957 
Czechoslovakia and the DRVN signed a five-year contract 
on cultural cooperation which provided for the exchange and 
publication of technical materials as well as for the 
exchange of cultural, educational, scientific and sporting
Ho Chi Minh's speech on National Day, after returning 
from his trip, included the following: "[a]s regards the
international situation, we have entirely agreed on the 
necessity to struggle for the defense of a lasting peace 
and for the settlement of all international problems through 
peaceful negotiations; on the necessity to struggle for the 
materialization of the principles of peaceful coexistence, 
disarmament, the setting up of systems of collective 
security in Europe and Asia, and the ban on the use of 
atomic and hydrogen bombs". Vietnam News Agency in English 
morse to Southeast Asia, 1100 GMT, September 2, 1957.
6 6 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 
0655 GMT, 0719 GMT, April 6, 1957; and Vietnam News Agency 
in English morse to Southeast Asia, 1135 GMT, January 
11, 1958.
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groups. Poland agreed to step up its economic
6 8assistance to the DRVN, while Bulgaria and North
Viet-Nam negotiated an agreement on the exchange of goods
and payments for 1958. Under the terms of this
agreement Bulgaria would supply chemicals, textiles,
electrical equipment, pharmaceutical products and consumer
goods to Viet-Nam in exchange for mining, farm and handi-
69craft products.
A third significant aspect was the inclusion of the
secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party
in the delegations from Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria,Russia
and North Korea. On the occasion of the visit by the
Russian Parliamentary delegation it was reported that
70members of this group called on the VWP Politburo. It is
therefore probable that senior Party officials of the
visiting delegation took the opportunity to hold discussions
71with their VWP counterparts. It also seems likely that 
VWP participation in the national Party congresses of the 
Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria were touched upon
6 7 The agreement provided for the exchange and publication 
of scientific and research documents, for the exchange of 
scientific, cultural, educational, and sports and physical 
cultural delegations, for the exchange of students, and for 
cooperation between the press, broadcasting and cinematographic 
institutions; Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast 
Asia, 0540 GMT, March 20, 1957.
6 8 Associated Press dispatch from Hong Kong quoting Radio 
Hanoi in The New York Times (March 31, 1957), p.34.
69 Vietnam News Agency, October 9, 1957.
7 0 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia,
1100 GMT, October 19, 1957.
71 In March 1958 members of a Rumanian delegation called 
upon their VWP counterparts; Vietnam News Agency in English 
morse to Southeast Asia, 0509 GMT, March 24, 1958.
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7 2at this time. The visit to Hanoi by a DPRK delegation
led by Kim Il-Sung may have had a secondary purpose of
balancing the visit to Saigon by South Korean President
7 3Syngman Rhee three weeks earlier. In January 1958 the
VWP hosted its first official visit by a fraternal Party
when a three-member French Communist Party group toured the 
74DRVN. No doubt the de facto division of Viet-Nam coupled
with an approved three-year program of socialist
construction (see below) and Ho Chi Minh's long association
with international communism combined to boost the VWP's
role in the socialist camp. This new involvement was to
75occur simultaneously with the growing Sino-Soviet rift.
7 2 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 
0500 GMT, June 15, 1958.
7 3 Dispatch from Seoul in The New York Times (November 5, 
1958), p.7; Associated Press dispatch from Saigon in ibid. 
(November 7, 1958), p.3; Vietnam News Agency, November 28, 
1958 and KCNA dispatch, December 2, 1958 in BBC, Summary 
of World Broadcasts, Part 5 (December 9, 1958), No.826, 
pp.36-39.
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Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 
0500 GMT, 0531 GMT and 0552 GMT, January 8, 1958; 1127 GMT 
and 1245 GMT, January 9, 1958; and 0500 GMT, January 24,
1958 .
7 5 There was a fourth aspect to the DRVN's externalization 
efforts: the use of a variety of semi-official organizations
to conduct relations. In 1957-58 this feature was in its 
embryonic stage; in later years the use of semi-official 
organizations was to assume greater importance. At this 
time the following delegations travelled overseas: in
December 1957 a delegation of the Vietnamese Committee for 
Asian Solidarity attended the Afro-Asian Solidarity 
Conference in Cairo; a delegation representing the Vietnam 
Peace Committee attended the Stockholm Congress for 
Disarmament and International Cooperation in July 1958 and 
a three-member group from the Vietnam-Soviet Friendship 
Association toured the USSR in July-August, 1958. See: 
Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 1115 
GMT, December 11, 1957; 1120 GMT, June 30, 1958; and 
1204 GMT, July 28, 1958.
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C. HO CHI MINK'S TOURS OVERSEAS
During 1957-58 President Ho Chi Minh undertook
three major tours overseas: (1) to Korea, China, Russia
and Eastern Europe (July-August 1957), (2) to Moscow for
the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution (discussed
separately) and (3) to India and Burma (February 1958).
Ho's trip in July-August 1957 was an unprecedented 55-day
sojourn through eleven nations comprising the socialist
camp: China, Korea, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia,
Poland, East Germany, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Albania,
Bulgaria and Rumania (see Table 9-5).
Ho Chi Minh's delegation included Hoang Minh Giam, the
Minister of Culture; Hoang Van Hoan, a member of the VWP
Politburo and Pham Ngoc Thach, the Vice-Minister of Public 
7 6Health. This composition suggests, especially in light
of the forthcoming Moscow anniversary celebrations, that
the DRVN delegation's primary purposes were fourfold:
(1) to enhance the prestige and international standing of
the DRVN and to forge closer state-to-state ties with the
77other members of the socialist camp; (2) to negotiate
and coordinate various types of cultural, scientific and
7 8economic assistance to Viet-Nam (3) to obtain endorsement
Voice of Vietnam in Vietnamese to Southeast Asia, 2245 
GMT, June 30, 1957 and Vietnam News Agency in English morse 
to Southeast Asia, 0500 GMT, July 3, 1957.
77 Ho Chi Minh extended invitations to a number of Heads of 
State and senior government officials to visit Viet-Nam 
(Kim Il-sung, Zawakdski, Dieckman, Tito and Yugov); Nhan Dan 
(August 24, 1957) in BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts, Part 
5, (August 29, 1957), No.694, p.51.
7 ft "IIo's Travels", The Economist (July 27 , 1957), Vol.184, 
p.300; Fifield, The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia, op.cit., 
p.338; Zagoria, Vietnam Triangle, op.cit., p.102; Turner, 
Vietnamese Communism, op.cit., pp.292-293; and Honey, 
Communism in North~~Vietnam, op.cit., pp.50-51.
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for the reunification of Viet-Nam under the terms of the
791954 Geneva Agreements and (4) to discuss relations among
8 0socialist countries, especially in light of events 
during 1956. This latter possibility is suggested by the 
presence of Hoang Van Hoan, a specialist in international 
relations. Hoan was the DRVN's first diplomatic represen­
tative to the PRC. He served in Peking first as a minister 
(1950-52) and then as ambassador (1952-57). Hoan also 
served concurrently as the DRVN's ambassador to Mongolia 
and North Korea, posts to which he was appointed in 1955 and 
1958 respectively. Hoan was also a member of the DRVN 
delegation to the 1954 Geneva Conference. During 1954-57 he 
represented the VWP at congresses of the Mongolian, North 
Korean and Chinese communist parties.^"*-
Hoang Minh Giam and Pham Ngoc Thach also shared an 
expertise in foreign affairs. Both attended the Bandung
Conference in April 1955. Giam, a close intimate of Ho Chi 
8 2Minh, served as the DRVN's foreign affairs minister from
7 9 Associated Press dispatch from Berlin in The New York 
Times (July 29, 1957), p.4; and Vietnam News Agency in English 
morse to Southeast Asia, 1150 GMT, August 15, 1957.
8 0 Obviously this issue was important given the Hungarian 
Uprising of 1956. Equally important was Yugoslavia's path 
of national independence. Press accounts of Ho's visit 
raised the possibility that he might mediate between Albania 
and Yugoslavia; Dispatch by Harrison E. Salisbury from 
Belgrade in The New York Times (August 6, 1957), pp.l and 
2; and United Press dispatch from Belgrade in ibid. (August 
10, 1957), p.6.
81 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Who's Who in North 
Vietnam, op.cit., p.123.
8 2 Both of them were born in Nghe An province. Giam served 
as an intermediary for Ho in his discussions with the 
French in September, 1945. He was also a member of the 
DRVN delegation to the Fontainbleau Conference in July 
1946; ibid., pp.99-100.
585
1947 to August 1954. Prior to embarking on this trip he
led a DRVN delegation to Cambodia to attend the celebrations
8 3marking Buddha’s 2,500th birthday. Thach gained experience 
in international relations when he accompanied Ho to Peking 
and Moscow in mid-1955.
It is beyond the scope of this section to examine in
detail the relations between Viet-Nam and each country on
Ho Chi Minh's itinerary.^ Our purpose here is to record
the dramatic way in which VWP leaders set about ending
Viet-Nam's relative isolation from her major allies. As
we have already noted this diplomatic offensive was linked
to a three-pronged policy designed to achieve the eventual
8 5reunification of Viet-Nam. As a result of Ho Chi Minh's
Ibid., p.100; Giam also endorsed a call for the convening 
of a second Bandung-type conference. Vietnam News Agency 
in English morse to Southeast Asia, 0530 GMT, April 19,
1957 .
8 4 In fact it would be extremely difficult to do so given the 
gaps in the radio monitoring reports. This would, however, 
be an interesting area for future research for someone 
with the capability to exploit Eastern European sources.
See the following: President Ho Chi Minh's Friendly Visit
to the People's Democratic Republic of Korea (Hanoi:
Foreign Languages Publishing House [FLPH], 1958); President 
Ho Chi Minh's Friendly Visit to the Republic of 
Czechoslovakia (Hanoi: FLPH, 1958); President Ho Chi Minh's
Friendly Visit to the People's Republic of Poland (Hanoi:
F L P H 1058) ; President Ho Chi Minh's Friendly Visit to the 
German Democratic Republic (Hanoi: FLPH, 1958); President Ho
Chi Minh's Friendly Visit to the Hungarian People's 
Republic (Hanoi: FLPH, 19 5 8); President Ho Chi Minh's
Friendly Visit to the People's Republic of Albania (Hanoi:
FLPH, 1958); and President Ho Chi Minh's Friendly Visit to 
the People's RepubTic of Rumania (Hanoi: FLPH, 1958) . Each
of these pamphlets contains the text of speeches exchanged, 
a description of Ho's tour and a copy of the joint 
communique; they were located in the Southeast Asia Reading 
Room Pamphlet File, Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University.
8 5 "I wish also to let you know that during our recent visit, 
we have paid attention to the struggle for national re­
unification of the Korean and German peoples. What we should 
learn from them is that these two brotherly peoples are now
cont'd
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tour at least four major socialist governments sent high- 
level delegations to Hanoi: the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia,
Bulgaria and Rumania. (see Table 9-4). In addition, the 
DRVN matched and perhaps exceeded the RVN in cementing 
overseas contacts (Diem visited the U.S., Thailand, 
Australia, South Korea, India and the Philippines during 
the same time span; see Table 9-5). In 1959, a delegation 
representing the DRVN National Assembly toured five Eastern 
European countries (Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary,
o c.Bulgaria and Poland.
Although Viet-Nam had little success in attracting
recognition from outside the Communist bloc, Ho Chi Minh
nevertheless achieved success with the Asian neutralist
states. During the period February 4-17, 1958 the DRVN
President led a four-member delegation on a state tour
8 7to India and Burma. Ho' s visit to India complemented New 
Delhi’s earlier recognition of Ngo Dinh Diem in November
85 cont'd
engaged in actively building the North of Korea and East 
Germany respectively, that they have obtained numerous 
successes, and that each of these successes in the peaceful 
building of their fatherland has an obvious influence on 
the whole country and on the struggle for national unity".
Full text of speech by Ho Chi Minh on 12th Anniversary of 
Founding of D.R.V.N. delivered at meeting in Ba Dinh Square, 
2 September", Vietnam News Agency in English morse to 
Southeast Asia, 1100 GMT, September 2, 1957 in U.S. FBIS 
Daily Report (September 3, 1957), No.170, pp.EEE1-EEE8.
86 T 7 .Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 
0533 GMT, May 14, 1958; and 0555 GMT, August 3, 1958.
8 7 The delegation included: Ho Chi Min; Phan Ke Taoi,
deputy prime minister; Pham Hung, minister attached to the 
premier's office; Phan Anh, minister of commerce; and Hoang 
Minh Giam, minister of culture. Vietnam News Agency in 
English morse to Southeast Asia, 0500 GMT, February 4,1958.
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TABLE 9-4
THE COMPOSITION OF THE SOCIALIST DELEGATIONS TO THE DRVN (1957-58)1
2 3Position CSR PPR BPR USSR DPRK PRR YFR
Council of Ministers X X 2° xc X 2e X
Foreign Affairs X X X X X X
Secretary of Party's CC X - X X X - -
Foreign Trade X X X - - - -
Diplomatic X 2a X - Xd X -Art and Culture - X - - Xd - -
Education - X - - X - -
National Defence - - - - X - -
State Planning Board X - - - - - •fFinance X - - - - - xf
National Construction X - - - - - -
Public Health X - - X - - -
Local Economy X - - - - - -
Light Industry - X - - - - -
Parliamentary - - - 3 - - -
Size of Delegation 10 8 6 6 6 4 3
ABBREVIATIONS: Bulgaria (BPR), Czechoslovakia (CSR), North Korea (DPRK)
Poland (PPR), Rumania (PRR), the Soviet Union (USSR) 
and Yugoslavia (YFR).
X = one person
CC = Central Committee
Albanian Military Delegation (October 1958) not included.
2 There were two Bulgarian delegations; these figures are for the first 
(October 6-9 1957). The second delegation was led by V. Chervenkov, 
vice chairman of the Council of Ministers and it visited Viet-Nam during 
October 9-14, 1958.
3 Voroshilov's visit (May 20-24, 1957) is not included as it is 
discussed in detail in the text. This column provides information on 
the USSR Parliamentary Delegation which visited from October 18-26, 1957.
Two individuals were included in this category: the Ambassador to
Viet-Nam and the Charge d'Affaires a.i. to China.
b This includes A. Yugov and G. Traikov, chairman and first vice 
chairman of the Council of Ministers, respectively.
0 A.B. Aristov, member of the legislative commission of the USSR and 
secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and I.K. Lebedev, member of 
the legislative committee of the USSR and first secretary of the 
Stavropol committee of the CPSU.
cont'd
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TABLE 9-4 cont'd
Lee Il-Kyong, Minister of Education and Culture, 
e C. Stoica and E. Bodnaras, chairman and vice chairman of the 
Council of Ministers, respectively.
V. Guzina, governor-general of the National Bank.
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OVERSEAS TOURS
TABLE 9-5
BY PRESIDENTS HO CHI MINH AND NGO DINH DIEM (1957-58)
Country
Date Ho Chi Minh Ngo Dinh Diem
May 1957 U.S.A.
June
July People's Republic of China
North Korea
Soviet Union
Czechoslovakia
Poland
East Germany
August Hungary Thailand
Yugoslavia
Albania
Bulgaria
Rumania
Soviet Union
People's Republic of China
September Australia 
South Korea
October
November Soviet Union India
December
January 1958 — —
February India
Burma
March Philippines
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8 81957. At this time India had accepted the reality of
Vietnamese partition and began to implement a more even
handed approach. Nevertheless, the VWP leadership
valued India's role on the ICC, especially in Laos. Ho
Chi Minh sought and obtained Indian support for Viet-Nam's
re-unification but the Indians failed to condemn either
the RVN or the United States for the present state of 
89affairs. According to the text of the joint statement
signed by Ho and Nehru:
The President and Prime Minister re-affirmed 
the hope expressed by the co-chairmen of the 
Geneva Conference in 1956 that 'the 
International Supervisory Commission will 
persevere in their efforts to maintain and 
strengthen peace in Viet-Nam on the basis of 
the fulfilment of the Geneva Agreements on 
Viet-Nam with a view to the re-unification 
of the country through the holding of the 
nation-wide elections in Viet-Nam under the 
supervision of an International Commission'.
In this connection, the President and the 
Prime Minister stressed the need for 
promotion of mutual understanding between 
the two zones in Viet-Nam in accordance with 
the purposes and provisions of the Geneva 
Agreements.^ 0
After completing his 10-day tour of India, Ho Chi 
Minh flew to Burma where he was greeted by President U Win 
Maung and Premier U Nu. Once again Ho obtained general 
support for the re-unification of Viet-Nam under the terms
Dispatch from New Delhi in The New York Times (February 
6, 1958), p.3, reports that Ho received precisely the same 
welcome accorded Diem the previous November (1957).
89 SarDesai, Indian Foreign Policy, op.cit., pp.111-112.
90 "The Text of the Joint Statement By The Prime Minister 
of India and The President of the Democratic Republic of 
Viet-Nam in New Delhi on February 13, 1958", in Foreign 
Policy of India,op.cit., pp.327-328; and dispatch from 
New Delhi in The New York Times (February 14, 1957), p.2.
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91of the 1954 Geneva Agreements. On his return to Hanoi
the DRVN President announced that presidents Prasad of
India and U Win Maung, had accepted invitations to visit
92North Viet-Nam.
D. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
The third major aspect of Viet-Nam's policy of 
"winning the sympathy and support of the world's people" 
concerned obtaining much needed foreign assistance to 
help in economic rehabilitation and reconstruction. During 
1955-57 Viet-Nam managed to obtain a grant of US$200 million 
from China and a Soviet aid package totalling US$119.5 
million (of which US$19.5 million were credits). The lion's 
share was obtained as a result of Ho Chi Minh's visits to 
Moscow and Peking in 1955. During 1957-58, the DRVN 
negotiated over eighteen separate agreements and protocols 
governing various types of cultural and economic assistance 
(see Table 9-6). Both China and the Soviet Union figured 
prominently in these agreements. The former agreed to
91 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 
1140 GMT, February 18, 1958; Vietnam News Agency in English 
morse to Southeast Asia, 0541 GMT, 0550 GMT, February 15, 
1957; and 0623 GMT, 1100 GMT, February 16, 1957. Ho Chi 
Minh, "Talk at a press conference in Rangoon", in Selected 
Works, op.cit., Vol.4, pp.295-300. President Ho Chi Minh's 
Visit to the Republic of India and the Union of Burma, 
February 4th-17th, 1958. Official Documents (Hanoi: Foreign
Languages Publishing House, 1958). There is no evidence to 
support the assertion made by Hoang Van Chi that Ho Chi Minh 
had to cut short his visit to Burma because of a successful 
propaganda campaign highlighting the failures of the DRVN's 
land reform launched by RVN officials against him; see:
Letter from Hoang Van Chi dated December 20, 1972, to Daniel 
Teodoru reprinted in "The Human Cost of Communism in Vietnam, 
II - The Myth of No Bloodbath", op.cit., pp.46-47.
92 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 
1225 GMT, February 17, 1958. Prasad visited both the RVN 
and the DRVN in March 1959; SarDesai, Indian Foreign Policy, 
op.cit., p.194.
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TABLE 9-6
DRVN Trade and Aid Agreements Negotiated During 1957-58
Date Description Country
1957a Credit agreement for spare parts 
($12m)
USSR
13 Feb. 1957b Agreement on cultural co-operation in 
1957
USSR
20 Mar. 1957° 5-year cultural co-operation 
agreement
Czechoslovakia
29 Mar. 1957d Aid agreement Poland
30 Mar. 1957e Cultural co-operation in 1957 China
30 Jul. 1957f Trade agreement; protocol on aid China
31 Jul. 19579 Agreement on cultural collaboration East Germany
2 Aug. 1957h 
19571
Agreement on cultural collaboration 
for 1957 Hungary
8 Oct. Exchange of goods and payments 
agreement Bulgaria
25 Dec. 1957b Agreement on cultural co-operation 
in 1958 USSR
12 Mar. 1958^ Credit agreement for spare parts 
($ 5m); USSR
Protocol and trade agreement for 1958; USSR
Navigation agreement USSR
31 Mar . 1958k Aid protocol for 1958 
Exchange of goods and payments
China
agreement
Agreement on assistance in 18
China
industries China
24 Nov. 19581 Protocol on cultural co-operation Albania
29 Dec. 1958m Trade protocol for 1956-60 USSR*
*Other agreements negotiated with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary and Rumania in January 1959.
SOURCES:
a Charles B. McLane, "The Russians and Viet-Nam: Strategies of
Indirection", op.cit., p.60.
Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 1130 GMT, 
December 27, 1957.
° Ibid, in English morse to Southeast Asia, 0540 GMT, March 20,
1957 .
AP dispatch from Hong Kong in The New York Times (March 31, 1957), 
p . 34.
cont'd
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TABLE 9-6 cont'd
SOURCES cont'd:
0 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 1175 
GMT, March 30, 1957.
 ^Ibid., July 31, 1957. Dispatch from Hong Kong in The New York Times 
(August 1, 1957), p.2.
g President Ho Chi Minh's Friendly Visit to the German Democratic 
Republic (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1958), p.4.
k President Ho Chi Minh's Friendly Visit to the Hungarian People's 
Republic (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1958), p.24.
Vietnam News Agency, October 9, 1957.
 ^ Ibid., in English morse to Southeast Asia, 0500 GMT, March 13,
1958.
k Ibid. , in English morse to Southeast Asia, 0575 GMT, April 1
1958.
Ibid.,, November 25, 1958.
m Ibid.,, December 30, 1958.
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supply raw cotton, textiles, medicines, rubber tyres,
vehicles, rolled steel and machinery in exchange for
9 3Vietnamese timber, farm products and minerals. The
Soviet Union, for its part, agreed to provide petroleum
products, fertilizers, laminated ferrous metals, cotton
yarn, electrical appliances, machine tools, cars, lorries,
tractors and farming machinery. In return Viet-Nam
exported rice, bananas, tea, coffee, plywood, clothing
94and footwear, jute and handcrafts.
In the second triennium (1958-50), while Viet-Nam
was pursuing her first Three-Year Plan, Soviet aid rose
a modest US$13.5 million to US$133 million (all in
credits) while Chinese assistance fell by half to US$100
million (of which only US$25 million was in the form of an
95outright grant). Credits from Eastern Europe totalled 
9 6US$26 million. Thus by the end of 1960 the DRVN received 
economic aid amounting to at least US$578.5 million; this 
compares to US$1,393.1 million, the amount of aid the U.S.
9 3 Dispatch from Hong Kong in The New York Times (August 1, 
1957), p.2; and Vietnam News Agency in English morse to 
Southeast Asia, 0545 GMT, April 1, 1958.
94 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 
0500 GMT, March 13, 1958; and 0500 GMT, December 30, 1958.
9 5 This was at a time when the USSR cut its aid to China. 
China was about to embark on the Great Leap Forward; Harold 
C. Hinton, An Introduction to Chinese Politics (Melbourne: 
Wrenn Publishing Pty. Ltd., 1973), pp.39-40.
96 Kaye, "A Bowl of Rice Divided", op.cit., Table 4, p.115. 
Kaye, who is listed as a "specialist in Asian and Communist 
agrarian problems", has been identified elsewhere by 
Bernard Fall as a British economist; Fall, "A 'Straight 
Zigzag': The Road to Socialism in North Viet-Nam", op.cit.,
p.222, footnote 27.
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97gave to the Diem regime during the same period (1955-60). 
According to DRVN figures foreign aid in fact represented an 
ever-diminishing share of its national budget: 65.3% in
1955; 40% in 1956; 60.8% in 1957; 31.3% in 1958; 27% in 1959 
and 17.7% in I960.98
V. CONSOLIDATING THE NORTH: THE 7th SESSION OF THE DRVN
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (10-19 SEPTEMBER 1957)
The 7th Session of the DRVN's National Assembly was
originally scheduled to convene in July 1957. However, due
to severe flooding caused by typhoons this meeting had to be
9 9postponed until September."'' In the interim the Council of 
Ministers took charge of urgent government business. Ho Chi 
Minh's long overseas tour coincided with this period and it 
is possible that the National Assembly also delayed opening 
until the nation's president returned. One of the first tasks 
of this session was to review the decisions taken by government 
leaders since the previous session and to hear Ho Chi Minh's 
report on his overseas tour.
As we have noted previously the "consolidation of the 
north" was the first of three major missions assigned by the
Montgomery, The Politics of Foreign Aid, op.cit., p.284. 
These figures are for the total amount of economic aid (grants 
and loans). It is unknown how much military assistance the 
DRVN received during this period.
9 8 Fall, The Two Viet-Nams, op.cit., p.177. Alternate figures 
for 1955 and 1959 are 38.6% and 36.9% respectively. According 
to Fall the discrepancy lies in two sets of figures released 
by the DRVN, one set in 1960 and the other in 1962. The latter 
figures, which Fall considers more realistic, are cited in the 
text.
9 9 Voice of Vietnam dictation in Vietnamese to Southeast Asia, 
2330 GMT, September 5, 1957.
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VWP at its 11th Plenum in December 1956. This preoccupation 
was clearly evident in the work of the Council of Ministers 
throughout 1957. In late June the Council met to consider 
reports by the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Water 
Conservation and Reconstruction. The budget for fiscal year
1956 received approval as did the draft budget for 1957. 
According to the communique issued by the Council, the 
financial situation in 1957 was "critical" and balancing the
1957 budget was declared to be "fundamental... to the 
completion of the 1957 State Plan".'1'^ The Council also 
called upon all levels and branches of government to pay 
special attention to the following eight areas:
1. financial affairs
2. tax collection
3. commercial activities related to basic construction
4. accurate inventory and evaluation of property
5. expenditures (to eliminate waste)
6. market and financial management
7. lowering the price of staple commodities
8. speculation and hoarding
After hearing a report from the Ministry of Water 
Conservation and Reconstruction on the advanced preparations 
to meet typhoon flooding during the coming rainy season, the 
Council of Ministers declared that the struggle against 
flooding "is one of the most important works at the moment"
Voice of Vietnam in Vietnamese to Southeast Asia, 2245 GMT, 
June 30, 1957.
Ibid., the report indicated that the repair of dykes and 
culverts had not been completed as planned.
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In July, in the face of severe typhoon damage the next
scheduled session of the National Assembly was postponed.
Nevertheless the Fatherland Front managed to convene its Sixth
Session (enlarged) at which time it heard reports on the
domestic situation. It endorsed draft legislation
establishing the government's policies toward businessmen and
102industrialists as well as towards intellectuals. It also
approved plans to combat typhoon flooding. As if to underline
the spirit of the times the resolution of the Front's Sixth
Session declared that the achievements obtained in the
peaceful reconstruction of the North were fundamental and that
10 3short-comings were but local and temporary.
In August the Council of Ministers met to consider three 
reports dealing with internal matters. The first, by the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, stated that drought had 
affected certain areas of the countryside and that this would 
hamper the autumn rice production plan. Accordingly, the 
Council declared:
The Party's policy towards intellectuals was published in 
Nhan Dan on August 29, 1957; see Vietnam News Agency in 
English morse to Southeast Asia, 1100 GMT, August 29, 1957. 
Special attention was focused on this group in the wake of 
"The Nhan Van - Giai Pham Affair". On the 12th anniversary of 
Resistance Day (for Nam Bo) Pham Thieu, a professor, addressed 
200 intellectuals on the role of southern intellectuals in the 
national revolutionary movement; Vietnam News Agency in 
English morse to Southeast Asia, 0525 GMT, September 24, 1957. 
These moves were part of a concerted VWP policy to mobilize 
the energies of so-called revolutionary intellectuals. See: 
Fall, "A 'Straight Zigzag': The Road to Socialism in North
Viet-Nam", op.cit., p.218; and Nhu Phong, "Intellectuals, 
Writers and Artists", op.cit., pp.84-87.
103 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 
0534 GMT, March 19, 1958.
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The fight against, drought must be considered a very 
urgent task, while flood-prevention work must not be 
neglected. According to the area and actual 
conditions, other tasks such as the correction of 
mistakes, collection of taxes must be coordinated 
with the work of struggling against drought and 
preventing floods. When floods and drought become 
serious, all other work may be stopped to permit 
consolidation of forces. (Emphasis added)
The second report was presented by the Central Land Reform
Committee. It dealt with the rectification of errors campaign
in general and with reclassification of individuals into
correct classes and the restitution of property wrongly
confiscated in particular. According to this report "the
correction of mistakes has been completed in a number of
regions and the majority of villages have entered the last
105phase of [mistakes] correction work". The Council of
Ministers approved the report but recommended that certain 
supplementary measures involving the restitution of property 
be carried out. The Premier was given the responsibility for 
issuing appropriate instructions.
The final report presented by the Ministry of National 
Defence concerned itself with various aspects of regularizing 
the army (i.e. various rules and regulations concerning 
military obligations, terms of service and army communications). 
The Council approved the draft law on national service and 
decided to implement it on an experimental basis in Vinh Phuc 
province. Various draft regulations presented by the military 
received Council approval.
In August 1957 only one-quarter of a year remained of the 
DRVN's three-year period of economic rehabilitation. At that
Vietnam News Agency in Vietnamese to South Vietnam, 0955 
GMT, August 28, 1957.
105 Ibid.
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time Nguyen Van Tran, deputy director of the State Planning
Board, took stock of the situation and declared that although
the enormous devastation caused by years of war had not been
entirely overcome that success ("in the main") had been
achieved in meeting the goals of the economic recovery plan.
Food production had been increased, dykes and other irrigation
systems had been rebuilt and hundreds of miles of railway
lines had been repaired. Tran also thanked the fraternal
106countries for their assistance.'1' This then was the 
background to the 7th Session of the DRVN's National Assembly 
which met from September 10-19, 1957.
The National Assembly's 7th Session, coming as it did 
more than five months after the previous plenary session of 
the VWP's Central Committee (March 1957) was not convened 
especially to serve as a sounding board for newly ratified 
Party policies which affected the state sphere of interest. 
Rather, the National Assembly was called into session to tidy 
up the outstanding problems which would face DRVN officials in 
the final quarter of the year. Of the eleven major reports 
delivered to the Assembly, nine dealt with domestic affairs 
(see Table 9-7). The other reports concerned Ho Chi Minh's 
overseas tour and the current situation in Nam Bo.
As the final resolutions of the 7th Session made clear, 
the task of economic rehabilitation was almost but not quite 
complete. Only another three months in the year remained to 
overcome shortcomings, a period of sufficient length to enable
Dispatch from Hong Kong in The New York Times (August 18, 
1957), p.15; and An Outline History of the Viet Nam Workers' 
Party, op.cit., pp.64-8$ .
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TABLE 9-7
MAJOR REPORTS DELIVERED TO THE 7th SESSION OF THE DRVN'S 
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (SEPTEMBER 1957)
Name Position Content of Report
Ho Chi Minh DRVN President State tour of Eastern Europe
Ton Quang Phiet Vice-chairman of the 
National Assembly's 
Standing Committee
Activities of the Standing 
Committee since the 6th 
Session
Tran Huy Lieu Secretary of the 
Committee to Amend the 
Constitution
Report on activities of 
Committee to Amend the 
Constitution
Phan Anh Minister of Commerce Decree banning speculation 
and hoarding
Cuu Huy Can Vice Minister of 
Culture
Decree on the press and other 
publications
Vu Dinh Hoe Minister of Justice Decree on law-breaking and 
corporal punishment
To Quang Dau Vice Minister of the 
Interior
Decree on elections to 
people's councils and 
administrative councils at 
all levels
Nguyen Van Tao Minister of Labor Draft law on trade unions
Nguyen Duy Trinh Head, Home Affairs 
Committee in Premier's 
office
Rectification of land reform 
errors
Le Van Hien Minister of Finance 1956 budget and 1957 draft 
budget
Pham Hung Minister attached to 
the Premier's office
The situation in Nam Bo
SOURCES:
Vietnam News Agency English morse to Southeast Asia, 0606 GMT, September 10 
1957; 1201 GMT, September 10, 1957; 1100 GMT, September 11, 1957; 0538 GMT 
and 1215 GMT, September 13, 1957; and 0525 GMT, September 14, 1957.
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the VWP delegation to the Moscow Conference of Communist
Parties (November 1957) to make a favourable report on
progress in the DRVN. Once these details were cleared up the
DRVN could embark on an ambitious three-year plan of economic
development. To quote from the final resolutions of the
National Assembly's 7th Session:
After hearing the government report on the realization 
of the State Plan during the first six months of 
1957...the National Assembly of the DRVN made the 
following resolutions:
1. The National Assembly welcomes the industriousness, 
the zeal, the endurance and the determination to 
overcome all difficulties of the compatriots and cadres 
who, in their efforts to realize the 1957 State plan, 
have achieved many new gains and have brought the 
basic completion of the economic restoration in the 
North nearer and nearer to final success. At the same 
time, the National Assembly has realized that there 
were shortcomings in the realization of the state plan 
during the first six months of 1957 - a number of 
monthly and quarterly plans have not been wholly 
completed either in quality or quantity.
2. The National Assembly agrees to charge the 
government with readjusting a number of points in the 
plan for the fourth quarter of 1957...The public 
services should try to develop their strong points....
3. The National Assembly appeals to all people and 
cadres...to basically complete the restoration phase, 
make preparations for the development phase, bring 
the North nearer and nearer to socialism and turn it 
into a powerful base for the struggle for national 
unification. '
Pham Hung's report on the situation in Nam Bo was a wide-
ranging view of developments there. This report gave no hint,
however, that the Politburo had made any alteration to the
108strategy outlined in "Duong Loi Cach Mang Mien Nam". In
Ibid.; and Voice of Vietnam in Vietnamese to South Vietnam, 
1130 GMT, September 20, 1957.
108 It would appear that there was a meeting of the Politburo 
in September as one source reports that Le Duan was admitted 
at that time; "Hanoi and the Insurgency in South Vietnam", in 
United States-Vietnam Relations, op.cit., Book IV.A.5. Tab 3, 
p. 30.
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fact Hung's review appeared to confirm the Party's
expectations of how events would unfold. For example, in his
account of the economic, cultural and social situation, Hung
stressed that increased U.S. aid and trade had harmed local
industry by creating "a flood of imports five times greater
109than exports" which caused massive unemployment. The RVN
budget, he observed, was top heavy with expenditures in the 
security and military fields, land reform was described as 
"capitalist style exploitation in the countryside". In brief, 
according to Hung "[t]he U.S. imperialists and the Ngo Dinh 
Diem clique are striving to doll up and give a false 
appearance of prosperity to the South Viet-Nam society, which 
is filled with acute contradictions".
By way of contrast Pham Hung highlighted developments in 
the North where, he pointed out, progress had been made in 
expanding industrial and agricultural output.110 Hung also 
stressed the tremendous contributions made by the regroupees
Pham Hung's speech was broadcast in three parts: Vietnam
News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 0538 GMT and 
1215 GMT, September 13, 1957 and 0525 GMT, September 14, 1957 
in U.S. FBIS Daily Report (September 17, 1957), No. 180, pp. 
EEE4-EEE10. Unattributed quotations in the following 
paragraphs are taken from this source.
110 Hung claimed that 4 million tons of paddy had been 
produced in 1956. This compares with a pre-war level (i.e. 
1939) of 2.4 million; see Table 6-1.
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in achieving these ends.] According to Hung all this was
evidence that "our regime is a regime of peace, construction,
and creative labor and that of the U.S.-Diem clique is a
regime of aggression, exploitation, and pauperization". Hung
then returned to a familiar theme:
the strength of solidarity and struggle of the entire 
people from North to South Vietnam is a decisive 
strength in the struggle for unity... People in South 
Vietnam have constantly followed and sought to 
acquaint themselves with the situation in the North. 
Every new success obtained in the consolidation of 
North Vietnam has exerted a great influence on all 
sections of the Southern compatriots, making them more 
elated at and confident in the movement of patriotic 
struggle.
Le Son Hong, a defector from the DRVN, reported that in 
October 1957 there was discontent among Southerners who 
wanted to return home. He mentioned a motion passed by 
members of 108 Regiment of the 305th Division; "An Officer of 
the Viet Cong People's Army Seeks Freedom in the South", The 
Times of Viet Nam (October 23, 1957), Vol. 1, No. 20, p.l, and 
Vietnam Press dispatch in ibid. (November 5, 1957), Vol. 1,
No. 30, p.2. Other reports of southern discontent appear in 
Dinh Xuan Cau's The Way to A Lasting Peace in Vietnam, ms.
RAND Document (April 2 , 1969) , p . 64 , '* [b] esides, ill-concealed 
miseries, such as the famine of 1956 and the general 
impoverishment of the people, had made them [southern 
regroupees] depressed and angry to such an extent that some 
of them began to talk about a coup d'etat. This plot was 
quickly uncovered and repressed. As an immediate 
consequence, a great number of these desparate regroupees 
deserted the army. Since they could not go South, they 
rallied in the northern areas of Yen Bay province, some 150 
miles northwest of Hanoi where they live [sic] as a self­
ruling group". According to the foreward of this study, 
written by William Taylor, Mr Cau is the "most experienced 
member of Rand's staff of Vietnamese interviewers" in Dinh 
Tuong province. Cau's account was based on interviews with 
prisoners and defectors. It is extremely difficult to assess 
the evidence that there was widespread discontent among the 
regroupees. The D R W  media did stress visits by senior PAVN 
officers to southern units at this time; Vietnam News Agency 
in English morse to Southeast Asia, 0523 GMT, August 27, 1957; 
Hanoi Radio in Vietnamese, 0200 GMT, December 30, 1957.
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The third section of Pham Hung's report dealt with the
struggle movement in Nam Bo. There, as we have observed in
Chapter 8, the Party was experiencing a brief period of
recovery. Hung's optimism reflected these developments:
Since early this year, though repressed, imprisoned, 
and even barbarously murdered by the South Vietnam 
authorities, the Southern people, in the cities as 
well as in the countryside, have valiantly struggled 
under effective slogans and various forms [of 
protest]. In the cities, workers have struggled for 
wage increases, for real trade union freedom, and 
against dismissal of employees. Last month alone 
more than 100 struggles were launched in various 
parts of South Vietnam. Twelve thousand workers at 
the Dalat, Kontum, Pleiku, and Banmethuot tea 
plantations have demanded wage increases and better 
living conditions. In the countryside, the South 
Vietnam peasants, basing themselves upon the 
agrarian reform laws of the Southern authorities, 
have struggled for their rights to land and against 
persecution, aggression and exploitation.
During the same period the most active and wide 
struggle has been that of the laboring people and 
forced evacuees against forced eviction from houses, 
burning of houses [by RVN officials], and drafting 
of slave laborers to plantations. The assistance 
movement for victims of eviction and burning of 
houses in Saigon has drawn broad masses of Catholic 
evacuees and created further difficulties for Diem's 
dislodgement [read: refugee resettlement] plan.
Small dealers in various South Vietnam markets also 
demanded reduction and suppression of taxes and 
fines. Industrialists and traders in South Vietnam, 
who had clearly realized the true nature of the 
U.S.-Diem regime, have urged restrictions of 
importation and development and effective assistance 
to home trade and industry... Religious sects in South 
Vietnam have also united and struggled for the 
preservation of their religion and peace.
Hung concluded his remarks with an analysis of U.S.
military involvement in the South. There, he pointed out, the
U.S. had tightened its hold over the army by firstly, expelling
pro-French officers and, secondly, by making ARVN dependent on
U.S. aid. Hung noted the increasing numbers of senior American
military officials who marched through Saigon as well as the
more permanent presence of MAAG, TRIM (redesignated Combat Army
Training Organization, CATO) and the Joint Services Support,
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a logistics advisory unit assigned to ARVN. With respect to
the American funded construction of roads and airfields, Hung
charged that these were part of a plan to transform "the high
plateaus in South Central Vietnam into a strategic center of
112South Vietnam and Southeast Asia as well".
The ultimate aim of all of this, according to Hung, was
"to turn South Vietnam into a de facto member of the aggressive
SEATO bloc". He analysed recent events in this way:
Since the beginning of this year South Vietnam has 
participated in a conference of this bloc [SEATO] in 
Canberra and in the military exercise 'Astra' of this 
bloc in the Thailand Gulf. It has also sent a 
military delegation to attend the military display 
in the Philippines and another to attend the U.S. 
nuclear tests in Nevada. Together with these facts, 
the joint declarations of Ngo Dinh Diem and U.S.
President Eisenhower, his recent visits to Thailand 
and Australia, and his forthcoming visit to South 
Korea have brought to light the plot of the U.S. 
imperialists and their followers to drag South 
Vietnam into the aggressive SEATO bloc.
The 7th Session of the DRVN's National Assembly ended its
deliberations on September 19th in the shadow of the 12th
anniversary of the South Viet-Nam Resistance Day (23rd
September 1945). The DRVN-VWP leadership chose to use this
occasion to recall the lessons of the past and to relate them
to the present. One of the most important commentaries was
113made by Vo Nguyen Giap before a crowd of 10,000 in Hanoi.
With obvious parallel to the present day, General Giap
112 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia,
0525 GMT, September 14, 1957, part 3, p.EEE9.
113 Ton Due Thang addressed an audience at the municipal 
theatre in Hanoi the night before; Vietnam News Agency in 
English morse to Southeast Asia, 0522 GMT, September 23, 1957. 
Pham Hung wrote a front page article in Nhan Dan entitled,
"Phat Trien Truyen Thuong Doan Ket Dau Tranh Anh Dung Va Tinh 
Than Tu Luc Canh Sinh Cua 'Nam-bo Khang Chien'" [Develop the 
Traditions of Unity and the Spirit of Heroic Struggle on the 
Anniversary of the Nam Bo Resistance] (September 29, 1957), p.l. 
General Giap's speech was broadcast by the Voice of Vietnam in 
Vietnamese, 0430 GMT, September 24, 1957 in U.S. FBIS Daily 
Report (September 26, 1957), No. 187, p.EEE2-EEE10.
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recounted the early years of resistance in the South and the
114contributions made by northern volunteers. He also stressed
the role of the Party and resistance bases in maintaining the
115revolutionary movement in adverse conditions.
As a result of these factors coupled with the concept of
unity ("unity means strength and unity has led our resistance
to success") Giap drew the following conclusion:
The long-term resistance of the people of the South 
and throughout the country can express one idea:
Vietnam is one; and the Vietnamese people are one.
No one, no reactionary force can divide them. It at 
the same time expresses our dearest aspiration:
Vietnam must be independent, the fatherland must be 
unified.
In speaking of the present Giap indirectly quoted from a 
VWP Central Committee resolution to indicate the strategy for 
the future:
"Many heroic youths of the North volunteered to join the 
troops of the South to exterminate the enemy. Many units of 
the liberation troops were sent from the north and central 
Vietnam to participate in the fighting in the South", ibid., 
p.EEE3.
115 Among the base areas Giap mentioned the following: U Minh
forest, Plaine des Jones, the 5th Interzone, the highlands of 
south central Vietnam, and Binh-Tri-Thien (shortened from 
Quang Binh, Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces). Concerning 
adverse conditions Giap commented: "Nam Bo was far from the
central government. From the objective point of view, we 
were weak, while the enemy had favorable conditions". Later 
he said, ".at that time, the communication lines were cut, and 
the various fronts were isolated, so the Vietnamese people and 
troops in the South had to fight under extremely hard 
conditions"; ibid., pp.EEE3-EEE4.
Voice of Vietnam in Vietnamese, 0430 GMT, September 24, 
1957. Unattributed quotations in the text are taken from this 
source.
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The partition of our country requires from us the 
responsibility of strengthening our unity to struggle 
for national unification. As pointed out by the 
resolutions of the Central Committee of the Lao Dong 
Party, our struggle for peoplesx liberation has not 
been terminated. While we are endeavouring to build 
the North into a socialist country, we have also the 
responsibility of uniting our entire people to carry 
on our struggle for the completion of the people's 
democratic national revolution throughout the country 
and to realize national unification on the basis of 
independence and democracy through peaceful means, 
(emphasis added)
In the past, our compatriots from North to South 
united to acquire independence and unification for 
our country. Now under new historic conditions, we 
have shifted from an armed struggle to a political 
one. But the struggle for national unification 
remains the common responsibility of all our 
compatriots. Our entire people from the North to the 
South - workers, farmers, intellectuals, school 
children, traders and industrialists - without 
distinction of race or religion, should thoroughly 
understand their responsibility toward the struggle 
for national unification and should unite more 
closely to struggle against every plot aimed at 
sabotaging peace and partitioning the country and for 
the holding of a pre-electoral consultative conference 
to discuss national unification and correct 
implementation of the Geneva Accords.
General Giap concluded his speech by noting that Viet- 
Nam's struggle for national liberation was occurring in a "new 
phase of a new historic era" in which the national liberation 
movement was in the ascendancy and colonialism on the decline. 
He pointed out that the paths of armed struggle and political 
struggle had enabled many countries (China, India, Indonesia, 
Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Egypt, Sudan, Morocco and Tunisia) to 
overthrow colonialism and advance toward "socialism or to 
bourgeois democratic regimes". As for Viet-Nam, General Giap 
concluded, it would benefit from the previous phase of armed 
struggle, which successfully liberated the North. The North 
would now serve as the "firm and powerful base for the 
revolution throughout the country". Within two months the
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issue of which path - peaceful struggle or armed violence - 
would occupy the attention of leaders of Communist parties 
from all over the world as they assembled in Moscow for the 
40th anniversary celebrations of the Soviet October Revolution.
VI. CRISIS IN THE NORTH? (MAY-DECEMBER 1957)
According to P.J. Honey the final months of 1957 witnessed
a crisis within the highest ranks of the VWP as a pro-Chinese
faction desparately tried to halt Viet-Nam's drift away from
117Peking and towards Moscow. Honey's account of this period
deserves close attention as his assumptions and argumentation
118have been accepted, often uncritically, by other scholars.^
In brief, Honey's analysis of events during this period has 
generally been regarded as definitive since they were first 
published in 1962.
Honey based his interpretation on one major premise: that
the VWP Politburo was divided into two major factions, one
headed by Vo Nguyen Giap and the other by Truong Chinh. The
major issue separating these two protagonists was their
alleged ideological alignment towards the Soviet Union and
China respectively. This cleavage was further deepened by
120personal antagonisms. Personality clashes among other
Honey, Communism in North Vietnam, op.cit., pp.48-58.
For example: Bernard B. Fall, The Two Viet-Nams, op.cit.,
p.198; Lacouture, Ho Chi Minh, op. cit. , pp. 2 54-56; ""Hanoi and 
the Insurgency in South Vietnam", in United States-Vietnam 
Relations, op.cit., Book 2, IV.A.5. Tab 3, p.50; and N. Khac 
Vien, Vision Accomplished? The Enigma of Ho Chi Minh (New 
York: Collier Books, 1971), pp.278-82.
P.J. Honey, "The Position of the DRV Leadership and the 
Succession to Ho Chi Minh", The China Quarterly (January-March 
1962), No. 9, pp.24-36; it was later reprinted in Honey, editor, 
North Vietnam Today, op.cit., pp.47-59.
120 Honey, Communism in North Vietnam, op.cit., pp.29-32.
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members of the Politburo also contributed to the formation of
121these factions. Honey was characterized the VWP's
factionalism in this way:
Truong Chinh and Nguyen Duy Trinh would seem to head 
a faction of the leadership which is more formally 
disposed towards China than Russia, while Vo Nguyen 
Giap and Le Duan head a second, which tends to look 
to Moscow. Le Due Tho, because of his long-standing 
differences with Le Duan, may be expected to lend his 
support to Truong Chinh, while Pham Van Dong, who 
indicated that he was npt an enthusiastic supporter 
of the pro-Chinese line and sought to reduce Truong 
Chinh's influence in the Politburo by sponsoring Pham 
Hung's membership will probably emerge on the side of 
Vo Nguyen Giap. Le Thanh Nghi and Hoang Van Hoan do 
not seem to have played a decisive role in the 
formulation of DRV policy... -^2
Elsewhere Honey had placed Nguyen Chi Thanh in Truong 
123Chinh's camp. “ Table 9-8 sets out this alignment in chart 
form.
According to Honey the years prior to 1956 were a period
124of predominant Chinese influence over the VWP. Not only
had the PRC provided considerable support during the anti-
French resistance but China had followed through with economic
assistance afterwards. Such external support reinforced
Truong Chinh and his pro-China group within the VWP Politburo
in the conduct of such Chinese-styled programs as land reform
and the "Hundred Flowers" campaign. In Honey's view:
By the end of 1956 it must have been obvious to the 
DRV leaders that the period of Chinese predominance 
in North Vietnam was nearing its end. The Soviet 
Union would have to be brought more into the picture. 
Although such a change in foreign relationships was 
made imperative by economic needs, there are good 
reasons for believing that other considerations as 
well made it welcome. Chinese Communist policies had
121
122
123
Ibid., p.35, particularly between Le Duan and Le Due Tho. 
Honey, editor, North Vietnam Today, op.cit., p.58.
Honey, Communism in North Vietnam, op.cit., pp.30-31.
124 Ibid., pp.43-47.
LE
AD
ER
SH
IP
 A
LI
GN
ME
NT
 O
F 
TH
E 
VW
P 
PO
LI
TB
UR
O 
(1
95
7)
610
03
G
•H
S3
u
I
o
G
CG
JG
G
•H
-g
u
Cr»
G
O
G
G
Eh
S3
G
-H
G
Eh
>1
G
Q
G
D
>i
G
Cn
5S
S3
G
•H
S3
u
I
o
g
a*
S3
G
03
S
Eh
O H 
S3 S3 
Eh U
U G 
G CD 
Q  > i 
G
CD Cn 
SI 2
-P
G G (1)
•H 03 03 •H
S3 O O > •
1—1 S Cn S3 S3 cn
03 G 2 u in
G •H G U 0 • l
-P S 03 O G cn
G G > G a co LD
03 •H 03 a l •
Z S S Cn Cr» cn CG
U Eh G G G rH Du
03 03 03 •
0 0) O G O 0-1 -
S3 h3 ^T4 Eh S3 CE
•K * 03
- 13
£ O
03 Eh
Cn
G 1 £
O -P 03
a , Q a) G
03 Cn •H -P
•H G G > CD
o G 03 G •H
i 03 > S3 G >
o G •H
G a e e S3
Ph 03 03 £ -P
a) S S U) G
S I P a P-i U) •H O
G G
CL) G
S3 g -
e § •
CE <d O 13
03 £ U 0)
•H
o a) - -
•P ■p > i > i
a; G 03 <u 03
•H (D G • • G G
> G CO O O
0 G CD w S3 S3
CO Cn -P U
1 2 i—1 S3 • •
0 03 D P> G>
g O O • •
P a > * CO O-i 0^
611
not only proved unpopular with the people of North 
Vietnam, they had also proved to be highly 
unsuccessful. Doubtless, land reform of some kind 
would have to be carried through, but the 
particularly brutal form imposed on the North 
Vietnamese by the Chinese had inflicted serious 
damage upon the prestige of the Lao Dong Party and 
upon the authority of the Communist regime. More 
antagonisms had been created by the census campaign, 
and opposition to the regime openly revealed by the 
'Hundred Flowers' campaign was so strong that it is 
regarded with some apprehension even today [i.e. in 
1963],125
%
As a result of errors committed during the course of the
land reform campaign Truong Chinh lost his post as VWP
Secretary-General. He was officially replaced by Ho Chi Minh.
At the same time Le Duan was recalled from his place on the
Nam Bo Regional Committee. These personnel changes worked out
to the favour of the pro-Soviet group. Again, to quote Honey:
The major change in the DRV relationship with the 
Soviet Union and China took place during 1957, yet 
the North Vietnamese press and radio gave little 
indication that such an important switch was taking 
place. The new development projects undertaken, more 
frequent references to Soviet and European 
technicians, and the economic agreements signed 
offered some indications of the change but the public 
attitude of North Vietnam toward China and the Soviet 
Union remained unaltered. It would have been 
difficult for an outside observer to detect that 
North Vietnam was systematically reducing its 
dependence upon China and introducing greater Soviet 
participation in her affairs....
Such a fundamental change in DRV alignment could 
hardly be effected without major upheavals in the 
leadership, for there were undoubtedly many leaders 
who had concluded that the DRV's future lay with 
China and had therefore taken the trouble to 
cultivate Chinese leaders, confident of a secure base 
on which to construct their future careers. These 
men could scarcely be expected to view a switch away 
from Chinese influence with equanimity. Unless they 
resisted the move, they risked losing their important 
positions and being overtaken by men who enjoyed 
stronger Soviet backing. There is no doubt that an 
internal struggle of great importance did take place
125 Ibid., p.47.
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within the Lao Dong Party, but the Vietnamese 
Communists successfully confined it to their group, 
and scarcely any evidence leaked out to provide 
detailed information about the sides taken by 
individuals or the form which the quarrel took.-^6
Before turning to the evidence provided by Honey to
document the alleged crisis which brewed between May-December
1957, it is necessary to comment briefly on Honey’s major
premise. It seems doubtful that strong pro-Chinese and pro-
Moscow factions ever existed within the VWP leadership. It
is also doubtful that China ever exerted a decisive influence
on the careers of the VWP's pro-China lobby, as Honey suggests.
Two observations seem particularly relevant. Firstly, Honey
provides little evidence to document his assertions that
affinity towards China (or Russia) was the decisive variable
in determining political orientation on the part of senior VWP
officials. This classification of individuals into one of two
categories appears too simple a device to account for the real
127complexities of the matter. This is not to deny however
Ibid., pp. 48-50.
127 See the excellent discussion in Zagoria, Vietnam Triangle, 
op.cit., pp.102-04; Turley, "Army, Party and Society Tn the 
Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam", op.cit., p.106. In 1969 
Dr Henry Kissinger, President-elect Richard Nixon's newly 
appointed assistant for national security affairs, posed the 
following question in a circular sent to all U.S. government 
organizations, agencies and departments dealing with Viet-Nam: 
"How sound is our knowledge of the existence and significance 
of stable 'Moscow' and 'Peking' factions within the Hanoi 
leadership, as distinct, for example, from shifting factions, 
all of whom recognize the need to balance off both allies. How 
much do we know, in general, of intraparty disputes and 
personalities within Hanoi?" A summary of the varied 
responses read as follows: "There is agreement that knowledge
of the existence and significance of possible factions within 
the Hanoi leadership is imprecise. There are differences of 
opinion within the leadership on tactics as opposed to 
ultimate objectives but there are not stable 'Moscow' and 
'Peking' factions. The Hanoi leadership will form different 
alignments on different issues. The attempts by the agencies 
to ascertain the position of various North Vietnamese leaders 
on specific issues shows the imprecision of our information and
(cont'd)
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that there may have been personality clashes within the VWP
leadership or that certain leaders may have preferred the
Chinese way of doing things to the Russian way.
The second observation that should be made is that many
of the facts do not fit Honey's case. For example, it is
undeniable that China rendered great assistance to the
Vietnamese and that the latter closely studied developments
in China. There does not seem to be any convincing evidence,
however, that a "brutal" form of land reform was "imposed on
the North Vietnamese by the Chinese" or that Viet-Nam's so-
called "Hundred Flowers" episode ("The Nhan Van-Giai Pham
12 8Affair") was a carbon copy of its Chinese counterpart.
127 cont'd
analysis. For example, different agencies set forth sharply 
conflicting identifications of the position of individual 
leaders such as [Vo Nguyen] Giap on particular questions".
U.S. National Security Study Memorandum, NSSM 1 (1969)
reprinted in The Congressional Record (May 10, 1972), 
pp.E4976-E5005 and (May 11, 1972), pp.E5008-E5066.
12 8 Cf. "Testimony of D. Gareth Porter", op.cit., pp.19-20; 
and Porter, "The Myth of the Bloodbath: North Vietnam's Land
Reform Reconsidered", IREA Interim Report No. 2, op.cit., 
pp.30-31 for a discussion of Chinese influence. For an 
opposite view consult: Teodoru, "The Bloodbath Hypothesis:
The Maoist Pattern in North Vietnam's Radical Land Reform", 
op.cit. It should be clear from the discussion in Chapter 6 
that North Viet-Nam's "Nhan Van-Giai Pham Affair" (the so- 
called "Hundred Flowers Campaign"! is an episode requiring 
further research. Nonetheless the timing of events in Viet- 
Nam seems to have preceded developments in China. Although 
there are superficial similarities between the two the 
differences seem greater. For a discussion on events in 
China see: Frederick C. Teiwes, "The Politics of Rectification:
From the Hundred Flowers to the Anti-Rightist Struggle", Paper 
presented to a seminar of the Contemporary China Centre,
Research School of Pacific Studies, The Australian National 
University (August 28, 1975); and MacFarquhar, The Origins of 
the Cultural Revolution, op.cit., Vol. 1.
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Further, it seems that Honey as well as many other writers 
has misinterpreted Truong Chinh's role in all of this. As we 
have observed previously, although Chinh lost his position as 
Party Secretary-General, he did not lose his place or rank in 
the Politburo, a fact borne out by Truong Chinh’s numerous
public appearances on behalf of that body after October
12 91956. Those most responsible for the land reform fiasco
not only lost their posts but were also expelled from the 
leading organs of the Party.
Given Honey's statements that "the North Vietnamese press 
and radio gave little indication that such an important switch 
[from pro-China to pro-Russia] was taking place", and that "it 
would have been difficult for an outside observer to detect 
[these changes]", and that "scarcely any evidence leaked out 
to provide detailed information [of what was happening]" it 
seems pertinent to examine closely Honey's case that a 
political crisis in late 1957 did occur.
Honey's argument focuses on several key events during 
this period: (1) Hanoi's erratic behaviour during the months
May-July 1957; (2) Ho Chi Minh's overseas tour of Europe; (3)
an alleged secret visit to Viet-Nam by Voroshilov in 
September; (4) the visit of a Russian Parliamentary delegation 
in October; and (5) press and radio coverage of Ho Chi Minh 
during the crucial period 10 November to 24 December 1957.
Honey implies that the visit of President Voroshilov to 
Hanoi in May 1957 was one of the first signs of the DRVN's
See Chapter 5, Section V and Chapter 6, Section II.D. In 
fact Truong Chinh was listed before Le Duan in the Politburo 
hierarchy until the November 1957 Moscow Conference of 
Communist Parties.
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realignment tov/ards the Soviet Union. As evidence he cites
the fact that Ton Due Thang, writing in the pages of Nhan Dan,
termed the visit a "most important historical event", that
Voroshilov's visit was accorded a great deal of publicity
inside Viet-Nam and that after the visit an announcement was
made that Ho Chi Minh would commence his tour of nine European
13 0countries on July 5th.
Apparently - and this is implied but not made explicit by
Honey - the pro-China group reacted adversely to these
developments. On July 2nd the PRC Deputy Minister for Foreign
Trade arrived in Hanoi causing Ho Chi Minh to delay his
departure. According to Honey:
Ho Chi Minh's departure was delayed by 24 hours, 
ostensibly because of bad weather, although flying 
conditions over Tonkin appeared perfect. The whole 
business conveyed an impression of crisis, disorder, 
and impromptu decisions.^^1
As further evidence of a brewing political storm, Honey 
deems significant the fact that Ho Chi Minh visited Moscow
13;although the Soviet Union was not included on his itinerary. 
Supposedly this pro-Soviet gesture was countered by the pro­
pelling hardliners who signed a goods exchange and payments 
agreement with the PRC during Ho's absence. Other pro-Soviet 
moves included Ho Chi Minh's visit to Yugoslavia, which was 
being wooed by the USSR at that time, and "an unusually early 
announcement... in Hanoi that the fortieth anniversary of the 
October Revolution would be celebrated in all parts of Vietnam
Honey, Communism in North Vietnam, op.cit., p.50.
131 Ibid., p.51. I have been unable to determine the weather 
patterns over North Viet-Nam (Tonkin) at that time.
132 Ibid.
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133over a period of six weeks". Again Honey is not explicit
but the impression one gains about the mention of this latter
item is that the pro-Russian forces were trying to pre-empt
the pro-Chinese faction by publicly committing the DRVN
government to a display of good will towards the Soviet Union.
Honey argues that "when Ho arrived at Hanoi on August 30
[after having stopped for two days in Peking where he was
greeted effusively], the storm had broken inside the Lao Dong
Party, and from that moment on developments appear confused
134to the outside observer". To overcome this problem Honey
135relied on the account of an "insider" Gerard Tongas, a
teacher of French then working in Hanoi.
According to Tongas "[t]he crisis exploded during the
visit to Hanoi, in September, 1957 [sic], of Marshall
Voroshilov...and lasted until December 24. It reached such a
pitch that in November the disappearance of Ho Chi Minh from
136the Vietnamese political scene seemed final and certain". 
Tongas states that a mammoth welcome was prepared for the 
Soviet President but by the date of arrival "[s]o great was 
the disagreement among the Vietnamese leaders that all the 
customary pomp and ceremony was cancelled". After a brief 
welcoming ceremony at the airport Voroshilov's visit was
133 Ibid.
Ibid., p.52.
13 5 Gerard Tongas, J'ai vecu dan l'enfer communiste au Nord 
Vietnam et J'ai choisi la liberte [I have lived in the 
communist hell of North Vietnam and I have chosen freedom] 
op.cit. I will rely on Honey's translations for quotations 
from this work.
13 6 Tongas cited in Honey, Communism in North Vietnam, op.cit., 
pp.52-53.
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shrouded in secrecy. The implication seems to be that the
pro-Chinese faction was responsible for this turn of events.
Apparently the same faction was responsible for the
lukewarm welcome (according to Tongas: "very few flags and no
receptions except for one of minimal importance") accorded the
Soviet Parliamentary delegation which arrived on October 
13718th. At that time, according to Honey, Truong Chinh and
Nguyen Duy Trinh (pro-Chinese) upstaged Premier Pham Van Dong
at the only public meeting held for the Russian delegation.
Nguyen Duy Trinh, states Honey, delivered the principal speech
"and its contents was singularly ill-chosen for a speech on a
Soviet anniversary before a Soviet delegation unless it was
the speaker's intention to insult them, for he quoted
13 8extensively from the works of Mao Tse-tung".
As a result of these events, Ho Chi Minh left Viet-Nam
for Moscow and then China which he visited for nearly two
months. In the interim, according to Tongas:
the drama reached its highest peak. The Vietnamese 
leaders, always deeply divided among themselves over 
the question of relations with foreign states, were 
split even more profoundly during lhat period. While 
some extolled the indestructible friendship with the 
Soviets, others advanced the cause of Chinese 
friendship. Thus it was at the very paroxysm of the 
crisis the pro-Chinese carried the day and boycotted 
the pro-Soviet friendship demonstrations. Ho Chi 
Minh, seeking continuing friendship with these two 
powerful allies without submission to either, and the 
protagonist of a policy of fence-sitting between the 
Soviet Union and China, left for Moscow alone.139
Tongas erroneously dates their arrival on October 15th, a 
mistake which Honey corrects. The delegation did in fact 
arrive on the date claimed by Honey; Vietnam News Agency in 
English morse to Southeast Asia, 1137 GMT, October 18, 1957.
13 8 Honey, Communism in North Vietnam, op.cit., p.57.
139 Tongas in ibid., p.54.
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While overseas, according to Tongas, Ho Chi Minh received
no mention in the Vietnamese press and radio during the period
10 November-24 December, thus adding evidence to their view
that the VWP was in the midst of a crisis. These
extraordinary events were finally brought to a close after
protracted negotiations between Ho and the pro-Chinese faction
in Hanoi. To quote Tongas:
During all this time a hectic exchange of letters 
was going on. Ho Chi Minh, in full disagreement with 
Hanoi, laid down his minimum conditions and refused 
to return unless he had first received full 
satisfaction. It is significant that he spent a 
month’s "holiday" at Hankow. Then he waited until 
the commemoration of December 19 [Resistance Day] 
and the anniversary of the foundation of the 
Vietnamese People’s Army (VPA), celebrated on 
December 22, had passed before he commenced his 
journey home. He arrived back in the capital only 
on December 24... ^-ZL-
P.J. Honey, although demurring on certain points of fact
(see below) accepted Tongas' account ("undoubtedly there is
some truth in the account, and I entertain no doubts about the
honesty and integrity of M. Tongas, whom I [P.J. Honey] have 
i 42met").‘L After reviewing the evidence, Honey finally 
concluded:
14 0 Ibid. Honey confirms this observation on page 56 and 
notes that no mention was made of the activities of Vo Nguyen 
Giap.
141 Ibid., p.55. No indication is given as to how Tongas was 
privy to such important correspondence.
 ^ D. Gareth Porter, "The Myth of the Bloodbath: North
Vietnam's Land Reform Reconsidered", IREA Interim Report No. 2, 
p.52, questions the credibility of Tongas as an objective 
observer; for a defense of Tongas see: the testimony by
Daniel E. Teodoru in "The Human Cost of Communism in Vietnam,
II - The Myth of No Bloodbath", op.cit., p.23.
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There can be no little doubt that the DRV leadership 
was sharply divided and that Ho Chi Minh's position 
was challenged, but the reasons are probably to be 
found in the personal wishes which existed between 
individual leaders, their relations with one another 
and with Chinese and Soviet leaders, and their 
personal ambitions as much as in the points of dispute 
between the Soviet Union and China. The fact that 
the crisis came about at the very moment when North 
Vietnam made the decision to replace predominantly 
Chinese aid by predominantly Soviet aid and East 
European aid can scarcely be attributed to 
coincidence. More probably the crisis was brought 
to a head by that important reorientation and its 
effects upon existing dissensions within the 
leadership. -L  ^3
Unfortunately the Honey-Tongas thesis errs in both fact
and interpretation. Whatever disagreements existed within the
VWP leadership revolved primarily around the priorities to be
assigned to building up the North versus liberating the 
144South. There was no clear split along pro-Soviet versus
pro-Chinese lines. There was no internal crisis during the 
final quarter of 1957, as suggested by Tongas. Rather, Ho Chi 
Minh was concerned with the dramatic developments which 
unfolded at the November Moscow Conference and their 
implications for Viet-Nam. In order to support these 
generalizations it will be necessary to criticize the Honey- 
Tongas thesis in detail.
Honey is correct in implying that Soviet involvement and 
influence in Viet-Nam increased during 1957 and that 
Voroshilov's visit to Hanoi in May is evidence for this. It 
is not clear however whether the initiatives for increased aid 
came solely from Hanoi. Honey errs in attaching too much 
significance to Thang's remark that Voroshilov's visit was a
143 Honey, Communism in North Vietnam, op.cit., p . 58.
14 4 Latimer, "Hanoi's Leaders and Their South Vietnam 
Policies", op.cit., pp.42-57.
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"most important historical event". Mikoyan's visit to Hanoi
in April 1956, it will be recalled, was billed as "an event
145of great significance". " Both visits in their own right 
were important to the Vietnamese and as such deserved full 
publicity. It seems unlikely that Voroshilov's visit 
precipitated Lin Hai-yun's (Chinese deputy minister of foreign 
trade) trip to Hanoi.
The public record of Ho's departure does reveal a
discrepancy: on July 3 it was announced that Ho would depart
146 Ho in fact was reported to have arrived in 
147
on July 5.
Peking on July 6 t h . L i n ,  the Chinese deputy minister,
arrived in Hanoi on July 2nd. Did Ho Chi Minh in fact delay
his departure for twenty-four hours ("ostensibly because of
bad weather, although flying conditions over Tonkin appeared
perfect")? There appears to be no definite answer to this
question. Honey fails, however, to indicate why Ho would wish
148to confer with Lin when he was stopping in Peking anyway.
The Soviet Union, in fact, had a gift plane waiting at the 
Peking airport to transport Ho on his trip. Thus the public 
record does not convey "an impression of crisis, disorder, and
l 4 5 Cf. "Mot Su Kien Co Y Nghia Lon" [An Event of Great 
Significance], Nhan Dan (March 23, 1956), No. 750, p.l, and 
Chapter 4, Section V .C.
14 6 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 
0500 GMT, July 3, 1957; and Honey, Communism in North Vietnam, 
op.cit., p.50.
Associated Press dispatch from Hong Kong in The New York 
Times (July 7, 1957), p.15.
14 8 Ho arrived in Pyongyang on July 8th; KCNA (Pyongyang) in 
English morse to the Far East, 1012 GMT, July 8, 1957.
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] 4 9impromptu decisions" in Ho1s departure. J (Part of his 
European trip had been forecast as early as April 1957 when
15 0it was announced that he had been invited to visit Poland).
The fact that Russia was not listed in Ho's original
itinerary may be significant, but not in the sense Honey
1 51intended. China was not listed either.'"“' The fact that the
Vietnamese media continually referred to Ho *s "nine nation 
152tour"“ might indicate that the Vietnamese leadership wished 
to highlight DRVN relations with socialist camp and to 
downplay the already established ties with China and the USSR.
No special significance need be attributed to the fact 
that a trade agreement (exchange of goods/payments) with China
Associated Press dispatch from Hong Kong in The New York 
Times (July 9, 1957), p.5; an Ilyushin-14 was presented to Ho 
Chi Minh on July 8th prior to his departure for North Korea. 
The Russians had given similar planes to the heads of India, 
Burma and Egypt. One wonders if this were the Russian's 
counter to Eisenhower's dispatch of "Columbine II" to Hawaii 
to meet President Diem.
15 0 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 
0655 GMT and 0719 GMT, April 6, 1957. In July it was 
announced that Ho Chi Minh would visit India; dispatch from 
New Delhi in The New York Times (July 18, 1957), p.3.
151 Cf. Communique of the President's office, Vietnam News 
Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 0500 GMT, July 1, 
1957; in late June the Council of Ministers announced its 
approval of Ho's trip; this statement mentioned only nine 
countries: Korea, Czechoslovakia, Poland, East Germany,
Yugoslavia, Hungary, Albania, Bulgaria and Rumania. See: 
Voice of Vietnam in Vietnamese to Southeast Asia, 2245 GMT, 
June 30, 1957.
On the occasion of Ho's return to Hanoi it was announced 
that he had completed a 55-day tour of nine countries "with 
stops" in the Soviet Union and China; Vietnam News Agency in 
English morse to Southeast Asia, 1305 GMT, August 30, 1957.
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i 5 ?was signed in Ho' s absence.' ~ Ho had not been involved in
signing any other agreement negotiated in Hanoi.
Ho Chi Minh's visit to Yugoslavia, the invitation
extended to Tito to visit Viet-Nam, and Vietnamese press
comment on Yugoslavia (which identified Yugoslavia as
"building socialism") are significant mainly as indications of
improved bilateral relations. As both Russia and China were
according similar treatment to the Tito regime at the time it
is difficult to classify Ho' s trip to Belgrade as a
154particularly "pro-Soviet" move. ' * Honey appears to have 
applied judgements suited to a later period of more strained 
Sino-Yugoslav relations.
The agreement was reached on July 30th; dispatch from Hong 
Kong in The New York Times (August 1, 1957), p.2; and Vietnam 
News Agency, July 31, 1957, cited by Honey, Communism in North 
Vietnam, op.cit., p.51, footnote 7.
154 The joint Yugoslav-Vietnamese communique could be read as 
DRVN endorsement for the principle of national independence 
(i.e. of Yugoslavia from the Soviet Union); see Reuters 
dispatch from Belgrade in The New York Times (August 1, 1957), 
p.2; and United Press dispatch from Belgrade in ibid. (August 
10, 1957), p.6. Tito and Khrushchev met in Bucharest in 
August 1957. Although China criticized Tito's "Pula Speech" 
an improvement in relations was noticeable during the 
following six months. In January 1957 a delegation of China's 
National People's Congress visited Belgrade. Vice-president 
Vukmanovic-Tempo visited China after touring Viet-Nam in 
September. The point being made is that both Russia and China 
were improving relations with Yugoslavia at the time. Chinese 
criticism and hostility came later. Therefore it is not 
possible to classify Ho's trip to Belgrade as a "pro-Soviet" 
move. For background on the bloc's relations with 
Yugoslavia see: dispatch from Hong Kong in The New York Times
(September 2, 1957), p.2; Floyd, Mao Against Khrushchev, 
op.cit., pp.45-46; and Viktor Meier, "Yugoslav Communism", 
in Griffith, editor, Communism in Europe, op.cit., Vol. I, 
pp.28-38.
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Finally, Honey stresses the "unusually early announcement"
on celebrations to mark the 40th anniversary of the Soviet
October revolution. He cited a Vietnam News Agency dispatch
155dated August 6th, 1957. However, as indicated above, the
VWP's 12th plenum in March resolved to organize celebrations
156to mark this occasion. Honey's assertion therefore appears
to be irrelevant as the VWP had made public its plans to 
celebrate the October Revolution before the first signs of 
the alleged domestic crisis.
Voroshilov's alleged visit to Hanoi in September 1957, as
Honey rightly observes, has not been corroborated by other 
157evidence. Honey also appears correct in stating "[i]t
[Voroshilov's September visit] seems unlikely on the face of
it that he should have returned so soon after his visit in
May". Voroshilov in fact met Ho Chi Minh in Moscow in August
during the latter's nine-nation tour of Europe and again in
November when Ho journeyed to Moscow to attend the
158celebrations marking the October Revolution."
Tongas asserts, on the basis of his contacts "with some
members" of the committee to welcome Voroshilov, that the
Soviet President arrived after the September 2nd celebrations
15 9marking DRVN National Day. " Honey raises and dismisses the
Honey, Communism in North Vietnam, op.cit., p.51, 
footnote 9.
1 5 6 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 
1100 GMT, April 23, 1957.
157 Honey, Communism in North Vietnam, op.cit., p.53, 
footnote 12.
Reuters dispatch from London in The New York Times (August 
26, 1957), p.3; and Vietnam News Agency in English morse to 
Southeast Asia, 0541 GMT, November 3, 1957.
15 9 Tongas cited in Honey, Communism in North Vietnam, op.cit., 
p.53.
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possibility that Tongas might have confused Voroshilov’s
alleged visit with that of a Yugoslov delegation headed by
Vice President Vukmanovic-Tempo because the latter arrived "a
little too early". In fact the Yugoslov delegation arrived
on September 1st and departed on the f o u r t h . S i n c e  Tongas
states that the platform erected for DRVN National Day
(September 2nd) was kept in place for use in welcoming
Voroshilov, the possibility of just such confusion by Tongas
cannot be dismissed. September was a busy month for DRVN
officials. The National Assembly's 7th Session met from 10-19
September and the Vice President of India paid a State visit
i 6 2lasting from 12-14 September.
The evidence at hand does not entirely disprove the
possibility that Voroshilov made an unpublicized visit to
16 3Hanoi; but this possibility seems improbable. J There 
appears to be no other evidence of political manoeuvring by 
the "pro-Chinese faction""0  ^at this (or any other) time.
160
161
Ibid., p.53, footnote 12.
Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 
0632 GMT, September 1, 1957 and 0500 GMT, September 4, 1957; 
and dispatch from Hong Kong in The New York Times (September 
5, 1957), p.2.
1 6  0
Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 
0606 GMT, September 10, 1957; 1238 GMT, September 14, 1957; 
and 1152 GMT, September 19, 1957.
16 3 Honey claims that "it has been established that he 
[Voroshilov] was absent from Moscow during the period in 
question"; Communism in North Vietnam, op.cit., p.53, 
footnote 12.
General Vo Nguyen Giap, the alleged leader of the pro- 
Soviet faction, was active at this time: (1) he attended the
reception in honour of the Yugoslav vice president on 
September 1st; (2) he delivered the "Order of the Day" at a 
rally marking the DRVN's National Day, September 2nd; (3) he
(cont'd)
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Honey's account of the reception accorded the Soviet
Parliamentary delegation which visited Hanoi from 18-26
October contains several errors. It will be recalled that
Honey argued that the pro-Chinese group (Truong Chinh and
Nguyen Duy Trinh) had upstaged Pham Van Dong and that Trinh
had insulted the Russian visitors by quoting "extensively from
the works of Mao Tse-tung in his opening speech". In fact
when the Soviet delegation paid a courtesy visit to the VWP
Politburo on October 19th there was no alteration in the
165official hierarchy. The official list read: Truong Chinh,
Le Duan, Pham Van Dong, Hoang Van Hoan, Pham Hung and Nguyen 
Duy Trinh. Neither Truong Chinh nor Nguyen Duy Trinh were 
Vice Premiers at that time as stated by Honey. Chinh received 
his appointment to that post in 1958; Trinh in July 1960."^^
164 cont'd
was present at a reception hosted by the Bulgarian embassy to 
mark their Liberation Day, September 9th; (4) he sat on the 
presidium of the 7th session of the DRVN’s National Assembly, . 
September 10th-19th; (5) he gave an interview to a
correspondent of the New China News Agency on September 19th; 
and (6) he delivered a major speech on the occasion of Nam Bo 
Resistance Day, September 23rd.
165 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia,
1100 GMT, October 19, 1957. Honey seems to have confused this 
meeting with the November 6, 1957 celebrations in Hanoi 
marking the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution. The 
presidium for these celebrations consisted of: Ton Due Thang,
Truong Chinh, Nguyen Duy Trinh, Pham Van Dong and Phan Ke Toai. 
Although the order may appear puzzling (i.e. Dong listed after 
Trinh), only Chinh and Trinh were identified by their Party 
posts; Dong attended in his capacity as DRVN Premier. Vietnam 
News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 0518 GMT, 
November 7, 1957. The celebrations marking this anniversary 
were more extensive than Tongas indicated.
Truong Chinh was appointed vice premier at the 8th session 
of the DRVN's National Assembly in April 1958 after the 
October 1957 visit to Hanoi by the Soviet Parliamentary 
delegation; Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast 
Asia, 1215 GMT, April 29, 1958. Nguyen Duy Trinh, who was 
appointed director of the Bureau of Internal Affairs in the 
Premier's office in mid-April 1957, was not made a vice premier 
until July 1960, during the 1st session of the DRVN's second 
National Assembly; Vietnam News Agency in English morse to 
Europe and Asia, 1344 GMT, July 15, 1960.
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Even more remarkable is the confusion surrounding Nguyen Duy 
Trinh's speech. It was delivered not before the visiting 
Soviet delegation in October but on November 6th before a 
public gathering called to commemorate the 40th anniversary of 
the October Revolution. There were no quotations from Mao Tse 
tung in the full text published in Nhan Dan a few days later.
Similarly both Tongas and Honey are completely wrong in 
asserting that Ho Chi Minh received no coverage in the DRVN 
press during the period 10 November-24 December. A brief 
consultation of the back issues of Nhan Dan for this period 
reveals that Ho Chi Minh's activities in Moscow at that time
g *j
received almost daily mention.“ ' A similar check of the back
files of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service's Daily
Reports of monitored radio broadcasts from Hanoi reveals that
Ho's name appears on more than one occasion, thus disproving
16 8another unfounded assertion by Tongas and Honey.
Although the lack of coverage accorded Vo Nguyen Giap 
during this same period is curious "it may" in the words of
167 During the early period of the alleged crisis, November 
10-29, Ho Chi Minh was mentioned on page one of Nhan Dan on 
the following dates: 10, 13, 15 (a picture of Ho appears), 17
(an interview), 18, 22, 24 and 29 (a letter). Ho's name is 
mentioned with equal frequency during December.
For coverage of Ho's Moscow press conference see:
Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 1210 
GMT, November 22, 1957 in U.S. FBIS, Daily Report (November 25 
1957), No. 228, p.EEEl; and for another story Vietnam News 
Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 0558 GMT, December 
1, 1957 in U.S. FBIS Daily Report (December 3, 1957), No. 233, 
p.EEEl. See also: Vietnam News Agency in English morse to
Southeast Asia, 0553 GMT, November 14, 1957; 1225 GMT,
November 22, 1957 and 1128 GMT, November 28, 1957.
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William S. Turley "mean anything or nothing" in the absence of
16 9additional evidence. ' Nhan Dan is not a large newspaper,
averaging some 6-8 pages in length in its daily edition.
During this period it devoted full space to reportage of
events in Moscow. It is therefore unsurprising that
comprehensive coverage was not given local developments,
17 0including the daily activities of Vo Nguyen Giap.
In summary, a detailed examination of the case that the 
VWP was rent by internal factionalism in late 1957 is found 
wanting. It is based on factual inaccuracies, faulty 
conceptualization, inappropriate methodology and over reliance 
on the account of one "inside" witness. Three additional 
considerations make it seem unlikely that a crisis of the 
magnitude described by Honey and Tongas occurred. Firstly,
Turley, "Army, Party and Society in the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam", op.cit., p.106, footnote 42.
17 0 One problem in dealing comprehensively with internal DRVN 
affairs is accessibility to the full range of domestic 
publications produced at that time. Nhan Dan is but one of 
several papers produced. The use of radio monitoring reports 
has its drawbacks. Neither the FBIS nor the BBC include all 
radio broadcasts in their daily reports. There is evidence 
that a number of radio broadcasts are monitored but not 
included in the editions of the Daily Report or Summary of 
World Broadcasts used here (they apparently appear m  another 
more comprehensive publication which is confidential). Quite 
often a dispatch from Hong Kong will cite a broadcast by Hanoi 
Radio which is not included in either the FBIS’ Daily ^ Report 
or the BBC's Summary of World Broadcasts. Therefore it is one 
thing to state that Ho's or Giap's name did not appear in 
either or both of the monitoring reports cited above; and 
quite another thing to assert that Ho's and Giap's names did 
not appear in any of the DRVN's press and radio output. In 
1962, there were at least 150 periodicals, including magazines, 
printed in the DRVN. See: P.J. Honey, "The Press in North
Vietnam", China News Analysis (December 14, 1961), No. 449, 
pp.1-7.
628
there were no dismissals or purges of the losers. Secondly,
the increase in Soviet assistance to Viet-Nam was apparently
brought about (in Honey's words) "without Chinese 
171resentment". Why should a "pro-China faction" in Viet-Nam
react so strongly when their mentors in Peking were so 
unconcerned? Finally, the timing of the alleged crisis is 
curious. It occurred before the increase in Soviet assistance 
(and presumably influence) was fully felt in Viet-Nam. While 
it might be argued that the "pro-Chinese faction" saw the 
writing on the wall as early as May and decided to halt the 
pro-Russian drift as soon as possible; it can also be argued 
that the "pro-Chinese group" could have adopted tactics of 
delay and sabotage. In brief, neither Tongas nor Honey have 
pointed to a particular incident which might have triggered so 
forceful a move on the part of a beleaguered "pro-China 
faction".
The final quarter of 1957 was marked by changes of a 
different nature, however. At that time Le Duan appeared in 
public and was identified as a member of the VWP Politburo.
He accompanied Ho Chi Minh to Moscow where he was privy to the 
emerging differences between China and Russia on the question 
of peaceful or non-peaceful transition to socialism. Le Duan, 
as a senior Party official, would soon be involved in 
grappling with the problem of reconciling these ideological 
differences to the perceived needs of the Vietnamese 
revolution in Nam Bo.
171 Honey, Communism in North Vietnam, op.cit., p.48.
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VII. THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE AND THE VWP'S 13th PLENUM 
(NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1957)
According to an Open Letter written by the Central 
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in 1963, the origins 
of the Sino-Soviet dispute can be traced back to Khrushchev's 
speech to the 20th Congress of the CPSU. In the words of the 
Chinese statement:
From the very onset we held that a number of views 
advanced at the 20th Congress concerning the 
contemporary international struggle and the 
international Communist movement were wrong, were 
violations of Marxism-Leninism. In particular, the 
complete negation of Stalin on the pretext of 
"combating the personality cult" and the thesis of 
peaceful transition to socialism by "the 
parliamentary road" are gross errors of principle.^ 2
In the period between the 20th Congress (February 1956)
and the November 1957 Moscow Conference of sixty-four Communist
and Workers' parties, officials of the CCP brought up the
question of how to interpret Stalin's contributions to
Communism in private discussions with their Soviet counterparts
on no iewer than six occasions.- It is unknown if members
of the VWP were privy to the content of these discussions.
Nonetheless with the publication of "On the Historical
Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" on April 5,
1956, and "More on the Historical Experience of the
Dictatorship of the Proletariat" on December 29, 1956, VWP
officials must have been aware of the broad outlines of Sino-
Soviet controversy.
"The Origin and Development of the 
Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves",
17~J Ibid., pp. 64-65.
Differences Between the 
op.cit., pp. 59-60.
174 See Chapter 4, Section VI, for the Vietnamese reaction.
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At the heart of the dispute over assessing Stalin's
contributions, was the issue of how the socialist bloc was to
be organized in the post-Stalin era. Khrushchev's
denunciation of Stalin and his endorsement of peaceful
coexistence were apparently made ex cathedra and without the
prior knowledge of the Chinese. During 1956 the CCP
challenged this Soviet presumption to speak for all countries;
in particular they defended Gomulka of Poland against verbal
attacks by the Soviet press. On the other hand, the Chinese
also opposed the advocates of polycentrism such as Togliatti
of Italy and Tito of Yugoslavia. The Chinese position has
been summed up by Donald Zagoria in this way:
Peking sought what might be called a flexible, 
confederative approach to Bloc relations, as 
contrasted with the unitary approach insisted upon 
by Moscow. This confederative approach implied that 
there should be limits to Soviet prerogatives vis-a- 
vis other Bloc countries; that deviations from the 
Soviet model of socialist construction were not 
necessarily harmful; that honest differences of view 
should be settled by genuine and frank discussion 
through intra-party channels and not in public; and, 
above all, that such honest differences, which 
inevitably arise, must be subordinated to the 
overriding common goals of all concerned - particularly 
to the struggle with the West.^J
The convening of a conference of Communist parties in 
Moscow following the celebrations of the 40th anniversary of 
the Soviet October Revolution set the stage for a renewal of 
Sino-Soviet debate as the CPSU apparently intended to obtain 
international endorsement for the policies which Khrushchev 
had outlined at the 20th Congress of the CPSU. It was not 
surprising, therefore, that Mao Tse-tung himself led the CCP's
175 Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, op.cit., p.62.
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delegation in an effort to bolster China's standing within
the socialist camp and to insure that the new line for the
Communist movement took cognizance of Chinese views.
The deliberations of the Moscow Conference were
influenced by domestic events within the Soviet Union and
China which occurred in 1957. In late June Khrushchev
successfully ousted the anti-Party group and thereafter
1 76consolidated his position.-" Khrushchev's rise to power
brought with it a change in Soviet relations with Yugoslavia.
Immediately prior to the 40th anniversary celebrations Soviet
technology scored several triumphs as Russia successfully
tested an intercontinental ballistic missile (August 26) and
successfully orbited two earth satellites (October 4 and 
177November 3).-
Meanwhile China was in the throes of an internal debate 
between "leftists" and "rightists" precipitated by the Hundred 
Flowers Campaign and the onset of a domestic economic crisis. 
The leftists increasingly gained the upper hand. In mid-year
The anti-Party group consisted of Malenkov, Kaganovich and 
Molotov. In July 1957 Khrushchev travelled to Czechoslovakia 
where he received support for purging this "anti-Lenin" trio. 
Meanwhile Ho arrived in Moscow and met Khrushchev on his 
return. During the same day Ho shared a position on the 
welcoming dias with the full CPSU Politburo. It seems more 
than likely that Ho Chi Minh was fully informed of these 
internal Soviet developments. See: Moscow dispatch in The
New York Times (July 17, 1957), p.4; Hinton, An Introduction 
to Chinese PoTitics, op.cit., p.38; Honey, Communism in North 
Vietnam^ op.cit., p.51. In October 1957 Khrushchev ousted 
Marshal Georgi Zhukov, a move which received Vietnamese 
endorsement: "The Leadership of the Party is the Determining
Factor in All our Victories and Progress", editorial in Nhan 
Dan broadcast by Voice of Vietnam in Vietnamese to Southeast 
Asia, 0550 GMT, November 5, 1957.
177 Hinton, Communist China in World Politics, op.cit., p.33.
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the Hundred Flowers Campaign was called-off and preparations
17 8v;ere made to launch an anti-rightist rectification campaign.
China's confederative policy towards bloc unity underwent a
one hundred and eighty degree change between June, when Mao
cancelled a scheduled trip to Poland, and late October, when
China began to stress bloc unity under the leadership of the 
17 9USSR. By September the victory of the leftists was clearly
evident within the CCP's Central Committee as a new twelve 
year programme of agricultural development was promoted once 
again. In fact China was experiencing the first stirrings of 
the Great Leap Forward. This domestic shift to more radical 
policies was paralleled by a swing to the left in foreign 
policy. The recent Soviet rocket and satellite successes were 
hailed by the Chinese as signalling a decisive shift in the 
balance of forces in favour of the socialist camp. The Chinese 
leadership concluded that the time had come to adopt a more 
militant attitude towards the West in order to exploit the new 
strategic situation. This policy, of course, ran counter to 
the USSR's policies of rapprochement with the West. On the 
one hand Khrushchev called for disarmament and peaceful 
coexistence, and on the other Mao proclaimed that "the East 
wind is prevailing over the West wind". David Floyd has 
summarized these developments in this way:
17 8 Ibid., pp.33-35; and Hinton, An Introduction to Chinese 
Politics, op.cit., p.363.
17 9 This change in Chinese policy was given emphasis by Mao 
Tse-tung in an address to students at Moscow University on 
November 17, 1957; see: Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict,
op.cit., p.146. Mao's views were promptly endorsed by Nhan 
Dan, see: Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast
Asia, 1219 GMT, November 20, 1957. The Chinese were 
instrumental in getting a condemnation of Yugoslav revisionism 
written into the Moscow Declaration; for a discussion see: 
Mehnert, Peking and Moscow, op.cit., pp.364-66.
633
Thus before they confronted each other in Moscow in 
November, a sort of polarisation of the Russian and 
Chinese parties had taken place: the Russians
moving towards the right and the Chinese towards the 
left. The touchstone of their attitude to world 
problems had become their relations with Tito’s 
Yugoslavia, with which Khrushchev was increasingly 
and persistently friendly and which Mao Tse-tung was 
eyeing with growing suspicion.180
Prior to the November Conference the CPSU circulated a
draft of the proposed declaration to various Communist parties,
including Yugoslavia. No doubt Khrushchev hoped to reach some
181sort of settlement with Tito in advance of the meeting; he 
was singularly unsuccessful however as the Yugoslav leader 
stayed away from the gathering. It seems probable that the 
debate over the wording of the final declaration began almost 
as soon as the CPSU circulated their draft and that fraternal 
parties, such as the VWP, were aware of Sino-Soviet differences 
in advance of the conference.
The most important document to emerge from the Moscow 
Conference was a 5,000-word Declaration which was hammered out 
during November 12th-14th at a special caucus of 
representatives of the twelve ruling Communist and Workers' 
parties. It is clear from subsequent Chinese accounts that 
Sino-Soviet differences were brought to the attention of other 
delegates. The CCP in fact circulated an "Outline of Views 
on the Question of Peaceful Transition" on the eve of the 
twelve-party gathering in an effort to alter the wording of
180 Floyd, Mao Against Khrushchev, op.cit., p.46.
181 Khrushchev and Tito met secretly in August 1957; ibid., 
pp. 4 5-4 6.
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18 2the Soviet draft.“' "' In the end the final declaration
represented something of a compromise. To quote from the 1963
Chinese Open Letter:
At this meeting the chief subject of controversy 
between us and the delegation of the CPSU was the 
transition from capitalism to socialism. In their 
original draft of the Declaration the leadership of 
the CPSU insisted on the inclusion of the erroneous 
views of the 20th Congress on peaceful transition.
The original draft said not a word about non­
peaceful transition, mentioning only a peaceful 
transition; moreover, it described peaceful 
transition as ’securing a majority in parliament and 
transforming parliament from an instrument of the 
bourgeois dictatorship into an instrument of a 
genuine people’s state power’. In fact, it 
substituted the ’parliamentary road’ advocated by 
the opportunists of the Second International for the 
road of the October Revolution and tampered with the 
basic Marxist-Leninist theory on the state and 
revolution.
The Chinese Communist Party resolutely opposed the 
wrong views contained in the draft declaration 
submitted by the leadership of the CPSU. We 
expressed our views on the two successive drafts put 
forward by the Central Committee of the CPSU and 
made a considerable number of major changes of 
principle which we presented as our own revised 
draft. Repeated discussions were then held between 
the delegations of the Chinese and Soviet Parties on 
the basis of our revised draft before the Joint 
Draft Declaration by the CPSU and the CPC was 
submitted to the delegations of the other fraternal 
Parties for their opinions.
As a result of the common efforts of the delegations 
of the CPC and the other fraternal Parties, the 
meeting finally adopted the present version of the 
Declaration, which contains two major changes on the 
question of the transition from capitalism to 
socialism compared with the first draft put forward 
by the leadership of the CPSU. First, while 
indicating the possibility of peaceful transition, 
the Declaration also points to the road of non­
peaceful transition and stresses that ’Leninism 
teaches, and experience confirms, that the ruling 
classes never relinquish power voluntarily’.
The text of this document may be found in The Polemic on 
the General Line of the International Communist Movement, 
op.cit., pp.105-08.
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Secondly, while speaking of securing 'a firm 
majority in parliament', the Declaration emphasizes 
the need to 'launch an extra-parliamentary mass 
struggle, smash the resistance of the reactionary 
forces and create the necessary conditions for 
peaceful realization of the socialist revolution'.
Despite these changes, the formulation in the 
Declaration on the question of the transition from 
capitalism to socialism was still unsatisfactory.
We finally conceded the point only out of 
consideration for the repeatedly expressed wish of 
the leaders of the CPSU that the formulation should 
show some connection with that of the 20th Congress 
of the CPSU.183
Two Vietnamese delegations journeyed to Moscow in
October-November 1957. The first consisted of a twenty-five-
member DRVN government delegation led by Hoang Quoc Viet.
This group represented the DRVN at the celebrations marking
184the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution. The
second and more important delegation was a six-member joint
party and Government group led by Ho Chi Minh. It consisted
of Le Duan, member of the VWP Politburo and Secretariat; Pham
Hung, Minister attached to the Premier's Office and member of
the VWP Politburo; Vo Dinh Tung, Minister of War Invalids;
Nguyen Xien, Minister of Social Welfare and Nguyen Van Kinh,
DRVN Ambassador to the USSR and member of the VWP Central 
18 5Committee. The second delegation also attended the October
Revolution anniversary celebration. Ho, Le Duan and Pham Hung 
represented the VWP at intra-party talks, including the 
twelve-party gathering which approved the Declaration (see 
Table 9-9 for highlights of the delegations' visit).
Quoted in ibid., pp.71-72; additional Chinese amendments 
may be found on pp.72-73.
184 Vietnam News Agency, October 8, 1957 in BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts, Part 5 (October 15, 1957), No. 707, p.47; 
and Vietnam News Agency, October 17, 1957 in ibid. (October 22, 
1957), No. 707, p.35.
18 5 Vietnam News Agency, October 28, 1957 in ibid. (October 31, 
1957), No. 712, p.41.
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T A BLE 9-9
H I G H L I G H T S  OF THE V I S I T  TO M O S C O W  BY THE J O I N T  DRVN-VWP D E L E G A T I O N  
(NOVEMBER 1957)
Date E v ent
1-2 N o v e m b e r S i x - m e m b e r  DRVN-VWP d e l e g a t i o n  led by Ho 
Chi M i n h  a r rives in Moscow; m e t  by 
P r e s i d e n t  Voroshilov.
4 N o v e m b e r Ho Chi M i n h  and DRVN-VWP d e l e g a t i o n  hold 
talks w i t h  N.S. Khrushchev, F i r s t  S e c r e t a r y  
of the CP S U  C entral Committee; and N.A. 
Bulganin, C h a i r m a n  of the U S S R  C o u n c i l  of 
M i n i s t e r s .
6 N o v e m b e r Ho Chi Mi n h  addresses e x t r a o r d i n a r y  session 
of U S S R  S u p r e m e  Soviet.
Le Duan a d dresses a m e e t i n g  of M o s c o w  
factory workers.
8 N o v e m b e r Ho Chi M i n h  attends inter n a t i o n a l  s o l idarity  
m e e t i n g  of M o s c o w  workers, elected to 
h o n o r a r y  presidium.
9 N o v e m b e r Ho Chi M i n h  and Le Duan address g a t h e r i n g  
of 700 V i e t n a m e s e  students studying in the 
USSR.
12-14 N o v e m b e r M e e t i n g  of Twe l v e  C o m m u n i s t  and Workers' 
Par t i e s  in S o c i a l i s t  Countries.
13 N o v e m b e r DRVN d e l e g a t i o n  returns from trip to 
L e n i n g r a d .
16 No v e m b e r D e c l a r a t i o n  of the M e e t i n g  of C o m m u n i s t  and 
Workers' Pa r t i e s  of S o c i a l i s t  Coun t r i e s  
i s s u e d .
21 No v e m b e r Ho Chi M i n h  and N.S. K h r u s h c h e v  hold talks; 
Ho Chi M i n h  g ives M o s c o w  press conference.
Hoang Q u o c  V i e t  and DRVN d e l e g a t i o n  leave 
for home.
28 N o v e m b e r Le Duan and four remai n i n g  m e m b e r s  of DRVN- 
VW P  d e l e g a t i o n  return to Hanoi; Ho Chi M i n h  
remains in Moscow.
20 De c e m b e r Ho Chi M i n h  re p o r t e d  in China.
24 December Ho Chi M i n h  arrives ba c k  in Hanoi.
The inclusion of Le Duan on the joint DRVN-VWP delegation
marked his ascendancy within the Politburo to a position second 
only to Ho Chi Minh. As we have noted previously, Le Duan 
served as Secretary of the Nam Bo Regional Committee until late
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19 56 when he was transferred to the north. Ilis reassignment
coincided with Truong Chinh's dismissal as Party Secretary-
General. Virtually nothing is known of Le Duan's whereabouts
during January-September 1957, at which time he emerged into
public view as the third-ranking member of the VWP Politburo
(after Ho Chi Minh and Truong Chinh). At the conclusion of
the Moscow gathering Ho remained in the Soviet Union for
discussions; Le Duan returned to Hanoi at the head of the
DRVN-VWP delegation and addressed the Politburo on the
significance of the Moscow Declaration. At this time he was
listed ahead of Truong Chinh.
Unfortunately also virtually nothing is known about the
role of the VWP delegation at the Moscow Conference as the
deliberations of the representatives of the twelve ruling
Communist parties were kept secret. We can only speculate
that the VWP leaders, while they may have favoured stronger
references to the non-peaceful path to socialism, were not
entirely dissatisfied by the wording of the final 
18 7Declaration.“ Le Duan's advocacy of increased violence in 
Nam Bo would have been common knowledge among members of the 
Politburo and Central Committee and may very well have been 
one of the reasons why he was included on the VWP delegation.
1 p C Latimer, "Hanoi's Leaders and Their South Vietnam 
Policies", op.cit., pp.53-54.
18 7 It is possible that the VWP was one of the "fraternal 
Parties" mentioned in the Chinese 1963 Open Letter which 
supported the CCP.
18 8 Rostow, The Diffusion of Power, op.cit., pp.41 and 43; 
Sheehan, compiler, The Pentagon Papers, op.cit., p.75; and 
Honey, Genesis of a Tragedy, op.cit., pp.73-74.
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The VWP, in approving the policies outlined in "Duong Loi Cach
Mang Mien Nam" had committed itself to the use of force when
18 9conditions were ripe." " In fact the wording of the 1957
Moscow Declaration clearly indicated that the use or non-use
of violence would be determined by the behaviour of those
holding state power. /according to the Declaration:
The forms of the transition to socialism may vary 
for different countries. The working class and its 
vanguard - the Marxist-Leninist Party - seek to 
achieve the socialist revolution by peaceful means.
This would accord with the interests of the working 
class and the people as a whole as well as with the 
national interests of the country.
Today in a number of capitalist countries the 
working class led by its vanguard has the opportunity, 
given a united working-class and popular front or 
other workable forms of agreement and political 
co-operation between the different parties and public 
organisations, to unite a majority of the people, to 
win state power without civil war and ensure the 
transfer of the basic means of production to the 
hands of the people. Relying on the majority of the 
people and decisively rebuffing the opportunist 
elements incapable of relinquishing the policy of 
compromise with the capitalists and landlords, the 
working class can defeat the reactionary, anti-popular 
forces, secure a firm majority in parliament, transform 
parliament from an instrument serving the class 
interests of the bourgeoisie into an instrument 
serving the working people, launch a non-parliamentary 
mass struggle, smash the resistance of the reactionary 
forces and create the necessary conditions for 
peaceful realisation of the socialist revolution.
All this will be possible only by broad and ceaseless 
development of the class struggle of the workers, 
peasant masses and the urban middle strata against 
big monopoly capital, against reaction, for profound 
social reforms, for peace and socialism.
In the event of the ruling class resorting to 
violence against the people, the possibility of non­
peaceful transition to socialism should be borne in 
mind. Leninism teaches, and experience confirms, that
Working Paper, Appendices, Item 301, p.3 states: "the
volume [Duong Loi Cach Mang Mien Nam] outlined a new strategic 
orientation for the South Vietnam revolution... It is necessary 
to continue the national democratic revolution in South 
Vietnam and it is necessary to use force to overthrow the 
feudalist imperialist regime...".
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the ruling classes never relinquish power 
voluntarily. In this case the degree of bitterness 
and the forms of class struggle will depend not so 
much on the proletariat as on the resistance put up 
by the reactionary circles to the will of the 
overwhelming majority of the people, on these 
circles using force at one or another stage of the 
struggle for socialism.
The possibility of one or another way to socialism 
depends on the concrete conditions in each country.
Three months prior to the Moscow Conference Le Duan in a
major speech commemorating the twelfth anniversary of the
August Revolution entitled "Reassessment of the Leadership of
the Vietnamese Proletariat", set out his views on the class
content of the national united front in Viet-Nam at the 
191present stage. The purpose of the speech appears to have
been to set out the logic and ideological underpinnings for a
new national united front in Viet-Nam based on a program
which appealed to the self-interests of the various social
classes comprising Vietnamese society. According to Le Duan:
therefore to conceive the National United Front 
independently of class awareness is but an abstract 
knowledge [sic], a means of deceit or an instinct 
of conservation of the selfish interests of his own 
class.
The content of the national united front cannot 
exclude class content. ^-92
Hudson, Lowenthal and MacFarquhar, editors, The Sino- 
Soviet Dispute, op.cit., pp.54-55 cites the text provided by 
the New China News Agency, November 22, 1957. See also: TASS
(Moscow) in English Hellschreiber to Europe, 0110 GMT,
November 23, 1957 in U.S. FBIS Daily Report (November 25, 1957), 
No. 228, pp.BB1-BB7.
191 Reprinted in Le Duan, On the Socialist Revolution in 
Vietnam (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1965),
op.cit., Vol. I, pp.57-84. This speech is important as it 
appears to be the first major statement by Le Duan since 
regrouping to the north.
Ibid., p.72; Le Duan specifically excluded from membership 
feudalists, that is, landlords who co-operate with the 
imperialists.
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Although Le Duan failed to mention the role of violence 
in achieving the objectives of the National United Front he 
did call for a step-up of the revolution in the south. In his 
words :
[t]he revolutionary task of all of us is to achieve 
national independence and democracy all over the 
country. This task lays ahead of us two concrete 
works: to build the North and take it vigorously
to socialism and to step up the revolutionary 
movement in South Vietnam against U.S. imperialism 
and Diem's feudalism.
In order to carry through these two tasks it is 
necessary to accelerate the patriotic movement among 
the population; this movement is manifested 
concretely in the valiant creative labour of all the 
northern people in their advance to socialism, in 
the gradual improvement of the material and spiritual 
life of the people, in the measure to thwart the 
sabotage of U.S. imperialism and Diem's feudalism 
and to oppose speculative transactions. In the South 
this patriotism must be concretely manifested in the 
movement opposing the enslavement policy of the 
U.S.-Diem clique, claiming national independence, 
fighting the fascist policies, repression and 
oppression, by the U.S. clique, demanding democracy, 
improvement of the people's livelihood, thwarting 
the U.S.-Diem's bellicose policy and claiming peaceful 
reunification of the country.^-'
In short, the strategy which Le Duan proposed in August
1957 was not in conflict with the wording of the November
194Moscow Declaration, " especially as the latter held open two 
possibilities in the transition to socialism. Presumably if 
the Diem regime resorted to violent repression of a stepped- 
up political struggle movement, then the VWP would be justified 
in resorting to armed struggle.
Ibid., pp. 83-84 .
194 It may have run counter to policies of the Soviet Union. 
Khrushchev wrote in Pravda at that time: "the only correct
path in the development of international relations is a policy 
of peaceful coexistence...We work from the premise that wars 
are not necessary to advance socialism"; translated and 
reprinted in Current Digest of the Soviet Press (January 1, 
1958), Vol. IX, No. 14, pp.13-18.
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The VWP quickly endorsed the Moscow Declaration calling
it not only a "political program for all the Communist and
Workers' parties of socialist countries" but also "a political
program" guiding "the building of socialism in North Vietnam
195as well as the struggle for Vietnam's reunification". On
November 30th after Le Duan and Pham Hung had arrived back in 
Hanoi they immediately addressed a meeting of the VWP
196Politburo on the significance of the Moscow Conference. 
According to an official press account: the "Politburo
expressed elation and confidence in the growth and solidarity 
of the socialist countries and communist movement. Particular 
[attention] was paid to the joint declaration and peace 
manifesto. The Party's Politburo's meeting decided to convene 
an extraordinary session of the Party's Central Committee to 
hear reports on these two important international 
conferences" .
Accordingly the 13th enlarged Plenum met on December 4th 
and heard a report by Le Duan. According to one official
Editorial in Nhan Dan (November 24, 1957) broadcast by 
Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 0516 
GMT, November 24, 1957.
They returned on November 28th? Vietnam News Agency in 
English morse to Southeast Asia, 1128 GMT, November 28, 1957. 
In an address before DRVN officials Le Duan is quoted as 
saying, "The Moscow documents have not only confirmed the line 
and created favorable conditions for North Vietnam to advance 
toward socialism but have also shown the path of struggle for 
national liberation and have created favorable conditions for 
the revolutionary movement in South Vietnam"; Vietnam News 
Agency, December 7, 1957 quoted in Honey, Communism in North 
Vietnam, op.cit., p.57. This same quote appears in Latimer, 
Hanoi' s Leaders and Their South Vietnam Policies", op.cit., 
pp.55-56, who cites Vietnam News Agency, December 8, 1957. 
Neither broadcast can be located in the U.S. FBIS or BBC 
monitoring reports.
197 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 
0558 GMT, December 1, 1957.
account: a unanimous resolution was passed "reflecting
agreement of the Party Central Committee with the
observations and documents which these international
congresses [of 12 Communist and Workers' Parties in socialist
countries and 64 Communist and Workers' Parties in the world]
had approved and appeal[ing] to the entire party to study the
198documents and widely disseminate them among the people...".
Interestingly, however, the communique of the 13th Plenum,
which was finally published on March 23, 1958, made no
reference to the 1957 Moscow Conference or its Declaration and
Peace Manifesto. The communique merely stated that the Plenum
considered "the living standards of workers, government
officials and cadres; analyzed the present wage system [salary
structure]; and discussed ways of improving the wage system
199and increasing wages in 1958".
The lack of any reference to the Moscow Conference at 
this time, especially after the extensive inter-Party 
discussions, deserves explanation. Quite possibly the
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1 9 s Voice of Vietnam dictation in Vietnamese to Southeast Asia, 
0001 GMT, December 5, 1957.
19 9 "Thong Cao Cua Hoi Nghi Lan Thu 13 (mo rong) Cua Ban Chap 
Hanh Trung Uong Dang Lao Dong Viet Nam" [Communique of the 
Thirteenth (enlarged) Plenum of the Central Committee of the 
Viet Nam Workers' Party], Nhan Dan (March 23, 1958), No. 1472, 
pp.l and 4.
Ho Chi Minh was still overseas at this time; it is 
possible that no formal resolution was passed until the Central 
Committee heard the results of his talks in Peking and Moscow.
A conference for high and mid-level cadres to study the 
documents of the Moscow Conference was held from December 27, 
1957 to January 14, 1958. It heard reports by Le Duan and 
Truong Chinh and was addressed by Ho Chi Minh on the last day. 
Hanoi Radio D/S [domestic service?], 0030 GMT, January 17,
1958.
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Central Committee was unable to reach a consensus on a
statement indicating the role and timing of revolutionary 
violence in the present stage of the Vietnamese revolution. 
During the last quarter of 1957, for example, party officials 
used the anniversaries of the 1940 Nam Bo Uprising and 
National Resistance Day to argue the appropriateness of 
lessons from the past. Tran Van Giau, a party cadre active 
in the August Revolution in Nam Bo and now a senior official, 
argued for restraint:
Thus if an uprising is raised when the revolutionary 
force is not powerful enough or when the powerful 
revolutionary force is not well organized, correctly 
led, and closely united, this uprising cannot 
succeed. It cannot escape certain failure, and an 
abortive uprising will exert a bad influence, 
especially on the revolutionary force itself.^01
Nhan Dan, the party newspaper, criticized those who had
become disillusioned with present policies. According to an 
editorial marking National Resistance Day:
[djuring the first years of our resistance, many 
people have shown themselves confused and have had 
no confidence in our final victory... Today after 
three years of hard struggle, some people are 
beginning to be discouraged and to doubt our advance 
under the party leadership because they are unable 
to hold fast to the basic principles and the 
development of our revolution during the present 
new phase.z ^2
Le Duan, citing the August Revolution as evidence, 
argued that:
[w]ithout a superior international position the 
revolution for national liberation of the Vietnamese 
people cannot have a revolutionary theory capable 
of grasping the line of growth and extinction of
Voice of Vietnam in Vietnamese to South Vietnam, 1200 GMT, 
November 23, 1957.
202 "Let Us Develop The Heroic Traditions of Our People and 
Firmly Maintain Our Confidence in Our Struggle" editorial in 
Nhan Dan (December 19, 1957) broadcast by Voice of Vietnam in 
Vietnamese to Southeast Asia, 0440 GMT, December 19, 1957.
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imperialism, and cannot have powerful allied forces 
in the world and cannot triumph. It is precisely 
the unity of the world proletariat and the 
contradictions of imperialism which have created 
for the national liberation movement in Vietnam the 
conditions to overthrow imperialism and local feudalism.^ 0 3
It is this latter point which appears to provide the best
explanation for Ho Chi Minh's prolonged absence from Viet-Nam.
Ho recognized that the struggle for the unification of Viet-
Nam could not be accomplished without relating it to broader
2 04developments affecting the socialist camp as a whole. Any
attempt to step up the revolutionary movement in Nam Bo would
need Soviet and Chinese support. It was obviously in Viet-
Nam's interest to follow a policy which encouraged a unity of
views between Moscow and Peking on the issue of Vietnamese 
2 05reunification. Although information is lacking on the
Le Duan, "Reassessment of the Leadership of the Vietnamese 
Proletariat" in On the Socialist Revolution in Vietnam, op.cit. 
Vol. 1, p.82.
Ho Chi Minh, "The October Revolution and the Liberation of 
the Peoples of the East (November 6, 1957)" in Fall, editor,
Ho Chi Minh On Revolution, op.cit., p.331 wrote: "the national
question can no longer be viewed from an abstract and isolated 
point of view. Marxism-Leninism has shown that national 
movements effectively directed against imperialism unfailingly 
contribute to the general revolutionary struggle and that 
national claims and national movements must not be estimated 
according to their strictly local political and social 
character in a narrow-minded way, but according to the part 
they play against the imperialist forces in the world".
2 05 North Viet-Nam's role in the Sino-Soviet dispute is a 
subject deserving further detailed study. Although various 
attempts have been made to chart the VWP's policy shifts in 
favour of one power and then towards the other, a general view 
would suggest that Viet-Nam followed its own independent course 
Ho Chi Minh, a founding member of the French Communist Party 
and an early associate of the Comintern, was especially 
concerned to maintain the unity of the socialist camp as an 
adjunct of the struggle for the reunification of Viet-Nam. Ho 
wrote in his final testament, "[b]eing a man who has devoted 
his whole life to the revolution, the more proud I am of the 
growth of the international communist and workers' movement, 
the more pained I am by the current discord among the fraternal 
Parties. I hope that our Party will do its best to contribute
(cont'd)
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substance of IIo' s talks in Moscow and Peking following the
conference of Communist and Workers' parties, it seems likely
that Ho discussed economic assistance (particularly with
2 0 6Soviet officials),*" bloc unity (the relations between parties
as well cis with Yugoslavia) and the form which the Vietnamese
revolution should take (whether peaceful or non-peaceful).
Paul Gorman, in analyzing the various interpretations of
events in Hanoi in the last quarter of 1957, concluded:
Proponents of both interpretations [that is, that 
the VWP was either split into pro-Chinese and pro- 
Russian factions (Honey) or that the VWP was split 
between factions who disagreed on how much priority 
should be given to northern developments as opposed 
to revolution in the south (Zagoria)] conclude that 
Hanoi's predilection for the USSR was ipso facto a 
deferral of support for the insurgency in the South.
But the evidence supports a third interpretation.
It is quite possible that DRV leaders sought and won 
Soviet support because they found it impossible 
amicably to set priorities between internal and 
external national objectives. It seems evident that 
only the Soviets could offer the wherewithal to 
pursue both sets of goals simultaneously, and it is 
possible that the Lao Dong leaders opted for 'guns 
and butter' rather than 'socialism in one country'.
The apparent harmony among the pro-China and pro- 
Russia 'factions' by early 1958 bespeaks such a 
compromise solution. Of course, serious doubt 
remains whether the Soviets would have valued DRV 
fealty high enough to pay the price, yet it seems 
that such could have been the case. The new DRV- 
USSR understanding reached during 1957 definitely 
included the extension of material aid which North 
Vietnam needed for its economic advancement. It
205 cont'd
effectively to the restoration of unity among the fraternal 
Parties on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian 
internationalism, in a way which conforms to both reason and 
sentiment". See: President Ho Chi Minh's Testament (Hanoi:
Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1969), p.10.
2 0 6 The DRVN and the USSR signed a cultural co-operation 
agreement for 1958 on December 25, 1957 after a week of talks. 
Nguyen Khanh Toan, the DRVN's Vice Minister of Education 
signed for Viet-Nam. Vietnam News Agency in English morse to 
Southeast Asia, 1130 GMT, December 27, 1957.
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evidently also included Soviet concurrence in a more 
adventuresome policy toward reunification. Whether 
or not specific DRV advances upon South Vietnam were 
countenanced, it is evident that the DRV leaders had 
obtained Soviet recognition that North Vietnam's 
circumstances placed it outside the range of 
strategic and doctrinal considerations which had led 
Khrushchev, et al., into 'peaceful competition' and 
'peaceful coexistence207
VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A. CONSOLIDATING THE NORTH
On New Year's Day 1958, Ho Chi Minh announced that "the
period of economic restoration has come to an end and the
period of planned economic development has begun. This marks
a new advance in the revolutionary work of our people...To
develop our economy and culture means to build socialism 
2 08gradually". In short the DRVN had recovered from the
damage inflicted during the Resistance War; the national
democratic revolution in the North was declared completed and
the era of building socialism begun.
The DRVN's economic development plans for 1958 were
mapped out at the 8th Session of the National Assembly which
209met from April 16th-29th. In his report to the National
Assembly, Pham Van Dong set out two major tasks to be 
accomplished:
2 07 "Hanoi and the Insurgency in South Vietnam", in United 
States-Vietnam Relations, op.cit., Book 2, IV.A.5. Tab 3, p.52. 
General Gorman was identified as the author of this section 
after the publication of the Pentagon Papers; see: Kahin,
"The Pentagon Papers: A Critical Evaluation", op.cit., p.677.
2 08 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia,
0507 GMT, January 1, 1958.
2 0 9 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia,
1215 GMT, April 29, 1958. This session of the National 
Assembly announced a number of personnel changes; for an
(cont'd)
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1. We must develop the state economy along socialist 
lines, turn Vietnam from a backward agricultural 
country into a prosperous agricultural and industrial 
country, and then into a rich, strong, advanced, and 
industrialized socialist country.
2. Simultaneously, and beginning now, we must pay 
particular attention to transforming the national 
economy, transforming the non-socialist economic 
sectors into socialist ones, and transforming 
agriculture, handicrafts, and private capitalist 
industry and commerce along socialist lines.
211It was clear from this and other reports"- that the DRVN 
was preparing to initiate a three-year period of planned 
economic development in which every effort would be made to 
transform various sectors of the economy into state-owned 
enterprises. Dong reported, for example, that only capital 
construction, posts and telegraphst railways and banks were 
one hundred percent state-operated. Although the socialized 
sector of the economy was "the leading force" Dong pointed out
209 cont'd
analysis see: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence
and Research, Office of Intelligence Research and Analysis, 
Intelligence Report: North Vietnam Braces Itself for Socialism
(Washington, D.C.: October 13 , 19 58) , No. 7 8 37 .
210 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia,
1150 GMT, April 17, 1958 in U.S. FBIS Daily Report (April 21, 
1958), No. 77, pp.EEE1-EEE2.
211 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia,
1320 GMT, April 29, 1958 reports that the National Assembly 
passed four resolutions (endorsing the leading role of the VWP 
in the DRVN government, endorsing the tasks of the three-year 
plan and the State plan for 1958, approving the government 
report on the balance of payments for 1957 and the national 
budget for 1958 and temporarily postponing elections for the 
National Assembly thus continuing a resolution of the 6th 
Session of the National Assembly) and two draft laws (on the 
organization of local administration and on the conditions of 
service for PAVN officers).
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that there still remained a large capitalist sector,
especially in the areas of handicrafts, small business (retail
212trade) and agriculture. The DRVN's first Three-Year Plan,
outlined at the National Assembly's Oth Session, indicated
that each of these areas would be gradually transformed along
socialist lines. In agriculture, for example, nascent mutual
aid teams would provide the base from which agricultural
212co-operatives would be built.
In rounding out his report Dong identified two areas of
crucial importance. He stated that:
[sjocialist transformation of private capitalist 
commerce must be considered as one of the most 
important and urgent problems because in the private 
capitalist sector there are a number of bad elements 
who, by engaging in speculation and hoarding, have 
disrupted the markets, evaded taxes, etc.^-Q
The other area of importance concerned agriculture where
"particular importance must be paid to the production of food,
especially paddy". Here, stated Dong, "the most important
problem at present" lies in solving the problem of irrigation,
obtaining sufficient fertilizer and improving agricultural
techniques.
The DRVN's economic development plans also called for the 
growth of industry which, as Pham Van Dong indicated, relied
212 Privately owned small businesses and handicrafts accounted 
for 59% of industrial output. Sixty-eight percent of retail 
trade and 39% of wholesale trade was in private hands.
213 Hong Kong dispatch in The New York Times (April 20, 1958), 
p.5 cites remarks by Nguyen Van Tran, the DRVN deputy chairman 
of the State Planning Board.
214 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 
1150 GMT, April 17, 1958 in U.S. FBIS Daily Report (April 21, 
1958), No. 77, p.EEE2.
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"on the cooperation and assistance of the socialist countries". 
In this area the DRVN planned to concentrate on developing the 
means of production, producing consumer goods and exploiting 
natural resources.
The DRVN's economic development plans were obviously made
possible by increased foreign assistance (primarily Soviet and
215Chinese) which rose from 1958 onward. In May 1958 the
DRVN's progress in building socialism was acknowledged when a
representative of the VWP was invited to attend a meeting of
216the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance in Moscow. The
Council was composed of members of the Warsaw Pact. 
Representatives of the CCP, Korean Labor Party, and the 
Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party were also invited to 
send observers.
Although the Council meeting was primarily concerned with
217 .ironing out problems of economic integration in Europe, its 
final communique indicated that economic co-operation was 
being planned for the entire socialist bloc:
In November 1958 the DRVN signed an agreement on cultural 
co-operation with Albania and the following month negotiated 
a trade agreement with the USSR which witnessed a 70% increase 
in trade over 1956; see: Vietnam News Agency, November 25,
1958 and December 30, 1958 respectively. For a general 
discussion consult, "Soviet Trade With South-East Asian 
Countries", The YUVA Newsletter (April 1962), Vol. I, No. 2, 
p.36 and (January 1963), Vol. 2, No. 1, p.l and Honey, 
Communism in North Vietnam, op.cit., pp.65-66.
Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia,
1100 GMT, June 23, 1958 reports that the VWP delegation was 
led by Politburo member Nguyen Duy Trinh, a specialist on 
foreign aid and economic affairs.
Harry Schwartz dispatch from New York in The New York Times 
(May 25, 1958), p.36; William J. Jorden dispatch from Moscow m  
ibid. (May 27, 1958), p.5 and Sydney Gruson dispatch from 
Warsaw in ibid. (May 25, 1958), pp.l and 34.
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[t]he representatives of parties of the countries 
which do not belong to the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance expressed readiness to take an 
active part in the economic cooperation of the 
Socialist countries, to strengthen this cooperation 
in due forms by measures conforming to the specific 
conditions in their countries.
Throughout the remainder of the year the DRVN proceeded 
on the basis of economic plans approved by the 8th Session of 
the National Assembly. In September the Council of Ministers 
summed up the prospects for continued economic development in 
this way:
There are advantages and difficulties in the present 
situation. First, our advantages. The rectification 
campaign has brought results in rural areas. Thanks 
to the patriotic emulation movement, the carrying out 
of the State plan has made notable progress in recent 
months, especially in the fourth quarter. In this 
10th month crop, we have exerted new efforts to 
increase production and develop the manpower exchange 
and co-operative movement; the gradual reform of anti­
socialist economic elements along socialist lines is 
being carried out, or preparations are being made to 
carry it out in a steadfast and positive manner. We 
have begun to readjust our organisations and pay 
special attention to the problem of alloting 
managerial jobs. We have paid special attention to 
the political and ideological education of cadres and 
the people and achieved initial results. In State 
factories, we are embarking on a campaign aimed at 
teaching socialist thinking to workers, improving 
factory management, and extensively applying labour 
union laws.
In the present situation in the North, however, we 
face many difficulties and obstacles in every branch 
of activity at both central and local levels, and many 
shortcomings and mistakes have not been corrected. To 
surmount these difficulties and obstacles, we must 
clearly and fully understand them. There are, however, 
fundamental advantages... These advantages are thesource of our determination. 19
Reuters dispatch from London in ibid. (May 25, 1958), p.35 
reproduces the communique of the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance as translated by TASS.
219 Vietnam News Agency, October 24, 1958.
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In short the DRVN was making progress in its efforts to 
develop the north, a fact recognized by the Soviet Union. On 
the occasion of the 1958 celebrations of the October 
Revolution the DRVN was listed in slogans marking that 
occasion as among the nations "building socialism" for the 
first time.220
At the end of the year the VWP convened the 14th Plenum 
of its Central Committee (November) and the 9th Session of the 
National Assembly (December 9-12) to review developments in 
1958 and to decide on the general line, direction and tasks 
for the socialist revolution. The Central Committee, after 
hearing a report by Nguyen Duy Trinh on the 1958-60 plan for 
economic transformation and cultural development decided that:
1[t]he immediate central task is to step up the 
socialist transformation of the sector of individual 
economy of the peasants and handicraftsmen and that 
of the sector of privately-run capitalist economy, 
and at the same time to strive to develop the sector 
of state-run economy which is the leading force of 
the whole national economy.' (emphasis in the original)221
The 9th Session of the National Assembly approved the
final draft of the Three-Year Plan for Economic and Cultural
222Development for the years 1958-60. According to Nguyen
Duy Trinh the Three-Year Plan included the following three 
objectives:
Cameron, "The Soviet Union and Vietnam", op.cit., p.199.
221 An Outline History of the Viet Nam Workers' Party, op.cit., 
p.88; material enclosed Tn single quotation marks is usually 
an excerpt from the original resolution. See also: Hanoi
Radio in Vietnamese D/S, 0015 GMT, December 8, 1958 in BBC, 
Summary of World Broadcasts, Part 5 (December 11, 1958),
No. 827, pp.53-54.
222 Hanoi Radio in Vietnamese, 1100 GMT, December 5, 1958.
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1. To accelerate the development of agricultural 
and industrial production by considering agricultural 
production as the main point, to solve the food 
problem, while paying keen attention to industrial 
production, increasing means of production and 
satisfying the major part of the demand in consumer goods.
2. To endeavour to transform agriculture, 
handicrafts, private capitalist industry and trade 
along socialist lines, the main link in the chain 
being the acceleration of agricultural co-operation; 
simultaneously to develop and strengthen the State 
economic sector.
3. On the basis of developing production, to 
improve a step further the material and cultural
The decision to step-up the process of agricultural
collectivization coupled with a record grain harvest of 4.6
»million metric tons (see Table 6-1) is clear evidence that the
DRVN had overcome the disruptions caused by land reform. Pham
Van Dong, in fact, declared at the 8th Session of the National
Assembly that "[g]enerally speaking, the mistakes committed
during land reform have been corrected and the rectification
of errors has brought good results. A number of remaining
224cases are still being redressed".
In addition to positive progress in the economic 
consolidation of the north, VWP leaders also achieved success 
in 1957-58 in the following areas:
Nguyen Duy Trinh, "Economic and Cultural Development", in 
The Problems Facing the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam in 
l$6l (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, n.d.),
pp.9-10.
224 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 
1150 GMT, April 17, 1958 in U.S. FBIS Daily Report (April 21, 
1958), No. 77, P.EEE3.
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1. The Viet-Nam Workers’ Party, weakened by the land
reform fiasco in 1956, was remoulded into an effective 
225organization.
2. The People's Army of Viet-Nam, swollen in size by the
absorption of regional and guerrilla forces as well as
226military units regrouped from the south,  ^ was reorganized
into a modern fighting force, with various specialized 
227branches. During 1957-59 it underwent a process of
technological modernization. At the same time Party political
2 2 8controls were instituted at all levels.
As a result of decisions taken by the VWP's 12th Plenum, 
military units were assigned tasks in the civilian economy.
An Outline History of the Viet Nam Workers' Party, op.cit., 
p.90. This was particularly important as membership in the 
VWP probably never exceeded 2% of the population. See: David 
W.P. Elliott, "Political Integration in North Vietnam: The
Cooperativization Period", in Zasloff and Brown, editors, 
Communism in Indochina, op.cit., pp.165-93 for a discussion of 
the importance of this low ratio of Party members to the 
civilian population. Fall estimates that the VWP membership 
in 1960 may have totalled 500,000 in a population of 30 million; 
Fall, "A 'Straight Zigzag': The Road to Socialism in North
Viet-Nam", op.cit., p.216.
22 6 Associated Press dispatch from Washington in The New York 
Times (July 1, 1955), p.10 quotes the U.S. State Department as 
estimating that PAVN had doubled in size from 4 to 6 new 
infantry divisions; Associated Press dispatch from Washington 
in ibid. (June 2, 1956), p.4, reports that PAVN had increased 
from seven to 20 divisions. The estimate was provided by 
Walter S. Robertson, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State.
227 Much of the equipment was provided by China and was 
transported into Viet-Nam without being controlled or 
supervised by the ICC; see: Nutt, Troika on Trial, op.cit.,
Vol. I, pp.238-50. The reorganization of PAVN witnessed the 
demobilization of 80,000 veterans; see: Vietnam News Agency
in English morse to Southeast Asia, 1100 GMT, May 8, 1958.
22 8 Hanoi Radio dictation in Vietnamese to Southeast Asia, 
0030 GMT, July 2, 1958.
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The Army's involvement in this sector was increased in 1958
as certain units assumed responsibility for running State
* 229farms.
3. Following the "Nhan Van-Giai Pham Affair" DRVN
authorities instituted a variety of programs to control
dissident intellectuals. In 1957 a new Writers' Union was
formed and a new journal Van (Literature) published. In 1958,
after a series of re-education courses and criticism 
230sessions, (for musicians, fine arts, writers, journalists,
etc.) reorganized their executive committees. During June and
July, for example, numerous dissidents were expelled or
suspended from membership. At the same time the government
promulgated a variety of guidelines to control the activities
2 31of the intelligentsia.
4. In January 1957 the 6th Session of the National 
Assembly appointed a Committee to Amend the Constitution under 
the chairmanship of Ho Chi Minh. The purpose of this
2 2 9 Voice of Vietnam in Vietnamese to Southeast Asia, 1330 
GMT, March 26, 1958 provides commentary on Vo Nguyen Giap's, 
"The 1958 Responsibilities of Our Army"; for an assessment of 
the PAVN's performance in the first half of 1958 see: Voice
of Vietnam in Vietnamese to Southeast Asia, 1100 GMT, June 27, 
1958. See also: Gittinger, "Communist Land Policy in North
Vietnam", op.cit., p.124.
2 3 0 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 
1100 GMT, April 15, 1958 carries a self-criticism by Nguyen 
Manh Tuong in which he repudiates his speech on land reform 
in 1956. It will be recalled that a doctored version of 
Tuong's speech was given wide circulation by RVN psychological 
warfare agencies.
2 31 Nhu Phong, "Intellectuals, Writers and Artists", op.cit., 
pp.84-89; New China News Agency, April 13, 1958; Reuters 
dispatch from Saigon, 1143 GMT, April 22, 1958 in U.S. FBIS 
Daily Report (April 22, 1958), No. 78, p.EEEl; Voice of 
Vietnam dictation to Southeast Asia, 0030 GMT, July 10, 1958 
in ibid. (July 11, 1958), No. 134, pp.EEE6-EEE7.
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committee was to prepare a new document to replace the 1946
Constitution. In June 1958 it was announced that a referendum
232would be held to approve the draft constitution. The
significance of this development is that by providing a legal 
base for its program of socialist construction, the DRVN 
overcame many of the criticisms voiced in 1956 concerning the 
legal rights of individuals in the DRVN.
B. WINNING THE SYMPATHY AND SUPPORT OF THE WORLD'S PEOPLES
In 1957-58 the DRVN made great strides in expanding the
level of its international contacts. Most progress was made
within the socialist camp, where the DRVN negotiated a series
of economic and cultural agreements. The DRVN and socialist
countries also exchanged high-level delegations which served
to draw the DRVN closer to its European allies, which raised
the DRVN's international prestige, which matched the RVN's
efforts in the field of diplomacy and, most importantly, which
netted the DRVN much needed development assistance. The DRVN
2 3 3also improved its relations with neighbouring Laos,
2 34Cambodia, Burma and India as well as with nations 
comprising the Afro-Asian Bloc.
2 32 Voice of Vietnam in Vietnamese to Southeast Asia, 0130 
GMT, April 19, 1958; dictation in Vietnamese to Southeast 
Asia, 0030 GMT, July 1, 1958.
233 An RLG delegation visited the DRVN in 1957 to discuss 
border problems and the withdrawal of military forces from the 
frontier, see: Vietnam News Agency in English morse to
Southeast Asia, 1203 GMT, October 4, 1957 and Reuters dispatch 
from Hong Kong in The New York Times (September 23, 1957), p.8.
234 A DRVN delegation attended celebrations in Phnom Penh 
marking the anniversary of Bhudda's birth; Vietnam News Agency 
in English morse to Southeast Asia, 0540 GMT, May 23, 1957. 
Later in the year Cambodia and the DRVN held talks on the 
status of Vietnamese residents of Cambodia; Vietnam News Agency 
in English morse to Southeast Asia, 0500 GMT, November 2, 1957.
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These international contacts became especially important
in 1958 when the DRVN made another attempt to settle the
issue of Vietnamese reunification by peaceful means. As we
have noted above the VWP was unable to reach a consensus on
the issue of non-peaceful transition to socialism at its 13th
Plenum. On the one hand there was disagreement over domestic
factors. Some argued that a resort to force at that time
would be premature. Others argued that priority should
continue to be placed on developing the north. On the other
hand, it would appear, there was also disagreement over
external factors. Undoubtedly Sino-Soviet differences weighed
heavily on these deliberations. Given these circumstances it
seems likely that in 1958 the VWP bowed to Soviet pressures
to intensify the pursuit of Vietnamese reunification by
23 5peaceful means.
As we noted in Chapter 5, when it became clear that the 
RVN would refuse to meet any of the deadlines on political 
issues set by the Geneva Agreements, the DRVN immediately 
launched a broad campaign proposing contacts on several levels.
During most of this period the DRVN dutifully endorsed 
USSR foreign policy. The Moscow Conference declaration and 
peace manifesto was endorsed by a host of domestic groups in 
North Viet-Nam including the Fatherland Front; Vietnam News 
Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 0520 GMT, March 23, 
1958. The November 6th appeal and December 25th resolution of 
the USSR's Supreme Soviet on easing world tension and 
co-operation for peace received wide endorsement in the DRVN; 
Hanoi Radio D/S, 0030 GMT, January 25, 1958. Soviet proposals 
for a summit conference were backed by the Standing Committee 
of the DRVN National Assembly; Vietnam News Agency in English 
morse to Southeast Asia, 1100 GMT, January 30, 1958. The 
Soviet decision to halt nuclear testing was similarly 
acclaimed; Vietnam NewTs Agency in English morse to Southeast 
Asia, 0552 GMT, April 16, 1958. The DRVN also joined in Bloc 
attacks on Yugoslav revisionism after Tito circulated a draft 
program on the Yugoslav Communist League; Vietnam News Agency 
in English morse to Southeast Asia, 0621 GMT, May 8, 1958.
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The DRVN also kept the issue alive by addressing letters to
the ICC and the Geneva Conference co-chairmen. This same
pattern continued during 1957 and 1958.
On June 8, 1957 Pham Van Dong forwarded a letter to the
Geneva co-chairmen asking them to take all necessary measures
to insure that "the Geneva Agreements are respected and
2 36correctly implemented". This was followed later in the
year by repeated calls to expand postal, banking and trading 
2 37relations. On July 18, 1957 the DRVN once again proposed
to the "competent authorities" in South Viet-Nam that they
hold a consultative conference to discuss reunification 
2 38elections. In this note the DRVN once again reiterated its
earlier proposals for the establishment of normal relations
"in all fields". The RVN responded with a communique dated
July 26, 1957 scotching the proposals. Otherwise these
efforts to keep the issue of Vietnamese reunification alive
failed to evoke any response from the non-Communist Geneva 
239powers.
2 36 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia,
0500 GMT, June 12, 1957 and Associated Press dispatch from 
Saigon in The New York Times (June 13, 1956), p.10. Apparently 
the DRVN received no reply.
2 37 For statements by the various departments concerned see: 
Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 1100 
GMT, June 25, 1957; in English morse to South Vietnam, 0140 
GMT, August 11, 1957; Voice of Vietnam in Vietnamese to 
Southeast Asia, 2330 GMT, September 24, 1957 and Vietnam News 
Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 0607 GMT, January 
30, 1958.
2 38 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia,
0525 GMT, July 24, 1957 and Tillman Durdin dispatch from Hong 
Kong in The New York Times (July 21, 1958), p.9.
239 Sar Desai, Indian Foreign Policy, op.cit., p.lll.
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While the DRVN initiatives of 1957 appear to be a
continuation of its earlier attempts to put the onus on the
RVN and to stimulate the political struggle movement in Nam
Bo, a definite shift in intention was noticeable in 1958. On
March 7th Pham Van Dong proposed not only the re-establishment
of trading relations but also a bilateral reduction in armed
f o r c e s . T h i s  initiative immediately received endorsement
241from the Soviet Union and China. Dong's offer was
rejected by the RVN as "propaganda" aimed at undermining a
24 2SEATO meeting then taking place in Manila. In a further
statement issued on April 26th the RVN called upon the DRVN
to renounce the "revolutionary acceleration of the liberation
of the South" characterized by an increase in terror, sabotage
24 3and murder in remote southern villages.
Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 
0500 GMT, March 9, 1958. Dong mentioned that PAVN had been 
reduced by 80,000 in the previous year and called for an end 
to U.S. interference in Viet-Nam.
New China News Agency (Peking) radioteletype in English to 
West and North Europe, 2100 GMT, March 8, 1958 and 1730 GMT, 
March 9, 1958; and Radio Moscow in Vietnamese to Southeast 
Asia, 1300 GMT, March 10, 1958. The statement also received 
wide endorsement by a variety of groups in the DRVN, for a 
statement by the Fatherland Front see: Vietnam News Agency
in English morse to Southeast Asia, 1619 GMT, March 10, 1958.
24 2 Associated Press dispatch from Saigon in The New York 
Times (March 17, 1958), p.5; for details of the SEATO meeting 
see: dispatch by Robert C. Doty from Paris in ibid. (March 2,
1958), p.3, and Hinton, Communist China in World Politics, 
op.cit., p.37, who points out that the meeting was concerned 
with "'indirect aggression', meaning Communist subversion, 
clearly a major instrumentality of the CPR and those Asian 
Communist Parties closest to it".
24 3 "Declaration of the Government of The Republic April 26, 
1958", The Times of Viet Nam (April 26, 1958), Vol. 2, No.
85, pp.1-2.
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Pham Van Dong's letter of March 7th, and a follow-up
statement issued by the Premier's Office on May 8 t h , w e r e
certainly more than mere propaganda. They went much further
than the earlier initiatives designed to demonstrate the RVN's
obstinancy and the DRVN's commitment to peaceful
reunification. Coming as they did after the Moscow Conference,
the 13th Plenum and Ho's lenghty discussions in Moscow and
Peking, they appear designed as part of a campaign to prove
that the peaceful reunification of Viet-Nam was in fact
impossible because of the attitudes of the RVN and the United
States. Throughout 1958 various ministries and organizations
in the North flooded their counterparts in the South with
reguests for co-operation not only in the area of trade,
24 5banking and communications, but also in the areas of
24 6literature, art, education, science, culture and health.
In September and in December Pham Van Dong once again sent a 
note to the RVN proposing consultations, a reduction in 
military forces, freedom of movement and trading
24 4 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 
1100 GMT, May 8, 1958 in U.S. FBIS Daily Report (May 9, 1958), 
No. 91, pp.EEE4-EEE16.
24 5 Cf. Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast 
Asia, 0500 GMT, April 25, 1958 (for a statement by the 
Ministry of Commerce); 0541 GMT, April 26, 1958 (National 
Bank); 0532 GMT, June 10, 1958 (Ministry of Communications, 
Posts and Telecommunications).
24 6 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 
1230 GMT, July 8, 1958 (Ministry of Culture); Vietnam News 
Agency, July 23, 1958 (Ministry of Education); and Vietnam 
News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 1318 GMT,
July 31, 1958 (Ministry of Public Health). These statements 
were followed up by other letters.
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relations.^ 1^  By that time, however, the Phu Loi incident^^ 
had occurred and VWP now appeared ready to unleash to 
bellicose propaganda barrage against the Diem regime and its 
American backers.
In parallel with these initiatives towards the Republic
of Viet-Nam, the DRVN also began to beat the drums of anti-
Americanism. On March 19, 1958, the first of a series of
anti-U.S. demonstrations was held. Forty thousand people were
reported to have gathered in Hai Phong - Nam Dinh, while
24 9another thirty-five thousand attended a rally in Hanoi 
sponsored jointly by the Fatherland Front, the Viet-Nam 
Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity and the Viet-Nam Peace
Vietnam News Agency, December 26, 1958; Quang Loi, South 
of the 17th Parallel, op.cit., pp.103-05; and Hong Kong 
dispatch in The New~York Times (December 27 , 1958), p.2.
Dong's statement made four main points: (1) neither zone
should adhere to any form of military alliance and both sides 
should reduce their armed forces; (2) both zones should 
engage in the exchange of local items and other forms of 
trade; (3) both sides should halt "war propaganda"; and (4) 
free movement should be permitted between North and South. 
Dong's letter was widely circulated in the south by the Party's 
underground for use with the political struggle movement; see: 
"Cong Ham Cua Thu Tuong Chanh Phu Nuoc Viet Nam Dan Chu Cong 
Hoa Goi Tong Thong Cong Iloa Viet Nam" [Official Letter from 
the Premier of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam to the 
President of the Republic of Viet-Nam] (December 22, 1958) in 
Race, compiler, Vietnamese Materials, Reel I, document 1013.
248 An alleged food poisoning incident which occurred on 
December 1, 1958 and which received wide and exaggerated 
coverage by the DRVN's media. In retrospect this incident 
appears to have been made the casus belli between the DRVN 
and RVN. Cf. New Facts: Phu Loi Mass Murder in South Viet
Nam (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1959). This
incident will be discussed in the following chapter.
Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 
1130 GMT, March 19, 1958; 0521 GMT, March 20, 1958. March 
19th was the anniversary of a 1950 public protest at the 
arrival in Saigon of American warships in support of the 
French.
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250Committee. By April over 170,000 persons were estimated
to have attended similar rallies throughout the country. In
June the DRVN inaugurated a "film season against U.S.
imperialism" using material produced in Russia, China and
2 51other socialist countries.
The fourth anniversary of the Geneva Agreements (July 20,
1958) served as another occasion for displays of anti-American
sentiment. According to media reports 30,000 rallied in Hai
252Phong while another 50,000 demonstrated in Hanoi.
Thereafter the pace of developments picked up for by
September, according to Xuan Thuy, over 2.25 million persons
2 5 3had been involved in these gatherings.
Hand in hand with the anti-U.S. rallies came revelations
that foreign spy rings and saboteur groups were operating in 
254the north. On March 20, 1958 fourteen alleged espionage
agents were tried before 10,000 people in Hanoi. The group's
The Peace Committee was enlarged at this time to include 
at least two individuals with extensive experience in the 
south: Pham Huy Thong, a former member of the Saigon-Cholon
Peace Movement who had been expelled to the north; and Tran 
Van Giau, a participant in Saigon during the August Revolution 
See: Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia,
0526 GMT, August 27, 1958.
Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 
0500 GMT, June 9, 1958.
252 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 
1158 GMT, July 23, 1958; and Voice of Vietnam in Vietnamese to 
Southeast Asia, 0430 and 1100 GMT, July 21, 1958.
2 53 Voice of Vietnam in Vietnamese to Southeast Asia, 1100 GMT 
September 10, 1958.
The DRVN had made several complaints earlier concerning 
violations of North Viet-Nam's air space; see: Vietnam News
Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 1205 GMT, December 
24, 1957; and 1305 GMT, February 7, 1958.
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2 5 5leader was sentenced to death and publicly executed. At
the same time the DRVN expelled a diplomat attached to the
French General-Delegation in Hanoi who was implicated in the 
256affair. Two months later both the French and British were
2 57forced to close their consulates in Hai Phong. Further
25 8groups were uncovered as the year wore on.
C. THE 14th PLENUM (NOVEMBER 1958)
During 1958, despite the Soviet Union's policy of 
peaceful coexistence, the international situation grew more 
tense. In part this was due to the domestic politics of
259various countries which affected the international system.
In July, for example, as a result of a left-wing revolution
2 6 0in Iraq, that country withdrew from the Baghdad Pact.
morse to Southeast Asia, 
Radio, 0030 GMT, May 28,
morse to Southeast Asia,
Saigon in The New York
in English morse to 
GMT, April 20, 1958; "Hanoi 
Students Jailed", The Times of Viet Nam (August 1, 1958),
Vol. 2, No. 166, p .1; New China News Agency, August 22, 1957 
reports on a Kuo Min Tang agent who was parachuted into the 
DRVN; Vietnam News Agency, November 23, 1958.
259 In addition to the cases cited below it should be recalled 
that the Algerian revolution was in progress. China and the 
DRVN were among the first to grant the provisional Algerian 
government diplomatic recognition. See: Ho Chi Minh,
"Telegram Greeting the Provisional Government of the Republic 
of Algeria", Selected Works, op.cit., Vol. 4, pp.322-23; and 
Hinton, Communist China in World Politics, op.cit., p.35.
Vietnam News Agency in English 
0605 GMT, March 21, 1958 and Hanoi 
1958 .
2 5 6 Vietnam News Agency in English 
1135 GMT, March 21, 1958.
257 Associated Press dispatch from 
Times (May 30, 1958), p.3.
2 5 8 New China News Agency (Peking) 
Northeast and Southeast Asia, 0939
260 Ibid., p.37.
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These events precipitated American military intervention in
Lebanon. Sino-Soviet differences immediately came to the fore
as China adopted a more militant attitude towards these events.
At that time the PRC was in the process of accelerating
the Great Leap Forward, a radical domestic program, officially
approved at the CCP's 8th Congress (second session) in 
261May. J" As we have noted Soviet rocket successes in late 1957
had encouraged the PRC to adopt more militant policies.
Throughout the months of May-July 1958 a Chinese military
conference met and publicly announced plans to "liberate 
262Taiwan". On August 23rd mainland gunners opened up on the
Nationalist-held off-shore islands of Quemoy and Matsu
precipitating the Formosan Straits Crisis.
Meanwhile developments in Indochina seemed to offer
possibilities for the VWP. In Laos the left-wing Neo Lao
2 6 3Haksat made dramatic electoral gains in May. This
immediately provoked a right-wing counter-reaction. In July,
despite protests by the Communist powers, ICC operations in
Laos were terminated. At the same time Premier Souvanna
Phouma resigned setting the stage for the dismissal of left-
wing representatives from the Royal Lao Government. This
264occurred on August 18th.
261
262
Hinton, An Introduction to Chinese Politics, op.cit., p.40. 
Hinton, Communist China in World Politics, op.cit., p.266.
Tillman Durdin dispatch from Vientiane in The New York 
Times (May 13, 1958), p.7. The Neo Lao Haksat and their 
supporters in the Santiphab (Neutrality) party won 13 of 21 
seats; this gave the left-wing faction a voting strength in 
the National Assembly of roughly 21-25 out of a total of 59.
Associated Press dispatch from Vientiane in ibid. (July 
23, 1958), p.2 and (August 19, 1958), p.8. See also: Hinton,
Communist China in World Politics, pp.341-42.
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During May-July relations between Cambodia and the
Republic of Viet-Nam deteriorated as a result of incursions
by Vietnamese Army units in pursuit of sect and Communist-led 
265guerrillas. Prince Sihanouk immediately sought to protect
Cambodia's sovereignty by granting diplomatic recognition to
China. In August the Prince journeyed to Peking where he met
.. „ 2 66 Mao Tse-tung.
These international developments set the environment for
the deliberations of the VWP's 14th Plenum which met in early
November 1958. According to the final communique the Central
Committee discussed three reports: one by Le Duan on the
international situation, another by Nguyen Duy Trinh on the
1958-60 plan for economic transformation and cultural
development and the third by Truong Chinh summarizing the
2 6 7results of the land reform.
With respect to the international situation the Plenum 
declared:
since the conference of twelve Communist and 
Workers' parties in socialist countries and the 
conference of sixty-four Communist and Workers' 
parties in the world held in Moscow last year, the 
forces of the socialist countries have shown
o  /" c Associated Press dispatch in The Times of Viet Nam (April 
2, 1958), Vol. 2, No. 71, pp.1 and 4; "Full Translation of the 
Government Communique", in ibid. (June 27, 1958), Vol. 2, No. 
136, p.l; Reuters dispatch from Saigon in The New York Times 
(June 5, 1958), p.5; Associated Press dispatch in ibid. (June 
26, 1958), p.10; Reuters dispatch from Phnom Penh in ibid. 
(July 1, 1958), p.3 and Tillman Durdin dispatch in ibid. (July 
2, 1958), p.2. Cf. Sihanouk and Burchett, My War with the 
C.I.A., op.cit., p.102.
9 6 6 Ibid., p.103; Associated Press dispatch from Tokyo in The 
New York Times (August 16, 1958), p.6; and Reuters dispatch 
from Hong Kong in ibid. (July 2, 1958), p.2.
9 6 7 "Hoi Nghi Trung Uong Dang Lan Thu 14 Thao Luan Va Quyet 
Dinh Nhiem Vu Cai Tao Xa Hoi Chu Nghia Va Nhung Muc Tieu Phan
(cont' d)
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themselves to be increasingly superior to those of 
the imperialist countries and that the East wind 
has continued to prevail over the West wind (gio 
Dong tiep tue thoi bat gio Tay).
The communique also stated that "the movement for national
liberation in Asia, Africa and South America (Nam My)
continues to develop steadily".
On the domestic scene the Plenum noted with approval the
progress achieved under the 1958 State Plan and approved the
first Three-Year Plan for Economic Transformation and Cultural
Development. The main task to be accomplished in the coming
years was agricultural co-operativization. It was hoped to
raise agricultural production from the present high level of
4.6 million tons "to a minimum of 7.6 million tons of paddy
per year". In the industrial sector the communique forecast
the construction of industrial zones at Viet Tri and Thai
Nguyen as well as factories to process raw materials and
2 6 8others to produce farm machinery.
Once again the decision to accord priority to northern 
developments provoked controversy. According to an official 
VWP history:
[t]he Party also struggled to overcome inappropriate 
understanding of the close inter-relations of the 
task of the socialist revolution in the North and 
that of liberating the South, characterized by the 
fear that the advance of the North toward socialism 
would hinder the struggle for Viet Nam's 
reunification. The Party pointed out that i[t] was 
just in order to create favourable conditions for
267 cont'd
Dau Cua Ke Hoach Ba Nam Phat Trien Kinh Te Va Van Hoa" [The 
14th Plenum of the Party's Central Committee Discussed and 
Resolved the Tasks of Socialist Construction and the 
Objectives of the Three-Year Plan of Economic and Cultural 
Development], Nhan Dan (December 8, 1958), No. 1730, pp.1-2.
26 8 Coincidentally Dang Viet Chau, the Deputy Minister for 
Foreign Trade, led a DRVN trade delegation to the Soviet Union, 
Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania to sign trade 
agreements for 1959-60; Vietnam News Agency, November 28, 1958.
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the struggle to liberate the South and achieve the 
reunification of the country that the North must 
advance rapidly, vigorously and steadily toward 
socialism.
Under the specific conditions of our country... 
while the country was still divided into two zones, 
what methods and forms should we use and what tempo 
should we adopt to advance toward socialism? Such 
were the very complex problems facing our Party [at 
the 14th Plenum in November 1958].269
It seems likely that the Central Committee, after
approving the Three-Year Plan of socialist construction, also
agreed to conduct a comprehensive review of Party policy
toward the revolution in Nam Bo. In order to fully appreciate
developments there Le Duan left Hanoi on a secret trip to the
South to gather material for a report to the Central
27 0Committee at its next meeting.
An Outline History of the Viet Nam Workers' Party, op.cit., 
pp.87-8Ö.
27 0 Carver, "The Faceless Viet Cong", op.cit., p.359 writes 
"in late 1958 Le Duan himself was sent on an extensive 
inspection trip in the South, and that upon his return to 
Hanoi in early 1959 he presented a list of recommendations 
subsequently adopted by the Lao Dong Central Committee and 
referred to in Viet Cong cadre training sessions as 'Resolution 
15'". Le Duan in fact was absent during the visit 
(28 November-2 December 1958) to North Viet-Nam of the North 
Korean government delegation led by Kim Il-sung as his name 
was missing from all public coverage of the tour. On the face 
of it this is not necessarily significant as Le Duan held no 
formal government as opposed to party position; however on 
November 29th when the Korean delegation called upon the 
leaders of the VWP Le Duan's name was once again absent from 
the list (which specifically referred to VWP Politburo 
members). See: Vietnam News Agency, November 29, 1958.
According to a 1965 publication Le Duan addressed a meeting of 
administrative cadres in Thanh Hoa province sometime in 
December 1958; Le Duan, "Some Opinions on the Movement for 
Agricultural Co-operativization", in On the Socialist 
Revolution in Vietnam, op.cit., Vol. Y~, pp. 56-9 0.
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Although the 15th Plenum (which convened in January 1959)
has been identified by VWP sources as the meeting which
approved the stepping-up of the revolutionary movement in the
South, there are indications that the VWP may have decided in
principle to intensify the revolutionary movement at the 14th
Plenum. According to Pentagon analyst Paul Gorman:
U.S. intelligence came into possession of a directive 
from Hanoi to its subordinate headquarters in Inter- 
Sector [Zone] V during December, 1958, which stated 
that the Lao Dong Party Central Committee had decided 
to 'open a new stage of the struggle...'.'1
"Hanoi and the Insurgency in South Vietnam", in United 
States-Vietnam Relations, op.cit., Book 2, IV.A.5. Tab 3, 
p.55, footnote 185. Gorman cites two sources: (1) U.S.
Central Intelligence Agency, Memorandum: The Organization,
Activities, and Objectives of the Communist Front in South 
Viet-Nam (September 22, 1965) and (T) U.S. Central 
intelligence Agency, Current Intelligence Weekly Review 
(19 April 1958) [sic]. The Memorandum, a copy of which is in 
the author's possession, states: }i t i ] n late 1958 , Hanoi
apparently began to plan to revitalize its Front apparatus in 
South Vietnam". George Kahin, who disparages Gorman's 
research and conclusions, has correctly pointed out that the 
second source was published seven months before the alleged 
decision was taken. Kahin fails to consider the possibility 
that the date might be a typographical error for 1959. Cf. 
Kahin, "The Pentagon Papers: A Critical Evaluation", op.cit.,
p. 67 8 .
In an effort to clear up this point I wrote to General 
Gorman. His reply states: "I reaffirm that the most
reliable sources of U.S. intelligence at that time were 
indicating exactly what I described. Moreover, I can assure 
you that what was written was subjected to close scrutiny by 
Les Gelb and others, who examined my evidence, and allowed my 
interpretation to stand. Whatever your version of the 
footnotes may show, my judgment then and now is that the DRV 
covert action stepped up in 1958, and December 1958-January 
1959 intercepts established an intention to support military 
action". Paul F. Gorman letter to the author, November 13, 
1976.
PART 3
FOUNDING THE NATIONAL FRONT
CHAPTER 10
FOUNDING THE NFLSVN
I. THE 15th PLENUM (JANUARY 1959)
On December 1, 1958 during the course of a riot by
detainees at the Phu Loi reeducation centre in Thu Dau Mot
province, inexperienced warders, members of the Civil Guard,
panicked and machine-gunned to death a score or more of the
demonstrators.^ Among the dead and wounded were former
members of the Resistance, peace activists and individuals
2associated with the sects. This incident was immediately 
seized upon by DRVN propagandists who alleged that an 
unsuccessful attempt had been made to poison the entire prison 
population of 6,000 inmates. According to DRVN claims, 1,000
3persons were killed.
Over the course of the following months the Phu Loi 
incident was given wide publicity in both halves of Viet-Nam 
by the VWP. It, and other alleged incidents of anti-Communist 
repression, were used as evidence of the "fascist, warlike and 
dictatorial nature" of the Diem regime. It is undeniable that 
the Party's underground had suffered terribly at the hands of
Honey, "The Problem of Democracy in Vietnam", op.cit., pp. 
74-77; Lacouture, Vietnam: Between Two Truces, op.cit., p.29;
and Republic of Viet-Nam^ Violations of the Geneva Agreements 
by the Viet-Minh Communists^ op.cit., pp.106-08.
2 Quang Loi, South of the 17th Parallel, op.cit., p.69.
3 Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia, 1200 
GMT, January 18, 1959; see also: New Facts: Phu Loi Mass
Murder in South Viet Nam, op.cit. and The Phu Loi Massacre in 
South Viet Nam (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House,
1959).
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4the RVN. As we have noted in Chapter 8, after a period of
recovery during early 1958 the Party's fortunes began to
plummet later in the year. In the face of renewed repression
the question of armed force was debated once again. One Party
cadre has stated for example:
by 1959 the situation in the South had crossed to a 
stage which the Communists considered to be the 
darkest in their whole lives... Because of this 
situation Party members were angry at the Central 
Committee, and demanded armed action. Party members 
did not dare break discipline, but nevertheless 
there were instances of undisciplined behavior, 
kidnappings and assassinations, in order to resolve 
the problem of survival. At the same time the 
southern branch of the Party demanded of the Central 
Committee a reasonable policy in dealing with the 
southern regime, in order to preserve the existence 
of the southern organization. If not, it would be completely destroyed.^
According to an official Party history:
in January, 1959, in an important conference, South 
Viet-Nam's revolutionary leaders pointed out that 
South Vietnamese society was a neo-colonial and 
semi-feudal one. The Ngo Dinh Diem administration 
was a reactionary, cruel, war-like one which had 
betrayed the national interests. It was obviously 
a US tool for aggression and enslavement. The 
direction and task of (the) South Vietnamese 
revolution could not diverge from the general 
revolutionary law of using revolutionary violence 
to oppose counter-revolutionary violence, rising 
up to seize power for the people. It was time to 
resort to armed struggle, combined with political 
struggle to push the movement forward.
For example, in February 1959 the chief of An Xuyen province 
announced the following results of a five-week ACDC: 8,125
"Viet Cong" agents surrendered and the denunciation of 9,806 
others in addition to 29,978 sympathizers. United States 
Operations Mission, Saigon Daily News Round-Up (February 28, 
1959) in Scigliano, South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress, op.
cit., p.169; Burchett^ Vietnam Will Win!, op.cit., p.151;
Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, p.8; Zaslof£, Origins~of the Insurgency, 
op.cit., pp.15, 18 and 21; and Vo Nguyen Giap, memorandum 
(March 6, 1959) to the ICC as carried by Vietnam News Agency 
in English morse to Southeast Asia, 0526 GMT, March 19, 1959 
in U.S. FBIS Daily Report (March 20, 1959), No. 55, pp.EEE2- 
EEE13.
5 Race, "The Origins of the Second Indochina War", op.cit., 
p.376.
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In the light of this conference, the people of South 
Viet Nam passed from various forms of political 
struggle and armed struggle to insurrection, 
beginning with the simultaneous uprising of the 
people of Ben Tre province (on January 17, I960), 
(emphasis in original)
The January conference was almost certainly the 15th 
Plenum of the VWP's Central Committee which met at that time
7to hear Le Duan's report on his trip to the South. George 
Carver has written:
he [Le Duan] presented a list of recommendations 
subsequently adopted by the Lao Dong [Party] Central 
Committee and referred to in Viet Cong cadre 
training sessions as 'Resolution 15'. These 
recommendations laid out the whole future course of 
the southern insurgency, including the establishment 
of a National Liberation Front to be controlled by 
the Central Committee of the South Vietnamese branch 
of the Lao Dong Party and supported by a South 
Vietnamese 'liberation army'. The Front was to be 
charged with conducting a political struggle, backed 
by armed force, designed to neutralize the South and 
pave the way for 'reunification'...^
Communist documents captured after Carver's article was
9written confirm this account. The new Front was to consist
An Outline History of the Viet Nam Workers' Party, op.cit., 
pp.108-09.
7 There has been considerable confusion over the dating of the 
15th Plenum no doubt arising from the fact that the communique 
of the plenum was published in May. It has now been 
established that the 15th Plenum met in January, the 16th 
Plenum in April and the Politburo in May 1959. See: "Main 
Events in the History of the Viet Nam Workers' Party",
Vietnam News Agency, 4th transmission, January 24, 1970; 
Vietnam News Agency, May 19, 1959 in BBC, Summary of World 
Broadcasts, Part 3, Weekly Supplement, 2nd series, No. 6 
(May 27, T959), FE/W6/B/34-35 which carries the text of the 
communique of the 16th Plenum; and Working Paper, Appendices, 
Item 301, p.10.
p Carver, "The Faceless Viet Cong", op.cit., pp.359-60.
9 Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, p.33 and Experiences of the South Vietnam 
Revolutionary Movement During the Past Several Years, Working 
Paper, Appendices, Item 301, pp.3-5 and 10.
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of a four-class alliance (of which the "workers and farmers
[peasants] is the basic factor") led by the Party. The VWP
made plans to reactivate a directorate of the Central
Committee (cue trung uong), an organizational device dating
back to the Resistance, to oversee its operations in the
South.Resolution 15 not only approved the continued growth
of the revolutionary armed forces, it also approved the use
of violence to accompany the political struggle movement. In
brief, the 15th Plenum sanctioned a limited escalation of the
conflict. Force was to be used to protect the Party and its
bases, to disrupt and destroy RVN administration at the most
basic level and to create an environment in which it might be
possible to launch a general uprising.^ The VWP had no
intention of employing PAVN units in an armed confrontation
with ARVN; neither was the VWP sanctioning a policy of all-out
12attack on the Republic of Viet-Nam.
13Whatever the disagreements it is certain that the VWP 
Central Committee approved a significant change in policy at 
this time. According to the communique of the 15th Plenum:
Republic of Viet-Nam, Ministry of National Defence, Study 
of the Activation and Activities of R, op.cit., pp.21, 48 and 
68. For an analysis of the role of the Central Committee 
Directorate for Southern Viet-Nam (Trung Uong Cue Mien Nam) 
see: Thayer, "Southern Vietnamese Revolutionary Organizations
and The Viet Nam Workers' Party", op.cit., pp.31-48.
Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, p.28; and Republic of Viet-Nam, Ministry 
of National Defence, Study of the Activation and Activities 
of R, op.cit., p.68.
12 Race, "The Origins of the Second Indochina War", op.cit., 
pp.375-77; Turley, "Army, Party and Society in the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam", op.cit., pp.158-60; and Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, 
pp.33-38.
13 Race, "The Origins of the Second Indochina War", op.cit., 
p.375 writes that "the new policy must have been born of a 
sharp conflict within the Central Committee itself in which 
the proponents of change overcame the backers of the status 
quo" .
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our whole people, united and struggling heroically 
with, perseverance, will certainly smash the U.S. 
scheme to seize our land and the plot to sell out 
our country by their [the Americans] lackeys. On 
the basis of the consolidation of the North, and its 
steady development in all fields, and on the basis 
of the broad and powerful development of the 
patriotic movement in the South, and with the 
approval and support of the peace-loving people the 
world over, our struggle for national reunification 
will certainly be successful.^
In other words, after two years of implementing the 
policies outlined in "Duong Loi Cach Mang Mien Nam" a majority 
of Central Committee members concluded that sufficient 
progress had been made in consolidating the north and winning 
the sympathy and support of the world's peoples to merit 
giving more attention to developments in the South. The key 
factor in this decision was the state of the Party's 
underground organization and its ability to survive RVN 
repression. Thus the decision to authorize the use of force 
appears to have been taken none too soon for the VWP's 
underground declined in strength from 15,000 members in 1957 
to a mere 5,000 by mid-1959.^
The implementation of resolution 15 appears to have been 
delayed for four months, during which time Ho Chi Minh
"Hoi Nghi Trung Uong Dang Lan Thu 15 (mo rong)" [The 15th 
Plenum (enlarged) of the Party's Central Committee] Nhan Dan 
(May 14, 1959), No. 1885, p.l. It was the publication of this 
communique (which stated that the Central Committee had met 
"recently") which led most observers to conclude that the 15th 
Plenum had convened in May.
15 Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, p.26. "At any rate a short period of 
time was lost because although many areas were engaged in 
armed propaganda up to this time it was limited to armed 
propaganda and insufficient strength existed to maintain 
continual opposition to the enemy. Although slow in coming, 
it was not too slow because there was still time to transform 
the situation into one where the proper conditions existed". 
Quoted from Working Paper, Appendices, Item 301, p.ll.
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journeyed overseas to consult with Soviet and Chinese
leaders.^ In May, after Ho's return, the VWP Politburo met
to draw up guidelines for the implementation of resolution 15.
It is clear that the passage of Law 10/59 in the South, a
law under which members of the Communist Party were executed 
18by beheading, influenced the final outcome. If reluctance 
to permit the use of armed violence had been evident during 
the months since January, it now was overcome by the majority 
view in the Politburo. A later account noted with regard to 
Nam Bo:
[t]he directive of the Politburo in May 1959 stated 
that the time had come to push the armed struggle 
against the enemy. Thanks to this, we followed the 
actual situation in order to formulate a program 
which we felt to be essential, and in October 1959, 
the armed struggle was launched. ^
A similar policy was implemented in the highlands of 
Trung Bo where, as we have seen, preparations had long been 
underway to launch an armed uprising. According to Ta Xuan 
Linh:
Vietnam News Agency in English morse to Southeast Asia,
0500 GMT, January 20, 1959 reports that Ho attended the CPSU's 
21st Congress; New China News Agency, February 8 and 9, 1959 
reports on Ho' s activities in Peking; and Hinton, Communist 
China in World Politics, op.cit., pp.36 and 342.
17 Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, pp.34 and 36. For a copy of the text of 
the law see: Pham Van Bach, et al. Fascist Terror in South
Viet-Nam: Law 10/59 (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing
House, 1961), pp.71-77.
18 Warner, The Last Confucian, op.cit., pp.109-10 has written: 
"[d]uring the first year that the law operated, the tribunals 
investigated 431 incidents and tried 25 cases involving 131 
accused, 27 were sentenced to death, 50 to life imprisonment, 
or 20 years, 47 to 10 years, and 7 others were acquitted".
19 Working Paper, Appendices, Item 301, p.10. The 4th 
Congress of theNam Bo Regional Committee was held in October 
1959; Race, War Comes to Long An, op.cit., p.117. See also: 
Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, p.38.
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[i]n the summer of this year [June-August 1959] a 
historic resolution reached them [Party cadres in 
the highlands], giving them the green light for 
switching from political struggle alone to political 
struggle combined with armed self-defense and 
support activities. A new page had been turned in 
the history of the South Vietnamese revolution.20
During May, no doubt as a result of Politburo initiative,
preparations were undertaken to increase the infiltration of
southern regroupees back to the south via the Ho Chi Minh
trail in Laos. Doan 559 (Group 559) was established at this
21time to oversee some twenty way-stations on the trail.
Later in the year Doan 603, a maritime unit, was set up to
22oversee movement by sea. By the end of 1960 these groups
successfully introduced some 4,500 cadres into the South where
23they replenished a badly decimated Party underground.
After the historic resolution of the 15th Plenum and the 
Politburo's May directive had been read and digested at all
Ta Xuan Linh, "Armed Uprising by Ethnic Minorities Along 
the Truong Son", Part 2, op.cit., p.20.
21 According to Van Tien Dung, "The 559th Troops, as their 
name indicates, came into being in May 1959 and are subordinate 
to the Rear Service General Department" in Nhan Dan (April 6, 
1976) as translated by U.S. FBIS Daily Report (June 7, 1976), 
Vol. IV, No. 110, Supplement No. 38, pp.12 and 15. 
"Interrogation of a Senior Sergeant, a member of the Viet Cong 
5th Military Region", Working Paper, Appendices, Item 73, p.l; 
and "Interrogation of a member of the 603rd Battalion, who was 
captured in Quang Ngai Province in 1960, and the interrogation 
of the commander of a company who was also captured in Quang 
Ngai Province in 1960"; ibid., Item 72.
22 "Interrogation reports of Viet Cong agents dispatched by 
the maritime infiltration unit of Hanoi's Intelligence 
Directorate. The unnamed individuals were captured aboard a 
junk in July 1960"; ibid., Item 75 and "An intelligence 
summary on the interrogation of numerous Viet Cong agents 
captured along the coast of South Vietnam during June and July 
1961", ibid., Item 76.
2 3 United States Department of State, Working Paper on the 
North Vietnamese Role in the War in South Vietnam reproduced 
in Viet-Nam Documents and Research Notes (June 1968), Nos. 
36-37, Table I, p.19.
675
levels, the Party's underground took to the offensive. In the
final quarter of 1959 the number of RVN officials killed and
kidnapped rose dramatically, reaching the 1,400 mark by the 
24end of 1960. This tactic effectively cut off the RVN from
certain rural areas where the Party developed larger-sized
military units (see Map 10-1).
In March and April 1959 the first provincial armed units
to be formed in the highlands since 1954 were created in Quang
2 5Ngai and Ninh Thuan provinces. After receiving the
"resolution on the orientation of the movement" the Party
implemented long-standing plans for an uprising in Tra Bong
2 6district of Quang Ngai. This occurred in August. The
following month Party forces in Nam Bo successfully ambushed
27two companies of ARVN's 23rd Infantry Division. The
weapons captured in this attack were used in a successful
assault on the headquarters of ARVN's 32nd Regiment based at
2 8Trang Sup, Tay Ninh province during Tet 1960. At the same
4U 4 United States Department of State, A Threat to Peace, 
op.cit., Part I, p.13.
Ta Xuan Linh, "Armed Uprisings by Ethnic Minorities Along 
the Truong Son", Part 2, op.cit., p.19. One group was named 
"339" after the date of its founding, March 3, 1959.
2 6 Ibid., p.20; and Ta Xuan Linh, Nguyen Ho and Nguyen Khanh 
Tuong, "Cuoc Dong Khoi Tra Bong (28-8-1959)" [The Tra Bong 
Uprising of August 28, 1959], Nghien Cuu Lieh Su (May-June 
1971), No. 138, pp.12-27.
27 Warner, The Last Confucian, op.cit., pp.159-60 and Warner, 
"Vietnam: How Did It All Begin?", The Sydney Morning Herald
(January 16, 1974), p.2.
2 8 Charles W. Thayer, Guerrilla (London: Michael Joseph Ltd.,
1963), pp.25-29; Warner, The Last Confucian, op.cit., p.160; 
Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, p .38; Burchett, Inside Story of the 
Guerrilla War~j op.cit., pp.109-19; Burchett, Vietnam Will Win! , 
pp.3-4; Burchett, The Furtive War, op.cit., p.106; Race, War 
Comes to Long An, op.cit., pp.106-07; and Ta Xuan Linh, "How 
Armed Struggle Began in South Viet-Nam", op.cit., p.24.
Philippe Devillers, "The Struggle for the Unification of 
Vietnam", op.cit., p.14 erroneously dates the attack in 1959.
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MAP 10-1
COMMUNIST REBEL ACTIVITIES 
APRIL 1959-MAY 1960
COMMUNIST REBEI, ACTIVITIES 
A p r i l  1030 -  Hay lOftO
VI ETNAM
A pr i l  l t&f  Apr i l  l tftS
/ \ ,?-♦
a-» d a c q u m
J : . U 1  fl_j!
O I n c i d e n t  I n v o l v i n g  
K i l l  inf»,»
O I n c i d e n t  i n v o l v i n g  
m a i n l y  Abhotagn i
( S h a d m t  n r e A»  i n d i c a t e  d e l l h e r n t i v  1 9 3 7 —5 9  n h i f t  
f rom n o c u r i n g  a n o l i d  r e b e l  b a n a  i n  t h e  Melio&g 
riol  ta  t o  c u t t i n g  o f f  ü n l ß o n  f r o «  h i n  t o r  l a n d . J
SOURCE:
Bernard B. Fall, editor, Viet-Nam Witness,
p .  282 . ---
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time the Party conducted an uprising in Ben Tre province^ 
inaugurating the period of "simultaneous" or "concerted" 
uprisings.
The expansion of the Party's influence in the rural areas
followed in the wake of armed violence. Party cadres
concentrated on restoring underground cells and in creating
the embryo of village revolutionary administrations and mass 
3 0organizations. Ex-Resistance veterans were grouped together
into an Association of Former Resistance Veterans which
convened a much publicized meeting in March 1960 to call for
31the overthrow of the Diem government.
Thus in the period from the 15th Plenum to September 
1960, when the VWP held its Third National Congress, the 
Party's underground in the south witnessed a reversal of 
fortune. The new policy of armed violence permitted the VWP 
organization to strike out at the RVN on the local level, 
severely crippling its administrative capacity. The Party's 
success in achieving these objectives led to the formal 
ratification of plans to create a new front. Le Duan, in his 
political report to the Congress stated, for example:
An Bao Minh, "Uprising in Ben Tre", Vietnamese Studies 
(September 1968), Nos. 18/19, pp.130-501 and An Bao Minh, 
"Simultaneous Uprisings", South Viet Nam in Struggle (May 20, 
1974), No. 249, p.3.
3 0 Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, pp.35-38; Burchett, Vietnam Will Win!, 
op.cit., p.121 writes, "[i]n Ca Mau a regional resistance 
organization was founded several months before the NFL was 
officially established". Cf. "Special Report on Current 
Internal Security Situation" telegram from the U.S. Embassy 
in Saigon to the U.S. Department of State, Dispatch 278 
(March 7, 1960) in United States-Vietnam Relations, op.cit., 
Book 10, pp.1254-75.
31 Tuyen Bo cua Nhung Nguoi Khang Chien Cu Ve Tinh Hinh Mien 
Nam Viet Nam [Declaration of Former Members of the Resistance 
Concerning the Situation in South Viet-Nam] in Race, compiler, 
Vietnamese Materials, Microfilm Reel I, Document No. 1041. 
Burchett, Inside Story of the Cuerrilla War, op.cit., p.186; 
and Race, War Comes to Long An, op.cit., pp.120-21.
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To ensure the complete success for the revolutionary 
struggle in south Viet Nam, our people there, under 
the leadership of the Marxist-Leninist Party of the 
working class, must strive to establish a united 
bloc of workers, peasants, and soldiers, and to 
bring into being a broad National United Front 
directed against the U.S. and Diem and based upon 
the worker-peasant alliance. This front must rally 
all the patriotic classes and sections of the 
people, the majority and the minority nationalities, 
all patriotic parties and religious groupings, 
together with all individuals inclined to oppose the 
U.S.-Diem [regime]. The aims of the struggle of the 
National United Front against the U.S. and Diem in 
the South are peace, national independence, 
democratic freedoms, improvement of the living 
conditions of the people and the peaceful 
reunification of the Fatherland.^
By the time Le Duan made this statement preparations to
create such a Front at the village level had been underway for 
33nearly a year. Apparently an unexpected (and unsuccessful)
coup d'etat by ARVN military officers launched against the
Diem government in November 1960 caused Party cadres to speed
34up their schedule. A month later, according to Bernard B.
Fall:
Le Duan, "Political Report of the Central Committee of the 
Viet Nam Workers' Party (September 5, I960)", in Third 
National Congress of the Viet Nam Workers' Party, Documents, 
Volume I, pp.62-63.
3 3 Bernard B. Fall, "The Roots of the Conflict", International 
Affairs [London] (January 1965), Vol. XL, No. 1 reprinted in 
Fall, ed., Viet-Nam Witness, op.cit., p.283. For details of 
this organization-building period see the accounts by various 
Party cadres who were active in the 1959-60 period: Z-ZH
Interviews Nos. 41, 65, 117, 124, 127, 128, and 130 in Rand 
Vietnam Interview Series Z - Viet Cong Organization and 
Motivation and Experiences of Its Members, AD 74132 
(Alexandria, Virginia: Defense Documentation Station for
Scientific and Technical Information, March 1972), 2 Microfilm 
Reels.
34 "Saigon, Bastion of the Anti-US Struggle", Vietnam Courier 
(June 1975), New series No. 37, p.25. For a description of 
the coup and lengthy excerpts from the manifesto issued by the 
unsuccessful plotters consult: Burchett, The Furtive War,
op.cit., pp.29-80, passim.
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at 8 pm - exactly fourteen years to the hour from 
the beginning of the Viet-Minh's anti-French 
resistance - a small group of representatives of 
various South Vietnamese opposition groups met in 
the inaccessible forests north of Saigon. According 
to the well-informed Douglas Pike, there may have 
been "about fifty others attending as individuals".
The meeting lasted beyond midnight, and the 
resulting organization, the NFL, thus was proclaimed to exist as of December 20, 1960.^5
During the following year the VWP underground emerged
under the guise of the People's Revolutionary Party (Dang Nhan
3 6Dan Cach Mang). The various military forces were united
under a single command, headed by a PAVN officer, and renamed
3 7the Liberation Armed Forces. Various functional liberation
associations (for peasants, women, youth, students, etc.) were
established and the embryo of the NFL administrative
38structure, from province to village level, was created. In
February-March 1962 the NFL held its First National Congress
at which the provisional organizing committee of 1960 turned
3 9over its duties to a newly chosen Central Committee. The
Fall, The Two Viet-Nams, Revised Edition, op.cit., p.362. 
See also: Z-ZH Interview No. 128, p.7 in Rand Vietnam
Interview Series Z, op.cit.
3 6 Burchett, Vietnam Will Win!, op.cit., p.151.
37 Ta Xuan Linh, "How Armed Struggle Began in South Viet Nam", 
op.cit., p.19; and 10 Years of the P.L.A.F. (South Vietnam: 
Giai Phong Editions, 1971), p.50. The commander of these 
forces was Tran Nam Trung since identified as Tran Luong, a 
member of the VWP Central Committee and a PAVN general. See 
also: Burchett, Inside Story of the Guerrilla V/ar, op.cit.,
p.146 who quotes Sao Nam as stating, "at the end of 1960, we 
operated under the name of Armed Propaganda Groups of the 
People's Self-Defense Forces".
3 8 Ta Xuan Linh, "Armed Uprisings by Ethnic Minorities Along 
the Truong Son", Part 2, op.cit., p.21; Vietnam Youth [Hanoi] 
(March 1966), p.ll; Liberation Radio in Vietnamese to South 
Vietnam, 0500 GMT, January 9, 1974 and New China News Agency, 
0822 GMT, February 3, 1961.
39 Burchett, The Furtive War, op.cit., pp.95-106.
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leadership of the NFL consisted of long-time VWP cadres who
had been active in the south, members of the sect forces,
former non-Party members of the Resistance and non-Communist
4 0opponents of the Diem regime. * Rank-and-file membership
consisted of rural folk long under the influence of the
Party's underground or areas under the influence of dissident 
41sect forces. The Liberation Armed Forces likewise included
soldiers from the sect armed forces as well as newly recruited
units under the leadership of Party cadres. The National
Front for the Liberation of South Viet Nam quickly grew in
size. According to Douglas Pike the NFL had a membership of
about 37,500 when it was founded in December 1960; by the time
4 2of its first congress this figure had risen to 300,000. It 
was the growth and influence of this organization which so 
worried President Kennedy when he took office in early 1961.
II. CONCLUSION
A. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
Previous accounts of the origins of the NFL, as we have 
pointed out in the introduction, were greatly influenced by 
the nature of the debate over the efficacy of Western 
involvement in Viet-Nam. Official U.S. and RVN interpretations 
correctly stressed the role of the Lao Dong Party but failed
Commission for Foreign Relations of the South Vietnam 
National Front for Liberation, Personalities of the South 
Vietnam Liberation Movement, op.cit.
41 United States Mission in Vietnam, A Note on the Vietnamese 
Sects (Saigon: Joint United States Planning Office, May 1969),
pp.2-3.
42 Pike, Viet Cong, op.cit., p.115.
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to indicate that the Party itself was a national organization
4 3which had operated throughout Viet-Nam prior to partition.
The official interpretations put forward in various White
Papers overlooked the pre-existing areas of Party influence
in the south. These same accounts also tended to overlook the
widespread opposition to the Diem regime by the politico-
religious sects (and others) as well as the increasing
alienation of various groups (farmers, ethnic minorities,
urban intellectuals, etc.) caused by Diem's domestic policies.
On the other hand, critics of the U.S. and RVN
interpretations have correctly stressed the brutal treatment
accorded ex-members of the Resistance as one of the major
factors leading to a renewal of insurgency in the south.
These writers, however, have overstressed the independence of
cadres in the south in their relations with the Party Central
Committee. Although it is true that the demand to resort to
armed force arose in the south, it is also true that other
cadres, particularly on the Nam Bo Regional Committee (1957-
59) , felt that unification could be achieved by peaceful 
4 4means. In the course of internal disputes in the south the 
Nam Bo Committee exercised strict discipline over lower-level 
cadres who violated the Party's guidelines. The Regional 
Committee only changed its policies after the Central Committee
Or alternatively, when the People's Revolutionary Party 
(the southern VWP organization) was mentioned it was assumed 
to be under the control of "North Vietnamese".
44 Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, pp.32-38.
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passed resolution 15 which approved the principle of using 
revolutionary violence in support of the political struggle 
movement. ^
Both sets of accounts concerning the origins of the NFL
fell into the semantic trap discussed at length in the
introduction. In order to prove "aggression from the north",
official U.S. and RVN interpretations stressed the crucial
importance of the VWP' s 15th Plenum which they erroneously set 
4 6in May 1959. They also pointed to the Third National
Congress of the Lao Dong Party. Those who argued that the
impetus for the creation of the NFL came from southerners
stressed the importance of the March 1960 meeting of
ex-Resistance veterans. They pointed out that this meeting
occurred before the Party's National Congress approved the
formation of a Front. Jean Lacouture has argued, for example:
the actual birth of the National Liberation Front 
must be traced back to March 1960. At that time a 
group of the old resistance fighters assembled in 
Zone D (eastern Cochinchina), issued a proclamation 
calling the prevailing situation 'intolerable' for 
the people as a result of Diem's actions, and called 
upon patriots to regroup with a view toward ultimate 
collective action...the little Congress of March 
1960 was in some ways the 'general call' for the 
creation of the Front, the signal that, coming from 
the South, was to force the government in the North 
to assume its responsibility.^
For example, Tinh Hinh va Nhiem Vu 59 (The Situation and 
Tasks for 1959) the Nam Bo Regional Committee's guidelines for 
1959, drafted in late 1958, argued that the revolution could 
be advanced by peaceful means (as previously) by exploiting 
the contradictions in South Viet-Nam.
46 For a discussion of the 15th Plenum see: Noam Chomsky, "The
Pentagon Papers as Propaganda and History" in Noam Chomsky and 
Howard Zinn, editors, The Pentagon Papers: Critical Essays
(Boston: Beacon Press'^ 1972), Vol. 5 , pp. 179-84 ; and King C.
Chen, "Hanoi's Three Decisions and the Escalation of the 
Vietnam War", Political Science Quarterly (Summer 1975), Vol.
90, No. 2, pp. 245-48.
47 Lacouture, Vietnam: Between Two Truces, op.cit., pp.53-54;
and Lacouture, '^ Le F.N.L. est-il bien le"^Satellite' de Hanoi?", 
be Monde (April 4, 1965), pp.1-2.
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This thesis has tried to present the case that the
decision to create the National Front for the Liberation of
South Viet-Nam in December 1960 was the outcome of a complex
interplay of four sets of factors which operated over time:
(1) the international environment, (2) domestic developments
in the North, (3) the state of the Party's underground in the
South and (4) the policies of the Diem regime and its American
ally. For purpose of drawing conclusions it will be
convenient to view these factors as operating with varying
degrees of influence on three levels: the international,
4 8national and decision-making levels.
B. THREE LEVELS OF ANALYSIS
1. The International Level of Analysis
In 1954 the DRVN was born into an international system 
which was dominated by the power and Cold War rivalries of the 
Soviet Union and the United States. As a junior member of the 
socialist camp and as a small, divided and weak Southeast Asian 
nation the DRVN had little leverage to alter the policies of 
either Russia or China when these ran counter to the DRVN's 
declared objectives.
It would appear that in order to achieve its national 
objectives (territorial security, economic rehabilitation and 
growth, reunification, the end of foreign interference, etc.) 
the DRVN had little choice but to adhere loyally to the 
policies of the socialist bloc headed by the Soviet Union. 
Indeed Russian and Chinese aid in the early years was 
indispensable in averting famine and in restoring the North's
These have been adapted from Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis 
Problem in International Relations", op.cit.
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war-ravaged economy. Membership in the socialist camp also 
afforded the DRVN with a measure of protection against attack 
by the United States, which was a constant fear of Hanoi's 
leaders.
The DRVN's attempts during 1954-56 to reunify Viet-Nam 
under the terms of the 1954 Geneva Agreements foundered on the 
central fact that neither superpower found it in its interest 
to support such a settlement. The United States was hostile to 
the Geneva Conference from the beginning. Immediately as a 
political settlement was achieved the U.S. adopted a policy of 
shoring up the Diem government and abetting it in its refusal 
to hold negotiations with the North. The Soviet Union, although 
willing to grant limited support for DRVN initiatives, was in 
fact more concerned with obtaining concessions from the West in 
Europe than in pushing the issue of Vietnamese unification.
China too gave limited support to DRVN initiatives. And 
France, which had some economic interests in the North, quickly 
divested itself of all responsibilities by withdrawing the 
French Expeditionary Corps prior to the July 1956 electoral 
deadline. In the face of these developments the attitudes of 
India and other Asian states, however sympathetic, was hardly 
decisive.
The DRVN adjusted to these setbacks by adopting a long- 
range policy of building up international contacts and by 
awaiting more favourable circumstances. These arose in 1957 as 
a result of the deepening Sino-Soviet dispute. It will be 
recalled that the solidarity of the socialist bloc was shaken 
as a result of Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin and as a 
result of the Polish troubles and Hungarian uprising of 1956.
In November 1957 the CCP and the CPSU aired their differences
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on several matters, including the issue of peaceful or non­
peaceful transition to socialism before a meeting of twelve 
Communist and Workers' parties in Moscow. China's subsequent 
militant line in foreign affairs throughout 1958 created a set 
of circumstances wThich enabled the VWP leadership to move 
without the previous constraints. According to a Party review 
of this period:
If one took the world situation as the model for the 
policy line (duong loi) for our country, which had 
its own special characteristics, it would be 
inappropriate to do so even if the revolution in a 
particular country depended greatly on the 
international situation. Concerning the possibility 
of advancing revolution by peaceful means even the 
resolution (nghi quyet) of the 20th Congress of the 
CPSU stated that it could be achieved only in 
certain countries which already had democratic 
institutions. South Viet Nam is an American colony 
dominated by the My-Diem system; it therefore has 
its own laws governing revolution. It cannot take 
the general guidelines concerning the world for its 
own... according to declaration (tuyen ngon) 12, the 
Party stated: 'Whether the Revolution is violent or
not will not depend on us, but on the attitude of 
our enemy'.  ^9
In January 1959, after two years of economic progress and 
after strengthening contacts with socialist bloc countries, the 
leaders of the DRVN were in a position to approve a more 
militant policy in the south. In short, the international 
constraints which applied in an earlier period were partially 
removed. The new low-risk policy which the VWP adopted was 
designed to take advantage of this. As the situation in
Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, p.32. This statement was made in light of 
the 1181" (January 8th?) conference. According to Working Paper, 
Appendices, Item 301, p.6, "[t]he external international 
situation exerts a very important but not decisive influence on 
the situation. The general strategic responsibilities of the 
world also exert an influence and exert a degree of control as 
do the revolutionary experiences of enlightened countries but 
neither are decisive factors. In addition the struggle 
procedures of each phase of the revolution in a given country 
will not be identical".
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5 0neighbouring Laos deteriorated, bringing first American then
Soviet involvement, the VWP undertook bolder steps. In late
511960 the Kong Le coup in Laos coupled with the November
5 2attempted coup against Diem provided the climate for a 
continuation of these militant actions. In December 1960 the 
NFL was formed with the twin purpose of overthrowing the Diem 
government and liberating the south from the influence of the 
American imperialists. In short, Viet-Nam became an example of 
a "just war of national liberation" to which the Chinese and 
Russians could give some measure of support.
2. The National Level of Analysis
The second level of analysis, the nation-state level, 
focuses primarily on internal developments within a country in 
order to explain policy outcomes. In the case of Viet-Nam two 
features in particular appear significant: (1) the role of the
Marxist-Leninist Viet-Nam Workers' Party (its ideology and 
previous experiences) and (2) the fact of national partition.
The VWP, as a Marxist-Leninist Party, subscribes to the 
two stage theory of revolution: a national democratic phase 
followed by a phase of socialist revolution. In this respect
In January a border dispute broke out between Laos and the 
DRVN; in May the Royal Lao Army attempted to surround and 
disarm two Pathet Lao battalions. These events, as well as 
U.S. support for the Laotian right-wing precipitated a crisis 
which caused grave concern in Hanoi and Peking. Cf. Arthur 
Dommen, Conflict in Laos: The Politics of Neutralization,
Revised Edition (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971) , pp.117-
41.
51 Hugh Toye, Laos: Buffer State or Battleground (London:
Oxford University Press, 1958), pp.138-70. The coup took place 
on August 9th.
52 The coup in Viet-Nam occurred on the same day as a right- 
wing coup m  Vientiane: November 11th. See: Reuters and AFP
dispatches from Saigon in The Times of India (November 12, 1960).
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one of the most important components of VWP ideology is the
idea of a front (mat tran), a broad union of various social
classes, suited to "the objective circumstances" of each
53historical period. Thus in the Resistance War the Viet 
Minh-Lien Viet Fronts served as the main instruments of 
national mobilization. Because the historic period was one of 
armed struggle, the role of the People's Army was also 
important. During the 1954-56 period, when the VWP shifted to 
political struggle, the Fatherland Front served as the prime 
organization for mobilization in the north. It never became 
a mass organization in the south, mainly because of the 
hostile environment in which the Party organization had to 
operate. Nevertheless it existed in embryo, ready to expand 
should the Diem government collapse and a coalition favourably 
disposed towards reunification take its place.
The leaders of the Viet-Nam Workers' Party, after eight 
long years of fighting the French only achieved partial 
success. As a result of the 1954 Geneva Conference they were 
given control of Viet-Nam north of the 17th parallel. The 
partitioning of Viet-Nam must be seen as a fundamental factor 
influencing Party policy because for the first time it became 
impossible for the entire Party to pursue the same objectives 
throughout the country. In brief Party leaders asserted that 
there were two main interrelated objectives in the post-1954 
period: socialist construction in the north and the carrying
out of a national democratic revolution in the south. The 
decision to accept power in a divided Viet-Nam and the
Cf. P.J. Honey, "The National United Front in Vietnam", 
Studies in Comparative Communism (January 1969), Vol. 2, No. 1, 
pp.69-95.
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decision to pursue two objectives simultaneously almost proved 
impossible. In the period 1954-55, when it appeared that 
reunification could be achieved by peaceful means under the 
terms of the Geneva Agreements, the contradictions in this dual 
approach were less evident. Afterwards, however, the 
difficulty of carrying out these two objectives became 
apparent as the U.S. support for the Republic of Viet-Nam upset 
the power ratio within Viet-Nam.
In the north the VWP was faced with the immense task of 
restoring a war-damaged economy and avoiding famine. The pace 
of recovery depended not only on the success of Party policies 
and programmes but also on the nature and extent of foreign 
assistance. In 1956 the Party faced a serious crisis in the 
aftermath of its land reform campaign (a campaign necessitated 
by the ideology of the VWP leaders to carry out a socialist 
revolution). The ramifications of this crisis, which spurred 
a revolt among the intellectuals as well as a peasant uprising 
in Quynh Luu district, extended for several years, draining 
the Party's energies and resources.
Simultaneously the VWP had to face the impact of U.S. and 
RVN policies in the south. As the Diem regime grew stronger, 
and as U.S. assistance increased, the ability of the VWP 
underground to respond diminished accordingly. The problem for 
the VWP, of course, was to cope with both sets of problems at 
the same time. In late 1956 a new policy was devised which 
continued to place priority on the consolidation of the north 
(economic stability and development, public order and security, 
regularization and modernization of PAVN, etc.). Its other 
components consisted of maintaining and developing the movement
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in the south and winning international sympathy and support 
(which contributed to both objectives). After two years of 
implementing this policy (1957-58) progress in the north had 
reached such a level where it was now possible to contemplate 
a step-up in the movement in the south.
There, meanwhile, Party leaders faced a dilemma. On the 
one hand the repressive policies of the Diem regime (military 
operations, security laws, anti-Communist denunciation 
campaigns, etc.) severely weakened the Party. On the other 
hand, other policies of the RVN (land reform, resettlement, 
regroupment in the highlands, press censorship, etc.) raised 
discontent and also the potential for rebellion as group after 
group became alienated from the incumbent government.
Restrictions on the use of armed force severely 
hampered the Party's underground in its attempts to strike 
back. The Party therefore relied on the armed sect forces and, 
in 1957, in an extermination of traitors programme (tru gian) 
carried out by armed propaganda teams. Both policies achieved 
mixed success. In 1959, therefore, Party cadres in both the 
north and south argued that sufficient progress had been made 
in building up the DRVN and in obtaining international support 
to permit a change in tactics in the south. The use of armed 
violence was sanctioned as a counter to the actions of the 
Diem regime. In order to avoid U.S. retaliation on the DRVN, 
the movement in the south had to rely as much as possible on 
its own resources. The creation of the NFL was designed to 
demonstrate that people in the south supported the overthrow of 
Diem and the end of American influence.
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3. The Decision-Making Level
The decision-making level of analysis attempts to explain 
policy outcomes by focusing on the decision-making structure 
of the country being studied and on the role of various 
organizations and individuals within that structure. In the 
case of Viet-Nam it is immediately apparent that the key 
decision-making structure rests within the Viet-Nam Workers' 
Party. This thesis has focused on the regular plenary 
sessions of the VWP's Central Committee during the period 
1954-60. It is evident that since the Central Committee met 
on average only twice a year, that the implementation of policy 
on a regular basis was the responsibility of the Politburo. 
However because of the nature of the data, it has not been 
possible to analyze thoroughly the role of this group (only 
three crucial meetings have been discussed in the text: 
September 1954, November-December 1956 and May 1959).
During the time period under consideration VWP policy
towards the south was set at the plenary session of the Central
Committee at which the views of the subordinate Nam Bo Regional
Committee were considered. Decision-making was an interactive
process by which Party officials on the Central Committee had
to consider the demands of various sectors in the light of
existing priorities and limited resources. Contrary to the
54views of some writers, the VWP organization in the south did 
not act independently of the Central Committee. In fact in 
early 1959 after the VWP Central Committee had approved the use
54 Kahin and Lewis, The United States in Vietnam, op.cit., 
pp.113-20; Lacouture^ Vietnam: Between Two Truces, op.cit.,
pp. 53-57; and Devillers^ "The Struggle for the Unification of 
Vietnam", op.cit., pp.18-20.
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of armed violence, the Nam Bo Regional Committee was still 
restricting its use in the south while at the same time 
misleading the Central Committee about the pressures building
c trup there in favour of armed struggle.
Although complete data is lacking it is also evident that 
Le Duan played a key role within the VWP Central Committee. 
During 1954-56 as secretary of the Nam Bo Regional Committee he 
consistently advocated the employment of armed force. His 
proposals were not accepted in their entirety because of the 
pressing nature of problems in the DRVN. It was only with the 
demise of Truong Chinh following the land reform campaign that 
Le Duan was brought into the inner-circle of decision-makers 
where he tipped the balance in favour of greater commitment to 
the revolutionary movement in the south. Not only did Le Duan 
draft the important policy guidelines embodied in "Duong Loi 
Cach Mang Mien Nam" but he also submitted the crucial report to 
the VWP's 15th Plenum.
By the time of the VWP's Third National Congress in
September 1960 the influence of the southern lobby (and the
military) was clear in appointments to the Secretariat and
Central Committee. Le Duan himself was appointed First
5 6Secretary of the Party. Thereafter the VWP further increased 
the tempo of revolutionary activity in the south.
55 Tinh Hinh Nam Bo, pp.32-33, which states, "[mjoreover, until 
the beginning of 1$59, the Party's Regional Committee still 
hesitated to explain its own problems and those of the Party 
organization (Dang bo) to the Central Committee".
"Intelligence summary on Lao Dong Central Committee 
membership of the Central Office for South Vietnam", Working 
Paper, Appendices, Item 208, p.l states: "[djuring the Lao
Dong Party Congress of 1960, almost a dozen southern or
(cont'd)
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Finally, the material presented in this thesis has 
indicated that the disputes within the Central Committee have 
more likely been based on the relative priorities to be 
assigned to the consolidation of the north and the national 
democratic revolution in the south than over pro-Soviet or 
pro-Chinese orientations.
In conclusion, it would appear that the birth of the 
National Front for the Liberation of South Viet-Nam was a far 
more complex process than previous writers have indicated. In 
order to understand why the NFL was created in December 1960 
it is necessary to weigh the influence of four major factors on 
the decision-making process of the Viet-Nam Workers' Party:
(1) the constraints imposed by the international environment,
(2) the process of economic, social and political developments 
in the north, (3) the success of the VWP's underground in the 
south and (4) the policies of the RVN and its American allies.
56 cont.
central Vietnamese were made members of the Central Committee 
of the Lao Dong Party. This group of men was subsequently 
chosen to form the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN)
[a mistranslation of the Vietnamese "trung uong cue mien nam" 
which I have translated as Central Committee Directorate for 
Southern Viet-Nam] as an extension of the Lao Dong Party in 
South Vietnam". See also: "Agents from North Lead Viet Cong",
The Sunday Telegraph [London] (July 29, 1962), p.24 which 
states that a DRVN official in Geneva inadvertently revealed 
the names of four of the individuals (Nguyen Van Cue, Pham Thai 
Buong, Le Toan Thu and Pham Van Dang).
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